I keep returning to Jean-Jacques Lecercle\u2019s article \u2018The Misprision of Pragmatics: Conceptions of Language in Contemporary French Philosophy\u2019. I return to it not because I don\u2019t understand it and have to keep reading it, again and again, as if it was beyond me, but because of the stuff I read, or, rather come across on a daily basis. The media is saturated by politics and it\u2019s only fitting to cite Gilles Deleuze and F\u00e9lix Guattari (82) in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia\u2019 here:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cPragmatics is a politics of language.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
To be more specific, they (83) note:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cIf the objection is leveled that these specific features pertain to politics and not linguistics, it must be observed how thoroughly politics works language from within, causing not only the vocabulary but also the structure and all of the phrasal elements to vary as the order-words change.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
In other words, you can\u2019t neatly separate language <\/em>from politics<\/em>. As they (83) continue:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cA type of statement can be evaluated only as a function of its pragmatic implications, in other words, in relation to the implicit presuppositions, immanent acts, or incorporeal transformations it expresses and which introduce new configurations of bodies.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Now, I\u2019m not going to explain the concepts used here. I\u2019ve done that a number of times already and going into detail here would be just me reiterating what I’ve written in the past. You do have to look up incorporeal transformations though. Also reading parts of \u2018The Logic of Sense\u2019 by Deleuze may prove to be helpful in understanding that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In summary, an incorporeal transformation<\/em> is something in which a body <\/em>is transformed as a surface effect<\/em>, not in itself. So, a bank robber that rolls in with an assault rifle turns people in a bank into hostages and the bank building into a prison by expressing \u201cThis is a robbery!\u201d. There are no actual changes to the bodies, the people and the building, unless someone attempts to foil the robbery. If there was, that\u2019d be a corporeal transformation<\/em>. The point is that while the bodies don\u2019t transform corporeally in such cases, the incorporeal transformation is real and has clear effects on people. That is what language <\/em>can do<\/em>. It has that potential. Of course it\u2019s just empty words if the preexisting configuration of bodies does not support it. Take out the assault rifle and the statement \u201cThis is a robbery!\u201d is impotent. Hence they (83) state that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cTrue intuition is not a judgment of grammaticality but an evaluation of internal variables of enunciation in relation to the aggregate of the circumstances.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
So, the person who rolls in doesn’t have to yell what’s the deal in grammatically perfect English. The person might yell \u201cThis a robbery!\u201d or just \u201cRobbery!\u201d and it’d still result in an incorporeal transformation<\/em>. There’s just that something to a person handling an assault rifle that’ll make you ignore grammar. At that point I reckon you get the gist, regardless of grammar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Anyway, back to what I was going to start out with, the article written by Lecercle. In the article he provides three (actually four) readings of the same text (but I\u2019ll skip the supposed naive reading of a text). The first reading included here he (24) calls the Anglo-Saxon or pragmatic reading, influenced by the likes of J. L. Austin, J. R. Searle and notably H. P. Grice. The second reading he (24) calls a continental reading, influenced by Jacques Lacan. The third reading is still continental, but that of Deleuze and Guattari, as expressed in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019, as stated by Lecercle (32). This time I\u2019ll be looking at the first one, the pragmatics of Grice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To those who are not familiar with Grice I recommend looking up his text \u2018Logic and Conversation\u2019. It\u2019s fairly short and to the point. It\u2019s included, for example, in his book \u2018Studies in the Way of Words\u2019 and in a volume three of \u2018Syntax and Semantics\u2019 that focuses on speech acts<\/em>. I would say it\u2019s fairly accessible and only some sixteen pages, including all the examples. It\u2019s among the more self-explanatory texts that I\u2019ve read, so there\u2019s little extra that you need to know before you read it. In other words, there is no good reason not to read it, even if you are not into linguistics, not to mention pragmatics. The pagination here is from ‘Syntax and Semantics’, just so you can check things if that\u2019s your thing. Grice (43) starts out by explaining what an implicature<\/em> is, defining it as having to do with, as you might guess from the wording of it, what is implied<\/em> in a conversation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To explain this, Grice (43) uses the example of two people talking to one another about a third person, not present to observe the conversation, nor take part in it. Long story short, one of the two asks a question about the person absent, to which the other person answers in a way that is or may be unclear. Why that is? Well, as he (43) goes to explain, whether what is said is clear or unclear depends on the existing circumstances. In Grice’s (43) example, the situation of the absent person is characterized as quite alright, doing good and what not, but then there is this bit that could be understood as a negative characterization of the person, that \u201che hasn\u2019t been to prison yet<\/em>.