I brought up Wilhelm von Humboldt in an earlier essay, in one of the texts I wrote on the aesthetics lectures. I noted that while apparently fairly influential in the 1800s, as well as in the 1900s, he is one of those figures that have eluded me. This may well be just by chance alone that I didn\u2019t encounter his work as an undergrad, yet something tells me that, as I pointed out, that he, alongside a host of other German scholars, got effectively erased from curricula due to certain events in the last decades of the first half of the 1900s. While not stating such as the reason for it, James Underhill (xi) comments in \u2018Humboldt, Worldview and Language\u2019 that his work is largely forgotten in the Anglophone circles, which, I reckon, are by and large just the circles these days as other circles are considered of little importance in academics. Oddly enough, I\u2019m more familiar with the work of his younger brother Alexander. His name kept cropping up during geography lectures, at least on the lectures by the older generation of lecturers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Anyway, as I\u2019m supposed to read to an exam, I decided to have a closer look at the notes provided to us during the lecture. I can\u2019t say who wrote them, mere four pages or so, but I assume that if it wasn\u2019t the lecturer, it\u2019s someone familiar with von Humboldt\u2019s work. My money is on the lecturer, Tuomas Tolonen, considering how I cannot find a single book by von Humboldt at the university library that isn\u2019t in German. In other words, I\u2019d be surprised if someone else has come up with this concise summary of his linguistics works. It could be that someone else typed this for him, considering that he has stated that he doesn\u2019t have a computer, but that doesn\u2019t really change much.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The only work translated into something that I can actually comprehend is an edited volume by Michael Losonsky (translation by Peter Heath) titled \u2018On Language: On the Diversity of Human Language Construction and its Influence on the Mental Development of the Human Species\u2019. In the introduction to this translation of the 1836 original, Losonsky (viii, x) notes that the problem with von Humboldt\u2019s work is that is that it tends to be incomplete, as he was, apparently, known for starting projects that he didn\u2019t finish or just otherwise ended up reworking much of what he had already done, resulting in rather fragmented works that are not exactly the most reader friendly. Now, it\u2019s worth noting that it\u2019s not that there aren\u2019t others who\u2019ve worked on von Humboldt, but rather that his works haven\u2019t really been translated that much, which is a bit of a bummer here, considering that while yours truly can understand some German, it\u2019s hardly enough to tackle this. I always prefer reading the originals, even if translated, rather than commentaries by others, but I can\u2019t always do that. Sometimes it\u2019s possible to dedicate enough time to translate something, but by the looks of this, von Humboldt didn\u2019t exactly write concise articles. For example, his works are included in a collection made up seventeen volumes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
First things first, it\u2019s indicated in the summary that von Humboldt builds on Johann Gottfried von Herder and Johann Georg Hamann. In \u2018German Philosophy of Language: From Schlegel to Hegel and Beyond\u2019 Michael Forster notes that, what is also indicated in the summary, von Humboldt\u2019s early short 1795-1796 essay \u2018On Thinking and Speaking\u2019 was, in particular, influenced by Herder\u2019s \u2018Treatise on the Origin of Language\u2019. The former can be found, for example, as included in Nathan Rotenstreich article \u2018Humboldt’s Prolegomena To Philosophy of Language\u2019. Anyway, in the summary it\u2019s stated that his theory is Romantic language theory and for him the focus is primarily on what language is rather than how they\u2019ve developed. That\u2019s the premise for all this. After that there are a total of twelve parts on some three half pages or so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the first segment, it is stated that being human <\/em>and language <\/em>are inseparable. One cannot make or invent language because one already has language. I think here it\u2019s worth clarifying that, the way I interpret this, it\u2019s not that we cannot invent a<\/em> language, say Klingon, but rather that we cannot invent language itself. There\u2019s a clear distinction here, one that pertains to whether we only have language and a continuum <\/em>of it, now with certain gaps of course, or distinct languages, marked as this or that. What I take from this is not that languages don’t matter, they do, but