{"id":1257,"date":"2018-08-14T14:20:03","date_gmt":"2018-08-14T14:20:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/?p=1257"},"modified":"2023-06-20T19:01:35","modified_gmt":"2023-06-20T19:01:35","slug":"lacant-or-wont","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/2018\/08\/14\/lacant-or-wont\/","title":{"rendered":"Lacan\u2019t or won\u2019t?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

So, I went through H.P. Grice\u2019s text \u2018Logic and Conversation\u2019 in the previous essay, covering his take on pragmatics. I left it at that, not really getting into it deeper, so its shortcomings weren\u2019t really covered. Sure, I did make note of what Grice concedes here and there, namely that people, in general, don\u2019t actually follow the Cooperative Principle<\/em> (CP). There are plenty of cases where people are rather un<\/em>cooperative. That said, I also noted that while people may be cooperative or uncooperative, they aren\u2019t necessarily mutually exclusive. This just to reiterate some key points from the previous essay.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jean-Jacques Lecercle addresses Grice\u2019s pragmatics in \u2018The Misprision of Pragmatics: Conceptions of Language in Contemporary French Philosophy\u2019. He (26) lists the four categories<\/em>, or, to simplify things here, maxims<\/em>: Quantity<\/em>, Quality<\/em>, Relation <\/em>and Modality <\/em>(instead of Manner<\/em>). He (27) goes on to challenge the notion of cooperation<\/em>, noting the importance of purpose, why it is that one does, for example, fulfill the maxim of quality, that is to say speak the truth <\/em>(what you hold as true and have the proof for it). The key thing here, for him (27), is one\u2019s strategy <\/em>and what tactics <\/em>are used. Now, this may seem rather contradictory to the CP, but, as acknowledged by Lecercle (27), this is not the case as the CP and its maxims are rather ideals, not what happens in real life at all times. You may remember me explaining about the cases where the maxims are not fulfilled, for example, when they are exploited<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lecercle (27) characterizes the Gricean theory of conversation, his pragmatics, as irenic<\/em>. In \u2018Deleuze and Language\u2019, he (162-163) lists four limitations in Anglo-Saxon pragmatics, namely those of Grice, Austin and Searle. Firstly, they rely on what he (162) calls methodological individualism<\/em>, that a speaker is fully conscious and intentional at all times. A speaker means this and\/or that and it is then recognized by another person. He (163) finds this lacking in the sense that it is very much subjective <\/em>because meaning <\/em>is tied to what someone means by saying this and\/or that and considers it \u201ca philosophical regression, when compared with the achievements of structuralism.\u201d Secondly, tied to the first limitation, he (163) notes that methodological individualism results in speech-acts<\/em> that are always individual<\/em>, having little or simply nothing to do with the society and its institutions. In other words, it lacks any theory of practice<\/em>, of habits<\/em>. Thirdly, he (163) states that while they build on principles <\/em>and maxims<\/em>, arguably a clear improvement over as language <\/em>having laws of nature<\/em>, as is the case with Grice, they are ahistorical<\/em>, which then end up assuming that there is something universal<\/em>, an eternally valid human nature<\/em>. For example, for the Cooperative Principle <\/em>to hold, which, I think, even Grice is, actually, somewhat doubtful, it must be assumed that it is human nature to cooperate<\/em>, to exchange knowledge, to communicate information. It is this presupposition of language being irenic that is the problem. If that is the case, that we want to cooperate, why is it that we engage in arguments? Fourthly, he (163) finds Anglo-Saxon pragmatics lacking because while they insist on performativity<\/em>, action <\/em>and force<\/em>, the effects <\/em>of language are left undiscussed. He (164) characterizes it as moving from considering language as representation<\/em>, that is to say a na\u00efvely representing the world, to interpretation<\/em>. Now, I think it’s worth noting that I consider that progress. That said, as discussed by Lecercle (163-164), it ignores the effects language has on all things material. For me, it sort of stops where things gets interesting. This is something that I addressed in some of my previous essays that focus on meaning<\/em> and sense<\/em>, as discussed in Gilles Deleuze’s \u2018The Logic of Sense\u2019 and in his collaboration with F\u00e9lix Guattari, \u2018A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the article, Lecercle (27-30) contrasts the Gricean theory of conversation with something that he calls anti-Gricean, an agonistic <\/em>theory of conversation, in which the Gricean maxims <\/em>are replaced by five Lacanian maxims<\/em>: Reception<\/em>, Recognition<\/em>, Imposition<\/em>, Evocation <\/em>and Inversion<\/em>. Those monikers are what I came up with in summary of the relevant parts of Lecercle\u2019s article. I reckon one could also reformulate these, by replacing Imposition with Interpellation <\/em>and Evocation with Impelling <\/em>(Impellation<\/em>?).