{"id":1092,"date":"2018-06-10T15:47:57","date_gmt":"2018-06-10T15:47:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/?p=1092"},"modified":"2024-06-16T19:45:02","modified_gmt":"2024-06-16T19:45:02","slug":"nonhuman-landscapes-of-nature","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/2018\/06\/10\/nonhuman-landscapes-of-nature\/","title":{"rendered":"Nonhuman landscapes of nature"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

I\u2019ve written quite a bit on landscape <\/em>and, well, I won\u2019t let you down this time either. I\u2019ve particularly focused on how Gilles Deleuze and F\u00e9lix Guattari present it in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia\u2019. I\u2019m not going to focus on that in detail here, again, for the umpteenth time. I’ll do my best to bring it up only where relevant. For those who are interested, as a suggestion, if you want a, how to put it, sober account on how they define it in that book, I recommend looking up \u2018Faces\u2019 by Ronald Bogue, chapter four of his book titled \u2018Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anyway, as I pointed out, I\u2019ll be doing something different this time, yet still pertaining to landscapes<\/em>, as discussed by Bogue in \u2018The Landscape of Sensation\u2019, as nested in a book titled \u2018Gilles Deleuze: Image and Text\u2019. I\u2019m doing this because I keep telling people that landscape<\/em>, as discussed in much of the literature on landscapes, and emphasized in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019, is not exactly something you should be keen on. However, there\u2019s also something a bit lazy in arguing that this is how the world works, it\u2019s so bad for you, or so to speak, to put it in very simple terms, but not attempting to go beyond it. The point here is to address how one would go beyond it as there\u2019s no going back to time before landscape<\/em>, as defined, for example, in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019. There\u2019s only going forward, coming up with something else instead, deterritorializing <\/em>and reterritorializing<\/em>, decoding <\/em>and coding<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bogue (9) is nice enough, having read Deleuze and Guattari quite extensively, to list the works in which landscape <\/em>appears: \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019, \u2018Cinema 1: The Movement-Image\u2019, \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019 and \u2018Essays on Critical and Clinical\u2019. He (9) notes that for the two it\u2019s perhaps a bit too much to call landscape a concept, at least in the way that they define concept <\/em>very strictly (but let\u2019s not get tangled up in that). Instead, he (9) states that it\u2019s rather a recurring element, a conceptual motif that has to do with the tension between \u201cspeaking and seeing, between texts and images\u201d, that is to say statements <\/em>and visibilities<\/em>, hence the discussion of it as being the correlate of the abstract machine<\/em> of faciality <\/em>in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019. I\u2019m not sure if I should call it it\u2019s own abstract machine<\/em>, or merely what\u2019s linked to the one on faciliaty. Perhaps I should call it the abstract machine<\/em> of faciality-landscapity<\/em>, or, the face-landscape<\/em> complex<\/em>, as Bogue (9) calls it. The point here being that while we can think landscape as the facialization of the world<\/em>, i.e. the extension of faciality from the human body to the whole world, they nevertheless now work together, like a dynamic duo, if you will.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a side note, which I may have pointed out in some essay, way back, if you don\u2019t think the pair, face <\/em>and landscape<\/em>, is pervasive, cropping up everywhere, in the places you\u2019d least expect them, just check your word processor page orientation. Oh, yes, yes, yes, your choice is between the portrait and the landscape! Not even blank white pages will leave you alone! Print a page, black and white (it\u2019ll be black and white because it\u2019ll most likely be just text) and there you go! It\u2019s now literally a white wall<\/em> with some black holes<\/em> in it. Take it in your hand and rotate that wrist: portrait, landscape, portrait, landscape. The white wall, accompanied by the <\/em>black holes, just won\u2019t leave you be.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bogue goes on to summarize how Deleuze and Guattari defined landscape <\/em>in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019, but as I pointed out already, I’ll do my best to avoid elaborating that in detail. I reckon you can do that yourself, just check pages 9 to 12 or so, give or take. To put it in words that I find very useful and concise, Bogue (11-12) states that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[Face and landscape] constitute a general schema of visibility, a kind of vectorial gridding of the visual as a component co-functioning with language in the maintenance of a field of forces. In this regard, the facialized world resembles the domain of \u2018visibilities\u2019 that Deleuze sees as a central feature of Foucault\u2019s work. Foucault\u2019s \u2018visibilities\u2019 take form within what Deleuze calls a \u2018regime of light\u2019, a structure of scintillations, shadows, glares and reflections, a given regime of light serving as the condition of possibility that determines what can be seen and what cannot.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Now, if you think of it, at least if you have read \u2026 quite a bit of literature on landscapes, you might recall that, for example, Denis Cosgrove defines landscape <\/em>as a way of seeing<\/em>. I think he is very correct, yet, at the same time, what Deleuze and Guattari are on about goes a bit further on this. For them, as explained by Bogue (11-12), what defines the way of seeing is beyond the individual. The individual<\/em>, or the subject<\/em>, is, after all, not the starting point, but a certain secondary construct, as mind warping as it may seem. So, therefore, it\u2019s very hard not to see a landscape, because, well, it\u2019s how we, inevitably, come to see the world. It\u2019s what comes with the territory these days. There\u2019s no opt out, as you never really actually opted in to begin with. It\u2019s not that you were born with it, as just looking up the dictionary definition will come to tell you, but that you ended up co-opting in it. Anyway, Bogue (12) offers further clarification on this, including the bit on it not being inherent or universal:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cEach historically specific regime of light is in a dynamic relationship with a discursive formation, but visibilities are not reducible to statements. Rather, visibilities and statements intervene in one another, interconnect while remaining heterogeneous and incommensurable.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, we can say that landscape <\/em>is an invention<\/em>, one that can be traced to the (re)introduction of the linear perspective, as explained by Cosgrove in, for example, his article \u2018Prospect, Perspective and the Evolution of the Landscape Idea\u2019. The point here is not to get tangled up with the development of it, how it came to be used for this and\/or that, but that it\u2019s not inherent to the world itself, beyond being as real as anything else that we\u2019ve come up with. In other words, landscape has to do with a certain regime of ligh<\/em>t, or non-discursive formation<\/em>, with certain historical origins, tied to a certain regime of signs<\/em>, or discursive formation<\/em>, yet it\u2019s not reducible to either. It needs both. Bogue (12) explains:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe face-landscape complex of faciality may then be seen as a specific regime of light, one coordinated with the mixed linguistic semiotic of the despotic and passional regimes of signs.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

For me, what I believe I initially struggled with is coming to terms with this. Landscape <\/em>is not one or the other, but rather both, yet, not exactly either. Bogue is particularly right that landscape, as we come to see the world, is not how the world is, but rather how we\u2019ve come to see it, hence the earlier point about visibilities<\/em>, as influenced by statements<\/em>. If it was simply out there, it would quite literally be the world itself, which it isn\u2019t. Conversely, if it was only something that we came up with once upon a time, not bearing any relevance to the world, beyond being some words on paper (that\u2019s in world, still very real), it would be rather easy to dismiss it. In this sense then, landscape, or, to be more accurate here, face-landscape<\/em>, is a diagram <\/em>or an abstract machine<\/em> that assembles <\/em>the world into landscape. So, it isn\u2019t the world, but it\u2019s how the world appears to us. I don\u2019t know about others but it has taken me quite a bit of reading into this to wrap my head around that. I reckon I can say with confidence that I\u2019m able to stop the machine <\/em>from assembling <\/em>the world in that way, but then again that\u2019s only limited to me <\/em>and perhaps a handful of other people, as well as anyone blissfully untouched by such (that\u2019s not a lot of people, but I guess some people untouched by modernity aren\u2019t affected). However, this hardly changes anything as the issue is, quite literally, beyond me<\/em>. How to simplify this? Well, if I try explaining this to people, I either get the response that whatever they see is what they get, that is to say the objective <\/em>reality, or that whatever I\u2019m on about is just some subjective <\/em>matter, hardly relevant beyond personal enjoyment of scenery. What\u2019s common with the two is that it\u2019s something that can be happily ignored.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I have explained this in a previous essay, but a bit of repetition won\u2019t hurt us here. Going back to faces <\/em>and faciality <\/em>for a moment, in case you struggle with how that\u2019s relevant, Bogue (10) explains it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe face functions in tandem with the mixed semiotic of the despotic and passional regimes to enforce networks of signification and subjectivation, and since the goal of that mixed semiotic is to subsume everything within its order, faciality extends from the face per se to other body parts[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Take note here, that\u2019s just the face<\/em>, going from the head <\/em>to all over the body<\/em>. Deleuze and Guattari (170) are very clear on this in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cBut the operation does not end there: if the head and its elements are facialized, the entire body also can be facialized, comes to be facialized as part of an inevitable process.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Now, if you aren\u2019t familiar with their work, you might wonder how other body parts, such as the mouth, the nose, the eyes (all parts of what we consider the face<\/em>, mind you), hands, breasts and stomach, to name some listed by the two (170), are facialized<\/em>, it\u2019s because facialization <\/em>doesn\u2019t operate by \u201cresemblance but by an order of reasons.\u201d To be very clear on this, they (170) state that \u201c[i]t is not at all a question of taking a part of the body and making it resemble a face[.]\u201d Oh, as you might have gathered already, facialization won\u2019t stop there, considering that I already indicated that it, sort of, takes over the world. Bogue (10) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[F]aciality extends \u2026 to neighbouring objects and to the surrounding milieu.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Bogue (10) notes that this has to do with fetishization<\/em>, as clearly indicate by the two (170). Once the body <\/em>is done, facialized<\/em>, the next stop is all kinds of objects<\/em>, such as knives, cups, clocks and kettles, as listed by the two (175), stopping nowhere, extending to the whole world (172). That\u2019s landscape <\/em>for you, if it wasn\u2019t clear already. I\u2019ve dedicated quite a bit of time explaining this in my essays, so I won\u2019t do more of that here. Instead, as pointed in the opening paragraph, I want to explore something else, how one would go beyond this. After all, that should be the goal, right?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bogue (15) notes that in \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019 \u201clandscape is associated with the \u2018percept\u2019, which, along with the \u2018affect\u2019, is one of the constituents of \u2018sensation\u2019, sensation itself delineating the domain proper to the arts.\u201d Oh boy, that\u2019s a lot to take in at one go. Deleuze and Guattari (24) state in \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019 that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[P]hilosophy extracts concepts<\/em> (which must not be confused with general or abstract ideas), whereas science extracts prospects<\/em> (propositions that must not be confused with judgments), and art extracts percepts<\/em> and affects<\/em> (which must not be confused with perceptions or feelings).\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Now this doesn\u2019t help us much, considering that this is on a very broad level. That said, at least this tells us what percept isn\u2019t to be confused with; concepts <\/em>(philosophy), prospects <\/em>(science) and affects <\/em>(arts). There\u2019s that. Later on in the book they (65) note that \u201cthe powers of affects and percepts\u201d are tied to \u201caesthetic figures\u201d and they \u201ctake effect on a plane of composition as image of a Universe (phenomenon).\u201d They (65) specify that these aesthetic figures<\/em> include \u201cfigures of thought and the novel\u201d, that is to say people who write, as well as \u201cof painting, sculpture, and music\u201d which go beyond the everyday. They (65-66) go on to note that this does not mean that aesthetic figures are not to be found in philosophy which typically deals with what they call \u201cconceptual personae\u201d and vice versa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Later on Deleuze and Guattari dedicate a chapter to \u2018Percept, Affect, and Concept\u2019. They (163) begin the chapter by addressing paintings:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe young man will smile on the canvas for as long as the canvas lasts.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Followed by addressing the same in writing and film (163):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cIn a novel or a film, the young man will stop smiling, but he will start to smile again when we turn to this page or that moment.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Regardless of the medium, the point here is that (163):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cArt preserves, and it is the only thing in the world that is preserved.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Now, of course, they (163) note that while \u201c[i]t preserves and is preserved in itself \u2026 [it] actually \u2026 lasts no longer than its support and materials \u2013 stone, canvas, chemical color, and so on[.]\u201d Once its gone, its gone and everything fades away eventually. That said, they (163) note that, for example, statues stay the same, retain their pose even for thousands of years, regardless of who made it gesture or pose the way it does. Simply put, art outlives the artist, yet it still functions in the absence of the artist. Moreover, they (163-164) add that art not only becomes independent of the artist, the creator, but also of the person who senses it, for example the spectator if we are referring to visual art. Also, assuming that it\u2019s supposed to be based on something or someone, to model them, they (163) note that art also becomes independent of what it is supposed to model. What is important here is what remains, as already pointed out. They (164) call this, what remains, a piece of art:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cWhat is preserved \u2026 is a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