that’s secondary to language itself. Of course, you cannot altogether ignore languages either, just because they are what they’ve become, or so to speak. I think trajectory is an apt word here, as used by Underhill (73). Anyway, back to the summary, this is indicated as what separates humans <\/em>from animals<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the second segment, it is indicated that human language<\/em> cannot be explained via biology, nor via any other natural science for that matter. Here it\u2019s noted, or conceded, that animals <\/em>may well have very complex systems of communication, whatever that may entail, yet one cannot derive language <\/em>from such. Language is irreducible nature<\/em>, as well as consciousness<\/em>. Instead, it is simultaneously mental<\/em>, as well as material<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the third segment, what is stated in the second segment is emphasized. To be more specific, it is indicated in the summary that language <\/em>overcomes the mind<\/em>\/matter <\/em>or mind<\/em>\/body <\/em>duality. As Losonsky (xi) characterizes it, \u201c[c]entral to Humboldt\u2019s thinking about human language is the idea that there is a mental power (Geisteskraft<\/em>) that is responsible for language[.]\u201d In other words, these are inseparable. Simply put, consciousness <\/em>does not take precedence over language as that would relegate language into a mere instrument of communicating the content of consciousness. It\u2019s also noted that this also works the other way around, meaning that thinking is only possible because we have language. In a way, it\u2019s speaking in silence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the fourth segment, it is indicated that for von Humboldt language <\/em>is not simply something that is<\/em>, but something that is done<\/em>. Simply put, it\u2019s not about being<\/em>, but about doing<\/em>. It does not consist of phonemes <\/em>and graphemes <\/em>(albeit I reckon he doesn\u2019t actually use those words). Instead, language is about the practice <\/em>of it, articulating<\/em>, speaking<\/em>, using <\/em>the relevant parts of one\u2019s body <\/em>to accomplish such. Relevant here, Forster (88) notes that for von Humboldt verbs are fundamental parts of language. It is emphasized in this segment of the summary that for von Humboldt the difference is between what is produced, ergon<\/em>, and producing, energeia<\/em>. Therefore, as one might expect, energeia <\/em>takes precedence over ergon<\/em>. Losonsky (xi) points this out as well, stating that \u201c[w]hat science understands is the finished product \u2013 the completed work \u2013 but language, in Humboldt\u2019s famous words, is \u2018no product (ergon<\/em>), but an activity (energeia<\/em>)\u2019\u201d. This reminds me of the pragmatics <\/em>of Gilles Deleuze and F\u00e9lix Guattari, as presented in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia\u2019, because for them, similarly to von Humboldt, it seems, language cannot be understood as complete, as a fixed system<\/em>. To be clear here, Losonsky (xi) adds that for von Humboldt this activity, energeia<\/em>, is not something voluntary<\/em>, as in something one would put into use intentionally <\/em>for some specific task. That sort of makes sense here, considering that it is established in the third segment that language is not preceded by conscious thinking<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the fifth segment, it is stated that, I assume I no longer need to state whose view on this this is, language <\/em>is about articulation<\/em>. To be more specific, it\u2019s about the ability to produce <\/em>certain combinations of sounds consistently<\/em>. In this sense, it is stated, language is about singing<\/em>. This may seem rather curious, but at least in \u2018On Language: On the Diversity of Human Language Construction and its Influence on the Mental Development of the Human Species\u2019 Humboldt (60) does actually state such, noting that \u201c[f]or [hu]man, as a species, is a singing creature, though the notes, in his case, are also coupled with thought.