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In more detail, drawing from Jacques Lacan, namely from his book \u2018\u00c9crits\u2019 with particular emphasis on a text called \u2018The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis\u2019, Lecercle (28) explains the first maxim (Reception<\/em>):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c\u2018No speech remains without an answer, even if it is only met with silence, provided there is a listener\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This may seem a bit odd, but, as he (28) points out, even silence is an answer, assuming that, of course, the person who is the intended recipient does hear what is said to that person. He (28) clarifies this in linguistic terms as what is known as the zero sign<\/em>. Not replying is a choice among others, a sign <\/em>among others. He (28) also points out that this is what\u2019s missing in the Gricean theory, \u201cthat meaning cannot be reduced to intention\u201d as it is not tied to the individual participants but \u201cthe overall situation of conversation\u201d. This reminds me of what Gilles Deleuze (13-15) has to say about the primacy of manifestation <\/em>in \u2018The Logic of Sense\u2019, that while it tends to seem like language has its source in the speaker, that manifestation is primary, it is, nonetheless, merely secondary as language does not emerge from the speaker on its own, but we’ll get to this later on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lecercle (28) summarizes the second maxim (Recognition<\/em>):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c\u2018Man\u2019s desire finds its meaning in the desire of the other, not so much because the other has the key to the desired object, as because his main object is to be recognized by the other\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He (28) clarifies this maxim by stating that one desires <\/em>not only what one desires, for example, the other person, whoever it is, but also what that other person desires, hence my point about recognition<\/em>, what he calls \u201ca kind of mimetic desire.\u201d Not that this is, by any means, a new development, but to exemplify this here better, you must have noticed this if you\u2019ve kept your eyes open with regards to social media. I\u2019m not going to go on and on about this or give you lecture about the vanity of it, but that\u2019s sort of the point, not posting a message about something simply because you desire something, because you want to express something, perhaps even impress someone, but because you wish to be acknowledged by others. Simply put, you not only desire but you also desire the desires of others, hence the talk over people obsessing over likes, shares, favorites and the like. This is also works in reverse, as explained by Lecercle (28). You wish to draw the attention of others, for the recognition, and if that fails, you feel dissatisfied.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lecercle (28) provides an explanation for the third maxim (Imposition<\/em>):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c\u2018If I address (or call) the person to whom I speak by whatever name I give him, I impose upon him a subject position, from which he will have to answer me, even if he rejects it.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He (28) notes that it\u2019s in this case, with this maxim, that makes it clear that the object of a conversation is not to cooperate <\/em>but to \u201cgain linguistic ground, to occupy a place \u2013 to be recognized by the opponent as occupying this place.\u201d I think it\u2019s worth pointing out that it\u2019s not, strictly speaking, about being un<\/em>cooperative, but about the conversation having a specific object or a goal that the speaker sets. This is, of course, clearly adversarial <\/em>as one seeks to to gain ground, to have the upper hand, to elevate oneself. He (28) also notes this works not only by promoting <\/em>oneself but also by demoting <\/em>the other, relegating the other person into a certain undesirable position, that of the scapegoat. He (28) uses the example of insulting people, calling them names, situating them as, for example, \u201cmadmen, criminals, perverts, foreigners, country bumpkins\u201d as well as \u201ctrade unionists and women\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He (29) goes on to explain how one may counter the third maxim. For example, without going into detail here, he (29) argues that silence may the best strategy when insulted or accused of something. This, of course, depends on the circumstances. He (29) points out that if others ignore this or stand up for the accused or the insulted, then the accusation or insult will fail. Then again, if the accuser or the one insulting the person has the support of others, then the accused or the insulted must answer \u201cfrom a position of presumed guilt.\u201d This is why he (29) argues that \u201c[t]he law of ordinary conversation is a lynching law, where there is no smoke without fire\u201d and adds that \u201cconversation is an unfair trial\u201d, \u201ca battle where the stronger party, not the innocent one, wins the day.\u201d Going back to the earlier point, this is why he emphasizes the role of others, what he (29) calls \u201cthe question of alliances\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This can also be exemplified by how people behave on social media, even if, again, this is hardly a new thing. The difference is, I guess, more about how it is probably easier to gain the support of others, to make allies, on social media, than it is in a face-to-face conversation as there are more obvious time and space constrains on the latter than on the former. I don\u2019t know about others, nor do I recommend accusing or insulting (in the sense that it is taken as such) others, except, perhaps, in a court of law if there are grounds for it (as otherwise it may well be defamation, which may take you to court), but something tells me that it\u2019s hard to succeed in face-to-face accusations or insults as others may react to it simply as belligerent behavior, as uncalled hostility, and ally themselves with the person who is accused or insulted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I\u2019ve actually been in such situation, being threatened on my way to home by a stranger, a foreign party crasher who got kicked out from a birthday party I attended. It nearly escalated to an assault, me dodging swings and attempting to calm down the person. Well, that technically makes it an attempted assault, as well as deprivation of personal liberty and\/or menacing, all offenses worth up to two years behind bars. Anyway, the person accused me, and others at the party (not present when that went down), for mistreatment, that we didn\u2019t like the person because of the person\u2019s foreign