\u201d As Grice (43) clarifies, he might be the kind of person who might end up behind bars in his line of work or that, for example, his colleagues might scheme against him. The point here really is that what is said is not the same thing as what is implied <\/em>by what is said, as well as that for it to make sense, one way or another, depends on the circumstances, who is saying what and to whom, in the presence or absence of other people, where it is said etc. To distinguish this from what many think of as meaning<\/em> (horrible word if you ask me), he (44) notes that this is not about what one knows about words in a given language as that would omit the circumstances, the context<\/em>, in which whatever is expressed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
He (43-44) uses the terms implicate<\/em> (verb, to implicate), implicature<\/em> (noun, implying) and implicatum<\/em> (noun, what is implied). He (44-45) further distinguishes between conventional implicatures<\/em> and non-conventional implicatures<\/em>, which include what he calls conversational implicatures<\/em>. The conventional implicatures include words, such as, ‘therefore’ and ‘but’. Either they are, conventionally, the way we take them to be understood or they aren\u2019t. For example, the word \u2018but\u2019 is used to create contrast and \u2018therefore\u2019 is used to indicate a conclusion based on a certain premise or premises. If one were to explain in the terms used by Deleuze (13) in \u2018The Logic of Sense\u2019, conventional implicatures are about denotation <\/em>or indication <\/em>(indexing<\/em>), in the sense that they either are or aren\u2019t, true <\/em>or false<\/em>. For example, this is this (true) and if it isn\u2019t, then it\u2019s not this but, for example, that (false). The conversational implicatures are at the core of Grice’s text, which this essay will mainly focus from here on out. Anyway, now that those terms have been clarified, I can move on to what\u2019s actually interesting in the text. He (45) states:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cOur talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Here it\u2019s worth adding that later on in the text, he further addresses in what sense he uses the word rational<\/em>. He (48) notes that not everyone acts this way, but rather that people, by and large, are in the habit<\/em> of doing so and it is reasonable<\/em> to expect to do so. Anyway, back to the opening remarks. He (45) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cThey are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, at least a mutually accepted direction.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
In other words, at least the way I read Grice (48), people are not inherently cooperative<\/em>, but, nonetheless, it is characteristic of people to behave that way, because it has become habitual to them. This makes me think of Pierre Bourdieu here, but let\u2019s not go on a tangent. In summary, it\u2019s an expectation, one that tends to hold, even if it isn\u2019t an inherent feature of people. Right, he (45) then goes on to propose that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cWe might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected \u2026 to observe, namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
He (45) calls this the Cooperative Princip<\/em>le, in short the CP. He (45-46) introduces four maxims<\/em>, marked by relevant categories<\/em>. The first category, Quantity<\/em>, consists of two maxims. Firstly (45):<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cMake your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Secondly (45):<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cDo not make your contribution more informative than is required.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
In short, the category <\/em>of Quantity <\/em>has to do with being as informative as is necessary. Provide enough information, not too little, not too much. In the light of the CP, it\u2019s not very cooperative to say little. It\u2019ll just leave people puzzled. It\u2019s the same the other way around. It can be hard grasp what someone is saying when they say too much, when they keep going on and on and on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The second category<\/em>, Quality<\/em>, builds on what he (46) calls the supermaxim <\/em>of \u201c[t]ry to make your contribution one that is true\u2019, further elaborated by subdividing it to two maxims. Firstly (46):<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cDo not say what you believe to be false.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Note, not what is false<\/em>, but what you believe to be false. Secondly (46):<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cDo not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Again, not what is false <\/em>or untrue, but what you are unsure of because you simply can\u2019t really be sure of it. If we are to simplify this category<\/em>, this is the category about lying to people. In the light of the CP, it\u2019s rather un<\/em>cooperative to state something you reckon is false or you can\u2019t be sure of. That said, it\u2019s worth emphasizing this is not about knowing <\/em>something to be false. So, you are being cooperative <\/em>if you believe something to be true<\/em>, even if, in fact, it is actually false. People are not actually expected to be oracles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The third category<\/em>, Relation<\/em>, Grice (46) links to only one maxim<\/em>, \u201c[b]e relevant.