This time I’ll be looking at something that I read not that long ago, maybe less than a month ago, give or take. It\u2019ll on the short side, I hope. Well, at least the text itself isn\u2019t that long, mere nine pages, so it shouldn’t be too bad. So, this time I\u2019ll taking a close look \u2018To Have Done with Judgment\u2019 by Gilles Deleuze. The text is included in a collection of various short essays known as \u2018Essays Critical and Clinical\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Before I get into this, explaining how I ended up writing on this, let\u2019s have a look at the word itself. It\u2019s understood as being a faculty<\/em>, something you possess, as indicated in a dictionary, in this case the Oxford English Dictionary (OED, s.v. \u201cjudgment\u201d, n):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe ability to make considered decisions or to arrive at reasonable conclusions or opinions on the basis of the available information; the critical faculty; discernment, discrimination.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n And:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe fact of possessing this ability to a high degree or in a sophisticated form; discretion, good sense, wisdom.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n As well as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe formation of an opinion or conclusion concerning something, esp. following careful consideration or deliberation. Also: the opinion or conclusion thus formed; an assessment, a view, an estimate.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n But it is also understood as something declared:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThat which has been formally decided and pronounced to be the case; any formal or authoritative decision, as of an umpire or arbiter.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n It is also used in a legal sense, which is, perhaps, what we are most used to:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe action or result of pronouncing a legal decision, and related uses.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n There are numerous definitions provided for the word in the dictionary and I\u2019m not listing all of them here. There are, however, certain ones that have to do with religion:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cA divine pronouncement; an eternal law or ordinance.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n And:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe determination of human reward and punishment by God.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Clarified as having to do with:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[T]he evaluation of human moral worth and consequent determination of reward and punishment by God.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n And:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cPunishment imposed by God for wrongdoing. Hence: a misfortune or calamity regarded as a divine punishment, or as signifying God’s displeasure; (in later use also more generally) any untoward event or circumstance interpreted as following inevitably upon a wrong or wicked action, an unwise decision, etc.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Anyway, this essay has to do with how the word is used in all of these senses, mostly in the legal sense, but also bearing particular relevance in the other senses as they are related to one another. You\u2019ll see.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So, after that introduction, I was not going to write on this, at least this wasn\u2019t on my to do list. What prompted me to address judgment <\/em>was an encounter with judgment<\/em>. No, it was not a legal judgment<\/em>. I was not in court and found (not) guilty. I was, however, (un)happy to read that an article of mine was rejected. Now, to be fair to my judges<\/em>, sorry, referees<\/em>, they did point out certain shortcomings, even if some of them were, as is typically the case, about pointing what they deem to be missing, which others would then judge <\/em>me for including. That’s the problem with opinions. This is not even about what the judgment <\/em>masked as feedback was about. This is rather about judgment <\/em>itself. What I find severely lacking is the possibility to argue. There simply is no room for it. I\u2019d love some polemic! Upheaval! Get medieval! Jokes aside, the thing is that it\u2019s called peer review<\/em>, which is itself a misnomer and an oxymoron. Why is that? Well, peers <\/em>are people who are of equal standing. If I\u2019m your equal, then my word is as good as yours. The same applies the other way around as well, rather obviously. If we are of equal standing, that is to say our position is in parallel, not greater or lower in relation to one another, then we cannot compel one another. Am I right?