In the previous essay, like in multiple essays before, I focused on Valentin Volo\u0161inov\u2019s \u2018Marxism and the Philosophy of Language\u2019. I was able to cover the second chapter of the first part of the book, as well as a large chunk the fourth chapter of the second part of the book.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In summary, it was established that theme <\/em>is the thematic unity<\/em> of an utterance<\/em>, the upper limit<\/em> of linguistic significance, whereas meaning is the lower limit<\/em> of linguistic significance. Importantly, without one, you don\u2019t have the other. In other words, they presuppose one another. You could say that theme <\/em>is what is important in language <\/em>for Volo\u0161inov as he is all about how language <\/em>is used and how it keep changing as it is used. Then again, for him, there has to be something that locks people together, otherwise we have people just uttering <\/em>nonsense to one another. In other words, the theme <\/em>of each utterance <\/em>is unique, indivisible and unreproducible, whereas meaning<\/em>, nested in theme<\/em>, is what is divisible, reproducible and self-identical. Theme <\/em>needs to convey meaning<\/em>, but meaning <\/em>cannot be separated from theme<\/em>, the thematic unity<\/em> of an utterance<\/em>. In short, on their own, words have no meaning<\/em>. Other interesting bits include how he emphasizes the importance of intonation<\/em>, not in a way what you\u2019d expect, really, but how context <\/em>comes to drive intonation<\/em>, which, in turn, comes to drive theme <\/em>and meaning<\/em>, even on a single word basis (for example how flexible swear words can be). This all then linked back to how we come to talk to one another is context <\/em>dependent, how people are part of this and\/or that social group<\/em> and certain hierarchical structures <\/em>that come to influence their view of the world, how this and\/or that item, thing or discursive object<\/em> comes to appear in their circle of items, their purview.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moving on, chapter three of part one is titled \u2018Philosophy of Language and Objective Psychology\u2019. In the abstract, inner speech<\/em> is mentioned so this ought to get interesting. It was already covered, sort of, but not really, so I\u2019m looking forward to going through this. Volo\u0161inov (25-26) kicks off with pointing that what he means by objective psychology<\/em> is to be rooted not in physiology <\/em>or biology <\/em>but in sociology<\/em>. More precisely, to avoid the terms he is using (namely ideology <\/em>that he keeps repeating so often that it gets annoying), he (25) states that consciousness <\/em>or conscious psyche <\/em>is a sociological fact<\/em>, not a physical <\/em>or a biological fact<\/em>. He (25) expresses this in order to point out that natural sciences are of no use here because the psyche <\/em>is not a product of biology <\/em>or physiology<\/em>. Simply put, he (25) argues that, as counter-intuitive as it might seem, psyche <\/em>is the product of external, not internal processes. To be clear, he (25) does add that it, of course, requires the individual<\/em>, otherwise there\u2019d be no psyche <\/em>to discuss.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He (26) elaborates that what is known as inner experience<\/em>, the subjective psyche<\/em>, is the very same material reality<\/em> of that of signs<\/em>, that of language<\/em>. He (26) warns not to take this to mean that there is nothing outside the inner experience<\/em>, the subjective psyche<\/em>. Indeed there is, as he (26) notes that just the human body involves a large number of physiological processes. It\u2019s rather that our consciousness <\/em>has no existence of its own, as he (26) goes on to point out. What is it then, if not part of human physiology <\/em>or biology<\/em>, the organism<\/em>, or an entity of its own? In his (26) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cBy its very existential nature, the subjective psyche is to be localized somewhere between the organism and the outside world, on the borderline<\/em> separating these two spheres of reality.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Again, he (26) adds to this, warning not to take this as meaning that it is simply a matter of situating this moment \u201cbetween the organism and the outside world\u201d because the moment, how you, me, everyone really, come to make sense of the world and ourselves is not a physical <\/em>encounter but a semiotic <\/em>one. In his (26) words, \u201cthe organism and the outside world meet here in the sign<\/em>.\u201d Very simply put, just as he (26) puts it, \u201c[p]sychic experience is the semiotic expression of the contact between the organism and the outside environment.\u201d What follows from this, as pointed out already in rejection of applying methods of natural sciences, is that \u201cthe inner psyche is not analyzable as a thing but can only be understood and interpreted as a sign<\/em>.