\u201d Anyway, the point here is that in order for us to understand<\/em>, or even begin to understand, one another, the sounds produced <\/em>must remain consistent. The way I read the summary, it says constant<\/em>, but while I may err here, in translation, I\u2019d rather use the word consistent<\/em>. That\u2019s, of course, on me, but that\u2019s because I\u2019m not fond of constants to begin with. It\u2019s just a bit too fixed a notion for me. Consistency <\/em>is, in my opinion, more apt here because it does not assume something always stays the same<\/em>, yet once situated it functions as if it were, regardless of whether it is or isn\u2019t. A day later, reading Underhill (76), it is stated that the word <\/em>is indeed constant, yet it is not to be understood as fixed <\/em>or static<\/em>. To be more specific here, Underhill (76) clarifies that it only remains fixed inasmuch as language is used <\/em>the same way over and over again. Underhill (76) refers to this as language having patterns<\/em>. I’d still prefer consistency over constant though. Anyway, in the final bit here, it is stated in the summary that this makes phonetics <\/em>central in linguistics <\/em>as it pertains to the structure <\/em>of articulation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the sixth segment, something very crucial is expressed. Language <\/em>is not only an activity<\/em>, something that one does<\/em>, but a social activity<\/em>, something that one does in the company of others. Moreover, to be specific, this is necessitated. Just think of it. How does one come to use language, to speak<\/em>, to write<\/em>? Oh, yes, not by yourself, that\u2019s for sure, well, unless I\u2019m missing something crucial. To put it very simply, language is first and foremost a conversation<\/em>, a dialogue<\/em>. There\u2019s quite a bit of extra here, how one comes to realize who speaks<\/em>, me or the other person, but the gist is, as emphasized in the final bit here, for von Humboldt there is no me <\/em>without you <\/em>and the other way around. I can\u2019t help but to think of, for example, Louis Althusser, Deleuze and Guattari, as well as Valentin Volo\u0161inov here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the seventh segment, it is stated that a conversation <\/em>or conversing <\/em>is futile unless words mean <\/em>something. In other words, it just doesn\u2019t work if there isn\u2019t language<\/em>. In a way that\u2019s sort of obvious, really. This is what the second bit in this segment addresses, otherwise this would be just stating something hilariously obvious, yet that\u2019d still be a bold claim with little support for it. It\u2019d be like saying that we understand <\/em>one another because all words <\/em>have an inherent meaning<\/em>. Anyway, so, it\u2019s added that by themselves words <\/em>don\u2019t mean a thing<\/em>. What is needed is someone who means <\/em>something by using <\/em>them and someone who <\/em>must understand what the other person means by whatever the word happens to be. The point here is that, as emphasized in the summary, words cannot be understood merely semantically<\/em>. In other words, language doesn\u2019t exist separate from people. To borrow a word that I encounter used by Deleuze and Guattari, language as a system <\/em>and as speech <\/em>are in reciprocal presupposition. In simple terms, you work your way within that system as you were born and taught into it, yet that system requires people, you included, to have that system. This also means, at least the way I understand it, that the system is in a flux<\/em>, so it\u2019s never exactly stable<\/em>, no matter how much we wish to codify <\/em>and fix <\/em>it. So, as it is stated in the summary, on one hand speaking is about upholding as well as changing language as an institution <\/em>and on the other hand language as an institution permits speaking. You can\u2019t have one without the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the eight segment, it\u2019s indicated that that language <\/em>is a worldview<\/em>. It organizes <\/em>both sensing <\/em>and thinking<\/em>. Underhill (18) notes that this is what von Humboldt refers to as the Weltansicht<\/em>, operating at very fundamental level that pertains to sensory contact with the world<\/em>, a point made in another segment, not to be confused with Weltanschauung<\/em> which is rather one\u2019s interpretation <\/em>of the world <\/em>as influenced by various other factors. Simply put, therefore, as summarized by Underhill (55), the latter has to do with not a view of the world<\/em>, but rather a vision of the world<\/em>, \u201cin the sense of the conceptions or ideologies.\u201d He (55) offers a number of examples, such as the communist and capitalist visions or worldviews, as well as Catholic and Protestant visions or worldviews, which may well exist in the same community, despite opposing one another, thus not being bound to language itself. Moreover, as Underhill (55-56) clarifies it, the former is about the nature of language itself, how it has to do with \u201cthe capacity which language bestows upon us to form the concepts with which we think and which we need in order to communicate.