<\/p>\n\n\n\n To put this in military terms, which you\u2019ll for sure understand if you\u2019ve experienced it, you cannot exercise power<\/em> over those who are of the same rank. You simply aren\u2019t in the position to do so. Those who outrank you, they get to do that. Oh, and don\u2019t think for a minute that you get to object to whatever those who outrank you make you do. There is no challenging your superiors<\/em>. It\u2019s rigged that way. As an expert tip, the best way to minimize being pushed around is to minimize the contact with people who are in the position to do so. Don\u2019t go thinking your superior <\/em>is your peer<\/em>. Those who are equal <\/em>are your peers<\/em>. This is hierarchy 101. It\u2019s also an interesting social experiment. I know that I\u2019m getting sidetracked here, but it\u2019s fascinating how it works in the military. Your background doesn\u2019t matter. You are flattened to your rank and you end up associating with the people of that rank, just because, well, they, for sure, are not in the position to exercise power<\/em> over you. Conversely, you avoid your superiors <\/em>like the plague if you can help it, not because you don\u2019t like them or don’t respect them, but because at any time they can look at you and tell you to jump. Jumping becomes your only option. Sure, there are limits to this, but still. That’s pretty much how it is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The military is not your everyday life, unless you are in the military that is. In its defense, I must however say, it is at least honest and transparent about how it works. Rank is everything. Image is nothing. Obey your superior<\/em>. It\u2019s clear that people with more bling are above you. You can actually see <\/em>this, those chevrons, stripes and stars or whatever it is, eagles or lions, that marks the rank on the uniform, typically in gold, just so that it stands out. Anecdotally, to amuse you for a moment, there is this expression in the army that \u201cshit rolls down hill\u201d, albeit in the Finnish form it’s \u201cshit flows downwards\u201d. You can think of the stripes or bars that officers have in some countries as their insignia as stacking up. The lower the stack, the more of you get covered in it. The same applies to the non-commissioned officers, who, at least in the case of Finland have chevrons, inverted v-shapes, as their insignia. The chevron is itself humorously called the \u201cshit plow\u201d. Anyway, the lower the stack, the more you get covered in it. Those at the bottom, without anything to stack, well they are the ones to get most of it. Anyway, that said, the taller the stack, the higher the rank, the easier it gets to avoid these people like the plague. You\u2019ll learn to see them coming about a mile away. This is not the case outside military or at least it is not as obvious.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now, if you have no experience in military, I cannot judge <\/em>you. I can only say, that\u2019s on you, mate. I don\u2019t know what to do with that. However, it\u2019s only likely that you\u2019ve gone through a system of education<\/em>, for example a primary school followed by a secondary school. If you are reading this, it\u2019s also only likely that you are an academic, someone with university education. Of course, you might be a veritable autodidact, interested in this type of stuff, so there\u2019s that. I applaud you if that\u2019s the case. Anyway, assuming that you did go to school, for years, you\u2019ll know how it is. Other students are your peers<\/em>. Your teacher is not. As in the military, this does not mean that you dislike the superior <\/em>or that you have no respect for the superior<\/em>. You just recognize that you are not <\/em>at equal <\/em>footing. If it has been too long since you went to school, which is only likely to be the case, you may not remember how it was. Or wish to do so. Fair enough. If you\u2019ve ever worked in a factory, it\u2019s the same thing. Same with working in an office. You know your peers<\/em>. They are the people not above you, nor below you. They are the people you work with <\/em>on a mutual first name basis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I think it\u2019s time to jump to the text by Deleuze. I tried my best to explain this in terms of hierarchy in the military, but it\u2019s all too quaint and fair in its transparency, to the points it\u2019s obvious. It\u2019s, so, so, old school despotic<\/em>. There\u2019s no appeal to reason <\/em>or logic<\/em>. The only logic <\/em>is to do as you are told by your superiors<\/em>, who are told to do it by their superiors<\/em>, who are told to do so by their superiors <\/em>etc. At the top of this is someone is effectively the supreme leader<\/em> of the military, the despot-god<\/em>, to put it in Deleuzo-Guattarian terms. At least you know you serve the emperor<\/em>. Okay, time for some Deleuze (126):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cFrom Greek tragedy to modern philosophy, an entire doctrine of judgment has been elaborated and developed.