\u201d In fancier terms, as he\u2019ll come to address this, introspection <\/em>is pointless, albeit only in the sense that one attempts to present the inner psyche<\/em>, one\u2019s own experiences <\/em>as the expression of one\u2019s experiences is always a re<\/em>presentation, a sign of a sign, as he\u2019ll (36) point out later on. For me, it\u2019s you stepping outside yourself, as if that was even possible, to analyze you. What a pointless exercise! Not understanding that it is you <\/em>who is analyzing you<\/em>, going around in circles, not taking into account that your <\/em>analysis of your <\/em>condition is conditioned by you<\/em>. Sad and funny, at the same time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Volo\u0161inov (26) takes a detour to Wilhelm Dilthey (1833\u20131911), a philosopher and a polymath. He (26) summarizes that for Dilthey:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[I]t was not so much a matter that subjective psychic experience existed, the way a thing may be said to exist, as that it had meaning<\/em>.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n More importantly, he (26) argues that, as I pointed out, we get nowhere if we do the opposite:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWhen disregarding this meaning in the attempt to arrive at the pure reality of experience, we find ourselves, according to Dilthey, confronting in actual fact a physiological process in the organism and losing sight of the experience in the meantime \u2013 just as, when disregarding the meaning of a word, we lose the word itself and confront its sheer physical sound and the physiological process of its articulation.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n As you can see, he (26) reiterates the point I covered about theme <\/em>and meaning <\/em>in the previous essay. At this stage of the book, this may seem somewhat off, even contradictory as he (26) goes on to state that \u201c[w]hat makes a word a word is its meaning\u201d and \u201c[w]hat makes an experience an experience is also its meaning\u201d but it\u2019s worth keeping in mind that, as he goes on to explain later on in the book, in chapter four of the second part, meaning <\/em>is nested in theme <\/em>and everything is contextual<\/em>. As I pointed out in the summary part, that doesn\u2019t negate meaning<\/em>. What he is after is that just as language <\/em>cannot be separated from context <\/em>(otherwise it becomes meaningless<\/em>), the inner experience<\/em> cannot be separated from context<\/em>. To repeat myself, you <\/em>cannot step outside yourself<\/em>, as if you <\/em>were separate from yourself<\/em>, in order to analyze yourself<\/em>. That is just impossible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now, while Volo\u0161inov (26-27) agrees with Dilthey on that inner experience<\/em> cannot be reduced to physiology<\/em>, he disagrees with Dilthey on, pretty much, everything else, namely that \u201cpsychology must provide the basis for the humanities.\u201d It\u2019s just untenable for him, idealistic, that everything, including meaning<\/em>, is grounded on the subject<\/em>, the individual<\/em>. He (27) finds it lacking because no provision is made to the social <\/em>character of meaning<\/em>. More importantly, for him (27), this builds on a poor, if not false premise, a proton pseudos<\/em>, in which meaning <\/em>is considered essential <\/em>but it\u2019s not explained what it is <\/em>and how it is connected language<\/em>. So, for him (27), Dilthey ends up using meaning <\/em>as a handy analogy, as an explanatory figure, but ends up drawing false conclusions. So, as I pointed out, this all falls apart unless you address meaning<\/em>, which Volo\u0161inov does, in particular, in chapter four of the second part of the book. Here I think it\u2019s worth adding though that while that\u2019s spot on calling something idealist, you have to careful with going the other way as well, otherwise you still end up going the idealist route, as discussed in the fairly recent essay on Marx that I wrote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Right, as you might expect if you read my previous essay or read the book yourself, perhaps in a wonky order, then Volo\u0161inov\u2019s objection won\u2019t come as a surprise. I know I\u2019m repeating myself, again, but he (28) puts this so nicely that I\u2019ll indulge in this repetitiveness once more:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIf experience does have meaning and is not merely a particular piece of reality \u2026, then surely experience could hardly come about other than in the material of signs. After all, meaning can belong only to a sign; meaning outside a sign is a fiction. Meaning is the expression of a semiotic relationship between a particular piece of reality and another kind of reality that it stands for, represents, or depicts.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Or, more simply put (28):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cMeaning is a function of the sign and is therefore inconceivable (since meaning is pure relation, or function) outside the sign as some particular, independently existing thing.