background and that we, me, plus a couple of other foreigners, were laughing at the person\u2019s expense. What the person failed to recognize was the irony and the sarcasm in a conversation that the person was not part of, that we were saying the exact opposite of what the person accused us as having said and that it had nothing to do with the person as we were hardly aware of a party crasher at an invitation only birthday party. It was very absurd, being being accused and threatened with violence for something that you didn\u2019t state. The person actually struggled with it, how I calmly agreed on this and that, because it was not outright assault, just jumping on me. It was more like the person wished to project me as someone else, in order to justify the desire <\/em>for violence. The person only got physical when I expressed my wish to move along. That was when I drew in passers-by, who allied with me, not because they had more reason to believe me over the other person based on our stories but because of the evident hostility and threatening language expressed against me. Thanks to those guys, I was able to carry on and get home safe. I\u2019ll gladly offer them a beverage of their choice, if I ever run into them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Before you go stating that I should have handled it better and that it teaches me not to run my mouth, when I brought this up with friends who where at the party, they told me that, as I pointed out already, the person was a party crasher, who apparently came in as someone\u2019s plus one (or that was the story given anyway), drank other people\u2019s drinks and got kicked out of the party for getting caught doing that, as well as getting confrontational with others. Strange how people don\u2019t like you if you are revealed to be a party crasher! Long story short, unbeknownst to me, the person wanted to get drunk, got drunk, at the expense of others, and when others complained to the hosts, the person got ejected from the party, which then aggrieved the person to look for fights with anyone who was at the party. Had I known all this, I would not have wasted a moment with the person.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anyway, I reckon that\u2019ll do for an example of how it makes a clear difference to have allies. Getting back on topic here, getting allies is, I reckon, a bit easier online than it is on a street corner. One can prepare, rally people to one\u2019s cause, in order support the accusations and impose <\/em>certain subject positions<\/em> upon others. Now, sure, that can be done offline as well. One can gather a group of people and then confront the people who are to be accused of this and\/or that. That\u2019s what they call an angry mob, the people who swoop in carrying torches and pitchforks. This is why Lecercle (29) states that \u201c[t]he law of ordinary conversation is a lynching law[.]\u201d Things happening online, it\u2019s just that the torches and pitchforks are no longer needed. What’s needed is enough allies who believe in the accusation, that angry mob. Now, of course, the accusation may well be correct, but that\u2019s beside the point as \u201cconversation is an unfair trial\u201d, \u201ca battle where the stronger party, not the innocent one, wins the day\u201d, as expressed by Lecercle (29).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lecercle (29) explains the fourth maxim (Evocation<\/em>):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c\u2018In speech, the function of language is not to inform, but to evoke. What I seek when I speak is the other\u2019s answer. My question makes me a subject.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He (29) clarifies this by stating that, for example, if you asks a question, the other person is pushed to recognize <\/em>your subject position<\/em>. He (29) offers a humorous, to the point, example of how in cop shows the detectives say something like \u201c\u2018I\u2019m asking the questions here!\u2019\u201d to assert their position. Of course, as he (29) explains, this requires the person being questioned to answer the questions as non-compliance undermines the subject position of the detective. The detective can keep going, as long as needed, but as long as the person remains silent, the detective\u2019s position remains undermined and unrecognized. That\u2019s also why the detective has to keep asking questions. Stopping will result in conceding a defeat. Then again, going on and on, without an answer, also makes it apparent that it will end in defeat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He (29) introduces the fifth and last maxim (Inversion<\/em>):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c\u2018The speaker receives his own message from the hearer, in an inverted form\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Before further explaining this, he (29-30) reminds that we must remember that for there to be a conversation, we not only have to have at least two people, two parties, but that one of them must function as the one saying something, while other must function as the recipient, the one who hears what is said to that person. In other words, this is him reiterating the earlier point about how meaning <\/em>is not reducible to the intention <\/em>of the speaker as the speaker also intends for the recipient to recognize <\/em>this intention. He (30) calls this immediacy<\/em>. However, he (30) points out that it\u2019s not as simple as that as one\u2019s intention or meaning is not simply mirrored in the other person. He (30) clarifies that this has to do with first and second person pronouns, what in linguistics are known as shifters<\/em>. He (30) provides a basic example:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c\u2018I want you to do this\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Followed by the inversion<\/em>, the shift, the reply from the recipient, the hearer, which is required for the meaning to stay the same (30):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c\u2018[Y]ou want me to do