To make more sense of this, they (164) elaborate percepts:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cPercepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, as already pointed out in general when it comes to art, percepts <\/em>are independent of the perceiver<\/em>, the creator, the artist, and also outlive the artist. At the same time, percepts remain and it matters not who come to see them later on. They (164) emphasize this to the extent that they argue that \u201c[t]hey could be said to exist in the absence of man because man \u2026 is himself a compound of percepts and affects.\u201d To be more specific, they (166) clarify that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cAs percepts, sensations are not perceptions referring to an object (reference): if they resemble something it is with a resemblance produced with their own methods; and the smile on the canvas is made solely with colors, lines, shadow, and light.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The problem here is that to understand how percepts <\/em>compound with affects <\/em>as sensations<\/em>, we need to understand how they are not perceptions<\/em>. Bogue (15) clarifies that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cDeleuze and Guattari derive their sense of the landscape from Henri Maldiney, whose account of the operation of form and rhythm in visual art is based on a phenomenological reading of C\u00e9zanne\u2019s comments on painting.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Maldiney gets mentioned by the two (149) when state in an example that \u201c[p]henomenology needs art as logic needs science; Erwin Straus, Merleau-Ponty, or Maldiney need C\u00e9zanne or Chinese painting.\u201d Bogue (15) specifies that to draw insights from C\u00e9zanne, Maldiney takes cues from Erwin Straus:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[W]ho in The Primary World of the Senses<\/em> \u2026 argues that we must differentiate the world of perception, in which subject and object are clearly distinguished and situated within commonsense spatiotemporal coordinates, from the world of sensation, primary, preverbal world we share with animals, in which subject and objects indistinguishable and space-time moves with us in a perpetual Here-Now.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Maldiney\u2019s book \u2018Regard Parole Espace\u2019 has, apparently, never been translated, so, as a word of warning, you\u2019ll just have to do with my translations where applicable. Anyway, indeed, Maldiney (141) does state this with regard space <\/em>(l\u2019espace):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cRien ne d\u00e9passe en importance dans l\u2019histoire, faite ou \u00e0 faire, de l\u2019esth\u00e9tique les analyses par lesquelles Erwin Straus a mis en \u00e9vidence l\u2019articulation de la musique et de la danse et la constitution de l\u2019espace du paysage.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Here Maldiney emphasizes the importance of Erwin Straus to his treatment of landscape. On the same page (141) Maldiney brings up how Straus differentiates between geography <\/em>(g\u00e9ographie) and landscape <\/em>(paysage). To give you a proper translation, Bogue (15) explains that, in terms used by Straus, \u201cthe space of perception is a space of geography<\/em>, whereas [the space of] sensation[] is that of the landscape<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Maldiney (142) explains how in the classical pictorial style the use of line is limited and measured. Deleuze and Guattari (172) indicate\u00a0in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019 how this works: \u201cCompose them \u2026 color them in, complete them[.]\u201d They (173) call it \u201cthe great composition of the white canvas and black slash\u201d with its \u201caxis of escape\u201d and its \u201cvanishing point\u201d. They (173) use Titian as an example, stating that he \u201cbegan his paintings in black and white, not to make outlines to fill in, but as the matrix for each of the colors to come.\u201d The point here is that when it comes to landscapes, there is a way of doing it, starting with the lines and filling in the rest, adding color, in accordance to the black lines on the white canvas. It\u2019s essentially a template of how to do landscapes. Start with the grid and the rest will follow. Maldiney (142) rejects this, citing Robert Delaunay in \u2018Du cubisme \u00e0 l’art abstrait\u2019 (sorry, I couldn\u2019t find a copy of this), stating that \u201c\u2018the color gives depth \u2013 not perspective, not succession, but simultaneity.\u2019\u201d Aligning himself with Straus, he (142) states that color and form are inseparable, even if their use varies by style.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Assuming I get this right, when it comes to landscapes, Maldiney (143) argues that landscape <\/em>is a full or replete space <\/em>as it lacks nothing. He (143) explains this in Strausian terms, stating that in landscape one is surrounded or enveloped by space. He (143) clarifies that there are no points of reference, no coordinates, no geographical area<\/em>. He cites (144) Straus approvingly:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cLa peinture de paysage ne repr\u00e9sente pas ce que nous voyons, elle rend visible l’invisible.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Now, to be accurate, that\u2019s a translation of what Straus (279) expresses in German in \u2018Vom Sinn der Sinne: Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Psychologie\u2019, what Bogue refers to as \u2018The Primary World of the Senses\u2019. In the original Straus (279) states:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cDie Landschaftsmalarei stellt nich das dar, was wir sehen, n\u00e4mlich bei der Betrachtung einer Gegend bemerken, sondern \u2013 das Paradox ist nich zu vermeiden \u2013 sie macht das Unsichtbare sichtbar, aber als ein Entr\u00fccktes.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

More concisely, he (279) summarizes:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cDie Vision ist ein Sichtbar-Werden des Unsichtbaren.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This reminds me a lot of what Paul Klee (28) states in his part of \u2018Sch\u00f6pferische Konfession\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cKunst gibt nicht das Sichtbare wieder, sondern macht sichtbar.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

If your German isn\u2019t up to the task, both Klee and Straus are saying that it\u2019s not about rendering the visible<\/em> but rendering visible<\/em>. In other words, it\u2019s not about re-presenting<\/em> something, but presenting <\/em>something, something you don\u2019t see, as of yet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Deleuze states something similar in his book on Kant, in the 1983 published \u2018Kant\u2019s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties\u2019, where he explores the work of Immanuel Kant and the notion of representation<\/em>. He (8) states that for starters one must make a distinction \u201cbetween the representation<\/em> and what is represented<\/em>.\u201d This is fairly basic. In Kant\u2019s terms, we could speak of phenomena<\/em> and noumena<\/em> or, in singular, phenomenon<\/em> and noumenon<\/em>. You can find this in Kant\u2019s \u2018Critique of Pure Reason\u2019, where he (A249-A250) makes the distinction between how things appear <\/em>to us and how things are in themselves<\/em>. Deleuze (8) emphasizes that the thing with Kant is that phenomenon does not mean appearance <\/em>but appearing<\/em>. I find this explained better in a transcript of his first lecture on Kant titled \u2018Synthesis and Time\u2019, dated March 14, 1978. Deleuze states that while Kant’s split between phenomena and noumena is not unique, as such, what Kant makes of it is. Deleuze clarifies this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cPreviously philosophers spoke of phenomenon to distinguish what? Very broadly we can say that phenomenon was something like appearance. An appearance. The sensible, the a posteriori, what was given in experience had the status of phenomenon or appearance, and the sensible appearance was opposed to the intelligible essence.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In short, we have, on one hand, sensible appearance <\/em>and, on the other hand, intelligible essence<\/em>. He further clarifies how it was generally understood before Kant:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe intelligible essence was also the thing such as it is in itself, it was the thing in itself, the thing itself or the thing as thought; the thing as thought, as phenomenon, is a Greek word which precisely designates the appearance or something we don’t know yet, the thing as thought in Greek was the noumenon, which means the \u2018thought\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In short, the intelligible essence <\/em>is also known as the noumenon<\/em>, the thing in itself<\/em>, as it is thought, whereas the sensible appearance <\/em>is its simply its appearance<\/em>, regardless if we know its essence or not. Simply put, the noumenon is what it is <\/em>and the phenomenon is its appearance. Deleuze attributes this to Plato:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cI can thus say that the whole of classical philosophy from Plato onwards seemed to develop itself within the frame of a duality between sensible appearances and intelligible essences.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The problem here is, as explained by Deleuze, that this makes the subject <\/em>defective as appearance<\/em>, how, for example, we see something is not what it is<\/em>, only its appearance. As I may have botched that, in his words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cA fundamental defect, namely: appearance is in the end the thing such as it appears to me by virtue of my subjective constitution which deforms it.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He exemplifies this with how a stick in water appears broken. If you go closer and take the stick out of water, it no longer has the appearance <\/em>of a broken stick. It\u2019s simply an illusion. He notes that this is \u201cPlato\u2019s theme: leave appearances to find essences.\u201d It sort of makes sense, considering how appearance can be deceiving, as just explained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is, to be clear here, not how Kant defines phenomenon <\/em>and noumenon<\/em>. The lecture transcript is fairly lucid so I\u2019ll stay on it. Deleuze explains that Kant radically transforms phenomenon<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[T]he phenomenon will no longer at all be appearance.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Instead, Deleuze adds:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[T]he phenomenon is no longer defined as appearance but as apparition.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In the English translation of the book on Kant, this is translated as appearing<\/em>. In the 1963 French original, \u2018La philosophie critique de Kant: doctrine des facult\u00e9s\u2019, the word used is apparition <\/em>(14). I\u2019ve explored this in the past, but, anyway, according to a dictionary, such as the Oxford English Dictionary, the word apparition (OED, s.v. \u201capparition\u201d, n.) is used in English typically as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cAn immaterial appearance as of a real being; a spectre, phantom, or ghost. (The ordinary current sense.)\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

It can, however, be used as appearing:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe action of appearing or becoming visible.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In contrast, the word appearance (OED, s.v. \u201cappearance\u201d, n.) has to do with:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe action of coming forward into view or becoming visible.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

And:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe action or state of appearing or seeming to be (to eyes or mind); semblance; looking like. to all appearance: so far as appears to anyone.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

And:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe state or form in which a person or thing appears; apparent form, look, aspect.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, as I\u2019ve explained in a previous essay, they are very similar but not exactly the same. Appearance <\/em>has to do with how something looks, or, taking more senses into account, is sensible. Apparition <\/em>is how something becomes visible, how it appears <\/em>to our senses. Anyway, I prefer to use the word apparition instead of appearing. I think it\u2019s just conceptually more distinct, having to do with the act of it, whereas I might use appearing more in general, when it has little do with this distinction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Deleuze emphasizes the importance of this transformation, understanding phenomenon <\/em>as apparition<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe difference is enormous because when I say the word apparition I am no longer saying appearance at all, I am no longer at all opposing it to essence. The apparition is what appears in so far as it appears. Full stop. I don’t ask myself if there is something behind, I don’t ask myself if it is false or not false.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Now, if you\u2019ve done your homework, that is to say read Kant, you\u2019ll be aware of that you can\u2019t reach the noumena<\/em>. We can\u2019t get to the things as they are<\/em>. Conversely, as pointed out here, what now matters is apparition<\/em>, how something appears <\/em>in as much it does. Simply put, there\u2019s no search for the essences<\/em>. This is also why Deleuze calls Kant the founder of phenomenology<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cI think that if there is a founder of phenomenology it is Kant. There is phenomenology from the moment that the phenomenon is no longer defined as appearance but as apparition.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Deleuze thus defines phenomenology <\/em>as \u201cthe opposite of a discipline of appearances\u201d, as \u201ca rigorous science of the apparition\u201d which focuses on asking a specific question: \u201c[W]hat can we say about the fact of appearing?\u201d He further clarifies the distinction between appearance <\/em>and apparition<\/em>, first explaining what appearance pertains to:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe appearance is something that refers to essence in a relation of disjunction, in a disjunctive relation, which is to say either it’s appearance or it’s essence.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Followed by an explanation of what apparition <\/em>pertains to:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe apparition is very different, it’s something that refers to the conditions of what appears.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In short, summarizing the two, as he goes on to do, appearance <\/em>has to do with disjunction<\/em>, a disjunctive appearance<\/em>\/essence <\/em>couple, whereas apparition <\/em>has to do with conjunction<\/em>, a conjunctive \u201cwhat appears\/conditions of apparition\u201d couple. He also calls the conjunctive couple \u201capparition\/sense\u201d, sense being \u201csense of the apparition, signification of the apparition\u201d. In other words, as he puts is, it\u2019s no longer a matter of finding essence <\/em>behind appearance but there being \u201cthe sense or non-sense of what appears.\u201d Deleuze goes on to note that this change in thought is so radical that, \u201cto the point \u2026 that in this respect we are all Kantians.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To be clear here, as Deleuze goes on to warn the audience (remember, it\u2019s a lecture) against a possible radical misinterpretation, apparition <\/em>does not entail that the subject <\/em>constitutes what comes to appear <\/em>to the subject. In other words, what\u2019s outside the subject is not made up by the subject. If that were the case, we\u2019d all exist in our own subjective <\/em>worlds in which everything is tied to the subject. Instead, as he clarifies, the subject constitutes \u201cthe conditions under what appears to it appears to it\u201d, the conditions of apparition<\/em>. In other words, we live in the same world, but what comes to appear to us is based on us. For Kant, as explained by Deleuze, this is twofold. On one hand, there is the empirical subject<\/em>, that of the appearance<\/em>\/essence<\/em>, like you <\/em>or me<\/em>. On the other hand, there is the transcendental subject<\/em>, \u201cthe unity of all the conditions under which something appears\u201d to the empirical subject. In other words, you have what you can sense and know, as well as what you cannot sense, only think of and thus not know. Combining the two then, Deleuze explains that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cWe will seek the conditions of [the] apparition [of the phenomenon], and in fact the conditions of its apparition are, the categories on one hand and on the other space and time.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

If you wonder from where space <\/em>and time <\/em>are injected here, for Kant space and time are tied to the transcendental subject<\/em>. They are for him (A373-A374) \u201crepresentations a priori, which dwell in us as forms of our sensible intuition[.]\u201d Deleuze simply calls them presentational<\/em>, considering that they are the way they are \u201cbefore any real object has even determined our inner sense through sensation in such a way that we represent it under those sensible relations\u201d, as explained by Kant (A373-A374). To be more specific, for Kant (A494) space and time are \u201ca receptivity for being affected\u201d. Deleuze refers to space as \u201cthe form of exteriority\u201d, meaning \u201ceverything which appears in space appears as exterior to whoever grasps it, and exterior from one thing to another\u201d, and time <\/em>as \u201cthe form of interiority\u201d, meaning \u201cthe form under which we affect ourselves\u201d. Simply put, they are irreducible to anything else besides themselves. Relevant to what was cited above, Deleuze notes that \u201cspace and time are the forms of representation of what appears.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If you are wondering what are categories<\/em>, or rather what he means by them, Kant (B129) explains:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[They] are concepts of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is regarded as determined<\/strong> with regard to one of the logical functions<\/strong> for judgments.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Which he (B129) then exemplifies:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThus, the function of the categorical judgment was that of the relationship of the subject to the predicate, e.g., \u201cAll bodies are divisible.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Also in reverse (B129):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[O]ne can also say: \u2018Something divisible is a body.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The point here being that in both instances you have a subject predicate relationship, but, as Kant (B129) points out, through the category <\/em>of substance <\/em>the body <\/em>is determined as the subject<\/em>. I\u2019m not going to go through his categories here. Otherwise this essays turns into a never ending detour into Kant. This was just so if you wonder what categories are in general, to not leave you hanging.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

How does this all come together then? Well, Deleuze summarizes this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cWe have thus to distinguish the diversity of what appears in space and in time and the diversity of space and time themselves.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He further elaborates that the first<\/em> diversity<\/em>, that of what appears <\/em>in space <\/em>and time<\/em>, is empirical diversity<\/em> and the second diversity<\/em> has to do with space and time itself, constituting the a priori diversity, the forms of presentation<\/em>. He adds that the categories <\/em>function to unify diversity. They are the mediators, to make sense of it all. So, in a nutshell, in Deleuze\u2019s words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cIt is in this sense that it is not simply a form of presentation of what appears, it will be a form of the representation of what appears. The prefix re- indicates here the activity of the concept in opposition to the immediate or passive character of space and time which are given or which are the form of what is given.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Oh boy, I may have not done a good job here, but I reckon this will suffice as an explanation as to why the focus on rendering visible<\/em> (apparition<\/em>), not the visible<\/em> (appearance<\/em>). This, the part of Kant, is, of course, just how Kant approaches this. It doesn\u2019t mean that I subscribe to Kant, nor that Deleuze does. I chose to explain this through Kant because, in a sense, the people discussed in this essay are all Kantians (at least up to this point).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now where was I? Ah, yes, back to Henri Maldiney on space <\/em>and landscape<\/em>. Oddly enough, believe it or not (as I didn\u2019t bother to read on before going on that tangent (Klee), followed by another tangent (Kant, Deleuze), Maldiney (144) brings up Klee:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c\u2018[L]’art ne rend pas le visible, il rend visible[.]\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The passage is a translation, but it is the exact same passage, the one I already quoted in German. Only the publication in which it is included is different in Maldiney\u2019s book. Deleuze and Guattari (422) paraphrase this in \u2018Capitalisme et schizophr\u00e9nie: Mille plateaux\u2019 as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cRendre<\/em> visible, disait Klee, et non pas rendre ou reproduire le visible.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Which is translated by Massumi in the English translation of the book as (342):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cRender<\/em> visible, Klee said; not render or reproduce the visible.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

It may make little sense to go through these, who cite or paraphrase Klee, but I included these bits to point out my favored \u2026 rendering of the passage, that is to say why I like to speak of rendering visible<\/em>, not the visible<\/em>. I get that from \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019. It\u2019s not in the German original, as such, but I prefer rendering <\/em>over making <\/em>as I think it works better in different contexts. There\u2019s also another bit Maldiney (146) cites from Klee, from \u2018Das bildnerische Denken\u2019. I went through the effort of finding the German original, so I\u2019ll present that here instead of the French translation:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cDa, wo das Zentralorgan aller zeitlich-r\u00e4umlichen Bewegtheit, hei\u00dfe es nun Hirn oder Herz der Sch\u00f6pfung alle Funktionen veranla\u00dft, wer m\u00f6chte da als K\u00fcnstler nicht wohnen?\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

My German is alright for reading, but often lacking in writing, so I\u2019ll use the translation provided in \u2018Paul Klee: Philosophical Vision: From Nature to Art\u2019, edited by John Sallis. To be more specific, it\u2019s in the book, in chapter titled \u2018On Modern Art\u2019. Klee states that (14)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThere where the central organ of all temporal-spatial animatedness, whether we call it the brain or the hear of Creation, occasions all the functions: who as an artist would not want to dwell there?\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