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, in summary, yes, inner experience<\/em> does necessitate meaning<\/em>, as argued by Dilthey, but it\u2019s not something that springs from the subject<\/em>, the individual<\/em>. Simply put, it\u2019s interindividual <\/em>(hence relational<\/em>\/functional<\/em>) because meaning <\/em>comes about only through language <\/em>or, more broadly speaking, semiosis<\/em>. It\u2019s probably not worth adding this, what Volo\u0161inov (28) goes on to state, here as this is rather basic for many linguists and semioticians, but I\u2019ll do that anyway because it crystallizes the issue with language <\/em>so well to those who are not familiar with linguistics and\/or semiotics:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIt would be just as absurd to maintain such a notion as to take the meaning of the word \u2018horse\u2019 to be this particular, live animal I am pointing to.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n He (28) adds another example, one about apples (sadly, not oranges), noting how if that were the case, that there was such relation<\/em>, then one would, for example, always also quite literally consume the meaning<\/em>. So, in other words, without using specific examples, he (28) states that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cA sign is a particular material thing, but meaning is not a thing and cannot be isolated from the sign as if it were a piece of reality existing on its own apart from the sign.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n What follows from this then is that (28):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[I]f experience does have meaning, if it is susceptible of being understood and interpreted, then it must have its existence in the material of actual, real signs.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n He (28) argues that what follows from all this, up to this point with regards to experience<\/em>, is that as experience <\/em>is tied to the sign<\/em>, any and all experiences <\/em>are expressible<\/em>, they have the potential to be expressed<\/em>, be it in words, gestures, facial expressions or the like (hence why I refer to language\/semiosis). Now, I\u2019d note here that, aye, yes, that makes sense, yet, what one experiences <\/em>is not necessarily expressed <\/em>or expressible <\/em>in a way that relays and conveys the experience <\/em>to someone else. Then again, perhaps I\u2019m getting too tangled up with how one goes about expressing <\/em>that verbally and ignoring the nonverbal <\/em>side of expression<\/em>. Anyway, be it as it may, one way or another, he (28) emphasizes this connection because for something to be an experience<\/em>, it must be somehow meaningful<\/em>, hence his insistence of it having the potential to be expressed<\/em>. In fact, he (28) is very adamant on this point, for a reason that resonates with what I\u2019ve come across in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia\u2019 by Gilles Deleuze and F\u00e9lix Guattari when they elaborate their views on language:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThus there is no leap involved between inner experience and its expression, no crossing over from one qualitative reality of reality to another.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n I brought up Deleuze and Guattari because this reminds me of how they reject the view that language <\/em>is instrumental<\/em>, in the sense that it is something that we make use of<\/em> to express <\/em>ourselves, our thoughts <\/em>and experiences<\/em>, as sort of an afterthought (thinking <\/em>preceding utterance<\/em>). So, as heavily emphasized by Volo\u0161inov (28) here, that is not the case. All our experiences<\/em>, all our thoughts<\/em>, yours and mine, are linked to language <\/em>or sense making, to put it more broadly. So, to briefly return to the earlier point, you need expression<\/em>, language<\/em>\/semiosis<\/em>, for there to be any experience <\/em>before you even bring up the point out about how it is that you express <\/em>those experiences<\/em>. Simply put, expression <\/em>is not something that exist separate from experience<\/em>, nor the other way around. Sure, you may experience <\/em>something in a way that differs from how you express <\/em>it, say non-verbally<\/em> followed by a verbal expression<\/em>, but that\u2019s still in the same realm or reality<\/em>, as he (28) goes on to point out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So, in summary, it\u2019s all very material<\/em>, even psyche<\/em>, as he (28) goes on to list:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cAny organic activity or process: breathing, blood circulation, movements of the body, articulation, inner speech, mimetic motions, reaction to external stimuli (e.g., light stimuli) and so forth.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n He (29) even goes on to provide his own concise recap of this (btw, it\u2019s something which, to my surprise, he keeps doing quite a bit in the book, every now and then within the chapters):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIn short, anything and everything occurring within the organism can become the material of experience<\/em>, since everything can acquire semiotic significance, can become expressive.