\u201d This is about focus and retaining it throughout a conversation. In light of the CP, it\u2019s not exactly cooperative to go off topic. You might mix this up with Quantity<\/em>, but in my view Relation is not about how much or how little one speaks or writes. Sure, by being too informative you may risk ending up expressing all kinds of things that are not relevant. There\u2019s that. Then again, you might well be aptly informative, yet what is expressed is irrelevant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The fourth category<\/em>, Manner<\/em>, has to do with what Grice (46) calls the supermaxim <\/em>of \u201c[b]e perspicuous\u201d, further elaborated by subdividing it to four maxims. Firstly (46):<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cAvoid obscurity of expression.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Secondly (46):<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cAvoid ambiguity.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Thirdly (46):<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cBe brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
Fourthly (46):<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cBe orderly.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
He (46-47) then concedes that there might be more maxims <\/em>pertaining to Manner<\/em>, such as being polite, but, for him, such are not conversational maxims<\/em>. In contrast to the other categories<\/em>, Manner, is, arguably, the least clear of the four categories. In summary, it\u2019s the thing in conversation that doesn\u2019t have to do with how much or little is said (Quantity<\/em>), whether the one expressing it believes it holds or not (Quality<\/em>) nor whether what is expressed is relevant or not (Relation<\/em>). It\u2019s not about what <\/em>is expressed, the content of it, but about how <\/em>it is expressed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I think it\u2019s worth noting that in general the categories <\/em>are also often referred to as the maxims<\/em>, albeit Grice refers to them as categories that have to do with this and\/or that maxim. That said, I don\u2019t think it\u2019s wrong to refer to them as the maxims, considering that each category is, in a nutshell, what the maxims are all about. I\u2019m a bit willy-nilly about this, sloppy, but this just as a clarification that, yes, there is a further distinction made so I went with it, how it is presented by Grice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Anyway, after explaining the categories <\/em>and the maxims<\/em>, he (49) lists four ways of how to not fulfill maxims. Firstly, one may simply violate <\/em>a maxim. Secondly, one may opt out<\/em> from fulfilling the maxims and the CP by pointing out that one is not playing ball. Oh no, too bad! This also includes cases where one simply cannot fulfill the maxim, for example, when one is not in the position to do so. Think of agreements on confidentiality. It\u2019s not up to you to give out the information, so you point out that you are not in the position to do so. In contrast to violating, this is evident whereas with violations it is not. Thirdly, one may face clash <\/em>of maxims. He uses the example of failing to fulfill the first maxim of quantity, providing enough information, because one doesn\u2019t have enough evidence, thus opting to cover up the lack of evidence, the second maxim of quality, by not saying much. In other words, when you don\u2019t have the evidence, i.e. you fail at the Quality category<\/em>, it may be preferential to opt to fail at the Quantity category<\/em> instead by saying as little as you can. One could also go the other route and say too much about something, in a sort of generic way, in order to hide the fact that you are presenting false <\/em>as true<\/em>. In this case you\u2019d be failing the second maxim in the category of Quantity in order to cover up that you also fail the first maxim in the Quality category. One could also point out that it might not be about Quantity but also or instead about Relation<\/em>. By saying too much, you may be going off topic, thus also failing the maxim pertaining to relation. In some cases it\u2019s not about quantity but relation alone, so going on a tangent can help you to avoid making it evident that you are have insufficient knowledge about something in order to address it. These clashes may prove to be useful in certain situations, albeit they are in violation of the CP. This leads us to the fourth way of not fulfilling a maxim, flouting<\/em>, which is done blatantly in order to exploit <\/em>it. He (53) lists a number of cases where this applies: irony, metaphor, meiosis and hyperbole. In simple terms, you may flout or exploit a maxim not because you wish to be un<\/em>cooperative, but rather the opposite. A lot of comedy wouldn\u2019t work if we simply said things on an as is basis. He (54-55) offers a couple of mundane examples, how one can, for instance, exploit the maxims of manner. He (55) notes that when it comes to obscurity, one may wish to be purposely somewhat obscure, just so that the other person in the conversation can grasp what\u2019s what but any nosy third parties are unable to comprehend the conversation. In addition, as he (55) points out, the obscurity, in itself, may be a clue to the other person as to keep things quiet, hinting towards distrust of the third party. This just so that when