So, I have about ten or so pages of \u2018The Biography of Landscape: Cause and Culpability\u2019 by Marwyn Samuels left to cover. I\u2019ll go through these pages in this essay. But before I do that, I\u2019ll summarize what I covered in my previous essay.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Right, the gist of the essay is that we should not attribute what we see, the landscape<\/em>, to some abstract, otherworldly entity or process, such as nature, culture, deity, economy, labor, capitalism, politics or humanity. That said, that\u2019s the trick. We tend to do exactly that, to attribute landscape to no one in particular (at all), which then obscures why things are the way they are. It is in this sense that landscape is particularly absurd. It\u2019s clearly a human invention<\/em>, yet it appears as if it wasn\u2019t. On top of that, it\u2019s very telling of humans, yet, oddly enough, it\u2019s that in the absence of actual humans. In short, I guess you could say that landscape is human, yet, at the same time, also inhuman because all that\u2019s human is at the expense of actual humans. So, it also not only obscures why things are the way they are, but it also obscures who did what and, in reverse, who didn\u2019t do what, that is to say who don\u2019t have agency, who don\u2019t get to have a say about the way things are or should be. In other words, Samuels reminds us to not forget who<\/em> is or could be held responsible for the way things are, hence the title of his essay includes the words \u2018cause\u2019 and \u2018culpability\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In order to address the central concern of his essay, authorship <\/em>or, what I\u2019d rather call it, agency<\/em>, Samuels (69) distinguishes between how we come imagine the world, landscape impressions<\/em>, and how we come to live in the world, landscape expressions<\/em>. Up to this point in the essay he\u2019s gone on and on about how subjectivism <\/em>is a good thing, to the point that I think that he, inadvertently, ends up doing the same as the objectivists<\/em>, universalizing <\/em>what it is to be human, making it no one in particular. Anyway, here he (69-70) shifts his view, making this neither simply a subjective<\/em> or an objective<\/em> matter. I can only appreciate this move.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He (70) elaborates landscape impressions<\/em> or landscapes of impressions. For him (70), they are \u201cby definition, [what] belong to and arise from the thoughts of someone\u201d, \u201cmore about<\/em> than in<\/em> the landscape\u201d. What\u2019s crucial is how <\/em>people come to perceive their surroundings and reshape them into images. So, in a sense, landscape impressions are imaginary. What\u2019s also important is how ill conceived landscape impressions are, how landscape imagery is riddled with caricatures, with clich\u00e9s. He (70-71) includes a short list of such caricatures that plague landscape art. I won\u2019t go through them. I\u2019ll offer another example instead. I remember watching a documentary on Australian painters. The documentary covers different stages in Australian visual arts. What struck me was how the first bunch of painters were plagued by the landscape impressions of Europe. Their depictions of their new surroundings looked awfully lot like Europe. For example, their depictions of mountains bore resemblance to the Alps. Having grown up in Europe, they had become accustomed to the ways painters had depicted mountains, so they ended up depicting them the same way. That may seem absurd but you do have to keep in mind that painting outdoors, looking at what you are attempting to depict on canvas, is fairly new thing. Many famous landscape paintings were actually painted indoors, in a studio, because mixing the paints was a pain in the ass, way too much of hassle to do somewhere outdoors before the introduction of prefabricated paints. When you take that into account, it\u2019s not that surprising that their depictions of Australian mountains ended up looking like the Alps. Okay, they may have had sketches done on the spot but they still had to fill in the gaps, or so to speak, and that\u2018s where the impressions kick in.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I pointed out in the previous essay how landscape art became associated with nationalism. Samuels (71) makes the same observation as did the lecturer on my aesthetics lectures when he points that nation states were keen to utilize landscape art for their own purposes:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe modern history of nation-states is filled with exaggerated images about homelands, motherlands, and fatherlands. They are exaggerated both by means of poetic license applied to the \u2018we of some identity with place, and by exaggerating the conditions of an alien \u2018they.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n He (71) calls this the topophilic myth<\/em> and exemplifies it with how countries such as Canada are depicted as virginal and untrammeled, distinguished by the vast swathes of untouched forest. He (71) adds that, in reverse, what tends to be missing is anything modern or technological:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIt is a landscape of lost, but aspired to, innocence; a modern day variant of romanticism.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, anything that is \u2018alien\u2019 or \u2018other\u2019 to these romanticized depictions of our environment is kept out. This means that, in practice, you\u2019ll find it hard to find landscape imagery that contains polluting factories, traffic jams, clearcutting or the like. Now, of course, this does depend on the context. For example, I reckon that you can have landscape imagery that depicts factories, say, those old brick buildings from the late 1800s and early 1900s, but, in my experience, they are, quite literally, sanitized versions of what was.