To make more sense of this, in the same edited book, in chapter titled \u2018Paul Klee\u2019s Vision of an Originary Cosmological Painting\u2019, Alejandro Arturo Vallega (30) points out what sort of was covered here already in the earlier bit included from Klee, how for Klee art is not about representing <\/em>the \u201cnatural objective form or product\u201d but about \u201cform-giving\u201d. In \u2018On Modern Art\u2019 Klee (13) explains that, in a sense:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[An artist] is perhaps, without really wanting to be, a philosopher.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Vallega (30) clarifies that, as you may gather from all this already (Kant\/Deleuze in particular), what unites the two, the artist and the philosopher, is going beyond appearances<\/em>, finding that there\u2019s more than meets the eye. So, for the umpteenth time by now, as Vallega (30) points out, it\u2019s creating <\/em>or producing <\/em>that is of interest to the artist, not the creation <\/em>or the end product<\/em>. Simply put, as emphasized by Vallega (31), the basis for art cannot be something in its objective presence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Perhaps it has to do with the lecturer, Tuomas Tolonen, being a phenomenologist, but, oddly enough, this is something that was covered during the lectures on aesthetics that I attended not long ago. It was not in reference to Klee, but rather art in the 1800s. It wasn\u2019t merely about painting, but it did pay a major role during the lectures as landscape painting was a big deal during that century. Anyway, in summary, a point was made how, at the time, art was not about re-presenting<\/em> but about presenting<\/em>. It was emphasized that an artist does not start with a clear picture <\/em>or idea <\/em>in mind, that one will simply know in advance what\u2019s to come and then proceed to do just that. So, when it comes to painting, for example, the artist doesn\u2019t have something on display, be it some object <\/em>or the landscape<\/em>, for it to be faithfully rendered in paint. The end result would be a reproduction<\/em>, a recreation<\/em>, a representation<\/em>. Instead, the painter seeks to create <\/em>something that is not <\/em>already there, visible<\/em>. Sure, fair enough, it\u2019s hard to avoid re-presenting<\/em> something, but that\u2019s not the point here, whether you do or don\u2019t.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For example, Caspar David Friechrich\u2019s \u2018Der Watzmann\u2019 (The Watzmann), does look like the real deal but apparently he never even saw the mountains himself, as pointed out by Timothy Mitchell (452, 455) in his article \u2018Caspar David Friedrich\u2019s Der Watzmann<\/em>: German Romantic Landscape Painting and Historical Geology\u2019. As I don\u2019t access to Mitchell\u2019s more encompassing work, the \u2018Art and Science in German Landscape Painting 1770-1840\u2019, I have to make due with Stephen Daniels (369), who adds in his review of Mitchell’s book:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cFriedrich never visited the scene, and the painting was made in Rome.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Why it does look quite a bit like the real deal then? Well, according to Mitchell (455), Friedrich likely had access to plenty of information on geology, including drawings of the mountains. He (455) also notes that it is possible that he has seen an unfinished painting of the mountains painted by a former student of his. However, Daniels (369) notes that while much of the painting looks as it should, as one might expect really, how \u201c[t]he absence of the ubiquitous cataract of alpine scenes strikes a realistic note, it also has certain unrealistic notes, namely \u201c[t]he outcrop in the foreground [which] has no topographical basis \u2026 [being] transposed from two illustrations\u201d sketched by Friedrich and Goethe, having nothing to do with \u201cthe limestone range to which the Watzmann belongs\u201d to. Mitchell (458) also points this out, noting that instead of striving for accuracy, \u201cFriedrich substitutes a composite image derived from drawing done at completely different sites.\u201d He (458) also points out how its factually off, including the substitution of an alpine stream with the arid rocky outcrop:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cEven from the standpoint of topographical accuracy, almost every aspect of Friedrich\u2019s Der Watzmann<\/em> is wrong, from the shape of the mountain to the type of rock displayed in the foreground.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The rocky outcrop is, however, of particular interest. It\u2019s wrong, because, as sign of the times, it had to be there, or so to speak. Mitchell (461) acknowledges this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[W]hile there are no granite outcroppings actually visible in the vicinity of Der Watzmann, theory demands that the suggestion of such forms be included. Friedrich sacrificed topographic accuracy for what he saw as a more profound truth.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, yes, it does bear certain resemblance<\/em>, but it\u2019s Friedrich\u2019s vision of it, to a point of fault, as noted by Daniels (369) and Mitchell (458). The resemblance is, however, not of much importance here, considering that \u201cFriedrich did not consider accuracy to local detail paramount in truthful rendering of a mountain scene\u201d, as noted by Mitchell (456). Simply put, it was beside the point for him. Moreover, Mitchell (458-459) hints that not being accurate was likely intentional, doing it for religious reasons. According to Mitchell (458), for Friedrich \u201cNature was the book of God and revealed his active presence through [landscape]\u201d and thus \u201clandscape painting was [for him] a form of religious art.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, what\u2019s really interesting in the painting is how the life of a mountain is presented in it by Friedrich. It\u2019s fairly easy to miss if you are only interested in its appearance<\/em>. I\u2019ve explained this before, so I won\u2019t go into much detail, but in the background you see the tall snow capped mountains, in the middle you see a less pronounced peak and in the front you see the formation of eroded rocks. The point here is about rendering visible <\/em>how mountains have different stages in their geological lives. Don\u2019t believe me? Well, Mitchell (452) points out the same thing, noting that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cFriedrich\u2019s paintings are recognizable as a hymn to the universal laws of mountain formation.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

To be more specific, Mitchell (458) argues that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cFriedrich\u2019s landscapes spring from a similar belief in this transcendental unity. By expressing the essential dynamics of mountain formation, Friedrich was simultaneously revealing part of God.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In summary, at least the way I see it, having never even seen the real thing himself and not giving a hoot that his depiction is way off, in multiple ways, Friedrich isn\u2019t rendering the visible<\/em>, but rendering visible<\/em>. What he renders visible are the ideas of geology, or, rather, what was then known as geognosy, as explained by Mitchell (455). To be accurate, as noted by Daniels (369-370), the mountain formation is not how we understand mountain formation, as you might have been taught in school, but how it was understood at the time, which is to say that if it\u2019s off, it\u2019s because it is. That said, the fact that it\u2019s off, how mountains are not formed and transformed, is not of great importance. He was under the impression that it\u2019s how it is, even though it clearly isn\u2019t. If we believe Mitchell (458-459), what was important for Friedrich was revealing Nature, revealing God. The lecturer at the aesthetics lectures also pointed out this, how, following Kant, during this period landscape <\/em>had to do with engagement in metaphysics and landscape painting<\/em> was an art that was the practice <\/em>of it. Simply put, ignoring the religiosity, it had to do with being one with the world. It\u2019s very profound really, even if it is, in part, profoundly off as well, at least in the case of the Watzmann. Sign of the times, I guess.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moving on, from Friedrich back to Klee, even if that\u2019s an oxymoron, an anachronism, Klee (9) expresses the creative process in \u2018On Modern Art\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[D]uring the period in which a work receives its shape this [creative] process goes on more or less preconsciously.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Unless I\u2019m mistaken, this is what the lecturer on the aesthetics lectures was on about. He explained how for an artists it\u2019s not about seeing something and\/or knowing something, in advance, and then rendering that on, for example, a canvas. Instead, he argued that it\u2019s how an artist creates <\/em>something sensible while at it, not knowing what will come of it, what the creation <\/em>will be or should be beforehand. Klee (10) goes on to explain how, at least at times, people come judge such understanding of art as a creative <\/em>process:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[F]rom time to time people have wanted to forbid the artist these divergences from the given models, divergences that are necessary to the artistic process. Some people have been so outraged that they accuse the artist of total incompetence or deliberate falsification.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In other words, if an artist doesn\u2019t represent <\/em>something accurately or realistically, it\u2019s considered childish. Speaking of childish works, there\u2019s something particularly interesting about them. For example, there\u2019s this drawing by my nephew. The first time I saw the drawing, I thought it had a valley, some mountains or hills in the back, then some ground, perhaps a town, and some water in front of it, perhaps a lake. In the foreground there\u2019s this black area that I thought is part of the elevated ground, hence the valley in it. I got it all wrong. What happened was that I assumed that there was depth in the drawing. I\u2019m so used to the linear perspective that I project it, even on to a child\u2019s drawing. According to the artist, my nephew, it\u2019s a steam locomotive on tracks. Who is the incompetent one here? Klee (14) wonders the same:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cWhen people talk about the infantilism of my sketches, they must be taking as their point of departure those linear constructions in which I was trying to connect an objective representation \u2026 with a pure presentation of the linear element.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Drawing from Klee, Deleuze and Guattari (344) make the same observation as I did, albeit without using a specific example. They (344) note how it is actually children who, by themselves, on their own, are able to pull it off by having the necessary sobriety to do so in order to deterritorialize <\/em>matters, molecularize <\/em>material and cosmicize <\/em>forces. They (344) also note how, for some reason, \u201c[p]eople often have too much of a tendency to reterritorialize on the child[.]\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I wonder when it is that it happens? When are children expected to render 3D on a 2D surface? I honestly can\u2019t remember when it was in school that we used a model, no, not a human standing still somewhere, but any object that we drew on the basis of what we saw. I\u2019ve been told that I used to draw a lot. I think I maxed all the visual arts courses in school and did stuff outside the school as well, until I foolishly deemed it not cool. Also, the older I got, the more I was annoyed by my inability to match the real world. I also couldn\u2019t stand colors, so I usually just used a random pencil to draw things if it had to be realistic. Getting the colors right was a pain. That\u2019s also why I didn\u2019t like paints. It was probably just impatience though, not willing to put the hours in, learning to make use of the colors consistently. The exception here was doing pastel works. I loved the way I was able to draw color and then blend the powdery pigments, to get soft transitions between colors. It pushed me not to work with lines but with the colors. In retrospect, having now read Klee (10-11) who classifies three dimensions of image, line (measure), tonality (weight, black\/white) and color (quality), what I think I liked about using pastels was the possibility to work with all of these at the same time. You can do lines of different color and tonality alright, pending how much you apply pressure and how you\u2019ll blend or suffuse the chosen colors. Anyway, oddly enough, I think I ended up quitting drawing because it was considered childish unless you were able to do it realistically. I remember being disciplined <\/em>for going off the script, drawing some made up version of an amphora instead of basing it on the model. So, in summary, I was pushed to mimic reality, but I found it rather unsatisfying because I wasn\u2019t that good at it. Connecting this to the points made by Klee, as well Deleuze and Guattari, my point here is that children get pushed towards fidelity<\/em>, mimesis<\/em>, going against their own creativity<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Klee (13) speaks of \u201c\u2018deformation\u2019 of the natural form of appearances.\u201d I take this as bearing particular relevance to depicting the real world. I think he (13) explains this particularly well:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[H]e does not grant these natural forms of appearance the compelling significance they have for the numerous and loudly critical realists.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This is just a part of the segment, but I stop here to emphasize two words here: appearance <\/em>and realists<\/em>. Anyway, he (13) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cHe does not feel so bound by these realities because he does not see in these culminating forms the essence of the creative process of nature.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

I’m stopping again for a moment. Here I\u2019d like to direct your attention to two words: forms <\/em>and process<\/em>. He (13) concludes this segment:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cMore important to him than the culminating forms are the formative forces.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, in summary, for Klee, what is of interest to the artist in the real world, or, as he (13) calls it, in \u201cthe objective realm\u201d, are not forms <\/em>but what forms those forms. Deleuze and Guattari (342) make note of this as they point out that this is no longer about finding \u201cthe corresponding principle of intelligibility in form\u201d but about \u201celaborating a material charged with harnessing forces of a different order[.]\u201d In simpler terms, they (342) summarize that it\u2019s about \u201cthe visual material [that] must capture nonvisible forces.\u201d This is why (13) Klee goes on to state that an artist \u201cdecries the things formed by nature that pass before his eyes, examines them with a penetrating look.\u201d Simply put, the artists finds that there\u2019s more than meets the eye to the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If you want examples of this, read the chapter on nomads, \u20181227: Treatise on Nomadology \u2013 The War Machine\u2019 in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019 and\/or Gilbert Simondon\u2019s \u2018L\u2019individuation \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re des notions de forme et d\u2019information\u2019. I dedicated a short essay on this so I won\u2019t go into this in detail. My example there had to do with chopping up firewood, how it makes a world of difference how you split the wood, going along the grain of the wood, instead of against it. The point here being that there\u2019s more than meets the eye even in firewood.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why is this important then? As Klee (13) goes on to point out, what was <\/em>and is <\/em>are not of great importance, at least not in comparison to what can be<\/em>. He (14) explains this in other words, stating that it\u2019s a matter of making \u201clife something more than, on average, it appears to be\u201d, \u201cnot simply mirror[ing] what has been seen, \u2026 but rather make visible those things that were seen in secret.\u201d Vallega (28) brings up how for Klee (13) there\u2019s a contrast between the stasis <\/em>of the classical style and dynamism <\/em>of the romanticist style, of which the latter Klee subscribes to, but only in the sense that he wishes to go beyond it, to \u201cpass beyond the style of bathos and compulsion to the kind of romanticism that melts into the universe.\u201d This may confuse you as I won\u2019t look into it more here, but I brought that up just so that my choice to discuss romanticism through Friedrich would make more sense alongside Klee.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where was I with Maldiney? I believe I got as far as space <\/em>and landscape <\/em>before going on a series of tangents. Following Straus, Maldiney (149) reiterates the earlier points made in this essay on landscape:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cL’espace du paysage ou le paysage (car en lui l\u2019espace et le monde sont un) commence avant la peinture de paysage qui le r\u00e9v\u00e9lera.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In translation, he is saying that landscape <\/em>exists before the landscape painting<\/em>. There is a bit first on what he calls a landscape space<\/em> that results in calling it just landscape because landscape necessitates space<\/em>. This just so if you wondered earlier on what\u2019s the deal with that. Anyway, he (149) goes on to reiterate the earlier distinction between landscape and geography:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cPl\u00e9nitude enveloppante au milieu de laquelle nous sommes ici, il est la spatialit\u00e9 primordiale qui ne comporte aucun syst\u00e8me de r\u00e9f\u00e9rence, ni coordonn\u00e9es ni point origine.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