\u201d Therefore, as Underhill (55-56) makes it clear, this is what\u2019s language-bound<\/em>. Underhill (57) also defines it \u201cas the capacity to coin concepts\u201d, which makes me think of Deleuze and Guattari in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019. Anyway, back to the summary provided during the lectures. This also ties to an earlier point made about dualism. There\u2019s no thinking outside language and therefore one doesn\u2019t merely use language to articulate thought. Instead, to put it in other words, thinking is, as already expressed, speaking in silence, as absurd as that may seem to you. What\u2019s important here, to bring in something new, which I reckon is the point of each segment, is that as a result, there\u2019s no separation of theory of consciousness, thinking and sensing (epistemology), theory of language, theory of reality (ontology). Both epistemology and ontology are possible only when combined with language. Consequently, tying this to an earlier point, only humans <\/em>have a world<\/em>, whereas animals <\/em>have an environment<\/em>. This reminds me a lot of Deleuze and Guattari (62, 172) in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019, stating that humans have worlds, followed by landscapes<\/em>, whereas animals only have their milieus<\/em>; welt<\/em> vs. umwelt<\/em>. In the very final bit it is added that world <\/em>is the correlate of the language system<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the ninth segment, it is expressed that language <\/em>cannot be thought to be instrumental<\/em>. This goes back to earlier bits on how language is not separate from thinking. Again, it\u2019s expressed that language is not just something used <\/em>to express thought as thought itself is nested in language. In other words, language is rather a state<\/em>, a world<\/em>, that is a condition for understanding<\/em> oneself, that is to say consciousness<\/em>, thinking, sensing and encountering others, as well as, anything really. It\u2019s further clarified that this does not mean that language is not a medium<\/em>. In fact, it is. What it is not is a mere instrument, something you select for certain tasks, as noted earlier on already. In the final bit it\u2019s expressed that humans live in culture <\/em>that is actually a sign system<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the tenth segment, the focus turn on to what language <\/em>is in its original form very close to sensing<\/em>. It\u2019s emphasized that originally meaning <\/em>pertains little to abstract concepts<\/em>, as opposed to the sensible<\/em>. In this sense, metaphor<\/em>, myth <\/em>and poetry <\/em>are closer to such than science <\/em>which relies on abstract concepts<\/em>. I\u2019m not exactly sure if the words sensing <\/em>and sensible <\/em>are apt here, but at least in the translation by Heath, it is used at times. For example, von Humboldt (148-149) states that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cLanguage is formed by speaking, and speaking is the expression of thought or feeling. The mode of thinking or sensing in a people, by which \u2013 as I was just saying \u2013 its language acquires colour and character, is already at work upon it from the very outset.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In this passage it\u2019s indicated that speaking <\/em>is indeed an expression of thought<\/em> or feeling<\/em>. However, at the same time, it cannot be understood as a mere instrument<\/em>, means to an end to express something. Language <\/em>gains \u201ccolour and character\u201d through thinking and sensing. Now, to be clear here, one should now also add that as language is a social activity<\/em> rather than a static entity<\/em>, that is to say you only acquire language through others, as expressed already, one thus never really thinks or senses by themselves. It\u2019s worth noting that also the word feeling <\/em>is used, but I think sensing <\/em>is more apt here. Feeling either comes across as too touchy feely, that is to say emotional, or too limited to touching. Anyway, back to the summary provided during the lectures, it\u2019s stated that conceptual language<\/em>, say that of the science<\/em>, is based on sensible language<\/em>, which then entails that reason <\/em>itself is based on myth<\/em>. That in turn entails that what is fundamental in organizing <\/em>the world <\/em>is language as tied to sensing. In practice this is done via stories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the eleventh segment, a further point is made about mythical language<\/em>, it being what organizes <\/em>the world<\/em>. Here it is added that this is because language is repeated in central social rites<\/em>. This is indicated as having to do with the deep meaning <\/em>of words. It\u2019s also indicated in passing that if and when the mythical language has been watered down, poets must come up with new mythology through art. The likes of Friedrich H\u00f6lderlin, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling get mentioned. Steven Cassedy (36) comments on this in \u2018Flight from Eden: The Origins of Modern Literary Criticism and Theory\u2019, stating that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cHarmony of inner and outer form is lost when a language stagnates. At that moment metaphors that had previously had a \u2018youthful sense\u2019 become, through daily use, \u2018worn out\u2019 so that they are \u2018barely perceived anymore.