{"id":41,"date":"2022-01-31T06:05:00","date_gmt":"2022-01-31T06:05:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/?p=41"},"modified":"2022-01-31T06:05:02","modified_gmt":"2022-01-31T06:05:02","slug":"planned-parenthood-of-southeastern-pennsylvania-v-casey","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/2022\/01\/31\/planned-parenthood-of-southeastern-pennsylvania-v-casey\/","title":{"rendered":"Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2018, Mississippi passed a so-called Gestational Age Act, a law, which prohibits abortions after 15 weeks of gestational age unless there\u2019s a medical emergency or severe fetal abnormality. The Courts line for the last fifty years has been that the right to pre-viability abortion must be guaranteed. The issue lies in the word \u201cviability\u201d \u2013 at what age is a fetus viable and can woman\u2019s right to abortion be based on that?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whether the Gestational Age Act is unconstitutional or not has not yet been settled. Case Dobbs v. Jackson Women\u2019s Health Organization <\/em>is pending in the U.S. Supreme Court. The petitioner as well as the respondent hold on to their arguments which consist of several precedents. One of the most important precedents the respondent, Jackson Women\u2019s Health Organization, cites, is Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992).<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Case analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey<\/em>, the Court reaffirmed that a state cannot prohibit pre-viability abortions since the state\u2019s interests aren\u2019t strong enough in the pre-viability state compared to women\u2019s rights. This particular case is seen as a \u201clandmark case\u201d when it comes to abortion regulation. As mentioned before, the issue lies in the word viability; for over fifty years the Court has ruled that it is unconstitutional to ban abortions before viability. The respondent in the pending case, Dobbs v. Jackson Women\u2019s Health Organization<\/em>, puts a great emphasis on this matter. Respondent, Jackson Women\u2019s Health Organization, claims that the state\u2019s interests before viability \u201ccannot override a pregnant person\u2019s interests in their liberty and autonomy over their own body\u201d. Problem seems to be the different interpretations on when the fetus is viable or would be able survive outside the womb \u2013 with or without medical assistance. The Court has taken a stand on this issue also in Casey<\/em>, where it reaffirmed the constitutional importance of viability and described the line between non-viable and viable fetus as follows: \u201cit is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of the state protection that now overrides the rights of the woman\u201d. The way I see it, the meaning and significance of the \u201cviability line\u201d seems to be clear yet it\u2019s unclear where<\/em> to draw the line.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Handling of the Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey<\/em> by the litigants in Dobbs v. Jackson Women\u2019s Health Organization<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This case seems to be significant especially to the respondent. Their main arguments are based on this precedent already in the \u2018questions\u2019 section in the brief of opposition. The petitioner also cites Casey <\/em>through its petition for a writ of certiorari but doesn\u2019t build its argumentation on that. What\u2019s interesting to me is that the respondent, Jackson Women\u2019s Health Organization, sticks to the \u201cviability rule\u201d reaffirmed in Casey <\/em>while the petitioner, Dobbs, is questioning whether the right to abortion can be based on viability at all. According to Dobbs, \u201cviability is not an appropriate standard for assessing the constitutionality of a law regulating abortion\u201d. Petitioner asks if the validity of Gestational Age Act should be considered under Casey<\/em>\u2019s \u201cundue burden\u201d standard or Hellerstedt<\/em>\u2019s balancing of benefits and burdens. As stated by the Court in Casey<\/em>, undue burden exists if a laws purpose or effect is to set significant obstacles for woman trying to get abortion. Question is, does the Gestational Age Act set significant obstacle for getting abortion or not?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The question in the pending case, Dobbs v. Jackson Women\u2019s Health Organizations,<\/em> revolves mainly around viability and its importance. Since the right to pre-viability abortions has been reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,<\/em> which is seen as a landmark case, it\u2019s obvious that its importance is significant. Although the petitioner and the respondent represent different point of views, they both cite Casey<\/em>. Casey<\/em> is in many ways setting a framework for findings in Dobbs v. Jackson Women\u2019s Health Organization. <\/em>It will be interesting to see whether the Court will hold its previous view or change its opinion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

V.N.B.A<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Introduction In 2018, Mississippi passed a so-called Gestational Age Act, a law, which prohibits abortions after 15 weeks of gestational age unless there\u2019s a medical emergency or severe fetal abnormality. The Courts line for the last fifty years has been that the right to pre-viability abortion must be guaranteed. The issue lies in the word … Continue reading Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":35805,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-41","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-scotus-2022"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/41","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/35805"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=41"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/41\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":42,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/41\/revisions\/42"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=41"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=41"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/caselaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=41"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}