I include these here because you probably forgot about this already. Anyway, the point is that landscape <\/em>is spatiality <\/em>without points of reference, without a grid or a coordinate system. He (149) specifies this by noting that the only point of reference to you is the horizon<\/em>, but that\u2019s hardly systematic because it’s tied to each individual<\/em>. The point here is that you are always in <\/em>it, here and now, as he (149) characterizes it. In other words, if you move a bit, from here to there, wherever that is in relation to where you were, the only point of reference you have with landscape is still the horizon. Even calling it here to there is off, as he (149) points out:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cLe terme de progression n’a aucun sens dans le paysage. Nous ne nous d\u00e9pla\u00e7ons pas \u00e0 travers lui, mais nous marchons en lui de ici en ici, envelopp\u00e9 parl horizon qui, comme le ici, contin\u00fbment se transforme en lui-m\u00eame.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, in summary, as I pointed out already, you can\u2019t move from here to there in landscape <\/em>because there is no point of reference. Maldiney (149) adds that this also means that you are free to roam as you see fit. Sure, as Maldiney (149) acknowledges, you can take the road, go from here to there, there\u2019s that, but you can also go your own way, do your own thing, go wherever the world takes you. When it comes to landscape, Maldiney (149-150) points out that, for him, it\u2019s circular as he is always in relation to the horizon <\/em>and vice versa, transforming itself as he moves. In other words, as I\u2019d put it, it is, as if, the landscape was following you.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At this point I finally manage to make my way back to Maldiney on C\u00e9zanne, as he (150) cites him, as included in Joachim Gasquet\u2019s \u2018C\u00e9zanne\u2019 (136):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cA ce moment l\u00e0 je ne fais plus qu’un avec mon tableau. (=Non pas le tableau peint, mais le monde \u00e0 peindre.) Nous sommes un chaos iris\u00e9. Je viens devant mon motif, je m’y perds… Nous germinons. Il me semble, lorsque la nuit descend, que je ne peindrai et que je n\u2019ai jamais peint.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Now, to do a service to the readers, this has been translated to English as well. For example, the one I came across is an edited volume by Michael Doran, titled \u2018Conversations with C\u00e9zanne\u2019. In it, C\u00e9zanne (114) characterizes his process:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cIn order to paint landscape correctly, first I have to discover the geographic strata. Imagine that the history of the world dates from the day when two atoms met, when two whirlwinds, two chemicals joined together.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Okay, we are quite far from merely applying paint on canvas, but do go on (114):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cI can see rising these rainbows, these cosmic prisms, this dawn of ourselves above nothingness. I immerse myself in them when I read Lucretius. I breathe the virginity of the world in this fine rain. A sharp sense of nuances works on me. I feel myself colored by all the nuances of infinity.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Right \u2026 this is still quite far from what people might think of when it comes to painting landscapes. In summary, so far, the way I read this is that it\u2019s about being one with the world. Anyway, this is the point where to the passage cited above in French (114):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cAt that moment, I am as one with my painting. We are an iridescent chaos. I come before my motif and I lose myself in it. [I dream, I wander. Silently the sun penetrates my being, like a faraway friend. It warms my idleness, fertilizes it.] We germinate. When night falls again, it seems to me that I shall never paint, that I have never painted. [I need night to tear my eyes away from the earth, from this corner of the earth into which I have melted.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

To be transparent, I normally mark what I\u2019ve added in [] but here I used [] to mark what is missing from the passage cited above in French, as included by Maldiney (150). This passage goes on as C\u00e9zanne (114) explains what happens the next day:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe next day, a beautiful morning, slowly geographical foundations appear, the layers, the major planes form themselves on my canvas. Mentally I compose the rocky skeleton. I can see the outcropping of stones under the water; the sky weighs on me. Everything falls into place. A pale palpitation envelops the linear elements. The red earths rise from an abyss. I begin to separate myself from the landscape, to see it.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He goes on with this, but I think that\u2019s enough. That\u2019s the gist of it, how he is first one with the world, as explained in the first passage, and only begins to see it once he picks up the brush and gets to painting. He (114) explains how at first he is stuck in the representational <\/em>ways, in geometry, only to be replaced by some feeling or an emotion that comes over him. In his (114) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cAn airborne, colorful logic quickly replaces the somber, stubborn geography.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He (114) further explains how this happens, how he moves away from the geographically <\/em>and geometrically <\/em>organized sketches, bit by bit, until it collapses catastrophically. What results from this is that, in his (115) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cAll that remains is color, and in color, brightness, clarity[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

His explanation is a fair bit longer, so I opted to abridge it here. He (115) goes on to explain the difficulty of doing what he does, how it is difficult to paint the world and only the world, not how we think it is but how it is, \u201c[t]o paint it in its reality!\u201d In the text Gasquet (115) asks C\u00e9zanne why it is difficult and why it is necessary to work the way he does, going through all the effort, to which C\u00e9zanne (115-116) replies that it\u2019s rather unfortunate how we\u2019ve come to see the world and how the skill or craft is all there is to it. In other words, I read him as lamenting on how art has turned into hollow representations<\/em>, mere appearances <\/em>that do look good but that\u2019s all there is to them. Connecting this to Klee, as discussed in this essay, C\u00e9zanne (116) argues that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe artist must never have an idea, a thought, a word in mind when he needs a sensation.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, just as argued by Klee, as well as the lecturer on the aesthetics course, art is not about knowing what will come of the process beforehand. C\u00e9zanne (116) is particularly adamant about this point as he continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cGreat words are thoughts that don\u2019t belong to you and clich\u00e9s are the leprosy of art.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This was probably a bit unnecessary as he made his point already, but I just had to include this here. It is just so hilarious. Anyway, in summary, C\u00e9zanne is on about sensation<\/em>. The same word, \u2018sensation\u2019 is used in French. However, I think it\u2019s worth bringing up here that it\u2019s not the case in Greek, as noted by Maldiney (153):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[O]\u00f9 il est pris au sens le plus large et le plus primitif, esth\u00e9tique se r\u00e9f\u00e8re au grec \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 (= sensation) et recouvre tout le champ de la r\u00e9ceptivit\u00e9 sensible.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Here you have the ancient Greek \u03b1\u1f34\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2<\/em> or a\u00edsth\u0113sis<\/em>. If we take a look in a dictionary, we\u2019ll find the word exist in English as \u2018aesthesis\u2019 (OED, s.v. \u201caesthesis\u201d, n.), indicated as having to with \u201c[t]he perception of the external world by the senses\u201d, its etymology being in ancient Greek for \u201csense perception, sensation, perception\u201d, stemming from \u03b1\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9<\/em>, to perceive, and probably having the same base as \u1f00\u03af\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd<\/em> to perceive, to hear. If we take a look at a related word, \u2018aesthetic\u2019 (OED, s.v. \u201caesthetic\u201d, n. and adj.), we\u2019ll notice that while it has been used, in general, similarly to \u2018aesthesis\u2019, it has more contemporarily, in late 1700s and early 1800s onward, been shifted in part to something else:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cOf or relating to the perception, appreciation, or criticism of that which is beautiful.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

And:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cOf a thing: in accordance with principles of artistic beauty or taste; giving or designed to give pleasure through beauty; of pleasing appearance.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

We also have the related word \u2018anaesthetic\u2019 (OED, s.v. \u201canaesthetic\u201d, n. and adj.) which stands for:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cInsensible, deprived of sensibility.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

And:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cAn an\u00e6sthetic agent; an agent which produces insensibility.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Oddly enough, despite having the medical use, to produce insinsibility, for something not to hurt when undergoing medical treatment, the \u2018anaesthetic\u2019 has remained tied to sensibility and perception. The etymology of the word (OED, s.v. \u201caesthetic\u201d, n. and adj.) is indicated as, unsurprisingly, stemming from Greek \u201c\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4<\/em>-\u03bf\u03c2 without feeling, insensible\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why I went on this tangent on etymology? Well, C\u00e9zanne emphasizes sensation<\/em>, so I wanted point out the connection to aesthetics<\/em>, which, in contemporary parlance is understood as having to do with beauty<\/em>. In C\u00e9zanne parlance it\u2019s not about aesthetics but about aesthesis<\/em>, about sensation, being one with the world on an as is basis, or so to speak.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now, back to Maldiney who goes on to reiterate certain arguments made by both Klee and C\u00e9zanne. In summary, he (154) acknowledges the coexistince of image <\/em>and form<\/em>, but argues that they are distinct, in the sense that form goes beyond the image which is a mere surface<\/em>, an appearance<\/em>. He (154) uses photography as an example of image in which the photograph is the copy <\/em>of an intentional object<\/em>. He (154) then contrasts this with a Johannes Vermeer painting, the \u2018Gezicht op Delft\u2019 (View of Delft), in which the elements, sky, earth and water, function as phenomenal formants<\/em>. Simply put, while this is not the easiest nor the most lucid passage in Maldiney\u2019s text, I understand this as having to do with how the painting is alive, the view being formed <\/em>as I look at it, whereas the photograph is not. I think it\u2019s worth adding that, of course, this does not mean that the painting, in this case the \u2018 Gezicht op Delft\u2019, is not an image or that it doesn\u2019t have an appearance. It certainly does, but, again, there\u2019s more than meets the eye. He (155) summarizes this on the following page:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cDans une oeuvre figurative l\u2019image a pour fonction essentielle non d\u2019imiter mais d\u2019appara\u00eetre[.]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Pay attention to two words: d\u2019imiter<\/em> and d\u2019appara\u00eetre<\/em>. Simply put, images <\/em>have to do with appearance<\/em>, whereas form <\/em>has to do with apparition<\/em>. I keep repeating these words for a reason, but if this notion of apparition still confuses you, I\u2019ll provide an example here. Maldiney (155) makes note of iconoclasm <\/em>(going after religious icons) in the Byzantine Empire, how iconoclasts were troubled by the power of icons <\/em>without really understanding how it can be that a mere image has any power whatsoever. This what was also covered on the aesthetics lectures, how icons function, gazing <\/em>from there to here. When you look at an icon, you\u2019ll notice that it\u2019s looking at you. As it\u2019s all on a single plane, there being no depth in it, to it, there\u2019s nowhere else to look, except looking outside the painting. In other words, they appear to be with us, making contact with us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To get to the point here, Maldiney (155) elaborates how this works:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cRegard de celui qui est l\u00e0-pr\u00e9sent et dont la pr\u00e9sence est fa\u00e7onn\u00e9e de part en part par les structures de l\u2019\u0153uvre en fonctionnement, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire anim\u00e9e et constitu\u00e9e par les formes.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The gist of this, how it works, if you didn\u2019t already get it from the icon <\/em>example above, is that it\u2019s all about perspective (OED, s.v. \u201cperspective\u201d, n.), in the sense that it is understood as \u201c[t]he appearance of viewed objects with regard to relative position, distance from the viewer, etc.\u201d In other words, as explained during the lectures a number of times, to really sink in the idea, as you face the work of art, look at it, you are positioned by that work of art. With the icon, you are positioned as the one looked at when you look at it. With the landscape<\/em>, you are the one looking at it, based on the view presented to you. Simply put, it\u2019s not about starting at the surface appearance<\/em>. It\u2019s not about admiring the shapes and the colors, as the lecturer noted humorously. In other words, Maldiney argues that it\u2019s a two way street. He (155-156) calls this autogenesis<\/em>, how the form <\/em>of the work of art is formed <\/em>on the spot, and argues that a figurative form<\/em> has two sides or dimensions:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cUne forme figurative a donc deux dimensions : une dimension \u2018intentionnelle-repr\u00e9sentative\u2019 selon laquelle elle est image, et une dimension \u2018g\u00e9n\u00e9tique-rythmique\u2019 qui en fait pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment une forme.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, as pointed out earlier on already, he reiterates that there\u2019s always the image<\/em>, the representatative <\/em>side, but there can also be the form<\/em>, the genetic or rhytmic side. As also pointed out already, these are not mutually exclusive, but indeed they can be. That\u2019s why a lot of images are, well, just images, mere imitations<\/em>, mere representations<\/em>. The point here about the form and its autogenesis <\/em>is that it gives the work of art a life of its own that comes to life once you engage with it, let it unfold, rather than merely look at its surface appearance<\/em>. Taking a handful of cues from Klee, Maldiney (156) adds that in this sense the form of a work of art is never finished as it is always formed <\/em>or gives form to itself once we engage with it. Moreover, he (156) adds that for it to be the case, the work of art to have a life of its own, or so to speak, it must have a world of its own and thus time <\/em>and space <\/em>of its own. For Maldiney (156) this also means that the autogenesis of form is not tied to this world but to its own world. The way I understand this is simply that the artwork is autonomous in the sense that the genesis <\/em>of form occurs in the world of the artwork.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To bring in yet another point of view, for the sake of variety, Maldiney (167) indicates how Chinese painter Xi\u00e8 H\u00e8 (in the text Sie-Ho) lists six principles of painting, of which Maldiney covers the first two. First (167):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c1\u00b0 Refl\u00e9ter le souffle vital c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire cr\u00e9er le mouvement\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Second (167):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c2\u00b0 Rechercher l\u2019ossature c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire savoir utiliser son pinceau\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The first one has to do with a vital breath<\/em>, the movement of the universe. The second one has to do with how the artist makes use of this, how the artist embodies <\/em>and articulates <\/em>that movement. Maldiney (167) specifies that art is located between the two, the universal vital breath, and its singular articulation<\/em>. Bogue (14) notes that this is reflected in Deleuze\u2019s treatment of film, as apparent in \u2018Cinema 1\u2019. In that book Deleuze (168) refers to the first principle as the \u2018respiration-space\u2019 and the second principle as the \u2018skeleton-space\u2019. He (168) also characterizes the first principle as \u201can ambient space\u201d and \u201cthe organic form\u201d and the second principle as \u201cthe vectorial space\u201d or \u201cvector-space\u201d that has \u201ctemporal distances.\u201d He (187) explicitly links these two, as present in Chinese and Japanese painting, with \u201cthe notion of landscape\u201d. The first he (187) elaborates as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[T]he primordial void and the breath of life which permeates all things in One, unites them in a whole, and transforms them according to the movement of a great circle or an organic spiral.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Followed by his (187) elaboration of the second principle:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[T]he void and the skeleton, the articulation, the joints, the wrinkle or broken stroke which moves from one being to another by taking them at the summit of their presence, following a line of university.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He (187) then assesses them both in other words, stating that the first principle has to do with the union, the pumping of the heart (\u201cdiastole and systole\u201d, hence the respiration), whereas the second has to with the autonomous events. So, as explained by Maldiney (167), the first one is the universal <\/em>or general one, whereas the second one is the singular <\/em>or particular one. In Deleuze\u2019s (187) treatment, however, it\u2019s worth noting the first principle has to do with the appearing <\/em>of things, whereas the second principle has to do with the disappearing <\/em>of things. This may seem a bit counter-intuitive, considering that I\u2019ve gone on and on about how it\u2019s all about the artist rendering visible<\/em>, not the visible<\/em>. However, I reckon that this still holds. What Deleuze (187) is pointing out is that in the first instance it\u2019s about \u201cthe presence of things in their \u2018appearing\u2019\u201d, the totality of that if you will, whereas in the second instance something does appear as articulated <\/em>by the artist, but not all. That\u2019s why it\u2019s about disappearing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This reminds me about what I covered in an earlier essay that addresses singularities <\/em>and multiplicities<\/em>. To make more sense of that, in \u2018The Logic of Sense\u2019, Deleuze (52) defines singularities as neutral, \u201cpre-individual, non-personal, and a-conceptual\u201d, as \u201cturning points and points of inflection\u201d where something turns into something else, such as when water condenses and boils.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To link this to art, as that\u2019s the topic here, he elaborates this neatly in \u2018L\u2019Ab\u00e9c\u00e9daire de Gilles Deleuze\u2019, a series of interviews conducted by Claire Parnet. Addressing the letter U, \u2018U comme Un\u2019, Deleuze argues that science has to do with singularities<\/em>, be they, for example, mathematical, physical or chemical, such as points of congealing (as already pointed out in \u2018The Logic of Sense\u2019). For him this also means that science does not address universals<\/em>. The point here is that whatever is at stake, the one, the singularity, is only part of the whole and even if you take into account multiple singularities, you are only dealing with multiplicities<\/em>, what he also calls aggregates of singularities<\/em> in the interview. This is why, as also stated by Deleuze and Guattari (17, 21) in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019, you don’t deal with the multiplicity, (the unknowable total, or so to speak, albeit, strictly speaking it’s not universal or total), the \u2018n\u2019, but what you deal with is always a subtraction <\/em>of it, \u2018n-1\u2019. As noted by the two (21), even if you pile up the singularities, add them up, you never get to \u2018n\u2019 as each singularity is itself a subtraction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anyway, I thought I\u2019d quickly cover this here, in case it helps to explain why Deleuze (187) explains the skeleton-space<\/em>, the second principle in Chinese painting as having to do with disappearance <\/em>as presented in \u2018Cinema 1\u2019. Simply put, assuming that I got this right, he speaks of it as having to do with disappearance because the artist cannot completely render visible <\/em>the respiration-space<\/em>. Something always disappears, regardless of what the artist renders visible. Now, of course with film this appearing-disappearing<\/em> couple gets quite a bit more complex as it has progression in time whereas a painting is, in comparison, stuck in time. I concede that I haven\u2019t done enough reading on this and I\u2019m hardly an expert on film, but to my understanding film is more flexible than painting and thus allows the artist, the director, to play with articulation <\/em>of singularities <\/em>(some appear<\/em>, others disappear<\/em>) and link them, not only in space <\/em>but also in time<\/em>. Then again, when you think of it, if you manage to pull it off on a mere canvas, isn\u2019t that even more impressive?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bogue (14) offers his take on appearing <\/em>and disappearing<\/em>. He (14) emphasizes that the \u2018skeleton-space\u2019 is called \u2018espace-ossature\u2019 in the 1983 French original (231), \u2018Cin\u00e9ma 1 : L’image-mouvement\u2019 by Deleuze, as \u2018ossature\u2019 is the word used by Maldiney (167). Bogue (14) clarifies that in French this works particularly well because \u2018ossature\u2019 means both skeleton, how bones are arranged as opposed to a mere collection of bones, as well as more generally speaking how anything is structured the same way. He (14) explains the first principle more or less as already explained Maldiney\u2019s and Deleuze\u2019s parlance but he also offers a further clarification:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[The painter\u2019s task to manifest this vital breath\u2019s movement as it \u2018appears\u2019 and \u2018comes into presence\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In addition, more importantly, I find his (14) elaboration of the second principle particularly helpful:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[T]he painter must also render individual details with discrete brush strokes, thereby demarcating the structuring[,] the ossature of the world and revealing the \u2018disappearing\u2019 of things, like the dragon whose tail disappears behind a cloud.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, as I tried to explain but perhaps failed at it, as the artist renders something on canvas, something else is consequently rendered out of sight. Something must disappear <\/em>for something else to appear<\/em>. The totality can never made apparent, only parts of it. In other words, as reiterated by Bogue (14), respiration-space<\/em> is all-encompassing, whereas skeleton-space<\/em> is constructed piece by piece.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I think I\u2019ve gone on a long enough tangent or series of tangents now, so it\u2019s about time I get back to Bogue on Deleuze and Guattari. Bogue (12) makes note of what I at least attempted to cover in this article without going into detail about music (as it\u2019s a bit too far from my comfort zone at the moment), that while music and painting are separate, there is a musical aspect to landscape<\/em>. This is the liveliness, the rhythm in landscape painting<\/em>, the process of forming<\/em>, creation <\/em>or articulation<\/em>, the autogenesis<\/em>, that happens in the painting in itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\u2019s time to get back to landscape <\/em>and painting in \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019 by Deleuze and Guattari. Bogue (16) links what has been covered here so far with regards to art, especially the bits from the works of Maldiney and Straus, to how Deleuze and Guattari approach art in \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019. He (16) cites a passage in the book, which I\u2019ll cover here in more detail. Firstly, Deleuze and Guattari (167) state that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cBy means of the material, the aim of art is to wrest the percept from perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Going back a bit, here they reiterate the earlier point made about percepts <\/em>being independent from the person experiencing them. This is also similar to the point by Maldiney on how an artwork has a life of its own if it goes beyond being a mere image<\/em>. Anyway, Deleuze and Guattari (167) further elaborate the aim of art, adding that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[The aim of art is] to wrest the affect from affections as the transition from one state to another[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Together then, combining both percept <\/em>and affect<\/em>, they (167) summarize that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[The aim of art is] to extract a block of sensations, a pure being of sensations.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This also reiterates a previous point made by the two how sensations <\/em>have to do with percepts <\/em>and affects<\/em>. If you can no longer remember what sensation is, it\u2019s used here as it is used by C\u00e9zanne. When it comes to landscape <\/em>then, they (169) state that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe percept is the landscape before man, in the absence of man.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