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n What is this judgment <\/em>then? Well, I did allude to it early on, but I think I\u2019ve said enough thus far. Deleuze (126) attributes Friedrich Nietzsche as the one who recognized the condition of judgment <\/em>as having to do with a debt <\/em>to a deity<\/em>, that is to say a god<\/em>. Moreover, he specifies (126) it\u2019s not just debt <\/em>among other debt<\/em>, something you can simply pay and be done with it but a debt <\/em>that cannot be paid. It is, as made abundantly clear by him (126), an infinite debt<\/em>. Therefore he (126) summarizes the doctrine of judgment<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cMan does not appeal to judgment, he judges and is judgable only to the extent that his existence is subject to an infinite debt; the infinity of the debt and the immortality of existence each depend on the other[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n If you are puzzled by the infinite debt<\/em>, it is infinite <\/em>because the debtor <\/em>never dies, as clarified by Deleuze (126-127). Spoiler alert, the debtor <\/em>never dies because it is immortal<\/em>, a god<\/em>. To be more precise, it\u2019s actually not merely a god<\/em>, but the <\/em>\u2026 God<\/em>. The point here really is, in summary, that as the one on top is immortal<\/em>, you cannot do anything about. What are you going to do to an immortal<\/em>? It\u2019s rather obvious that resistance <\/em>is futile. I mean, we are talking about an immortal<\/em>. Even if we ignore how it is presented, think of what would happen if your neighbor, to use the closest person that came to my mind, even if your neighbor is technically closest to you, not me, would realize its immortality<\/em>. Yeah, something tells me that that person would end up as the supreme leader<\/em> and we\u2019d end up jumping, each and every time, uppity downdidy, or else. Among others, Deleuze (127) exemplifies this with Franz Kafka\u2019s \u2018The Trial\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cKafka, for his part, locates the infinite debt in an \u2018apparent aquittal,\u2019 and the deferred destiny in an \u2018unlimited postponement.\u2019 both of which keep the judges beyond our experience and our comprehension.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, in trial, in general, not just in the book, you are found either guilty or not guilty, as this or that. That\u2019s judgment<\/em>. However, what Deleuze (127) points to in Kafka is the infinite deferral of judgment<\/em>. Even if you acquitted, found not guilty of whatever it is you have ended up in court for to be judged<\/em>, this is just one case, one segment<\/em>. Acquittal does not mean that the system of judgment<\/em> is done with you, not to mention done in general. You can always end up in court. Trial is, of course, only one form of judgment <\/em>or tribunal<\/em>. You don\u2019t need a courtroom to be judged<\/em>. Deleuze (127) uses real life Kafka as example a tribunal <\/em>outside the courtroom, in reference to Elias Canetti\u2019s \u2018Kafka’s Other Trial: The Letters to Felice\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cKafka showed himself to be \u2018diabolical in all innocence\u2019 in order to escape from the \u2018tribunal in the hotel\u2019 where his infinite engagements were being judged.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n He (127) provides D.H. Lawrence as another example:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cLawrence lived under the accusations of immoralism and pornography that were brought against the least of his watercolors[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Here the point is that you can, indeed, be judged <\/em>by just about anyone, for about anything. To connect this to being a peer<\/em>, an equal<\/em>, it is often a sham. If you end up judged <\/em>by the people purporting to be your peers<\/em>, they are, in fact, no longer your peers<\/em>. They\u2019ve elevated themselves, either by promoting themselves or by demoting you. They\u2019ve engaged in one-upping you. In both cases here, it\u2019s about moral condemnation<\/em>. I like how in that passage Deleuze uses the word ‘engagement’ so aptly. Kafka is getting judged <\/em>for breaking off engagement with Felice Bauer. Now, apparently, Kafka was flip-flopping on the engagement, so, yes, he did sort of have it coming. That said, there\u2019s a difference between disagreement <\/em>and judgment<\/em>. You can voice your concerns and objections to someone, even tell them off. I don\u2019t know about others, but in my experience that results in mutual disagreement<\/em>. It works both ways. It can, however, also result in agreement<\/em>. In judgment<\/em>, it\u2019s not about disagreement <\/em>but about assumption of guilt<\/em>. Jean-Jacques Lecercle (29) puts it particularly well in \u2018The Misprision of Pragmatics\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe law of ordinary conversation is a lynching law, where there is no smoke without fire, and where the accused answers from a position of presumed guilt.