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n I think it\u2019s worth noting here that when one uses the word myth<\/em>, it easily comes across as someone trying to uncover <\/em>some true foundation<\/em> or origin<\/em>. This may well seem contradictory here, considering that for von Humboldt language <\/em>is never finished. Cassedy (36) comments this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cHumboldt has taken the romantic myth of origin, by which language is a creature fallen from the grace it had \u2018in the beginning,\u2019 and replaced it with a myth of origin where that origin is always now<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, as Cassedy (36) comments, for von Humboldt language <\/em>mustn\u2019t stagnate. It must keep up with the times, or so to speak. It must remain relevant not to itself but to what\u2019s out there, \u201cto mediate between objective reality and subjective inwardness[.]\u201d So, simply put, it\u2019s worth emphasizing that the way this ought to be understood is not what we typically think of as myth <\/em>or mythical<\/em>, even though that can be a bit confusing. Therefore, in Cassedy\u2019s (37) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[For Humboldt] language does not spring into existence ready-made to serve poets as a vehicle for the expression of their feelings; on the contrary, we ceaselessly create language for the purpose of meaningfully organizing our own experience.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Why is this? Well, if you\u2019ve read Immanuel Kant, this will come as a no surprise, as explained by Cassedy (37):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cHumboldt was a good Kantian, believing that conscious beings can never \u2018know\u2019 things in and for themselves, to him, language, like any activity that generates meaning, cannot deal directly with objects.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, right, the key thing here, following Kant, is that we cannot really know how a thing-in-itself<\/em> is. Instead we can only understand how things come to appear <\/em>to us, as a matter of apparition<\/em>, which is not the same thing as the thing-in-itself. Therefore, as explained by Cassedy (37), it only makes sense that language <\/em>cannot actually \u201cdeal directly with objects.\u201d In other words, we are relegated to speaking of how things appear <\/em>to us, not as how they are<\/em>. What’s interesting about this then is that we constantly need language for this very purpose, coming up with something that pertains to our sensory experiences in order to organize <\/em>the world <\/em>around us. Just imagine if language was actually stuck as a certain fixed entity<\/em>, meaning that, say, you’d have to explain all this stuff in my room, this computer in particular, based on a template <\/em>of a language decades ago, centuries ago, millennia ago. I’m now getting sidetracked here, but this is something that bothers me in, say Plato. To me, it just doesn’t make any sense that there’d be an idea <\/em>of computer, or to put it in other words, more relevantly here, a ready-made expression<\/em> for it. We have to make words<\/em> up in order to keep up with the times, to make sense <\/em>of it all, otherwise most of these things <\/em>in my room wouldn’t even make any sense. Oddly enough, this added a day later, Underhill (70-71) actually makes note of this, stating that \u201c[i]t’s easy to imagine a language which would find our distinction between a cello and a violin difficult to grasp\u201d and adding that indeed many people do confuse them, even in English. That might be a bit nipitcky, so he (71) discusses how a table is something very basic and clearly defined, to the extent that we take it as existing \u201cindependent of our understanding\u201d, yet there’s nothing to it, nothing essential <\/em>in itself about a table for it to be table outside language. So, in summary, Underhill (71) states that \u201cthe signification that table<\/em> has for us is nonetheless constructed by the mind of man and applied to all tables by him to aid him to communicate.\u201d If you struggle with this, well, think of how animals, say, cats or dogs, behave around furniture. It’s worth emphasizing here that, as stressed by Underhill (72-73), this does not mean that we are stuck in language to the extent that all there is is language. In other words, as clarified by Underhill (72):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe [real external world] exists independent of ourselves, the [conception of that world] is the formulation which our understanding through language has negotiated with the world.