{"id":39,"date":"2022-01-31T06:03:01","date_gmt":"2022-01-31T06:03:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/?p=39"},"modified":"2022-01-31T06:03:02","modified_gmt":"2022-01-31T06:03:02","slug":"gonzales-v-carhart","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/2022\/01\/31\/gonzales-v-carhart\/","title":{"rendered":"Gonzales v. Carhart"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The case of&nbsp;<em>Gonzales v. Carhart<\/em>,&nbsp;550 U.S. 124 (2007) is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. It is about the so-called Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, a federal law banning a certain form of abortion called a \u201cpartial-birth abortion.\u201d The medical term for it is \u201cintact dilation and extraction\u201d, which is a type of late termination of pregnancy, where the fetus is removed feet-first and then its head collapsed. The statute, however, uses the term \u201cpartial-birth abortion\u201d to refer to any type of abortion where the fetus is extracted from the mother\u2019s body past the navel and then terminated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Act was protested against by pro-choice groups, due to an absence of exemption in case a pregnant woman\u2019s health is at risk and the procedure is needed to help her. This is one of the reasons why the Act was found unconstitutional by three district courts and three courts of appeals, after which Attorney General Gonzales petitioned the Supreme Court to review the decision. The question presented in&nbsp;<em>Gonzales v. Carhart<\/em>&nbsp;is whether the Act violates the right to personal liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment because it lacks the aforementioned exemption, whether it imposes an undue burden on a woman\u2019s right to abortion, and whether it should be found unconstitutional for those reasons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Case analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Court ruled by a 5-4 vote that the&nbsp;Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act is to be considered constitutional, upholding the law in question and reversing the previous decisions by the courts of appeals. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the dissenting opinion, which took quite a heavy stand on the majority opinion, ruling it as infringing on women\u2019s rights and totally ignoring Supreme Court abortion precedent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The decision in this case is heavily dependent on the precedent set by&nbsp;<em>Planned Parenthood v. Casey<\/em>, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). This is because one of the main challenges to the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act had to do with the main principle established in&nbsp;<em>Casey,<\/em>&nbsp;the undue burden standard. In short, the undue burden standard is a constitutional test used in this context to analyze restrictions on the right to have an abortion. A restriction on abortion rights poses an undue burden when it places a considerable obstacle in the path of the woman seeking an abortion. In&nbsp;<em>Gonzales<\/em>, banning only a certain form of abortion, the \u201cpartial-birth abortion\u201d, was deemed in the majority opinion as something that does not pose an undue burden on the woman. This was justified partly by explaining that the woman still has other options and other types of abortion to turn to.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Another important problem brought forward by the respondents was the absence of an exemption to preserve the health of the mother. The Supreme Court, however, found that there is no consensus in the medical community on whether the procedure is ever necessary to protect the woman\u2019s health. In the past, the Supreme Court has made decisions that allow legislation in areas where there is medical uncertainty, and this is the Court\u2019s reasoning behind the decision to uphold the Act even without this exemption. However, part of the so-called essential holding of&nbsp;<em>Roe v. Wade<\/em>,&nbsp;410 U.S. 113 (1973),&nbsp;is that the State can only restrict abortion rights in later stages of pregnancy when there is also an exception for pregnancies where the mother is in danger. Keeping in mind the doctrine of stare decisis, the failure to provide such an exception in&nbsp;<em>Gonzales<\/em>&nbsp;seems unjust, which is exactly what Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her dissenting opinion, as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Handling of&nbsp;<em>Gonzales v. Carhart&nbsp;<\/em>by the litigants in&nbsp;<em>Dobbs v. Jackson Women&#8217;s Health Organization<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Gonzales<\/em>&nbsp;is one of the cases presented in the Table of Authorities of both the Petitioner and the Respondent in the case of&nbsp;<em>Dobbs v. Jackson Women&#8217;s Health Organization<\/em>, but especially the Petitioner\u2019s side uses the case to their advantage and refers to it multiple times. This is because the Petitioner is trying to defend the strict Mississippi law banning abortion after 15 weeks, the Gestational Age Act, which is what&nbsp;<em>Dobbs<\/em>&nbsp;is all about.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Gonzales<\/em>&nbsp;is the first case to, in a way, go against previous precedent and to go from supporting reproductive rights to this time restricting them. It could provide&nbsp;<em>Dobbs&nbsp;<\/em>an example of a case in which these kinds of restrictions were able to be made. I think this is the direction in which the Petitioner in&nbsp;<em>Dobbs<\/em>&nbsp;is trying to take the case. By using&nbsp;<em>Gonzales<\/em>&nbsp;as an example, they can show that the Court has previously been willing to limit certain aspects of abortion, so perhaps it could be possible that they go a step further and allow even greater restrictions on reproductive rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Conclusions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The case in question is a very interesting one, as it is the first in a long line of decisions after the ground-breaking&nbsp;<em>Roe v. Wade<\/em>&nbsp;to impose restrictions on abortion rights, without an exception protecting the woman\u2019s health. The decision in&nbsp;<em>Gonzales<\/em>&nbsp;is interpreted to be the start of a shift toward a more restrictive approach to abortion rights in the Supreme Court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This shift is essentially made possible not necessarily by a change in public opinion or any justice\u2019s opinion, but rather by a change in the make-up of the Court; Justice Sandra Day O\u2019Connor was succeeded by Justice Samuel Alito just weeks before the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted. Justice Alito is generally thought to be one of the most conservative justices on the Court, while Justice O\u2019Connor is thought to have represented more moderately conservative views, and she cast the swing vote to the more liberal side in many important cases. It will be interesting to see whether&nbsp;<em>Dobbs<\/em>&nbsp;will be able to further this shift with even more radical restrictions on reproductive rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>V.N.B.A<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Introduction The case of&nbsp;Gonzales v. Carhart,&nbsp;550 U.S. 124 (2007) is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. It is about the so-called Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, a federal law banning a certain form of abortion called a \u201cpartial-birth abortion.\u201d The medical term for it is \u201cintact dilation and extraction\u201d, which is a &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/2022\/01\/31\/gonzales-v-carhart\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Gonzales v. Carhart<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":35805,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-39","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-scotus-2022"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/39","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/35805"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=39"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/39\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":40,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/39\/revisions\/40"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=39"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=39"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=39"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}