{"id":1376,"date":"2018-11-14T14:10:18","date_gmt":"2018-11-14T14:10:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/?p=1376"},"modified":"2023-04-27T19:52:55","modified_gmt":"2023-04-27T19:52:55","slug":"hmmm-boldt-how-can-you-be-saussure","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/2018\/11\/14\/hmmm-boldt-how-can-you-be-saussure\/","title":{"rendered":"Hmmm\u2026 \u2018Boldt! How can you be Saussure?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Guess what! Okay, no need to guess, you know it. You know what it is (not black and yellow though). I\u2019ll be, once again, focusing on Valentin Volo\u0161inov\u2019s \u2018Marxism and the Philosophy of Language\u2019. Last time I looked into one of the chapters, the third chapter of the first part of the book, that pertains to psychology <\/em>as well as anti-psychology, that is to say, on one hand, certain strands of psychology <\/em>of his time, the 1800s and the early 1900s, and, on the other hand, phenomenology<\/em>. I wasn\u2019t sure if I\u2019d cover it as it goes a bit out of its way to cover issues that aren\u2019t that close to what I\u2019m interested in, in general, but then opted otherwise because it includes various minor bits that make it worth the reading.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In summary, it is established in that chapter that consciousness <\/em>or psyche<\/em>, i.e. how it is to be human or the human condition (as opposed to some other sort of consciousness<\/em>, because, let\u2019s be honest, other forms of life have some sort of consciousness<\/em>, it\u2019s just vastly different from ours), is social <\/em>and emerges only through social intercourse,<\/em> dealing with other humans, albeit it does also necessitate the human biology <\/em>or physiology <\/em>(but doesn\u2019t simply follow from it without the social <\/em>aspect). The interesting segments in the chapter are the bits on inner <\/em>and outer speech<\/em>, how experience <\/em>is intertwined and colored by language <\/em>(experience <\/em>as a sign<\/em>), introspection <\/em>(not experience <\/em>itself but a sign of a sign<\/em>), as well as proton pseudos<\/em> (false premise leads to false conclusions, regardless of the intermediate reasoning).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This time I\u2019ll be going through the first chapter of the second part of the book that carry the titles \u2018Two Trends of Thought in Philosophy of Language\u2019. I wanted to include the second chapter \u2018Language, Speech, and Utterance\u2019 but I guess I’ll get it done eventually (it has a more critical look to things than what is in the first chapter).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If the introductory parts are not taken into account, this is actually the first part of the book that I read when I started reading the book because it is dedicated to key issues in language <\/em>and linguistics<\/em>. I reckon it\u2019s actually fairly basic for linguists and perhaps not worth reading, in the sense that if you are a linguist, you probably know most of the stuff covered in this part of the book. Then again, if you are not a linguist, or a semiotician, then this part of the book is most definitely worth going through because, as the title suggests, it covers two major lines of thinking about language, not only at the time but, to some extent, contemporarily as well. So, if your background is something else, say geography<\/em>, then, as dated as this book may be, this is a must read. Anyway, even if you are a linguist or a semiotician, I\u2019d still read this. At least for me it was not only a refresher of this and\/or that, but also included parts that were never covered in my prior studies (albeit that might not be the case for others).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Volo\u0161inov (45) indicates in the abstract that the first trend of thought is individualistic subjectivism<\/em> and the second trend of thought is abstract objectivism<\/em>. As this is about the philosophy of language<\/em>, doing the groundwork for the study of language<\/em>, he (45) ponders:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cBut what is language, and what is word?\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Only to answer this himself (45):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cWe do not, of course, have in mind anything like a conclusive definition of these concepts. Such a definition (insofar as any scientific definition may be called conclusive) might come at the end of a study, but not at its beginning.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, let us not be hasty, is what he is saying here. He (45) proposes that instead of jumping to conclusions here, we start by setting up methodological guidelines that we follow and see how they pan out. In particular, he (45-46) proposes that we use our eyes and hands, to see and to grasp, if you will, only to point out that when it comes to language<\/em>, it seems that ear, our hearing comes before seeing and touching. He (46) makes note of this, should I say, impericism<\/em> of the sound:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201c[I]ndeed, the temptations of a superficial phonetic empiricism<\/em> are very powerful in linguistic science. The study of the sound aspect of language occupies a disproportionately large place in linguistics, often setting the tone for the field, and in most cases is carried on outside any connection with the real essence of language as \u2026 sign.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Oh, and yes, I did not typo empiricism <\/em>as impericism<\/em>. It is my point exactly when it comes to this. Anyway, he (46) clarifies what the problem with this is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIf we isolate sound as a purely acoustic phenomenon<\/em>, we will not have language as our specific object. Sound pertains wholly to, the competence of physics.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

That sounds about right. If we just look at language <\/em>as sounds, there\u2019s really nothing to it. It\u2019s just sounds among other sounds, like the sound of my computer humming in the background. It\u2019s then just well within the competence of physics <\/em>to address, mere sounds among other sounds. He (46) moves on with the issue:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIf we add the physiological process of sound production<\/em> and the process of sound reception<\/em>, we still come no closer to our object.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In other words, we\u2019ve only added who <\/em>(or what<\/em>, if we don\u2019t differentiate between animate and inanimate) makes <\/em>the sounds and who <\/em>(or what\u2026) receives <\/em>it. He (46) thus adds more layers to this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIf we join onto this the experience<\/em> (inner signs) of the speaker and listener, we obtain two psychophysical processes, taking place in two different psychophysiological beings, and one physical sound complex whose natural manifestation in governed by the laws of physics.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Here it\u2019s worth noting, as a side note, that this makes more sense, this is easier to get, if you went through the previous chapter on psychology <\/em>where experience <\/em>and inner speech<\/em> (inner signs<\/em>) is covered. We are slowly getting somewhere with this but he (46) still isn\u2019t happy about it because:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cLanguage as the specific object of study keeps eluding us.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Only to summarize what has been, nonetheless, achieved so far (46):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201c[W]e have already encompassed three spheres of reality \u2013 the physical, the physiological, and the psychological, and we have obtained a fairly elaborate composite complex.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