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, as made clear by Underhill (73):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cHumboldt does not argue that the world only exists because we can speak about it. If we surround ourselves in a conceptual world of objects it is, he argues, because we seek to act in the world by acting upon the world of things as we have learned to understand them.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In other words, as expressed by Underhill (73), this does not result in \u201ca denial of reality or truth in the world around us: it simply affirms that our attempts to understand that world are language-bound.\u201d Returning to an earlier bit on language <\/em>and languages<\/em>, as noted by Underhill (73), how things <\/em>have panned out, of course, affects how we view <\/em>the world<\/em>. So, it’s sort of obvious, really, that my worldview<\/em>, based largely on Finnish, as well as English, as situated in Finland, as of 2018, is different from someone else who conceptualizes <\/em>the world <\/em>in another language or languages, somewhere else, possibly at another point in time. We could say the same just of me, in contrast to someone else also living in Finland, but, say, a hundred years ago. I reckon that could also be said of just me, now vs. then, say, ten or twenty years ago. I think it’s worth conceding that this is, of course, in part a question of vision of the world<\/em>, Weltanschauung<\/em>. For example, my vision of the world has also changed, due to this and\/or that reasons not in itself nested in language. That said, I think it can be said that it’s also about the Weltansicht<\/em>, how language itself, in my case, for example, Finnish has changed during my lifetime, as well as before it, affecting our view of the world<\/em>. This, despite all the efforts in school to iron out all kinds of wrinkles introduced by me and others in interaction with one another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The twelfth, and last, segment is on how nation<\/em>, i.e., human society<\/em>, is defined by a common language<\/em>, mythology<\/em>, worldview<\/em>, religion <\/em>and morality<\/em>. This is indicated as the common <\/em>or shared<\/em>, which is the basis for the nation. I didn’t have much to add here, except the skepticism of my own translation, but, a day later, I ran into Underhill (74) commenting on this, noting that nation is not to be understood as having to do with nationalism<\/em>, but rather as what I’d call a collective<\/em>, as made up of me and others in interaction with one another. This ties into the earlier bit on how language is social<\/em>, how you can’t have me <\/em>without you<\/em>. Underhill (74) defines it as \u201cquite simply as a body of people marked off by common descent, language, culture or historical tradition<\/em>.\u201d So, as I put it already, it’s the people who come to interact in another frequently enough to the extent that influence one another. To be very clear here, Underhill (75) states that von Humboldt was, in fact, opposed to seeking what is the origin <\/em>of language or society, because language and society are always in the making and what once was, way before our time, is, as I’d put it, not the past <\/em>but our reconstruction of the past<\/em>, \u201ca sort of rear-view mirror for time\u201d, as Philomena Cunk puts it in a mockumentary series titled ‘Cunk on Britain’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I\u2019m going to end here. I could add this and that, here and there, from this and\/or that book, but this essay is meant more as a glimpse into something long forgotten, rather than as an attempt to elaborate it in great detail. Anyway, as I may have mentioned already, I believe in an earlier essay on the lectures, I was surprised by what I was reading at the time, how similar it seemed to what I had read, for example, in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019. Of course, they are not one and the same, I mean hardly, but there\u2019s certain areas of overlap that made me want to investigate more and write this essay. Perhaps in the future I have time to read more on this, albeit it\u2019s a bit out of, not only my comfort zone, but also outside the confines of my own research. The book by Underhill seems to be rather good reading. At least I was able to make sense of it quite okay. I found the selected points of contrast, Franz Boas, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, very useful and I reckon they might make it easier to understand von Humboldt\u2019s theory of language<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
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