They (169) acknowledge that this is or may seem rather contradictory, considering how we generally understand landscape <\/em>as tied to an observer<\/em>. They (169) cite a passage from Gasquet\u2019s book on C\u00e9zanne in which C\u00e9zanne (118) states:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cWell, no one has ever painted the landscape, man absent but entirely within the landscape.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

To be accurate, their (169) rendition is a bit shorter:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cMan absent from but entirely within the landscape.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

I included both here just so that you can compare the two. Anyway, Deleuze and Guattari (169) call this C\u00e9zanne\u2019s enigma. Skipping the literary examples provided by the two here, they (169) clarify this position:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cWe are not in the world, we become with the world[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

How to put this in other words? Well, if you\u2019ve read Deleuze and Guattari, you\u2019ll likely be aware that for them becoming <\/em>is primary and being <\/em>is secondary. More simply put, you always are<\/em>, but only because you\u2019ve become <\/em>who you are. That\u2019s my take on it anyway. The same thing applies here as well. You are not with the world, but you become with the world. I think Daniel Smith (xxxiv) summarizes it well in the introduction to Deleuze’s ‘Essays Critical and Clinical’:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cWhat the percept makes visible are the invisible forces that populate the universe, that affect us and make us become: characters pass into the landscape and themselves become part of the compound of sensations.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He (xxxiv) adds that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cThese percepts are what [Virginia] Woolf called \u2018moments of the world and what Deleuze terms \u2018haecceities,\u2019 in which the mode of individuation of \u2018a life\u2019 does not differ in nature from that of \u2018a climate,\u2019 \u2018a wind,\u2019 \u2018a fog,\u2019 or \u2018an hour of a day.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

If this is of interest to you, you can find more of this in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019, where Deleuze and Guattari (261-263) state that, for example, \u201c[t]aking a walk is a haecceity\u201d, as is fog, glare, wind, climate, season and \u201cfive o’clock in the evening\u201d, to name a few. In short, Smith (xxxiv) argues that for them landscape <\/em>is no longer external to, an external reality, but very much something that is with us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bogue (16) summarizes the difference between how landscape <\/em>is defined in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019 and \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019. Starting with the former, he (16) argues that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201c[T]he earlier landscape was facialized landscape \u2013 that is, a landscape territorialized by forces of facialization.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

I think this is very aptly put. To be more specific, Deleuze and Guattari (172) state that it\u2019s a deterritorialized <\/em>world. However, to make sense of that, something must always deterritorialize <\/em>something else in order for it to become to deterritorialized <\/em>and then subsequently reterritorialized<\/em>. That\u2019s faciality <\/em>or facialization<\/em>, the abstract machine<\/em> of faciality, that extends faciality from the head <\/em>and the body <\/em>to the whole world, resulting in landscapity<\/em>, as explained by the two (172). In summary of the plateau \u2018Year Zero: Faciality\u2019, face <\/em>and landscape<\/em>, or the face-landscape complex<\/em> as Bogue (9) calls it, are particularly troublesome as they are highly resistant to deterritorialization <\/em>due to being situated at the intersection of the mixed semiotic system<\/em> that operates through signifiance <\/em>and subjectification<\/em>. To be more specific, they (180) state that as faciality is machinic<\/em>, it\u2019s \u201cnot an annex to the signifier and the subject\u201d but the other way around as it \u201cis their condition of possibility.\u201d In other words, as they (180) explain:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cWhat chooses the faces is not a subject \u2026 it is faces that choose their subjects.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Here we could also replace faciality <\/em>with landscapity <\/em>to bear more direct relevance to this essay:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cWhat chooses the [landscapes] is not a subject \u2026 it is [landscapes] that choose their subjects.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Simply put, the face-landscape complex<\/em> is particularly pervasive and resistant to deterritorialization <\/em>because it is intertwined with the mixed semiotic system<\/em>. So, as Deleuze and Guattari (181) put it, its function is to \u201callow and ensure the almightiness of the signifier as well as the autonomy of the subject.\u201d To further reinforce this notion, they (180-181) note that certain social formations or assemblages <\/em>that impose signifiance <\/em>and subjectification <\/em>not only produce face <\/em>and landscape <\/em>and activate them, but also come to rely on them. So, in other words, it works both ways. The mixture of signifying <\/em>and postsignifying regimes <\/em>enables face and landscape while they enable the regimes. Therefore, as explained by the two (180-181):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cIt is these assemblages \u2026 that give the new semiotic system the means of its imperialism \u2026 the means both to crush the other semiotics and protect itself against any threat from outside.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Now, this is a rather negative and pessimistic view to this. The plateau is largely that way, but they do point out a couple of times how it is still open to further deterritorialization<\/em>, despite the mutual reinforcement of the abstract machine<\/em> and the assemblages<\/em>. Bogue (16) makes note of this too, hence the optimism to be found in their definition in \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019 where it is, according to Bogue (16), defined as \u201cmost frequently paired not with faces but with becomings[.]\u201d He (16) pinpoints this in the book (169):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cSensation, then, consists of affects and percepts, and in the words of Deleuze and Guattari\u2019s aphoristic summation, \u2018Affects are precisely these nonhuman becomings of man<\/em>, just as percepts \u2013 including the town \u2013 are nonhuman landscapes of nature<\/em>\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Now, if this is confusing, it is because \u2026 it is. I\u2019ll try to make sense of it. In the first instance, as in how it is defined in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019, landscape <\/em>is tied to how we, us humans, have to come see the world. Therefore, simply put, we could speak of human landscapes of culture. The emphasis should be on human<\/em>. In the second instance, as in how it is defined in \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019, it is the exact opposite, hence the point made by the two (169) in reference to C\u00e9zanne: \u201c[hum]an absent from but entirely within the landscape.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bogue (16-17) notes how Deleuze and Guattari infuse rhythm and music into their discussion of landscape <\/em>in \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019 but argues that it stays nonetheless primarily visual and selects the relevant bits scattered across the pages: \u201cThe landscape sees\u201d (169), \u201cEverything is vision, becoming\u201d (169), \u201cThe artists is a seer, a becomer\u201d (171), \u201cIt should be said of all art that, in relation to the percepts or visions they give us, artists are presenters of affects, the inventors and creators of affects\u201d (174), \u201cAesthetic figures \u2026 are sensations: percepts and affects, landscapes and faces, visions and becomings\u201d (177). So, as summarized by Bogue (16-17), it is evident that landscapes <\/em>are paired with percepts <\/em>and becomings <\/em>are paired with affects<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As elaborated throughout this essay, there is a clear phenomenological <\/em>inclination or undercurrent to this understanding of landscape<\/em>. If you aren\u2019t familiar with the work of Deleuze and Guattari, then, well, simply put, phenomenology is arguably too subject <\/em>oriented for them. In this sense, it is a bit, no, not strange, but perhaps surprising that they draw on phenomenology. Bogue (17) makes note of how Deleuze and Guattari handle this in the book. They (178) pose this first as a question:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cCan sensation be assimilated to an original opinion, to Urdoxa<\/em> as the world’s foundation or immutable basis?<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

They do answer their own question, but I want to draw your attention the word Urdoxa<\/em>, just in case you don\u2019t know what is meant by it. They (210) use to mean an \u201coriginal opinion, or meaning of meanings.\u201d If you break the word down to its components, \u2018Ur\u2019 and \u2018doxa\u2019, you get to that alright. \u2018Ur\u2019 has to do with something original, at least supposedly. For example, you can get beer called \u2018Urweisse\u2019 and \u2018Urbock\u2019. It usually marks that they are based on some original recipe, how they used to do it way back in the day. That just as something you might come across and be able to relate to. In phenomenology, you\u2019ll find Urdoxa <\/em>or protodoxa <\/em>used by Edmund Husserl (59) in \u2018Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cAll experience in this concrete sense rests at bottom on the simple pregiving protodoxa<\/em> [Urdoxa] of ultimate, simply apprehensible substrates. The natural bodies pregiven in this doxa<\/em> are the ultimate substrates for all subsequent determinations, cognitive determinations as well as those which axiological or practical. All come into being from<\/em> these simply apprehensible substrates. But this domain of the protodoxa, the ground of simple doxic consciousness [Glaubensbewusstsein<\/em>], is merely passive pregiving consciousness of objects as substrates. In this domain the existent is pregiven as a unity of identity. However, this domain of doxa is a domain of the fluid. A passively pregiven unity of identity is not yet one which is grasped as such and retained as an objective identity.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Skipping some bits here (I\u2019m sure you can find this yourself and read it properly), Husserl (59) adds that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cIt is so in pure perception, in which we let our glance wander here and there over the pregiven object which affects us.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

By this point it should be evident what Husserl means by Urdoxa<\/em>. It\u2019s the original and pure domain, the passively pregiven. The word can be found scattered across \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019. In it Deleuze and Guattari (149) make note of that phenomenology has set up as its task:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cIt \u2026 goes in search of original opinions which bind us to the world as to our homeland (earth).\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Only to give it a twist (149):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cThe distinction between original and derivative is not by itself enough to get us out of the simple domain of opinion and the Urdoxa<\/em> does not raise us to the level of the concept. \u2026 [P]henomenology is never more in need of a higher wisdom, of a \u2018rigorous science,\u2019 than when it invites to renounce it. [It] wanted to renew our concepts by giving us perceptions and affections that would awaken us to the world, not as babies or hominids but as, by right, beings whose proto-opinions would be the foundations of this world.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Followed by (149) by contrasting it with their own machinic <\/em>understanding of the world:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cBut we do not fight against perceptual and affective clich\u00e9s if we do not also fight against the machine that produces them.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

At this point, it is, perhaps, useful to reiterate what C\u00e9zanne had to say about clich\u00e9s. He (116) went as far as to say: \u201cGreat words are thoughts that don\u2019t belong to you and clich\u00e9s are the leprosy of art.\u201d Deleuze and Guattari do agree, but not in order to dispel them and return to something originary. Therefore they (149) criticize phenomenology accordingly:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cBy invoking the primordial lived \u2026 phenomenology could not prevent the subject from forming no more than opinions that already extracted clich\u00e9s from new perceptions and promised affections.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