this\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, as he (30) points out, if you don\u2019t do the inversion<\/em>, the shift, you\u2019ll just parrot what was just said, thus also inverting and shifting the meaning<\/em>. In that case the reply would be identical to the initial request, thus both stating that they want the other person to do this, whatever it is that they are talking about, whatever that is. He (30) calls this the echo<\/em>. The thing here is that the play of shifters<\/em>, inversion and echo, allows what he (30) calls projection<\/em>, which allows a person express something, as if it originated from the other person. I\u2019ve changed the example a bit, but, so, the formula he (30) uses is something like statement-inversion-echo: I like you. \u2013 You like me? You like me! In this example, the statement is a wish, that one wishes to express one\u2019s interest in another person to that person, but as that\u2019s too in your face, this is turned into a question by shifting the positions, by inverting them, followed by the echo. In other words, as saying the first thing just won\u2019t work, you can attempt to do the same by projecting your intention to the other, in hope of it works. If it doesn\u2019t work, then it works as an accusation, that the other person can be blamed for, as if they said it, not you.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, to explain this better, going back a bit, remember how you can put others on a spot, to impose <\/em>a subject position<\/em> on them? Now this is how it works. If I say I like you, that\u2019s on me and you get to react on that. I\u2019ve expressed my interest in you and now you get to react to that. I\u2019ve put myself on the spot, boldly, bravely. It may work. Generally people like to be liked, which ties back to another point on how we desire <\/em>to be desired. In that light, it may work. Then again, it may be that the other person doesn\u2019t desire to be desired by me. So, then, to play it safe, instead of putting myself on the spot, I invert <\/em>the setting, I shift <\/em>the positions, and put the other person on the spot. If the other person says no, one way or another, it\u2019s on that person, not on me. If the answer is yes, then I get express your <\/em>interest, your <\/em>desire. It\u2019s a win-win for me, or so to speak. I either get what I want or, if not, I scapegoat the other person for that. Well ain\u2019t that just clever!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If we go back to my real life example, the one with the drunk party crasher, it involved the same move with the shifters<\/em>. What the person wanted was to pick a fight, to quarrel. Of course, as it takes two to tango, as otherwise it\u2019s just one sided, an assault, you need to provoke the other person. I vaguely remember the person expressing a desire <\/em>to fight, but as that didn\u2019t work, as there was no reason for such, the person asked me if I wanted to fight. So, in short, following Lecercle, it works like this: I want to fight you. \u2013 You want to fight me? \u2013 You want to fight me! The person was ready to fight but my unwillingness to fight, my perplexed silence, didn\u2019t work out that great for that person. As I drew passers-by to intervene, this move finally failed. Others saw right through it. It wasn\u2019t about resolving any disagreement (as there actually was none, as I agreed) but just a desire to punch. This isn\u2019t actually the first time this type of a thing has happened to me. When I was living abroad in Ireland, me and others, on our way to our accommodation, got into trouble, as some locals in Dublin took offense as we walked by them. It was about disrespecting: I disrespect you. You disrespect me? You disrespect me! I had to dodge swings that time as well, until a friend of mine somehow managed to bamboozle one of the locals into thinking we had something in common, that he had some street cred or something, after which everyone was shaking hands and hugging. That was so bizarre!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Back to Lecercle. He (30) notes in summary that what he is after with the fifth maxim, and I reckon in general with this Lacanian take on pragmatics, is that meaning emerges not directly <\/em>but indirectly<\/em>, even if this take still holds certain primacy of the manifestation<\/em>. In other words, as he (30) adds, the position <\/em>of the subject<\/em>, i.e. the speaker, is put into question, albeit it is still retained. This leads us to another take on take on pragmatics in which the meaning does not originate in the subject. That\u2019s why he (30) calls its thesis \u201c\u2018all speech is indirect speech\u2019\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But before I move to discuss the third reading, it\u2019s worth comparing the Gricean and Lacanian takes on pragmatics. Lecercle (31) argues that the Gricean category of Quantity <\/em>is marked by symmetry <\/em>and cooperative <\/em>exchange of information, whereas the Lacanian take on it is marked by dissymmetry<\/em>, excess and lack <\/em>of cooperation. The point here is that it may be beneficial to talk too much, to engage in what Lecercle (31) humorously calls logorrhea, or to be very sparse with one\u2019s words, even to the point of silence. He (31) addresses the category of Quality<\/em>, noting that in the agonistic <\/em>view the object is to gain status and recognition <\/em>so it matters not what you state. It\u2019s fine if it stings and it\u2019s also perfectly fine if you believe that it\u2019s not true or that you lack evidence for your statement. That said, it\u2019s not an either or case either. As he (31) emphasizes it, if you get the results you want by stating what you believe to be true and have the proof for it, then go for it. It\u2019s just that if that\u2019s not the case, you may still wish to simply lie or make claims that you can\u2019t properly back up. Why not? With regards to the category of Relation<\/em>, he (31) states that the only thing relevant in this view is the efficacy <\/em>of speech as a verbal weapon. So, whatever