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Anyway, Samuels (71) moves on to point out that while landscape impressions<\/em> are riddled with hyperbole, exaggeration and caricatures, they are not simply a matter of make believe. People are not being whimsical. In his (71-72) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[I]f subjective in origin, landscape impressions acquire an objective content insofar as they have a history: a history of authorship, diffusion and impact. That is, whether benign or odious, landscape images have an objective content as[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n This is a three-fold matter to him (72). Firstly (72):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[T]hey can be attributed someone[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Secondly, continuing on the first case (72):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c\u2026 who \u2026 created, obtained, or conveyed an image in a context[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Thirdly, continuing on the second case (72):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c\u2026 which \u2026 is shared with others.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In other words, as explained by him (72):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe image can be explained in terms of an historic someone somewhere. It can be explained in terms of a reality charged and often supercharged with attachments to and identities with places, people, and things on the part of some author in some context. In the process, the image itself acquires an objective content, because it too has a history.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n If it isn\u2019t obvious already, the key word here is history<\/em>. So, instead of taking things for granted, that a certain landscape is inevitably like this or like that, we need to examine its history, how it came to being and who were involved in it coming to being. Samuels (86-87) further elaborates this in the notes section of his essay, noting that it matters not whether something is actually true or false. What matters instead is what people hold to be true or false. In his (86-87) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe \u2018truth-value\u2019 of an image is not in the environment itself, but in the eye of the beholder. If the image is \u2018exaggerated,\u2019 it is only to say that someone else (a third party, or the one against whom the image may be aimed) holds a contrary view which through common agreement, is less \u2018exaggerated.\u2019 Whether true or false, benign or dangerous, images exist and acquire an \u2018objective\u2019 content as they acquire a history; a history of authors in context.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, that’s not given, but it appears to be given. He (87) also clarifies what he wants to do:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cOne essential merit of a biography of such imagery is that, by tracing the history of authorship, we expose the identity of those most responsible for the image, as well as for the landscape made in the wake of the image.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n That said, as acknowledged by him (72) in the body of the text, figuring out the authors <\/em>is easier said than done, because:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[T]he original authors, contexts, and meanings of landscape images are often lost[.] \u2026 The image may become, as it were, part of the media for the making of its likeness in the impressions of others. Here too, however, the image acquires an objective content as it is shared, promulgated, and changed by other authors to suit their own purposes. The image may become part of the media for the making of shared landscapes.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n More simply put, as this deals with landscape impressions<\/em>, how we imagine our surroundings, the impressions end up shaping subsequent impressions, and so on and so on, to the point that it can be quite hard to trace who <\/em>did what, why<\/em>, where <\/em>and when<\/em>. It can get quite blurry, yet it\u2019s all still quite important as our imagination is loaded with these impressions that we have inherited down the line. I reckon it\u2019s fair to say that landscape is an invention<\/em>, of a certain artistic kind, and hence subjective<\/em>. That said, imaginary or not, they are, oddly enough, not merely subjective. You don\u2019t get to have a say, really. This is part of the problem. You can not not see landscape <\/em>because it\u2019s not about you.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Samuels (72) turns his attention to landscape expressions<\/em> or landscapes of expression. Not unlike landscape impressions<\/em>, for him (73), \u201clandscape expressions are, by definition, expressing something on the part of someone.\u201d So, as already hinted in the title of his essay, he (73) wishes to emphasize the importance of asking the question of who<\/em> is behind this and\/or that expression in the landscape. The problem with this task is that, as acknowledged by him (73), \u201clandscapes are the products of pluralities, rather than particular individuals.\u201d In other words, again, it\u2019s hard to pinpoint anyone particular as responsible for this and\/or that in the landscape. On top of that, as pointed out by him (73), while it may well be possible to indicate certain individuals as responsible for this and\/or that expression, as manifested in the landscape, one needs to take into account how the landscape impressions, as well as any other unrelated impressions, operate as \u201cthe contexts for the making of landscapes\u201d, i.e. why <\/em>people act in this and\/or that way. Then there\u2019s also the problem for accounting for all the impressions that do not, for whatever reason, manifest in the landscape and indicating why that is or might be, as he (73) goes on to add.