the other person replies or asks for clarification, it\u2019s not done in less obscure terms, in order to prevent the third party from getting in on the conversation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the final segments, Grice (57-58) returns to address conversational implicature<\/em>. Firstly, taking the CP into account, he notes that conversational implicature assumes its presence, yet it is, indeed, possible to opt out<\/em> from the principle, thus canceling the conversational implicature. This is the bit about opting out reiterated. Secondly, he notes that they are marked by what he calls nondetachability<\/em>, how what is implied cannot be detached from what is said. I find this part, perhaps, the fuzziest point in Grice\u2019s text. Anyway, to make sense of this, this reminds of how in \u2018The Logic of Sense\u2019 Deleuze (14) notes that you can only imply <\/em>this or that and conclude <\/em>something on its basis if you retain the premise(s)<\/em>. If you remove or detach those premises, then what is said no longer carries the same implication<\/em>. That said, you can, of course, replace those premises with other premises that make it work again. Therefore, to be clear, you can actually remove or detach the premises of a proposition but only insofar that you replace the premises with other premises that make it work. Simply put, you cannot fully detach them. The result is that, in Deleuze\u2019s (14-15) terms, implication is not a matter of true <\/em>vs. false<\/em>, but true <\/em>vs. absurd<\/em>. If the premises don\u2019t hold, what is said is still, I reckon, fine but just absurd. Thirdly, Grice (58) states that conversation implicature must contain the feature that one speaks approximately, because it presupposes prior knowledge<\/em>. This sort of goes without saying, really, and ties with the second feature. You need something before the utterance, as he points out, as does Deleuze, otherwise it\u2019s just absurdity. You can\u2019t imply something without that being the condition for it. This is also what differentiates the conversational implicatures from the conventional implicatures<\/em>. Grice (58) does note that it is possible for them to become conventionalized, under certain circumstances, but that\u2019s a bit beside the point here. Fourthly, he (58) returns to point out that what is implied is not a matter of true vs. false, unlike with what is said. This may seem a bit convoluted, but, as he (58) puts it, \u201cthe implicature is not carried by what is said, but only by the saying of what is said, or by \u2018putting it that way.\u2019\u201d This bit reminds me of how Deleuze and Guattari discuss the role of the subject<\/em>, who speaks, who writes, in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019, noting that it\u2019s always the \u2018I\u2019 that writes the \u2018I\u2019. Even text on a page or on a screen, having become detached, severed from the writer, in this case me, as you read this, has this feature. It is no longer the writer, me (as opposed to you), who is writing (saying) what it is that I\u2019ve written here as the text lives a life of its own, in relation to you, the reader, but, there\u2019s always someone, in this case you, who says, to yourself (unless you speak out loud while reading), what it is written (said) here. The way you say it, the way you put it, makes a world of difference, and, linking this to the third feature, it\u2019s, in part, based on the presupposition of prior knowledge, whatever that happens to be in your case. Fifthly, he (58) notes that there\u2019s a disjunction of certain specific explanations as the list of various explanations, for this and\/or that, is open<\/em>, as opposed to closed<\/em>. I take this bit as emphasizing what he (58) calls indeterminacy<\/em>, hence the point made about implication being open, rather than closed. In Deleuzean terms, as explained in \u2018The Logic of Sense\u2019, the thing with meaning<\/em> is that for something to hold, you need the premises that support your proposition. The problem with this is that even the premises are, in fact, propositions, which themselves rely on other premises that need to be in place for them to hold and so on, and so on, ad infinitum<\/em>. This is known as infinite regress. This is the issue of an open system. Meaning isn\u2019t fixed as the system isn\u2019t closed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I was going to keep on writing on this one, but I reckon it\u2019s better to split this text into two (or more) essays. At least to me, there are certain somewhat obvious limitations to Grice\u2019s pragmatics. They have to do with the positioning of the subject <\/em>and its autonomy, as well as the same with the other speakers or interlocutors but I\u2019ll hope to address that in the following essay. In short, the issue is that this assumes quite a bit from people and sees deviating from it as \u2026 well \u2026. deviant. That said, ignoring the limitations for now (to be discussed in the following essay), I find Gricean pragmatics handy because it is easy to follow and, as pointed out by Lecercle (26), \u201c[a] Gricean reading is hard to kill[.]\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To exemplify the pros of a Gricean reading of whatever it is that happens to be at stake, the discussion or conversation at hand, it\u2019s not about what something means<\/em>, but about what is implied<\/em>. It offers a handy toolkit that allows people to examine what people say and what they<\/em> mean by it. To put it bluntly, it works quite well as a BS detector. I think it\u2019s worth emphasizing here that it\u2019s not about truth <\/em>vs. false<\/em>, but about a truth claim<\/em>, whether the person honestly believes to be right and can back it up.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