is relevant is tied to your strategy<\/em>, what it is that you desire <\/em>to accomplish. He (31) adds that the category of Modality <\/em>(Manner<\/em>) is altered to cater for the interest of the speaker, making it fine to be digressive <\/em>as opposed to being brief, if it fits the context. In addition, he (31) notes that it\u2019s generally better to be ambiguous<\/em>, and I would add, to fully address the Gricean maxims here, to be as obscure <\/em>and disorderly <\/em>as necessary, depending on the situation and your interests. In general, if Grice\u2019s pragmatics is marked by the principle of cooperation<\/em> between people, this take is marked by struggle <\/em>between people, to get what you <\/em>desire, by exploiting the maxims, as explained by Lecercle (31). In summary, as expressed by him (31):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThis principle of struggle \u2013 do not expose your position; adapt your verbal weapons to your strategy and to the context (tactics is also important), never forget that your goal is to achieve recognition, to place yourself \u2013 is as commonsensical as its opposite.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In short, this take is, more or less, a mirror-image of the Cooperative Principle<\/em>, as noted by Lecercle. It\u2019s flipped. Moving towards the third reading, he (32) points out that both Gricean and Lacanian pragmatics are marked by the centrality of the subject<\/em>, albeit its conception is quite different between the two. In his (31) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cGrice\u2019s subject is a centre of consciousness, of intentional meaning, whereas the Lacanian subject is decentred, dependent on the symbolic law of language, determined by his relation with the other, with or without the capital O, and certainly not always conscious of his meaning[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In other words, Gricean pragmatics takes it for granted that the subject <\/em>is autonomous and intentional, always in control and aware of what\u2019s what, whereas in the Lacanian version, as examined in this essay, the subject still remains but its autonomy (not reliant on others) is clearly undermined. This leads us, as well as Lecercle (32), to a take where the concept of an autonomous, intentional, individual subject is rejected, which also eradicates the calculation involved in both the Gricean and Lacanian pragmatics, no matter whether it is to cooperate or to further your own interests. So far I\u2019ve used the word desire <\/em>alongside the word interest<\/em>. This is because desire is typically understood as something that is subjective<\/em>, tied to the subject. This is exactly what the third take on pragmatics rejects. This is the pragmatics of Deleuze and Guattari. In their works desire is not something subjective. It\u2019s also not about conscious <\/em>vs. unconscious <\/em>desire. It\u2019s rather, how to put it, how \u2026 for the lack of a better word here \u2026 things come to be drawn together. It’s not just about you. It\u2019s rather beyond you. The centrality and primacy of the subject is replaced by what they call the collective assemblage of enunciation<\/em> in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019. In Lecercle\u2019s (32) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cAt a deeper level, there is no individual subject \u2013 and therefore no individual strategy \u2013 only what they call an \u2018agencement collectif d\u2019\u00e9nonciation\u2019 (collective arrangement of utterance).\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He uses a bit different translation there, but that\u2019s because, well, it\u2019s his translation and because the English translation came out in 1987, the same year his article was published. On top of that, he is entitled to his translation, as he has read the book in French. It\u2019s fairly hard to explain how this take works in reference to Lecercle\u2019s article as it works through a number of readings of a short play (what\u2019s why you should always read the original), so I\u2019ll have to just try my best to summarize the key points on this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lecercle (33) notes that there is an emphasis of subjects <\/em>in the previous takes. It always starts with what this or that person is saying to the other person or persons. In other words, it always starts from the point of view of a person, even if what we are interested in is actually the conversation <\/em>between people. So, if I focus on a conversation, I\u2019m focusing on what this person, \u2018A\u2019, is saying to the other person, \u2018B\u2019. I\u2019m examining them in turns. I\u2019m not interested in what <\/em>is said, as such, but what \u2018A\u2019 is doing<\/em>, the function<\/em>, regardless of whether I suppose that \u2018A\u2019 is abiding to the principle of cooperation <\/em>or struggle<\/em>. It\u2019s always first attributed to someone. That\u2019s the starting point. As summarized by Lecercle (34), the question is always \u201c\u2018who speaks in the text?\u2019\u201d As listed by Lecercle (34), the answer to that by Deleuze and Guattari is, firstly:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[A]ll speech is indirect speech[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Secondly (34):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[A]ll speech has its origin in a collective arrangement of utterance.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He (34) adds that what results from this is that language <\/em>does not originate in the person who utters it; the utterer is only a mere mouthpiece, spoken by language. In other words, as expressed by him (34):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201c[S]peech is always an instance of indirect speech, uttered by an absent \u2013 and here collective and impersonal \u2013 arrangement.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