What is lacking then, don\u2019t we have it all already? For him (46), what is clearly lacking is what he calls \u201ca \u2018soul\u2019\u201d, some unity, something that links these three components so that they are not a mere list of separate entities but \u201cprecisely the phenomenon of language.\u201d What is this \u2018soul\u2019 then? I mean he isn\u2019t suggesting that it\u2019s literally missing a soul. For him (46), as you might guess if you\u2019ve read other parts of the book (or at least previous parts), is the social intercourse<\/em>. In his (46) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIn order to observe the phenomenon of language, both the producer and the receiver of the sound itself must be place into the social atmosphere. After all, the speaker and listener must belong to the same language community \u2013 to a society organized along certain particular lines.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

However, that\u2019s not all, as he (46) continues, adding that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cFurthermore, our two individuals must be encompassed by unity of the immediate social situation, i.e., the must make contact, as one person to another, on a specific basis.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This is an important addition because, as already covered in my previous essays on this book, language <\/em>is always particular<\/em>, not only general<\/em>. If we ignore this addition that he makes here, we have a conception of language <\/em>that is social <\/em>but what is social <\/em>about it, the language community<\/em>, the society <\/em>with its organization, rendered inert, fixed, set in stone. That would be just idealism <\/em>again, assuming that there is this ideal language community<\/em>, this ideal society <\/em>that can be understood according to its organization along those certain particular lines. However, that\u2019s not the case. In summary, thus far, he (47) states:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cSo, we may say that the unity of the social milieu and the unity of the immediate social event of communication<\/em> are conditions absolutely essential for bringing our physico-psycho-physiological complex into relation with language, with speech, so that it become a language-speech fact.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

To make it absolutely clear what language <\/em>isn\u2019t, as also argued in the previous chapter:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cTwo biological organisms under purely natural conditions will not produce the fact of speech.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, as I stated earlier on about the human condition, consciousness <\/em>or psyche<\/em>, it doesn\u2019t simply emerge from our biology<\/em>, our physiology<\/em>, on its own, sort of unprompted. Anyway, he (47) notes that be that as it may, what he has stated thus far in this chapter, has done little to clarify anything rather than further obscuring it. That is, however, only because language <\/em>is highly complicated, involving multifaceted and multifarious connections, some more, some less important than others, as he (47) summarizes the issue. For him (47), what must be done is to account this all, to bring all these strands together \u201cto the focal point of the language process.\u201d Obviously that\u2019s not going to be an easy task, but, then again, if it was easy, then we wouldn\u2019t be going on and on about it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where are we at then, at this point? Well, we\u2019ve landed at the very heart of the issue, the problem of language <\/em>itself. He\u2019ll move on to address it by taking a closer look at the two philosophies of language<\/em>, individualistic subjectivism<\/em> and abstract objectivism<\/em>, and how they seek to solve this problem, which he (47-48) calls \u201cthe problem of the identification and the delimitation of language as a specific object of study<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Starting with the former, individualistic subjectivism<\/em>, he (48) characterizes it as based on a conception of language <\/em>in which the creative act of speech <\/em>is based on the individual<\/em>, the source of language <\/em>being in the individual psyche<\/em>. Again, I reckon that if you read the previous chapter, this point comes across better. In a nutshell, as summarized by him (48), language is seen as a continuous or unceasing creative process <\/em>that emerges from the psyche <\/em>of an individual, which, in turn, means that the laws of language<\/em>, that one is to study in linguistics<\/em>, are also the laws of individual psychology<\/em>. Simply put, as stated by him (48), language is seen as analogous \u201cto art \u2013 to aesthetic activity.\u201d He lists four principles of this trend. Firstly (48):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cLanguage is activity, an unceasing process of creation<\/em> (energeia) realized in individual speech acts<\/em>[.]\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Secondly (48):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe laws of language creativity are the laws of individual psychology<\/em>[.]\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Thirdly (48):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cCreativity of language is meaningful creativity, analogous to creative art<\/em>[.]\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Fourthly (48):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cLanguage as a ready-made product<\/em> (ergon), as a stable system (lexicon, grammar, phonetics), is, so to speak, the inert crust, the hardened lave of language creativity, of which linguistics makes an abstract construct in the interests of the practical teaching of language as a ready-made instrument<\/em>.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