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n He (29) also points to another relevant bit:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIf conversation is an unfair trial, or a battle where the stronger party, not the innocent one, wins the day, the question of alliances is decisive \u2013 one must isolate one’s enemies.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In Kafka\u2019s case it was indeed one against many. Actually, innocence and guilt were not on the menu, winning the day was. Felice could have confronted Kafka all by herself, told him off for flip-flopping, as well as for courting others, and end it right there, be done with it. Instead she orchestrated a trial <\/em>in which, she, her sister and her friend, confronted Kafka. This is the tribunal <\/em>at the hotel. If you are interested, this is explained in more detail in, for example, \u2018A Franz Kafka Encyclopedia\u2019 edited by Richard Gray, Ruth Gross, Rolf Goebel and Clayton Koelb. Just look up Felice Bauer. Deleuze (126-127) also uses Antonin Artaud as one of his examples, but I don\u2019t think I need to bring him up here, aside from that the title of Deleuze\u2019s essay is in reference to Artaud, who wish to be done with the judgment of God<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Summarizing the trials and tribulations of Nietzsche, Lawrence, Kafka and Artaud, all accused of different things, for being immoral <\/em>really, Deleuze (127) states that this has to do with the logic of judgment<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[It] merges with the psychology of the priest, as the inventor of the most somber organization: I want to judge, I have to judge.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Find this confusing? Well, I\u2019ll let Deleuze (127) further elaborate this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIt is not as if the judgment itself were postponed, put off until tomorrow, push back to infinity; on the contrary, it is the act of postponing, of carrying to infinity, that makes judgment possible. The condition of judgment lies in a supposed relation between existence and the infinite order<\/em> of time.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Who gets to judge <\/em>then? Deleuze (127) explains:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe power to judge[,] and to be judged[,] is given to whomever stands in this relation.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n I acknowledge that this may seem rather theological <\/em>to you, but that\u2019s because it is<\/em>. However, it\u2019s not limited to morality<\/em>. This is particularly relevant when it comes to academics<\/em>. I\u2019ll let Deleuze (127) explain this as he puts it so aptly:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cEven the judgment of knowledge envelops an infinity of space, time, and experience that determines the existence of phenomena in space and time (\u2018every time that \u2026\u2019).\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, to comment this, before I let him finish and make the connection, we are dealing here with what is true<\/em> and what is not<\/em>. That\u2019s what the cited bit in the passage is about, stating that, for example, every time that something happens, it leads to something else happening. Anyway, Deleuze (127) wraps this up:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cBut the judgment of knowledge in this sense implies a prior moral and theological form, according to which a relation was established between existence and the infinite following an order of time: the existing being as having debt to God.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n You are probably not convinced by him, but that\u2019s probably because we are barely halfway through the second page of his essay. In order to make more sense of this, Deleuze (127-128) juxtaposes the doctrine of judgment<\/em> with what he refers to a system of cruelty<\/em>. He (127) credits Nietzsche for having making it apparent to us that there is no infinite debt<\/em>, only finite debt<\/em> between various parties:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cOne begins by promising, and becomes indebted not to a god but to a partner, depending on the forces that pass between the parties. \u2026 Everything places between parties, and the ordeal is not a judgment of God, since there is neither god nor judgment.