I think he (34-35) manages to explain this better as he runs the example through his text, but to get to the gist of his examples, people tend to make use of what already exists, for example, various clich\u00e9s and slogans. So, in a way, you don\u2019t speak or write, this or that, by choosing the words and the expressions. Instead they choose you. You slip into speech. Assuming you know the origins of this, where Deleuze and Guattari draw their views on indirect speech<\/em>, I think it\u2019s only fitting to formulate it that way, in a cheeky reference to the \u2018In Soviet Russia\u2019 reversal here. The best example he (34) provides that I can make use of here (without explaining the play) is that of the erasure of the performative clause<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201c\u2018[T]his ball is red\u2019 comes from \u2018I state that this ball is red\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This is the \u2018I\u2019 always saying the \u2018I\u2019, even in the absence of the \u2018I\u2019. He (34-35) further exemplifies this with \u201cwhat linguists call pragmatic adverbs:\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201c\u2018Frankly, what you just said was a lie\u2019[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He (35) clarifies that if this is taken as containing an introductory pragmatic adverb, \u2018frankly\u2019, then it\u2019s, again, the \u2018I\u2019 saying the \u2018I\u2019. It\u2019s just not visible on the surface. Lecercle (35) emphasizes that for Deleuze and Guattari this is not about \u201ca subject, but an arrangement, impersonal and collective\u201d, \u201csocial forces that speak\u201d, doing that \u201cin mots d\u2019ordre<\/em>, passwords, slogans and injunctions\u201d, \u201cnot communicat[ing] a message\u201d but \u201ctransmit[ting] an impulse, a force.\u201d He (35) provides some examples, which are going to be somewhat out of context but I reckon they should work nonetheless. He notes how a woman in the play he is discussing typically starts with the \u2018I\u2019, followed by a verb and a complement, often an introductory clause. For example, the woman says (35):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201c\u2018All I asked you if I could get a bus \u2026\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

And (35):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201c\u2018Anyone can tell you\u2019re a foreigner\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He (35) adds that in the play the woman often starts by stating \u2018I know\u2019, not because of locutionary <\/em>reasons. She isn\u2019t the type of person whose speech is marked by such peculiarity. It\u2019s rather the opposite as she relies on clich\u00e9s and slogans, ready made expressions, because they pack a punch, they carry illocutionary force<\/em>. Moreover, he (35) notes that she is in the habit of using a wide variety of person pronouns to refer to herself, not just the first person singular, the \u2018I\u2019, in order to avoid personal responsibility. So, instead of saying \u2018I\u2019 think, you can say \u2018we\u2019 think or, I\u2019m making this up here on the spot, \u2018they say that\u2019 and \u2018it goes without saying that\u2019 to distance yourself from what you are saying or writing, as well as to make it appear that it\u2019s not you or at least not only you who thinks this way. It appears more credible if it\u2019s not just you but others as well. It\u2019s even better if you can avoid such, like I just did there with the second last one, to make it appear that some smart people, not just us normies, think that way. It\u2019s even better than that if you can make it appear that everyone agrees on it, universally, as a given, as I did with the last one. Of course the thing is that it can be just fluff, making it appear as if there is no \u2018I\u2019 even though there still is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lecercle (36) reiterates what is specific about this: when the woman speaks in slogans, \u201cshe speaks the language of domination and exclusion\u201d, yet, at the same time, she projects <\/em>being dominated and an outcast (as she is seen behaving oddly in the eyes of other people). He (36) notes that if we are to understand the woman\u2019s behavior in the way Deleuze and Guattari would, we need to scrap those readings into her behavior. In his (36) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201c[W]e must refrain from interpreting it as a strategy (as in our first reading), or reduce it to a symptom (a reduction implicit in a psychoanalytic reading \u2013 my second reading was an attempt at this).\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Now, it took me a moment or two to understand what he is referring to with the first and second readings, but unless I\u2019m mistaken, he is referring to the woman using language to dominate and to exclude, as well as a projection. So, he is not speaking of the four (reduced to three, as I skipped the first one) readings of the same play. This just to clarify this as it threw me off.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What should we do instead then? Lecercle (36) argues that what we should do is \u201cto listen<\/em> to it, to the d\u00e9lire of history within it (\u2018la languae d\u00e9lire l\u2019histoire as Anti-Oedipus<\/em> says).\u201d Okay, now you are probably wondering where d\u00e9lire <\/em>came in, all the sudden? Well, I skipped a bit. The way Lecercle (36) characterizes the woman\u2019s behavior is marked by her desire<\/em>, split to, on one side domination and exclusion (d\u00e9lire<\/em>), and, on the other side, projection <\/em>of being dominated and excluded (d\u00e9sir<\/em>). He (36) explains that the reason for using the French word \u2018d\u00e9lire\u2019 instead of the English equivalent \u2018delirium\u2019 has to do with how it captures what he is after with this better than the English one. He (36) refers to his own work published two years earlier, now accessible as a republication, titled \u2018Philosophy Through the Looking-Glass: Language, Nonsense, Desire\u2019. He (1-2) further explains this is in the introduction:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cMere delirium is poor and repetitive: this other type, which I shall call, for reasons soon to be explained, d\u00e9lire, is rich and imaginative; it calls for the respect and attention of the man of science, of the psychologist and the philosopher.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