If this seems familiar to you, it\u2019s probably because you are familiar with Wilhelm von Humboldt\u2019s conception of language<\/em>. Of course you might not be familiar with this, like I wasn\u2019t until it was explained to me, rather randomly, on the aesthetics <\/em>lectures I attended last semester. I reckon you don\u2019t really run into his conception of language <\/em>these days because, well, it\u2019s not only out of fashion, but also kept out of fashion, namely for being \u2026 cough, cough \u2026 German, because, something tells me that most things German got effectively erased from curricula due to certain events in the last decades of the first half of the 1900s, as I pointed out in a short essay dedicated to Wilhelm von Humboldt\u2019s views on language.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anyway, as suggested by ergon<\/em> (product<\/em>) and energeia<\/em> (process<\/em>), this trend is indeed marked by the influence of von Humboldt, as indicated by Volo\u0161inov (48). It\u2019s not that he is the only representative of this trend, as noted by Volo\u0161inov (48), as there are others, such as Johann Georg Hamann and Johann Gottfried von Herder who were his predecessors, but he is, nonetheless, the most influential representative of this trend. In Volo\u0161inov\u2019s (48) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cHumboldt\u2019s powerful thought has exercised an influence far exceeding the scope of the trend we have just characterized. It can be claimed that all post-Humboldtian linguistics, to the present day, has experienced his determinative influence.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He (48-49) acknowledges that von Humboldt\u2019s thought is not one specific thing, a totality <\/em>that neatly aligns with the four principles of this trend that he listed, but rather a host of things far too broad and complex, as well as contradictory, to fit his description, lending itself to \u201cwidely divergent trends and movements.\u201d He (49) adds that von Humboldt\u2019s successors, those who are part of this trend, as much as they rely on his work, their conceptions of language <\/em>are narrower and more simplistic than von Humboldt\u2019s views. I mean, as I pointed out in the essay dedicated to him, his work, largely existing only in German, is very extensive and all over the place. In that sense, it\u2019s only bound to happen that if you build on his works that you end up coming across as rather simplistic and small in scale in comparison to him. Anyway, be that as it may, Volo\u0161inov (49) sees von Humboldt\u2019s views as pivotal to the emergence of the first trend. It\u2019s still worth keeping in mind that it is incorrect to classify this trend as representing vol Humboldt\u2019s philosophy of language<\/em>. To my understanding, and if I remember correctly, language is markedly social for von Humboldt, which is something that Volo\u0161inov (49-50) considers largely missing in the first trend, with the insistence that language <\/em>is situated only in the individual psyche<\/em>. So, in a way, von Humboldt is and isn\u2019t a representative of this trend.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What actually fits the bill, the four principles he lists, instead of von Humboldt, Volo\u0161inov (50) names Karl Vossler and his followers. He (50) indicates what distinguishes what he calls the Vossler school:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201c[I]t is defined first and foremost by its decisive and theoretically grounded rejection of linguistic positivism<\/em>, with its inability to see anything beyond the linguistic form (primarily, the phonetic from as the most \u2018positive\u2019 kind) and the elementary psychophysiological act of its generation.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Only to add what Vossler is after (50):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe main impetus to linguistic creativity is said to be \u2018linguistic taste,\u2019 a special variety of artistic taste. [It] is that linguistic truth by which language lives and which the linguist must ascertain in every manifestation of language in order genuinely to understand and explain the manifestation in question.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Volo\u0161inov (50) cites Vossler summarizing his views in \u2018Grammar and the History of Language\u2019. Because I\u2019m not lazy, I traced this back to the original, \u2018Grammatik und Sprachgeschichte oder das Verh\u00e4ltnis von \u00bbrichtig\u00ab und \u00bbwahr\u00ab in der Sprachwissenschaft\u2019, in which Vossler (94) states:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cAber eine Wissenschaftliche Sprachgeschichte wird erst diejenige sein, die durch die ganze praktische Kausalreihe hindurch zur \u00e4sthetichen gelangt: so da\u00df der sprachliche Gedanke, die sprachliche Wahrheit, der Sprachgeschmack, das Sprachgef\u00fchl oder wie Wilhelm von Humbodlt es nennt: die innere Sprachform in all ihren physisch, psychisch, politisch, \u00f6konomisch und \u00fcberhaupt kulturell bedingten Wandlungen ersichtlich und verst\u00e4ndlich wird.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Which is translated into English, apparently from the Russian translation of the same journal issue (as, apparently, it ran side by side as German\/Russian, one being translated to the other), by the translators, Matejka and Titunik (50-51):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe only history of language that can claim the status of a science is the one that can run the whole gamut of the practical, causal order of things so as to arrive at the aesthetic order, so that thereby linguistic thought, linguistic truth, linguistic taste, and linguistic sensibility or, as Wilhelm Humboldt has called it, the inner form of language, in its physically, psychically, politically, economically and, in general, its culturally conditioned transformations, may be made clear and understandable.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Why did I go through the effort of finding the original, in German? Well, translation is always a translation. There\u2019s that. Then there\u2019s a translation of a translation. That\u2019s hardly ideal. As a side, before I continue on Volo\u0161inov, this journal is fascinating. It contains texts by the likes of Benedetto Croce, Ernst Cassirer, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Edmund Husserl, Georg Luk\u00e1cs, Georg Simmel and Max Weber, plus a host of others I just don\u2019t recognize. Right, back to Volo\u0161inov (51) who summarizes that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201c[F]or Vossler the basic manifestation, the basic reality, of language should not be language as a ready-made system, in the sense of a body [inherited], immediately usable forms \u2013 phonetic, grammatical, and other \u2013 but the individual creative act of speech<\/em> (Sprache als Rede<\/em>).\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