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Now, I reckon it actually makes no difference if there is a god <\/em>or gods, or not involved. As he (129) points out later on, it just happens to be that this is particularly marked in religions, especially in the Christian form. The crux of is that the relation is between parties and thus breaking that contract ought to result in confrontation between those parties and only those parties. Appealing to judgment<\/em>, to an outside party, is illegit, an illegitimate move on the behalf of one of the parties involved. The other party ends up having to participate in a rigged game. Think of it as playing a game of cards, poker, the classic version, the one in westerns where someone may get shot after a round, no re-raising allowed, and you end up losing the game because someone cheated, having an ace up one’s sleeve. There\u2019s a reason why people get shot around tables in westerns. To explain this better, I remember my brother once explaining to me that as kids a friend of his used to play poker with his younger brother. The rules were as they are, except for the fact that the older brother always won the game because he had six cards, instead of five, a trump card if you will. Even if he lost the game according to the set rules, he was able to bring that trump card in from the outside to win the game. Now, his younger brother was, apparently, no, not dumb, but simply too young to understand and\/or to question his older brother. Why would someone you look up to do that? Well, that\u2019s the point exactly. Because they can. That move may be illegit, but that\u2019s the whole point.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So, as in the risk of getting shot at a poker table in a western, Deleuze (127-128) explains how this works according to Nietzsche:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[T]here exists a justice that is opposed to all judgment, according to which bodies are marked by each other, and the debt is inscribed directly on the body following the finite<\/em> blocks that circulate in a territory. The law \u2026 does not have the immobility of eternal things, but is ceaselessly displaced among families that either have to draw blood or pay with it.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n This is why it\u2019s called the system of cruelty<\/em>, in case you were wondering about the moniker earlier on. To make this abundantly clear, Deleuze (128) characterizes it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cSuch are the terrible signs that lacerate bodies and stain them, the incisions and pigments that reveal in the flesh of each person what they owe and are owed[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n This is a level playing field. No third parties involved or invoked. In contrast, the doctrine of judgmen<\/em>t involves exactly that, invoking a superior <\/em>force to your aid. This is also the comic version of the golden rule: whoever has the gold, makes the rules. No, it\u2019s not about you giving someone gold in exchange for something, perhaps a favor, a debt <\/em>between two parties. If that were the case, the gold would simply circulate. It\u2019s about the involvement of a third party, the authority <\/em>that guarantees that your gold has value as gold has no intrinsic value.<\/p>\n\n\n\n How does this work then? Deleuze (128-129) explains that it functions according to lots<\/em>, supposedly given to people by gods<\/em>, and forms<\/em>, how well one fits <\/em>the allotted lot <\/em>for some end<\/em>. Now, obviously the lot <\/em>might not be the one you want or fit <\/em>in, but, well, too bad, that\u2019s what you got to deal with, or else. Life is reduced to judgment <\/em>in the name of higher values<\/em>. Deleuze (129) elaborates how it operates between people:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[People] judge insofar as they value their own lots, and are judged insofar as a form either confirms or dismisses their claim. They judge and are judged at the same time, and take equal delight in judging and being judged.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n What happens if you fail to stay or value your own lot<\/em>? Deleuze (129) states that if you fail at that, it results in delirium <\/em>and madness<\/em>, well, any form of supposed deviancy<\/em>, really. I realize that all this theology <\/em>might bore you. It probably seems a bit archaic. Anyway, before I get to how this operates contemporarily, it\u2019s worth noting that, as I sort of pointed out already, it\u2019s in Christianity where judgment <\/em>becomes about judgment <\/em>itself, not about this or that lot <\/em>or form <\/em>as there is only one lot <\/em>and one form<\/em>, as explained by Deleuze (129). He (129) explains how this works in modernity then:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cAt the limit, dividing oneself into lots and punishing oneself become the characteristics of the new judgment or modern tragedy.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n This reminds me of what Deleuze and Guattari state in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia\u2019. They (130) call this the \u201cparadox of the legislator-subject\u201d in which the despot-god<\/em> is replaced by the Cartesian Cogito<\/em>. As they (130) characterize it, one is no longer slave <\/em>to anyone else but yourself, obeying yourself at all times, very, very passionately. You no longer need anyone else to judge <\/em>you. You judge <\/em>yourself! It is in this sense that we can think of judgment <\/em>as a faculty<\/em>. It is, indeed, both extremely cold and extremely passionate at the same time, as they (130) point out. Of course that doesn\u2019t mean that just because we judge <\/em>ourselves, we cease to judge <\/em>others. No. Only the source of judgment <\/em>has shifted from a higher power to each and every one of us. This actually only makes the judgment <\/em>more potent. Deleuze (129) elaborates this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cNothing is left but judgment, and every judgment bears on another judgment.