If you struggle with this, think of the borderline of madness and genius. That\u2019s perhaps a bit simplistic, but, that\u2019s sort of what he is after with this. Anyway, I reckon going on a tangent on this, beyond what I\u2019ve elaborated so far, is better for another time (there\u2019s always another day).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, back to Deleuze and Guattari. Lecercle (36) notes in his article that there is something clearly paradoxical about this, claiming that speech works through you. To simplify this, it works like the \u2018Russian Reversal\u2019 to which I referred to earlier on already. So, it\u2019s not that \u2018you speak language\u2019 but that \u2018language speaks you\u2019. In his (36) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cHow can I say in the same breath that the collective voice of history speaks throughout the text, and that the piece is highly characteristic of [the writer\u2019s] individual style?\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He (36) answers this question, noting how Deleuze and Guattari handle this contradiction:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cThe object of their version of pragmatics is the study of style. \u2026 But for them style is not individual: it is the expression of a collective arrangement of utterance. [The writer\u2019s] individual voice is not the voice of an individual, but the voice of such an arrangement, which we will call [by the name of the writer\/author] for short.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He (36) acknowledges that this may seem like a joke; how can style <\/em>be collective<\/em>, not individual <\/em>if it is so clearly recognizable as this or that writer\/author? His (36) answer is that \u201cit is because it captures the essence of a discursive conjuncture\u201d. I\u2019ve explained what Deleuze and Guattari call a collective assemblage of enunciation<\/em> in some of my earlier essays, so I won\u2019t refer back to those or the definitions given in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019. I\u2019ll expand on the definition provided by Lecercle (36-37) instead:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201c[A] conception of language as unstable and violent, with force overshadowing communicate content; the overwhelming use of clich\u00e9s and ready-made sentences, with the consequent depersonalization of expression; a use of rhetoric which is the opposite of classical eloquence \u2013 where rhetoric is no longer the result of choice and the expression of subjectivity; the reduction of linguistic activity to the model provided by the patter of comedians, of radio-announcers, of disc-jockeys \u2013 which implies new relations between language, the public sphere and the private sphere.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

As I pointed out earlier on already, it is, in a way, that you <\/em>don\u2019t speak or write, this or that, by choosing the words and the expressions. Instead they <\/em>choose you.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now, I have to digress here, for a moment, to object a bit. Take comedians, for example. They are, in my opinion, among the people who are, or, well, at least can be very creative with language. That said, I reckon that by associating them with radio-announcers and disc-jockeys Lecercle is referring to comedians who rely on tropes, doing the same jokes over and over again. It\u2019s also hard to grasp the type of comedians Lecercle is referring to here. I\u2019m thinking more along the lines of stand-up comedians and the ones you see in panel shows. I think they are highly creative people, able to work and rework words and expressions on the spot, in reply to other people, even though, not unlike others, they rely on a host of pre-existing scripts. Taking this into account, perhaps Lecercle is referring to comedians in scripted shows and films. Then I\u2019d agree with that. Of course, I do acknowledge that there are plenty of comedians, the stand-up and on the spot types, who are hardly creative, just using ready-made sentences, templates if you will.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anyway, moving on, Lecercle (37) states that the way language is conceptualized by Deleuze and Guattari is not far from the way it is understood and utilized in advertising and in public relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is, more or less, the end of his article and the end of this essay. It\u2019s worth noting that Lecercle (37) does not see the pragmatics of Deleuze and Guattari as in contradiction with the two subject <\/em>oriented takes on pragmatics, that of Grice and that of Lacan. Instead, he (37) argues that \u201cit gives them a grounding<\/em>, it shows their social and historical source.\u201d Yes, as noted by him (37), it does, of course, undermine them because they are individual <\/em>and ahistorical <\/em>theories (37). Simply put, Gricean and Lacanian pragmatics consider the subject, the individual<\/em>, as primary, whereas Deleuze and Guattari consider it as secondary. Yes, it is there, but it is secondary. That\u2019s why their views are not actually in contradiction with that of Grice or Lacan but rather give them an actual grounding. You can\u2019t simply start from the subject, the individual, because otherwise you skip the bits on how did we get here, how it is that this or that person is the way the person is, which, in turn, contributes to how the person speaks or writes. Lecercle (38) emphasizes this in the final paragraph, noting that his article is not to be seen \u201cas a trajectory from error \u2026 to truth\u201d, that there is common ground to be found in Anglo-Saxon and French pragmatics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