As a side note, to clarify a bit, the [inherited] part above is almost as is as there seems to be typo in the book, the word being \u2018inhereited\u2019. Anyway, he (51) adds that what follows from this conception of language <\/em>is that speech acts<\/em> do not simply consist of one going for \u201cshared, stable, and immediately usable\u201d grammatical forms <\/em>of a specific language <\/em>across all utterances<\/em>, but actually stylistically concretizing and modifying these forms <\/em>on the go, thus individualizing and uniquely characterizing each and every utterance<\/em>. He (51) labels this as stylistic individualization<\/em> and emphasizes that as it is creative<\/em>, that is to say productive<\/em>, it is also historical<\/em>, which, in turn, results in the production of grammatical forms<\/em>. In other words, he (51) argues that, for Vossler, style<\/em>, the creative <\/em>production of language<\/em>, is primary, and grammatical form<\/em>, the solidified product of style<\/em>, is secondary. He (51) summarizes this as \u201cthe precedence of style over grammar<\/em>\u201d. As a final note on this trend, before I move on to the second trend, it\u2019s worth noting that he (51-52) mentions Benedetto Croce as part of this first trend, indicating that in his works the key term is expression<\/em>, that is to say artistic expression<\/em>, which then should be the object of study in linguistics<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second trend, abstract objectivism<\/em>, is, I reckon, very familiar to linguists, as well as semioticians, or at least should be. You\u2019ve been sleeping during lectures if you haven\u2019t encountered this. Like me, you may have been ignorant of the first trend for years, but with regards to the second trend, I don\u2019t know how you managed to pass the introductory course exams if you aren\u2019t familiar with it. It\u2019s just that familiar to you. Just dropping the name Ferdinand de Saussure should do the trick.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Volo\u0161inov (52) broadly characterizes abstract objectivism<\/em> as shifting the focus on language <\/em>from its use to it as \u201cthe linguistic system[,] as a system of the phonetic, grammatical, and lexical forms of language<\/em>.\u201d He (52) further contrasts the two trends, noting that in the first trend language <\/em>is considered \u201can ever-flowing stream of speech acts in which nothing remains fixed and identical to its itself\u201d whereas in the second trend language <\/em>is considered \u201cthe stationary rainbow archer over that stream\u201d and what is pivotal are the \u201cthe phonetic, grammatical, and lexical factors that are identical and therefore normative for all utterances\u201d thus registering and insuring \u201cthe unity of a given language and its comprehension by all the members of a given community.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turning his attention to normativity<\/em>, he (52-53) clarifies that he considers this second trend as focusing on normative identities<\/em>, for example, how something is pronounced in order to be understood by all members of a specific language community<\/em>, because there is no actual<\/em> factual identity<\/em> at play as each utterance <\/em>is unique to each individual speaker due to various physiological differences between people. I would add here that, to be accurate, even each utterance <\/em>by the same <\/em>speaker is unique as one is, after all, tied to time <\/em>and space<\/em>. We never stay the same<\/em>, so we can never, strictly speaking say the same <\/em>thing again the same <\/em>way we did before. Sure, as he (52) acknowledges, we may think that there are no differences because we cannot hear them, to distinguish the minute differences between speakers and their peculiarities. In short, it\u2019s about normative identity<\/em> because it can\u2019t be about actual identity<\/em>. As I\u2019ve discussed in my past essays, contrary to popular belief, identity <\/em>is about being non-identical<\/em> to someone or something else. In simple terms, wearing the same <\/em>t-shirt, whatever it is that they want you to buy to supposedly stand out from the crowd, is about being identical<\/em>, resulting in a twisted sense of uniqueness that builds on the same<\/em>, being the same <\/em>as others. That\u2019s normative identity<\/em> alright.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This normativity <\/em>applies to all elements of language<\/em>, not only phonetic, hence he (53) calls it the \u201cnormative identity of linguistic form\u201d. With regards to the individual<\/em>, the speaker, he (53) states that in this view the speaker is seen as merely implementing and impleting a particular form <\/em>in a particular speech act<\/em>. In short, the order of things is reversed here. Unlike in the first trend, from the view of the first trend, in the second trend the product <\/em>(ergon<\/em>) becomes before the production <\/em>(energeia<\/em>). One just applies language <\/em>and the differences in speech <\/em>between speakers are considered fortuitous factors that, nonetheless, do not play an important role, as he (53) points out. In summary, thus far, from the view of the second trend, creativity <\/em>that underlines the first trend is irrelevant because language <\/em>is considered a distinct system of language<\/em> separate from \u201cindividual creative acts, intentions, or motives\u201d of its speakers (and writers if we go beyond speaking). In his (53) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cLanguage stands before the individual as an inviolable, incontestable norm which the individual, for his part, can only accept.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

There is nothing non-acceptable, as he (53) goes on to clarify:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIf the individual fails to perceive a linguistic form as an incontestable norm, then it does not exist for him as a form of language simply as a natural possibility for his own individual, psychophysical apparatus.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Simply put, as he (53) summarizes it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe individual acquires the system of language from his speech community completely ready made. Any change within that system lies beyond the range of his individual consciousness.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In other words, in the second trend language <\/em>is this pre-existing fixed thing that you just inherit from people around you as grow up. Whatever you say, you ain\u2019t changing a thing. You can\u2019t even think otherwise. He (53) explains what follows from this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe individual act of articulating sounds becomes a linguistic act only by measure its compliance with the fixed (at any given moment in time) and incontestable (for the individual) system of language.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, to put it bluntly, your only option is compliance. Resistance <\/em>is futile. If your articulation is off, too much, then it isn\u2019t considered language <\/em>because it is measured in compliance to a fixed and incontestable system<\/em>. You can always ask: \u2018what about this, what about that?\u2019 The only reply you get is no, that falls outside the bounds of language<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Having summarized the second trend, albeit only in brief, so far, Volo\u0161inov (53-54) moves on to address what are the laws that govern the system of language<\/em>. His (54) short answer is that these laws are irreducible to any other laws, hence they are always already there. As a reminder, to jog your memory, in the first trend the laws are also the laws of consciousness <\/em>or psyche<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