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There\u2019s some repetition in this part of his (73-74) essay (on how impressions <\/em>and expressions <\/em>are alike and linked to one another), which I\u2019ll gladly skip, in order to cover new ground. So, Samuels (75) turns his attention to what he calls \u201cthe design<\/em> of landscape.\u201d He (75) indicates that some landscapes are clearly designed, that is to say that they were purposely <\/em>designed and subsequently built and\/or shaped according to a certain design<\/em>. He (75) exemplifies this with large gardens that are designed to look a certain way. That said, he (75) acknowledges that his example is clearly contrived and has little to do with the everyday life of most people. Indeed, when was the last time that you spent your days in some garden? Yeah, that must have been a while ago (except, perhaps, if you are a gardener or a groundskeeper). I for sure can\u2019t remember when that was. I reckon my last encounter with such was walking through some palace garden abroad. That would mean it was years ago. As a result of this issue, he (75) turns his attention to cities as they are often designed, yet, in actuality, their design involves a vast number of people, including \u201call those who live in and contribute to the design of the landscape.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Samuels (75-76) reckons that language <\/em>plays an important part in how <\/em>it is that we come to think<\/em> of certain areas. Again, he (76) wishes to emphasize that landscape impressions<\/em>, namely in the form of landscape imagery, are as important as the landscape itself. To be more specific, he (76) argues that, in the modern context, those who make the landscape are also often those who imagine it. So, you have to take into account those who have a stake in various developments, including \u201creal estate agents, brokers and developers\u201d who not only \u201cconvey and perpetuate landscape intentions cast by others\u201d but also \u201ccreate, manipulate, and designate the forms and meanings of places\u201d in order to convey a message that molds places, as explained by him (76). I reckon it\u2019s worth clarifying here that they do so because it\u2019s in their interest to do so, to make money. So, in short, while design <\/em>is important, one also needs to take into account how language (or, I guess, more broadly speaking, semiotics) plays a role in the production of landscapes, what he (76) calls designation<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Having established what he calls design <\/em>and designation<\/em>, Samuels (76) indicates what\u2019s left to do:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[W]e are still left with the problem of identifying particular authors. We may understand that some author or authors were responsible for an event or fact of landscape, but find the task of specific attribution difficult. At this juncture the biography of landscape becomes akin to the task of investigative reportage. It becomes, as it were, a search for those who have obviously, intentionally, or inadvertently left their signatures somewhere.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n What I found interesting about this is how we need to be on the lookout for signatures<\/em>. This made me think of Jacques Derrida in \u2018The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond\u2019 and in \u2018Limited Inc\u2019. In the former Derrida (5) asks a number of relevant questions:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWho is writing? To whom? And to send, to destine, to dispatch what? To what address?\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n As suggested by the title of his book, he (5) focuses on a post card and wonders, who wrote this, who sent this, and to whom it was written to, to be received in mail, only to make a further distinction. He (5) notes how a post card may contain a signature<\/em>, yet he can\u2019t be sure that the person who put the signature on it is the same person who wrote it. He (8) points out the same thing in \u2018Limited Inc\u2019, how the writer, the scripteur<\/em>, is not necessarily the same person as the underwriter, the souscripteur<\/em> (the one who sub<\/em>scribes?), the signatory. It\u2019s the same thing on the other end. The addressee is not necessarily the person who actually receives and takes a look at the post card.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This may seem rather gloomy, but, I reckon it\u2019s not. It\u2019s not a bug. It\u2019s a feature. As explained by Derrida (8) in \u2018Limited Inc\u2019, works, in his case texts<\/em>, are always cut off from their creators, \u201corphaned and separated at birth\u201d. I reckon this is a positive thing. This actually allows the works to operate in the absence of their creators. For example, this feature allows you to make sense <\/em>of this essay, in my absence. I hope you are aware that I\u2019m not literally having a conversation with you. Instead, it\u2019s rather like you having a conversation with a text, which is, at best, a fictional version of me, as imagined by you. Oddly enough, you don\u2019t have to query any of this from me. Sure, you can do that and I could put this and\/or that in other words, to further elaborate what I\u2019m after with this and\/or that, but it\u2019s not necessary. This also applies to cases where the creator is long gone, already dead. Of course, it\u2019s beside the point whether the creator is dead or not as the absence just has to do with not being present, there and then, to be consulted. Anyway, we are able to make sense of things, even in the absence of others, those who created whatever it is that we are trying to make sense of.