To get back on track here, to the passage noted by Bogue (17), Deleuze and Guattari (178) answer their own question, the one posed some paragraphs ago:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cPhenomenology finds sensation in perceptual and affective \u2018a priori materials\u2019 that transcend the perceptions and affections of the lived[.]\u201d \u2026 The being of sensation, the bloc of percept and affect, will appear as the unity or reversibility of feeling and felt, their intimate intermingling like hands clasped together[.] \u2026 [F]lesh gives us the being of sensation and bears the original opinion distinct from the judgment of experience[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

It\u2019s worth making note of a couple of words: a priori<\/em>, unity <\/em>and original opinion<\/em>. They are all words that appear as such (unity) or in another form (a priori \u2192 pregiven, original opinion \u2192 Urdoxa, protodoxa) in the passage I cited from Husserl (59). The last bit on flesh, they (178) turn their attention to that in particular, finding it lacking, calling it, embodiment<\/em>, \u201cthe final avatar of phenomenology\u201d plunged in \u201cthe mystery of incarnation.\u201d Their (178) gripe with it is, rather poetically, that the flesh only works inasmuch as it has bones to support it. They (178) argue that in this case the supporting skeleton consists of religious piety and sensuality. For them it\u2019s not much of a support. This is why they (179) offer something else instead:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[N]ot so much bone or skeletal structure as house or framework.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

What they are offering instead of a skeleton is more of an exoskeleton, in the sense that it\u2019s not located within the subject<\/em>. It\u2019s not internal but external. They (179) elaborate that it consists of various sections:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201c[P]ieces of differently oriented planes … provide flesh with its framework \u2013 foreground and background, horizontal and vertical sections, left and right, straight and oblique, rectilinear or curved. [They] are walls but also floors, doors, windows, French windows, and mirror, which give sensation the power to stand on its own within autonomous frames. They are the sides of the bloc of sensation.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

As this may seem quite obscure, Bogue (17) characterizes the house or the framework <\/em>as \u201ca kind of scaffolding, a structuring schema of planes\u201d with various \u201csurfaces and openings\u201d that \u201cserve as membranes and conduits for the interaction of forces outside and inside its scaffolding of planes and frames.\u201d I used exoskeleton, but I reckon scaffolding is even more fitting. Deleuze and Guattari (180) emphasize its importance as a junction, noting that it takes part in becoming and thus calling it \u201clife, the \u2018nonorganic life of things.\u2019\u201d Bogue (17) makes note of how Deleuze and Guattari (182) point out that the house is not a mere shelter from forces, but something that, at best, filters them, selects them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I realize that I have, once again, strayed quite far from landscapes. To get back on track, Bogue (17) states that Deleuze and Guattari expand landscape <\/em>in \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019 to the cosmos, to the whole of universe. Bogue (17) summarizes their views, what I covered in the previous, rather obscures passages on phenomenology, its limitations and what they propose instead, as having three elements. The first element is affective becoming<\/em>s (instead of being, the flesh of the world). The second element is the house or the framework <\/em>(instead of the skeleton). The third element is the cosmos<\/em>, the universe. He (18) specifies the second element, the house, framework or scaffolding, as delimiting and framing <\/em>forces, whereas the third element, the landscape, has no limits and no frames as it is simply \u201ca plane that extends to infinity.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This has to end at some point and I\u2019ve already gone on a series of tangents that probably make this a tedious reading, so I\u2019ll try summarize this essay, as concisely as possible. So, right, I wanted to address Bogue\u2019s text because examines how one would go about rethinking or reimagining landscape<\/em>. I wanted to do this because I keep preaching about the perils of what Bogue calls the face-landscape complex<\/em> but not offering any solutions to the issue. I\u2019m not sure if I did a good job here. I tried covering all the relevant bases, going far beyond my own comfort zone to read on art and phenomenology, but I\u2019m aware that I may have misunderstood something (hopefully not everything). Perhaps some of these will open up better in the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In order to make sense of this endeavor, I think it\u2019s best contrast how landscape <\/em>is presented first in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019 and then in \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019. Bogue (24) offers apt concise definitions of both. He (24) characterizes how landscape <\/em>is presented in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe landscape of faciality is a landscape of stratification, part of a face-landscape complex co-functioning with the mixed semiotic of the despotic and passional regimes of signs.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

I covered this in more detail in this essay, using a bit different terms, the signifying <\/em>and the postsignifying regimes of signs<\/em>. The important thing is to remember how the face-landscape complex<\/em> and the mixed semiotic system<\/em> mutually reinforce one another. That is what makes it so pervasive and hard to change it. Bogue (24) characterizes how landscape <\/em>is presented in \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019 (169, 183):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe landscape of sensation is a landscape of destratification, of percepts which are intimately related to affects. The \u2018nonhuman landscapes of nature\u2019 and the \u2018nonhuman becomings of man\u2019 … form part of a triad of cosmos-house-becomings, the \u2018being of sensation\u2019 consisting of \u2018the compound of nonhuman forces of the cosmos, of man\u2019s nonhuman becomings, and of the ambiguous house that exchanges and adjusts them\u2019[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

When it comes to landscapes, that is to say landscape painting<\/em>, he (24-25) adds that they are to take life of their own, as noted by Maldiney (155-156), to create percepts<\/em>, that is to say \u2018nonhuman landscapes of nature\u2019. The purpose is \u201cto make perceptible the imperceptible forces that populate the world, affect us, and make us become\u201d, as defined by Deleuze and Guattari (182) in \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019. More simply put, as expressed by Bogue (25), painting is about rendering visible invisible forces. I find these definitions very close to the definitions of art by the artists discussed in this essay: C\u00e9zanne, Klee and Xi\u00e8 H\u00e8. This is exactly why I am captivated by apparition<\/em>, not appearance<\/em>. There\u2019s more than meets the eye.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a final note, I wholeheartedly recommend reading Bogue\u2019s \u2018The Landscape of Sensation\u2019. As you may struggle with it, I also recommend reading his other text \u2018Faces\u2019. Having prior familiarity with \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019 and \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019 is arguably recommended, but I think Bogue does an excellent job at explaining the relevant parts to his readers. Reading the other texts covered in part in this essay is also recommended, especially the texts by Paul Klee.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
    \n
  • Bogue, R. (2003). Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts<\/em>. New York, NY: Routledge.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Bogue, R. (2009). The Landscape of Sensation. In E. W. Holland, D. W. Smith and C. J. Stivale (Eds.), Gilles Deleuze: Image and Text<\/em> (pp. 9\u201326). London, United Kingdom: Continuum.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Cosgrove, D. E. (1985). Prospect, Perspective and the Evolution of the Landscape Idea. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers<\/em>, 10 (1), 45\u201362.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Daniels, St. (1996). Reviewed Work: Art and science in German landscape painting 1770-1840 by T. Mitchell. Ecumene<\/em>, 3 (3), 368\u2013370.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Delaunay, R. (1957). Du cubisme \u00e0 l’art abstrait<\/em>. Paris, France: S.E.V.P.E.N.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Deleuze, G. (1963). La philosophie critique de Kant: doctrine des facult\u00e9s<\/em>. Paris, France: Presses Universitaires de France.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Deleuze, G. ([1978] n.d.). Kant: Synthesis and Time \/ 01(M. McMahon, Trans.). https:\/\/deleuze.cla.purdue.edu\/seminars\/kant-synthesis-and-time\/lecture-01<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Deleuze, G. (1983). Cin\u00e9ma 1: L’image-mouvement<\/em>. Paris, France: Les \u00c9ditions de Minuit.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
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  • Deleuze, G. ([1983] 1986). Cinema 1: The Movement-Image<\/em> (H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: Univesity of Minnesota Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
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  • Deleuze, G., and F. Guattari (1980). Capitalisme et schizophr\u00e9nie: Mille plateaux<\/em>. Paris, France: Les \u00c9ditions de Minuit.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Deleuze, G., and F. Guattari ([1980] 1987). A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia<\/em> (B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
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  • Friedrich, C. D. (1824\u20131825). Der Watzmann<\/em>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Gasquet, J. (1926). C\u00e9zanne<\/em>. Paris, France: Les \u00c9ditions Bernheim-Jeune.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Gasquet, J. ([1926] 2001). What He Told Me. In M. Doran (Ed.), Conversations with C\u00e9zanne<\/em> (J. L. Cochran, Trans.) (pp. 107\u2013160). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Husserl, E. ([1948] 1973). Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic<\/em> (S. Churchill and K. Ameriks, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
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  • Klee, P. (1920). Sch\u00f6pferische Konfession: Paul Klee. In K. Edschmid (Ed.), Trib\u00fcne der Kunst und der Zeit: Eine Schriftensammlung, Vol. XIII<\/em> (pp. 28\u201341). Berlin, Germany: Erich Rei\u00df Verlag.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Klee. P. (1971). Das bildnerische Denken<\/em>. Basel, Switzerland: Schwabe Verlag.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Klee, P. ([1971] 2012). On Modern Art (D. F. Krell, Trans.). In J. Sallis (Ed.), Paul Klee: Philosophical Vision: From Nature to Art<\/em> (pp. 9\u201314). Chestnut Hill, MA: McMullen Museum of Art, Boston College.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Maldiney, H. (1973). Regard Parole Espace<\/em>. Lausanne, Switzerland: \u00c9ditions L’\u00c2ge d’Homme.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Mitchell, T. (1984). Caspar David Friedrich\u2019s Der Watzmann<\/em>: German Romantic Landscape Painting and Historical Geology. The Art Bulletin<\/em>, 66 (3), 452\u2013464.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Mitchell, T. (1993). Art and Science in German Landscape Painting 1770\u20131840<\/em>. Oxford, United Kingdom: Clarendon Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Oxford English Dictionary<\/em> Online <\/em>(n. d.). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Simondon, G. (2013). L\u2019individuation \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re des notions de forme et d\u2019information<\/em> (2nd ed.). Grenoble, France: Editions J\u00e9r\u00f4me Millon.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Simondon, G. (2020). Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Informatio<\/em>n (T. Adkins, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
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  • Vermeer, J. (1660\u20131661). Gezicht op Delft<\/em>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    I\u2019ve written quite a bit on landscape and, well, I won\u2019t let you down this time either. I\u2019ve particularly focused on how Gilles Deleuze and F\u00e9lix Guattari present it in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia\u2019. I\u2019m not going to focus on that in detail here, again, for the umpteenth time. I’ll do my best […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3554,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[188,393,59,282,970,71,703,960,123,969,356,608,951,446,335,326,197,954,519,957,963,966],"class_list":["post-1092","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-essays","tag-bogue","tag-cezanne","tag-cosgrove","tag-daniels","tag-delaunay","tag-deleuze","tag-friedrich","tag-gasquet","tag-guattari","tag-husserl","tag-kant","tag-klee","tag-maldiney","tag-mitchell","tag-parnet","tag-simondon","tag-smith","tag-straus","tag-tolonen","tag-vallega","tag-vermeer","tag-xie-he"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1092","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3554"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1092"}],"version-history":[{"count":40,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1092\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5472,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1092\/revisions\/5472"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1092"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1092"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1092"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}