His (54) more elaborate answer is that synchronically<\/em>, that is to say examining language <\/em>at any specific point in time, say right now, all forms of language<\/em> are mutually indispensable and complementary and thus form a system<\/em>. He (54) calls this linguistic systematicity<\/em>. Importantly, as expressed by him (54), as language <\/em>is a system <\/em>beyond you in this view, it cannot explain individual consciousness <\/em>or psyche<\/em>. What follows from this, as he (54) goes on to explain, is that language <\/em>operates beyond you on an as is basis and you inevitably opt in to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What also follows from this is that, as I\u2019d put it, is that language <\/em>is considered neutral. This is because, as he (54) states it, there is no room for evaluation and discrimination, style <\/em>or taste, that, for example, something is considered \u201cbetter, worse, beautiful, ugly, or the like\u201d as the only criterion in linguistics <\/em>is whether something is correct or incorrect. This was, sort of pointed out already, as he (53) states that language <\/em>is inviolable. If you claim something that violates the laws, then it\u2019s simply a matter of you being incorrect as it doesn\u2019t correspond with the normative system of language<\/em>, as he (54) clarifies the issue. It\u2019s a yes or no. What ifs are always rendered into yes\/no because there is no room for evaluation beyond that binary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An important bit here is also to make note of how this results in, from the point of view of the individual <\/em>speaker, the arbitrariness of language<\/em>, as linguistic systematicity<\/em> is not based on anything that comes from the individual <\/em>speaker, be it natural <\/em>(biological or physiological) or social\/cultural <\/em>(artistic, creative), as he (54) summarizes this point.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Having explained the first characteristic of the second trend, that language <\/em>is a synchronic<\/em> system <\/em>beyond the individual<\/em>, Volo\u0161inov (54) moves on to explain the second characteristic of the trend. He (54) argues that if language <\/em>is independent from the individual<\/em>, then language <\/em>must be a collective product<\/em>, a social entity<\/em> that operates like a normative social institution<\/em>, above and beyond the individual<\/em>. What is crucial about this is that, as we know, language <\/em>does actually change, no matter how fixed it may seem. It only happens on the level of the speech community<\/em>, the collective<\/em>, as he (54) characterizes it. This occurs, according to him (54-56), as \u201ca special kind of discontinuity between the history of language and the system of language[.]\u201d In other words, there is a gap between how language <\/em>develops (diachrony<\/em>) historically <\/em>and how it is always, at any given point in time, a full fledged system <\/em>in which everything is neatly in place, consistent, indispensable and complementary (synchrony<\/em>) ahistorically<\/em>. Any change is, rather obviously, always in contradiction of the system of language<\/em>. He (56) argues that to make room for this change, it must be attributed beyond the individual <\/em>because, remember, the individual <\/em>is incapable of consciously changing the system <\/em>(always within its bounds). So, as he (55-56) points out, any change is to be attributed to unintentional errors, which, once popularized in the community<\/em>, become the norm<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Volo\u0161inov (55-56) explains the second principle and, centrally, the incapability to make the synchronic <\/em>and the diachronic <\/em>dimensions mutually comprehensible in quite the detail, with examples pertaining to \u2018I was\u2019 or \u2018Ich was\u2019 and it gets changed, but I reckon you get the point and can take a closer look yourself in case you didn\u2019t get the point. Instead of getting bogged down by the examples, it is more fruitful to contrast the two trends. Similar to the way he summarized the first trend, he (57) also provides a list of four basic principles for the second trend. Firstly (57):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cLanguage is a stable, immutable system of normatively identical linguistic forms which the individual consciousness finds ready-made and which is incontestable for that consciousness<\/em>.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Secondly (57):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe laws of language are the specifically linguistic laws of connection between linguistic signs withing a given, closed linguistic system<\/em>. These laws are objective with respect to any subjective consciousness.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Thirdly (57):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cSpecifically linguistic connections have nothing in common with \u2026 values<\/em> (artistic, cognitive, or other). Language phenomena are not grounded in \u2026 motives. No connection of a kind natural and comprehensible to the consciousness or of an artistic kind obtains between the word and its meaning.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Fourthly (57):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIndividual acts of speaking are, from the viewpoint of language, merely fortuitous refractions and variations or plain and simple distortions of normatively identical forms<\/em>; but precisely these acts of individual discourse explain the historical changeability that in itself, from the standpoint of the language system, is irrational and senseless. There is no connection, no sharing of motives, between the system of language and its history. They are alien to one another.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

As you can see, and as he (57) goes on to point out, these four principles are the antitheses to the four principles of the first trend. To make more sense of the second trend, it is, perhaps, useful to contrast it with the first trend. He (56) indicates the key differences between the two trends, first summarizing individualistic subjectivism<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201c[F]or the first trend the very essence of language is revealed precisely in its history; the logic of language is not at all a matter of reproducing a normatively identical form but of continuous renovation and individualization of that form via stylistically unreproducible utterance.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Or, defined more concisely as (56):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe reality of language is, in fact, its generation<\/em>.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In summary, to put this all in other words, language <\/em>is always in the moment, here and now, as one unity, as it is uttered, as he (56) goes on to elaborate in Vosslerian terms. It is also worth adding here that, as emphasized by him (56), what language <\/em>is and how it goes from one historical form<\/em> to another always occurs in psyche<\/em>, in individual consciousness<\/em>. As noted earlier on (48), explaining things in Humboldtian terms, the first trend is all about the energeia<\/em>, whereas the second trend is about ergon<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Speaking of von Humboldt, who is, arguably, the progenitor of the first trend, albeit, strictly speaking not of his doing, Volo\u0161inov (57) indicates that origins of the second trend are murky and there is not a single person like von Humboldt that one could consider as its founder or, at least its forefather. Instead, he (57-58) notes that its origins are in rationalism, Cartesianism and the Enlightenment, going all the way back to the 17th and 18th centuries. Jumping to the 20th century, as quickly done by Volo\u0161inov (57-59), as I pointed out when I switched over from explaining the first trend to explaining the second trend, the biggest name to represent the second trend is Ferdinand de Saussure and his contemporaries, namely Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye. In his (58) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe ideas of this second trend all have been endowed with amazing clarity and precision by Ferdinand de Saussure. His formulations of the basic concepts of linguistics can well be accounted classics of their kind. Moreover, Saussure undauntedly carried his ideas out to their conclusions, providing all the basic lines of abstract objectivism with exceptionally clear-cut and rigorous definition.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