More broadly speaking, in summary of Lecercle (37-38), as you can gather from \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019 and my essays on the parts that pertain to linguistics, the pragmatics of Deleuze and Guattari is marked by its opposition to understanding language as a closed system, ala Chomsky, in which a connection between syntax and semantics is established. They object to the conception of language as a neutral medium, as informative and communicative, transmitting information from one speaker to another directly or indirectly via intermediaries. They also object to linguistic universals, homogeneity and standards. This is because the standards and universals are drawn from heterogeneous particulars. In other words, they are artificial, derivative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If we are to look for similarities between the different forms of pragmatics, it\u2019s clear that they are all opposed to the mainstream understanding of language as neutral, as merely a medium for passing on information. Lecercle (38) uses his article to come up with a conception of language that builds up on the notion of force<\/em>, power <\/em>and violence<\/em>. He (38) argues that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cLiterally, utterances are potentially violent because they have force. They are used for insulting, for attack, for hurting one\u2019s opponent.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

I\u2019m sure that many people will object to this. How can language be violent<\/em>? How can it hurt? How can it do anything? Hurt feelings don\u2019t count! I think it\u2019s worth clarifying here that language is not violent in the sense that it causes physical injuries, what, after Deleuze and Guattari, we would call corporeal transformations<\/em>. It does not breach the surface. In that sense it is correct to object to it being violent. However, what it is capable is creating surface effects<\/em>, causing changes in surfaces, what Deleuze and Guattari call incorporeal transformations<\/em>. This is all in connection to what I wrote in the opening paragraphs of my previous essay. I wouldn\u2019t call language violent. That makes people think it\u2019s about getting beaten up. I\u2019d rather speak of it as connected to power relations<\/em>, how one is positioned <\/em>in relation to others and how language makes it possible to force <\/em>others into this or that position. I\u2019d only call it violent in the sense that language intervenes <\/em>with the world, reducing the world into a never ending list of objects (not that I\u2019m fully against that though, it has its uses). I\u2019m with Michel Foucault on this, insisting that power is productive<\/em>, not destructive. That doesn\u2019t mean that it denies destruction but rather that it is seen as among others, in the sense that you can produce or create destruction. Simply put, it\u2019s indifferent to what is produced. How <\/em>power is exercised, that\u2019s on me, that\u2019s on you, that\u2019s on us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
    \n
  • Austin, J. L. ([1955] 1962). How to Do Things with Words<\/em> (J. O. Urmson, Ed.). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Deleuze, G. ([1969] 1990). The Logic of Sense<\/em> (C. V. Boundas, Ed., M. Lester and C. J. Stivale, Trans.). London, United Kingdom: Athlone Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Deleuze, G., and F. Guattari ([1980] 1987). A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia<\/em> (B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In P. Cole and J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3: Speech Acts<\/em> (pp. 41\u201358). New York, NY: Academic Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Grice, H. P. ([1975] 1989). Logic and Conversation. In H. P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words<\/em> (pp. 22\u201340). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Lacan, J. ([1966] 2006). The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis. In J. Lacan, \u00c9crits: The First Complete Edition in English<\/em> (B. Fink, H. Fink and R. Grigg, Trans.) (pp. 197\u2013268). New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Lecercle, J-J. (1987). The Misprision of Pragmatics: Conceptions of Language in Contemporary French Philosophy. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures<\/em>, 21, 21\u201340.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Lecercle, J-J. (2002). Deleuze and Language<\/em>. Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Lecercle, J-J ([1985] 2016). Philosophy Through The Looking-Glass: Language, Nonsense, Desire<\/em>. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language<\/em>. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    So, I went through H.P. Grice\u2019s text \u2018Logic and Conversation\u2019 in the previous essay, covering his take on pragmatics. I left it at that, not really getting into it deeper, so its shortcomings weren\u2019t really covered. Sure, I did make note of what Grice concedes here and there, namely that people, in general, don\u2019t actually […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3554,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[71,48,897,123,129,885,1042],"class_list":["post-1257","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-essays","tag-deleuze","tag-foucault","tag-grice","tag-guattari","tag-lacan","tag-lecercle","tag-pinter"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1257","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3554"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1257"}],"version-history":[{"count":15,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1257\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5117,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1257\/revisions\/5117"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1257"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1257"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1257"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}