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In other words, we are dealing with endless chains of judgment<\/em>. Deleuze (129-130) moves on to provide examples, mainly ones from as recently as in the times of the ancient Greeks. I wouldn\u2019t bring these up if there wasn\u2019t something particularly interesting in these examples. Anyway, he (129-130) explains that, contrary to what many might think, dreams <\/em>are not liberating, but imprisoning. The problem for him is that our dreams <\/em>are organized<\/em>, structured<\/em>, after all, Apollo is not only the god of dreams<\/em> but also the god of judgment<\/em>. More contemporarily, it is, apparently, the people most interested in dreams that like to make use of them to judge <\/em>and punish people outside dreams<\/em>, in reality. So, for example, if you had a dream of about this and\/or that, then it\u2019s taken to mean this and\/or that, perhaps something that needs rectifying. He contrasts this with insomnia<\/em>. For him insomniacs are not people who fail to sleep, but people who escape dreams<\/em>, in the Apollonian sense. This why he (130) calls insomnia <\/em>\u201cthe state of Dionysian intoxication, [a] way of escaping judgment.\u201d This is perhaps too literal, but, if you think of it, what results from insomnia<\/em>, sleep deprivation, is somewhat similar to intoxication. I wouldn\u2019t call myself an insomniac, I quite like to sleep and enjoy the absurdity of my dreams<\/em>, but there is, in my experience, something to this. When I feel like I can\u2019t sleep, it\u2019s driven by this will to escape judgment<\/em>, to create something, right here, right now. It\u2019s also clarifying that Deleuze is not opposing insomnia <\/em>with sleep, but with dreams<\/em>. He (130) actually refers to it as dreamless sleep. You really have to think of this in multiple sense of the word, dreams <\/em>as having to do with sleeping and as having to do with how we wish for something to be, this and\/or that, organized <\/em>in a certain way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Deleuze (130-131) moves on to elaborate how the system of cruelty<\/em> and the doctrine of judgmen<\/em>t operate at the level of the body<\/em>. He (130) starts by pointing out how our bodies <\/em>are organized, how parts <\/em>of our bodies <\/em>are organs<\/em>, which he (130) specifies as \u201cboth judges and judged[.]\u201d He (130) adds that the divine judgment<\/em> is then the organization of infinity<\/em>. This is where he (130) connects judgment <\/em>with sensing<\/em>, as in having to do with our sense organs<\/em>. In other words, senses <\/em>are faculties<\/em>, hence the connection to judgment<\/em>. With regards to the body <\/em>then, the physical body<\/em>, he (131) clarifies that body <\/em>is only an organism <\/em>in as much it is judged <\/em>as such, marked by classifying it into various organs<\/em>. In contrast, the body <\/em>that is not classified as an organism<\/em>, consisting of organs<\/em>, is thus, following Artaud, referred to by him (131) as the body without organs<\/em>. This is a concept that gets elaborated in more detail in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019. An entire plateau is dedicated to it. He (131) elaborates it as vital, living, affective and intensive, having poles, zones, thresholds and gradients. He (131) also calls it inorganic, which may seem a bit confusing, but remember that this is not about organic in the sense that we tend to think of it as having to do with something living, but about organization<\/em>. So, inorgan<\/em>ic is about unorganized<\/em>. Deleuze (131) states the application of this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe way to escape judgment is to make yourself a body without organs, to find your body without organs. \u2026 [T]o defined the body in its becoming, in its intensity, as the power to affect or to be affected[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n This, \u201cthe power to affect or to be affected\u201d, he (131) attributes to Nietzsche\u2019s project, as in \u2018Will to Power\u2019. After explaining this with regards to the body<\/em>, Deleuze (132) moves on to explain what replaces judgment<\/em>, in all its senses:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[I]t is combat that replaces judgment. And no doubt the combat appears as a combat against judgment, against its authorities and its personae.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, judgment <\/em>is replaced by combat<\/em>. It only follows that the \n
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