I think it\u2019s worth noting here that his approval here is not of the second trend, of abstract objectivism<\/em>, but how it is well it is formulated and presented by de Saussure. I guess you could say that he approves it for its rigor, even if he doesn\u2019t agree with it all. I don\u2019t know what it is, but having read other studies, unrelated, in unrelated fields, such as geography, there seems to be just something to the way they wrote in the early 1900s. For example, I remember reading J.G. Gran\u00f6\u2019s \u2018Pure Geography\u2019, originally published in German in 1929 as \u2018Reine Geographie\u2019 and subsequently in Finnish in 1930 as \u2018Puhdas maantiede\u2019, out of interest to landscapes<\/em>. I can\u2019t say I agree with Gran\u00f6, with much anything, really, but, oddly enough, I enjoyed reading it. The clarity, the precision, the rigor. It has its appeal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After noting in passing that abstract objectivism<\/em>, following de Saussure, via Bally and Sechehaye, has had considerable impact on Russian linguistics, Volo\u0161inov (59) summarizes the key things about de Saussure\u2019s conception of language<\/em>, split into three aspects: \u201clanguage-speech<\/em> (langage), language as a system of forms<\/em> (langue) and the individual speech act \u2013 the utterance<\/em> (parole).\u201d In this conception language-speech<\/em> (langage<\/em>) consist of both language <\/em>(langue<\/em>) and utterance <\/em>(parole<\/em>). Crucially, as emphasized by Volo\u0161inov (59), in this conception language-speech<\/em> (langage<\/em>) \u201ccannot be the object of study for linguistics\u201d because it\u2019s \u201ca heterogeneous composite\u201d, not something that has \u201cinner unity and validity as an autonomous entity\u201d. As approaching language speech<\/em> (langage<\/em>) isn\u2019t feasible, one must turn to something else, which, for de Saussure (25), is language <\/em>as a system of forms<\/em> (langue<\/em>), as indicated in \u2018Cours de linguistique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIl n\u2019y a, selon nous, qu\u2019une solution \u00e0 toutes ces difficult\u00e9s : il faut se placer de prime abord sur le terrain de la langue et la prendre pour norme de toutes les autres manifestations du langage<\/em>. En effet, parmi tant de dualit\u00e9s, la langue seule para\u00eet \u00eatre susceptible d\u2019une d\u00e9finition autonome et fournit un point d\u2019appui satisfaisant pour l\u2019esprit.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Which is translated into English in \u2018Course in General Linguistics\u2019 as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cAs I see it there is only one solution to all the foregoing difficulties: from the very outset we must put both feet on the ground of language and use language as the norm of all other manifestations of speech<\/em>. Actually, among so many dualities, language alone seems to lend itself to independent definition and provide a fulcrum that satisfies the mind.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

To make more sense of this, de Saussure (25) elaborates the difference between language <\/em>(langue<\/em>) and speech <\/em>(parole<\/em>):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cPris dans son tout, le langage est multiforme et h\u00e9t\u00e9roclite ; \u00e0 cheval sur plusieurs domaines, \u00e0 la fois physique, physiologique et psychique, il appartient encore au domaine individuel et au domaine social ; il ne se laisse classer dans aucune cat\u00e9gorie des faits humains, parce qu\u2019on ne sait comment d\u00e9gager son unit\u00e9.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Which translates to (9):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cTaken as a whole, [language-]speech is many-sided and heterogeneous; straddling several areas simultaneously \u2013 physical, physiological, and psychological \u2013 it belongs both to the individual and to society; we cannot put it into any category of human facts, for we cannot discover its unity.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This is the point Volo\u0161inov (59) makes about how language-speech<\/em> (langage<\/em>) can\u2019t be object of study for linguistics<\/em>. Anyway, as we need to get somewhere with this, I\u2019ll let de Saussure (25) continue on the difference between language-speech<\/em> (langage<\/em>) and language <\/em>(langue<\/em>):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cLa langue, au contraire, est un tout en soi et un principe de classification. D\u00e8s que nous lui donnons la premi\u00e8re place parmi les faits de langage, nous introduisons un ordre naturel dans un ensemble qui ne se pr\u00eate \u00e0 aucune autre classification.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Which translates to (9):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cLanguage, on the contrary, is a self-contained whole and a principle of classification. As soon as we give language first place among the facts of speech, we introduce a natural order into a mass that lends itself to no other classification.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

I think here it\u2019s worth noting that how he indicates that one introduces not just an order, but a natural order, hence the emphasis of language<\/em> as a system <\/em>(langue<\/em>) over speech <\/em>(parole<\/em>). This is why Volo\u0161inov (60) states that for de Saussure language <\/em>(langue<\/em>) is always the point of departure for speech <\/em>(parole<\/em>). With regards to speech <\/em>(parole<\/em>), de Saussure (30) further comments on it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cEn s\u00e9parant la langue de la parole, on s\u00e9pare du m\u00eame coup : 1<\/span>o<\/span><\/sup> ce qui est social de ce qui est individuel ; 2<\/span>o<\/span><\/sup> ce qui est essentiel de ce qui est accessoire et plus ou moins accidentel.\u201d<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Which translates to (14):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIn separating language from speaking we are at the same time separating: (1) what is social from what is individual; and (2) what is essential from what is accessory and more or less accidental.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Okay, but that\u2019s not all as de Saussure (30) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cLa langue n\u2019est pas une fonction du sujet parlant, elle est le produit que l\u2019individu enregistre passivement ; elle ne suppose jamais de pr\u00e9m\u00e9ditation, et la r\u00e9flexion n\u2019y intervient que pour l\u2019activit\u00e9 de classement [.]\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Which translates to (14):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cLanguage is not a function of the speaker; it is a product that is passively assimilated by the individual. It never requires premeditation, and reflection enters in only for the purpose of classification[.]\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