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Of course, this not only makes our creations quite handy but it also lends us the potential to express anything<\/em> in our absence. Simply put, it\u2019s handy that we can relay a message to someone else, for example by leaving a note, say that we\u2019ve run out of food, so that that person can remedy the issue. That\u2019s very productive as people don\u2019t have to be in the same place at the same time. Then again, that\u2019s only one example, a rather benign one. The same applies to other expressions, such as signs indicating that an area has camera surveillance. It can and probably does change people\u2019s behavior, regardless of whether there actually are any cameras or not. Now, we could have someone there, to express the same thing to people, on the spot. We could also just have them there, for that purpose, to keep an eye on people, so that they behave. However, all that is expensive, at least when you compare it to just having a sign that tells people that they are under surveillance. As I pointed out, you don\u2019t even need the cameras. You only need to make it seem like there are or could be cameras, recording your every move.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For Samuels (76), one obvious form of signatures <\/em>is the practice of naming places, calling them this or that, often after this or that person. He (77) also notes how a lot of what\u2019s contained in the landscape, the design<\/em>(ed) bits, can traced back to various public and private entities by looking at various records, such as \u201ccity and county council minutes, newspaper editorials and columns, corporate stock holder meetings, promotional literatures, and in various other public and not-so-public archives.\u201d That said, he (77-78) reckons that this is only a part of the story as the records tend to only contain information about \u201cthose whose names have been deemed worthy of record.\u201d He (78) argues that we end up subscribing to a partial and elitist view of landscape authorship <\/em>if all the \u201ctransients, newcomers or strangers, criminals, the \u2018outsider[s],\u2019\u201d and \u201cthe \u2018poor\u2019\u201d are not taken into account.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Before he moves on to take less evident landscape participants <\/em>into account, he (78) clarifies what he means by elitist<\/em>. I don\u2019t think it\u2019s necessary for me to cover this segment. That said, I\u2019ll include bits of this segment because people often use the word differently from what it used to mean, specifically. He (78) acknowledges how it is typically used:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWhatever their scale or nature, the ordinary meaning of the term \u2018elite\u2019 refers to those who occupy positions of authority in the sense that others follow, listen to, and are influenced by their choices and decisions.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n I agree. I reckon that\u2019s how people tend to use the word. That said, as pointed out by him (78), to be specific, \u2018elite\u2019 has to do with having the ability to choose and therefore \u201c[c]hoice<\/em> is the central criterion of elitism.\u201d Often having a choice has to do with money. However, it\u2019s not only about the money. It could be about status or about your contacts. I\u2019m not going to go deep into this as this is a topic for another essay, something that I\u2019ve already done. Instead, I\u2019ll go with how Samuels (79) further elaborates the issue:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[T]he implementation of choice is often limited to those who, for one reason or another, have the means to overcome or escape social, economic, political, legal, education, physical, or other constraints.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n This does not, however, mean that it\u2019s a clear cut thing, that there are only the haves and have nots, not to mention the have yachts. Samuels (79) argues that while it may seem like that only the select few can shape landscape<\/em>, everyone actually do, albeit their influence over landscape obviously varies accordingly. In his (79) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[E]ven in the most socially limiting circumstances of birth, race, wealth, education, or position, individuals ceaselessly emerge to mold and create their own landscapes.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n He (79) adds that the expressions <\/em>of the masses, the folk and the poor are not hidden. They are always there but you just have to know how to look for them, as he (79) points out. What\u2019s missing here is, however, how one does that, how one not only looks for those expressions but also how one finds them. He (79) does provide some examples, such as graffiti, but at least I find his instructions rather concise. Then again, perhaps I\u2019m just more stringent on what counts as such expressions. He (79) includes people and what they tell in the mix, whereas, for me, those don\u2019t count as landscape expressions<\/em>. I reckon they may well count as landscape impressions<\/em>, but not really as expressions. Anyway, feel free to disagree if you don\u2019t like my view of the issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Samuels (79) wraps up his essay by emphasizing that unless we address agency <\/em>and grant that people have agency, no matter how difficult the circumstances may be, as in the concentration camp example he uses, we succumb into determinism <\/em>in which no one has any responsibility <\/em>because no one has any choice<\/em>. For him (79), there\u2019s always choice, even if those choices can at times be very limited. He (79) does acknowledge that there can be situations where people have no choice but it\u2019s not because they inherently have no choice but because others have stripped them from having a choice. In other words, the choice is rendered moot. This is what he (79) refers to as dehumanizing<\/em>, a process in which victims are no longer treated as humans and the perpetrators are, possibly, no longer acting as humans but mere automatons. Of course, he (79-80) isn\u2019t content with this, even if that may well be the case on the ground, or so to speak. This goes back to his (52) initial statement about the absurdity of landscape<\/em>, how it is certainly human<\/em>, yet it is \u201ca geography of man devoid of men.