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n That said, (29) adds that while this is all well and good, as it\u2019s about right, this is not all there is to a psyche <\/em>or inner experience<\/em>. It\u2019s not just what occurs within the organism <\/em>but also outside it once the psyche <\/em>has developed and differentiated to an extent that it is able to make use of what else is there, subtly plying it, shaping it, refining it and differentiating it. This is what he (29) calls the semiotic material<\/em> that is at one\u2019s disposal in the extracorporeal social milieu<\/em> once proceeds to express <\/em>oneself outside oneself. This is the point where he (29) emphasizes the importance of inner speech<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[I]t is the word that constitutes the foundation, the skeleton of inner life. Were it to be deprived of the word, the psyche would shrink to an extreme degree: deprived of all other expressive activities, it would die out altogether.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n To further emphasize the importance of this, he (29) reiterates that if language<\/em>\/semiosis <\/em>is ignored, psyche<\/em>, that is to say consciousness<\/em>, is rendered into a mere physiological process rooted in an organism<\/em>. It\u2019s not worth repeating his objections here, considering he has gone through them already to the extent that here the text drags on a bit. Simply put, he (29) objects to ignoring the social <\/em>aspect particular to humans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Skipping certain other somewhat repetitive bits, Volo\u0161inov (29-30) aligns himself with functional psychology<\/em>, namely a variant of it based on the work of Franz Brentano. He (29-30) is particularly interested in the content <\/em>of the psyche<\/em>. In summary, he (30) notes that in functional psychology<\/em> (of its time, of course), there are two factors, the \u201ccontent of experience<\/em>\u201d and \u201cthe function of any particular referential content within the closed system of individual psychic life<\/em>.\u201d The content <\/em>factor is not psychic <\/em>in nature. It is indicated as either \u201ca physical phenomenon on which the experience focuses (e.g., an object of perception) or a cognitive concept having its own logical governance or an ethical value, etc.\u201d It is, as you can see (30), very much just the content<\/em>, the \u201creferential aspect of experience \u2026 a property of nature, culture, or history\u201d and therefore is of little interest to the psychologist as all that falls into the domains of various scientific disciplines. Simply put, as he (30) characterizes it, the content <\/em>factor is what experience <\/em>is. In stark contrast, the function <\/em>factor has to do with what he (30) calls the \u201cexperienced-ness<\/em> or experientiality<\/em> of any content outside the psyche\u201d. This is for him (30) exactly what the psychologist should focus on. It is the object of psychology. Simply put, he (30) states that if the content <\/em>factor of psyche <\/em>is the what <\/em>aspect of psyche<\/em>, the function <\/em>factor is the how<\/em> aspect of psyche<\/em>. In other words, the psychologist, at least the functional psychologist, is not interested in what<\/em> experience <\/em>is, be it this and\/or that, but how<\/em> it is that one comes to experience <\/em>this and\/or that. In his (30) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe psychologist \u2026 studies only how thought processes with various objective contents \u2026 come about under conditions supplied by any given individual subjective psyche.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Note how he points out that this is about a process, one that isn\u2019t universal<\/em>. If we summarize all that has been covered so far, it\u2019s also worth noting how this is not to be understood as the process being particular <\/em>to the extent that it is individual<\/em>, what people tend to call subjective<\/em>. Okay, yes, it is individual <\/em>and thus subjective <\/em>but only in the sense that inner experience<\/em> is never separate from expression<\/em>, which, in turn, is never separate from experience <\/em>(and so on, and so on). In other words, in his (30) view the psychologist studies how <\/em>it is that this and\/or that experience <\/em>comes about, under these and\/or those conditions that are markedly social<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He (30) points out that he aligns with functional psychology<\/em> because while it, indeed, came out of idealism, it also exhibits diametrically opposite tendencies to interpretative psychology<\/em>, namely that of the Dilthey type. As noted earlier (26), Dilthey is all about meaning <\/em>being tied to psyche<\/em>, about the unity of content <\/em>and function <\/em>in the psyche<\/em>, as one might put it after his (30) formulation. As also noted (or foreshadowed) earlier (26), he (30) states that functional psychology<\/em> goes the other way, not only keeping them separate in the psyche<\/em>, drawing a clear line between content <\/em>and function<\/em>, the interface <\/em>of the inside <\/em>and the