As you can see here already, language <\/em>(langue<\/em>) is something that does not originate in the speaker. Instead, it is the speaker who assimilates the language<\/em>, which happens passively, without any need to reflect upon it. Anyway, de Saussure (30-31) still continues on this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cLa parole est au contraire un acte individuel de volont\u00e9 et d\u2019intelligence, dans lequel il convient de distinguer 1o<\/sup> les combinaisons par lesquelles le sujet parlant utilise le code de la langue en vue d\u2019exprimer sa pens\u00e9e personnelle ; 2o<\/sup> le m\u00e9canisme psycho-physique qui lui permet d\u2019ext\u00e9rioriser ces combinaisons.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Which translates to (14):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cSpeaking, on the contrary, is an individual act. It is wilful and intellectual. Within each act, we should distinguish between: (1) the combinations by which the speaker uses the language code for expressing his own thought; and (2) the psychophysical mechanism that allows him to exteriorize those combinations.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, in summary, language <\/em>as a system <\/em>(langue<\/em>) is beyond the individual <\/em>and thus social<\/em>, whereas speech <\/em>(parole<\/em>) is individual<\/em>, which happens to be main thesis here, as noted by Volo\u0161inov (60). The important thing here is to note that in the linguistics <\/em>of de Saussure\u2019s speech <\/em>or utterance <\/em>(parole<\/em>) is simply inconceivable as its object of study, as indicated by Volo\u0161inov (60).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now, as approving as Volo\u0161inov (58) is of the clarity and rigor of how de Saussure presents his view on language<\/em>, he (61) just doesn\u2019t buy it and states it contains a proton pseudos<\/em>, a false premise that undermines de Saussure\u2019s whole project (which I hope to address sooner or later). Here it\u2019s worth reminding that, again, reading the previous chapter helps immensively as it covers the issue that comes with false premises. In short, in case you didn\u2019t read it or forgot about it already, the issue is that if your premise is false, your conclusions end being false, no matter how much of your blood, sweat and tears there\u2019s in between the premise and the conclusions. Volo\u0161inov (60) turns to de Saussure\u2019s (129) own wording again here:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cC’est ainsi que le \u00ab ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne \u00bb synchronique n’a rien de commun avec le diachronique \u2026\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Which translates to (91):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe synchronic and diachronic \u2018phenomenon,\u2019 for example, have nothing in common \u2026\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The synchronic is explained by de Saussure (140) as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cLa linguistique synchronique<\/em> s\u2019occupera des rapports logiques et psychologiques reliant des termes coexistants et formant syst\u00e8me, tels qu\u2019ils sont aper\u00e7us par la m\u00eame conscience collective.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Which translates to (99-100):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cSynchronic linguistics<\/em> will be concerned with the logical and psychological relations that bind together coexisting terms and form a system in the collective mind of speakers.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Whereas, for de Saussure (140), the diachronic is about:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cLa linguistique diachronique<\/em> \u00e9tudiera au contraire les rapports reliant des termes successifs non aper\u00e7us par une m\u00eame conscience collective, et qui se substituent les uns aux autres sans former syst\u00e8me entre eux.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Which translates to (100):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cDiachronic linguistics<\/em>, on the contrary, will study relations that bind together successive terms not perceived by the collective mind but substituted for each other without forming a system.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

It\u2019s not hard to figure from the definitions which form of linguistics <\/em>is important for de Saussure (if it wasn\u2019t obvious already). There\u2019s also something peculiar about stating that language <\/em>is a system <\/em>that exists in the collective mind <\/em>of speakers, in the sense that it is outside them. That seems awfully superorganic<\/em>, transcendent <\/em>or holistic <\/em>to me. It doesn\u2019t do much good either when Volo\u0161inov (60) indicates that alongside de Saussure’s school of linguistics <\/em>there is another similar school of linguistics <\/em>that builds on the sociological school of \u00c9mile Durkheim, as represented by Antoine Meillet. I mean this has Durkheim written all over it. Collective mind<\/em> of speakers? Did you mean collective consciousness<\/em>? Anyway, I won\u2019t get tangled up on this as not long ago I wrote an essay that focuses on this very issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is pretty much everything that Volo\u0161inov has to say about the two trends in this chapter. In the very final paragraphs he (61-62) notes that, of course, there are more trends than these two trends and he only opted to cover them because they are the major trends. If we think how things are now, in glorious retrospect, it\u2019s rather evident that only the abstract objectivism<\/em> is still around. Of course that doesn\u2019t mean that individualistic subjectivism<\/em> is gone altogether. It\u2019s rather that there isn\u2019t much of a competition in linguistics <\/em>these days. The are minorities that seek to undermine abstract objectivism<\/em>, also known better known as structuralism<\/em>, typically under the heading post-structuralism<\/em>, because, well, structuralism<\/em>, as I see it, should be largely, no, sorry, should have been binned ages ago.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I have to separate this, as this is going to be a rant. Feel free to skip this paragraph if you can\u2019t be bothered with me ranting. I realize that I anger my fellow linguists <\/em>with all this \u2026 heresy! I was actually going to write that I \u2018probably\u2019 anger them but, well, judging by the lack of appreciation to what I do, especially in terms of funding (except for travel???) and peer review, it\u2019s rather evident that it\u2019s not just \u2018probably\u2019. I do anger them. Of course no one expresses it, at least not in their own name. I would actually welcome open anger, confrontation and combat<\/em>, instead of what it gets morphed into because it serves them, their desires<\/em>: anonymous satire, judgment and appeals to asylums of ignorance, such as appealing to consensus or propriety. I\u2019d have respect for challengers, just as I have respect for Plato, despite everything that I disagree with with him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where was I? Right, yeah, things have changed alright, ever since Volo\u0161inov wrote this book. There are challengers, namely those who engage in sociolinguistics<\/em>, discourse analysis<\/em> and pragmatics<\/em>, to name a few. Of course, compared to the mainstream, it\u2019s all very bubbling under and not considered linguistics <\/em>proper. Anyway, skipping his brief elaboration of minor trends, say various philological strands, which do, of course exist, Volo\u0161inov (62) expresses his unhappiness with linguistics<\/em>, as well as other disciplines<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIn linguistics, as in any other discipline, there are two basic devices for avoiding the obligation and trouble of thinking in responsible, theoretical, and, consequently, philosophical terms.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Ooooh! How dare he! Do go on (62):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe first, way is to accept all theoretical views wholesale (academic eclecticism), and the second is not to accept a single point of view of a theoretical nature and to proclaim \u2018fact\u2019 as the ultimate basis and criterion for any kind of knowledge (academic positivism).\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