\u201d Simply put, as I pointed out early on, landscape is both human and inhuman <\/em>at the same time. That\u2019s the central problem. In his (80) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[If] no one is ever responsible, if we are all but victims of G[o]d, History, Nature, Reason, or \u2018the System,\u2019 then we and our landscapes are by definition, lacking in human content. In that event, \u2018explanation\u2019 may supercede \u2018attribution\u2019[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n If it isn\u2019t obvious already, he (80) wants us to do the exact opposite, to pay attention to who<\/em> is responsible and for what. How one does that is something that he leaves open, as I already pointed out. To be fair, he (80) does actually indicate that his theory and his method is hardly complete, albeit largely because he reckons that he has barely scratched the surface of the issue that pertains to human choice <\/em>and responsibility<\/em>. I think it\u2019s good that he acknowledges that. Then again, perhaps that\u2019s a bit unnecessary. I mean, I reckon he does a fairly good job at explaining such a complex issue in about 30 pages of text. I quite appreciate how, at the time, it was actually possible to write 30 pages on a single issue. Imagine that now. Yeah, not gonna happen. There\u2019s no patience. What is expected of people is more of the same, what has already been established. I\u2019d love to write 30 pages on a single concept, but I reckon it would be considered tedious. Oh, why dost thou even bother, they\u2019d ask. For me the problem is that I end up writing something either something super dense or superficial when I don\u2019t get to explain things in the necessary detail.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Samuels (81) also adds that as much as he is in favor of focusing on the individual<\/em>, in order to embrace greater particularity and avoid the inhumanity <\/em>of attributing landscape <\/em>to abstract entities or processes, he acknowledges that his approach may not always work. To be more specific, he (81) concedes that much of our environment has been \u201cmolded, designed and designated\u201d for centuries without there being any traces of anyone\u2019s signature<\/em>. It\u2019s, of course, possible that there once were signatures but they have been eroded or removed. It\u2019s also possible that people didn\u2019t leave any signatures. This is actually ones of the points Derrida makes when he discusses how texts <\/em>function. Anyway, Samuels (81) reckons that often the best thing we can do is to speculate, to infer, to intuit, who <\/em>is responsible for this and\/or that feature or artifact in the landscape. For him (81), this by no means results in \u201ca dehumanization of the faceless and the nameless\u201d and it is, perhaps, if not likely, \u201call that we can ever hope to accomplish.\u201d On top of this, I would add, one should acknowledge the possibility of forged signatures<\/em>. Not everything is what it appears to be. Appearances can be deceiving.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As a recap, while I don\u2019t agree with everything in the essay, I do recommend reading it as it contains very good points that actually still highly relevant. Sure, I reckon it\u2019s fair to say that it shows that the essay was written in the late 1970s. That said, it\u2019s still way, way better than most journal articles that I come across these days. There\u2019s just the level of depth that I like. His emphasis on agency<\/em>, who<\/em> is responsible and for what, is what makes this essay stand out. He is also willing to recognize how difficult the task of answering that question is and how one inevitably runs into problems when attempting to answer that. At best, one is often left to make educated guesses, working on intuition as those responsible for this and\/or that are long gone. So, do yourself a favor and read this essay. You\u2019ll find it in a collection of essays titled \u2018The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes: Geographical Essays\u2019 edited by Donald Meinig.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So, I have about ten or so pages of \u2018The Biography of Landscape: Cause and Culpability\u2019 by Marwyn Samuels left to cover. I\u2019ll go through these pages in this essay. But before I do that, I\u2019ll summarize what I covered in my previous essay. Right, the gist of the essay is that we should not […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3554,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[168,24,519],"class_list":["post-1439","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-essays","tag-derrida","tag-samuels","tag-tolonen"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1439","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3554"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1439"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1439\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5475,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1439\/revisions\/5475"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1439"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1439"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1439"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}\n
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References<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
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