So, if we assume that people want to cooperate<\/em>, to make things work, it\u2019s only reasonable to assume that when they say something, they are as informative as necessary, not more, not less, (Quantity<\/em>), they only utter something that they believe to be true and also backed up by evidence (Quality<\/em>), they say what\u2019s relevant to what\u2019s at stake (Relation<\/em>) and they are brief, orderly and avoid being obscure and ambiguous (Manner<\/em>). Of course, as Grice does concede, there is nothing that makes people adhere to the Cooperative Principle<\/em>. Sure, it\u2019s probably reasonable <\/em>to expect people, others but also you included, to cooperate just so that we get somewhere, together, yet, as he does concede, it\u2019s evident that there is nothing that makes it so that people must pull together, nor that they actually do. Fair game. The good thing is that regardless of whether people are or aren\u2019t cooperative by nature <\/em>(ah, shiver me timbers, to even use that word), you can still use this as a foil. So instead of omitting that you assume that people seek to cooperate, let\u2019s explicitly suppose that they do, I mean, what would be the reason in a society for people to, for example, lie or exaggerate?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I used the principle for this purpose in my Master\u2019s Thesis, examining presidential candidate debates where it is, or at least should be, rather obvious that it is in the interest of the candidates to maximize their support. Now, okay, fair enough, we could assume that politicians never lie, omit information or exaggerate. In other words, let\u2019s assume that they\u2019ll do their best to cooperate <\/em>with other candidates and the audience, the voters, and the most suitable candidate is chosen this way. I acknowledge that this is already a bit messed up, a pipe dream. That said let\u2019s go with it, for the sake of argument. Isn\u2019t it great? That we get the best people, doing their best? By people. For people. Then again, what happens when one person doesn\u2019t go with this? What if one person plays dirty? Everyone will play dirty, obviously. All the time? Well, maybe not all the time. You have to pick your battles. I reckon you want to appear that you are the one for the task, the person who is cooperative, not belligerent. My point is that for me it\u2019s sort of given that people are not going to be cooperative at all times. That said, that doesn\u2019t mean that people are simply un<\/em>cooperative either. So, if Grice is off when he calls it the Cooperative Principle, I wouldn\u2019t say that just because people don\u2019t follow the principle that it should be called the Un-Cooperative Principle. What happens to be in your best interest is not necessarily mutually exclusive to the interest of others, a common good, even if that may well be the case. Also, what may be interest to everyone, in general, the common good, doesn\u2019t simply entail that it will be against your best interest. It\u2019s not for or against, either, or. It depends.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
References<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
\n
- Austin, J. L. ([1955] 1962). How to Do Things with Words<\/em> (J. O. Urmson, Ed.). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Deleuze, G. ([1969] 1990). The Logic of Sense<\/em> (C. V. Boundas, Ed., M. Lester and C. J. Stivale, Trans.). London, United Kingdom: Athlone Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Deleuze, G., and F. Guattari ([1980] 1987). A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia<\/em> (B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In P. Cole and J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3: Speech Acts<\/em> (pp. 41\u201358). New York, NY: Academic Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Grice, H. P. ([1975] 1989). Logic and Conversation. In H. P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words<\/em> (pp. 22\u201340). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Lecercle, J-J. (1987). The Misprision of Pragmatics: Conceptions of Language in Contemporary French Philosophy. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures<\/em>, 21, 21\u201340.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language<\/em>. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
I keep returning to Jean-Jacques Lecercle\u2019s article \u2018The Misprision of Pragmatics: Conceptions of Language in Contemporary French Philosophy\u2019. I return to it not because I don\u2019t understand it and have to keep reading it, again and again, as if it was beyond me, but because of the stuff I read, or, rather come across on […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3554,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[71,897,123,885],"class_list":["post-1251","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-essays","tag-deleuze","tag-grice","tag-guattari","tag-lecercle"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1251","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3554"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1251"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1251\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5118,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1251\/revisions\/5118"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1251"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1251"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1251"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}