These days the first way is known as \u2018anything goes\u2019, which, is, oddly enough, what the people subscribing to the second way accuse people who are, in their view, just off the hook with all the, whatever, unnecessary theoreticism<\/em>, esotericism <\/em>or mysticism<\/em>. I wonder though. I don\u2019t think there is much room for the first way these days though, except in the views of those who subscribe to the second way, which is, at least the way I see it, the majority in academics. I usually despair when I have to read academic papers, not because they are eclectic <\/em>but because they tend to be devoid of any theory<\/em>, grounding, premise, plane, philosophy, whatever you want to call it. It\u2019s all just supposedly factual, which is exactly what Volo\u0161inov (62) is upset about here. I know I\u2019ve expressed this before, but, yeah, it\u2019s a bit sad that, somehow, some obscure Russian fellow (62) who lived in the early 1900s, managed to put it all so, so well already back in the day:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe philosophical effect of both these devices for avoiding philosophy amounts to one and the same thing, since in the second case, too, all possible theoretical points of view can and do creep into investigation under the cover of \u2018fact.\u2019\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Oh dear, oh dear. If only this wasn\u2019t so to the point and so well expressed. This is exactly what I mean when I complain (oh, and I DO complain about it) about people sneaking in a premise, a presupposition<\/em>, some a priori<\/em>, through the backdoor, as if nothing of such ever happened, as if it all was simply a matter of facts<\/em>. Volo\u0161inov (62) even picks the most fitting word for such behavior:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cWhich of these devices an investigator will choose depends entirely upon his temperament: the eclectic tends more to the blithe side; the positivist, to the surreptitious.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Aye, an eclectic <\/em>would be like, yeah, dude, whatever, anything goes, can\u2019t be bothered, but, I can\u2019t think of such people in the academics, except, perhaps the people who are about to retire and just don\u2019t care and give the students better grades than they should be getting, just because, because it\u2019s not like it makes any difference if you do or don\u2019t as no one is going to fire you for it. Surreptitious<\/em>. What. A. Great. Word. For. This. Doing something stealthily, you know like … when sneaking. Wicked mischief! That\u2019s exactly what I keep running into in a lot of texts, talks and presentations, even if it happens, I guess, unwittingly to certain extent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the first chapter of the second part of the book is dedicated to the elaboration of the two major trends, the chapter that follows it, the second chapter, expands the discussion, moving on from explaining the trends to properly analyzing them (there is some analysis already in the first chapter, but it\u2019s still rather superficial, more contrastive than critical). Rather than presenting things in the same order as in the previous chapter, Volo\u0161inov (65) continues on the second trend in order to the questions posed at the end of the previous chapter (63), which is what I hope to get around to do next, in the next essay.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
  • Gran\u00f6, J. G. (1929). Reine Geografie<\/em>. Helsinki, Finland: Societas geographica Fenniae.<\/li>
  • Gran\u00f6, J. G. ([1929] 1930). Puhdas maantiede<\/em>. Helsinki, Finland: WSOY.<\/li>
  • Gran\u00f6, J. G. ([1929] 1997). Pure Geography<\/em> (O. Gran\u00f6 and A. Paasi, Eds., M. Hicks, Trans.). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.<\/li>
  • de Saussure, F. ([1916] 1922\/1971). Cours de linguistique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale<\/em> (C. Bally and A. Sechehaye, Eds.). Paris, France: Payot.<\/li>
  • de Saussure, F. ([1916] 1959). Course in General Linguistics<\/em> (C. Bally and A. Sechehaye, Eds., W. Baskin, Trans.). New York, NY: Philosophical Library.<\/li>
  • Volo\u0161inov, V. N. ([1930] 1973). Marxism and the Philosophy of Language<\/em> (L. Matejka and I. R. Titunik, Trans.). New York, NY: Seminar Press.<\/li>
  • Vossler, K. (1910). Grammatik und Sprachgeschichte oder das Verh\u00e4ltnis von \u00bbrichtig\u00ab und \u00bbwahr\u00ab in de Sprachwissenschaft. Logos: Zeitschrift f\u00fcr systematische Philosophie<\/em>, 1, 83\u201394.<\/li><\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Guess what! Okay, no need to guess, you know it. You know what it is (not black and yellow though). I\u2019ll be, once again, focusing on Valentin Volo\u0161inov\u2019s \u2018Marxism and the Philosophy of Language\u2019. Last time I looked into one of the chapters, the third chapter of the first part of the book, that pertains […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3554,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[1130,1069,831,1133],"class_list":["post-1376","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-essays","tag-saussure","tag-voloshinov","tag-von-humboldt","tag-vossler"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1376","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3554"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1376"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1376\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4135,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1376\/revisions\/4135"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1376"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1376"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1376"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}