I\u2019m not exactly sure how I ended up reading this, \u2018Learning to Translate the Linguistic Landscape\u2019 by David Malinowski, which can be found in \u2018Expanding the Linguistic Landscape: Linguistic Diversity, Multimodality and the Use of Space as a Semiotic Resource\u2019. I guess I was rather browsing through it, initially searching for the word \u2018landscape\u2019 while at it, but indeed I did, that\u2019s what matters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As the title suggests, his book chapter has to do with translation. That\u2019s not really what caught my attention though and so I won\u2019t be focusing on that here. This is not to say that translation is not important. It is. I like to summarize it the way Brian Massumi (16) expresses it in his book \u2018A User\u2019s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari\u2019 when he reminds the reader that \u201c[t]ranslation is repetition with a difference.\u201d I\u2019d actually go as far as to say that translation is just another word paraphrasing, which is, in itself, exactly as Massumi points out, repetition <\/em>with a difference<\/em>. To be exact, technically, there is nothing that is the same<\/em>. So, when I write something and repeat it, it is not exactly the same because the conditions <\/em>for its repetition are different in each instance. Nothing ever stays the same.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Anyway, to get somewhere with this and not just repeat what I\u2019ve written in the past (not that I can technically ever repeat anything, as there\u2019s always difference<\/em>), Malinowski (61) suggests that one needs to reflexive in one\u2019s work. I agree. He (61) points to Bernard Spolsky\u2019s book chapter \u2018Prolegomena to a Sociolinguistic Theory of Public Signage\u2019, as contained in \u2018Linguistic Landscape: Expanding the Scenery\u2019. In that book chapter, Spolsky (25) notes that as a field or study linguistic landscape is both \u201cawkwardly but attractively labeled\u201d. I agree. It is awkward, but it is also attractive. It doesn\u2019t really tell anyone anything prior to someone specifying what is meant by it. Then again, I reckon it does have buzz to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Spolsky (25) links linguistic landscape studies (LLS) to sociolinguistics and language policy studies and considers it as pertaining to language in urban space, which is why he reckons cityscape <\/em>would be a more apt and preferable to landscape<\/em>. He (25) also notes that regardless of the moniker and the nomenclature that comes with it, it is very unclear what is meant by it. To be more specific, he (25) wonders whether it is something that calls \u201cfor a theory, or simply a collection of somewhat disparate methodologies for studying the nature of public written signs?\u201d He (25) answers his own questions, albeit only, sort of, tentatively, by stating that if it doesn\u2019t need a theory of its own, then it still needs some theory, which can be found in some other field or discipline, such as semiotics. He (25) adds that if it is just about the methods, one still needs to figure out a lot of things, such as what\u2019s a sign anyway, how does one count the signs then, what is the geographic unit one is examining, how does one define it and its borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The questions posed Spolsky (25) are tough questions. No doubt about it. Now, it may be just me, acknowledged, but defining such concepts forces one to introduce theory, a lot of it. We may like to think that we can just engage with the world and gather evidence. Sure, you can do that, but that reminds me a lot of early geographic landscape studies, such as the work of Carl Sauer and J. G. Gran\u00f6, which, in summary, started from observation of some \u2018facts\u2019 and resulted in \u2018uncovering\u2019 geographic areas <\/em>or regions<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In short, what\u2019s problematic with such approaches, as pioneered in geography about a century ago already, mind you, is that the people involved fail to realize that they start from the supposed \u2018facts\u2019, certain units of analysis<\/em>, without much consideration that it is they<\/em> who define what counts as a unit of analysis, and they<\/em> who gather them in bulk in order to \u2018uncover\u2019 what some area <\/em>or region is<\/em> like. It\u2019s they<\/em> who have created that classification. It\u2019s their<\/em> creation. I reckon that wouldn\u2019t be a problem if what is asserted was that the data indicates that people in a certain area or region seem to be engaged in certain systematic practices, i.e. discourses<\/em>, that can be seen (yes, visually seen) as manifested <\/em>in the environment (as landscape <\/em>is a visual concept). However, if this is left out, as it typically was back in the day among geographic landscape scholars, what you get instead is asserting that a certain area or a region (defined by the researchers as such, mind you) is<\/em> what is<\/em> stated in the study.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To use Marxist lingo to explain this (not because I subscribe to Marxism, but because it\u2019s fair easy to understand the issue through it), not bothering with theory results in textbook example of reification<\/em>, creating objects that people come to take for granted, as having inherent attributes. It results in the object<\/em>, the thing<\/em>, whatever we are dealing with as appearing as if it had a life of its own. Now, of course, I don\u2019t believe it does. That said, what matters is that people come to believe that it does. They come to take it as such.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example, when it comes to landscape<\/em>, J. G. Gran\u00f6\u2019s work clearly still lingers in Finland as his classification of Finland into regions, that is to say clearly delimited areas<\/em>, as defined by him<\/em>, according to his<\/em> method, is still used as the basis for administering these regions, conserving their visual appeal, as discussed by Hannu Linkola in his article \u2018Administration, Landscape and Authorized Heritage Discourse \u2013 Contextualising the Nationally Valuable Landscape Areas of Finland\u2019. Simply put, what can be said about these areas and what can be done in these areas is based on the research of one guy, who did that research in the early 1900s. Something tells me that I don\u2019t even need to explain what\u2019s problematic about that, but I\u2019ll do that anyway.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So, to explain the core issue with that, again in Marxist terms (again, out of convenience), people are thus alienated<\/em> from their surroundings, seen as acting out what they are supposed to act out in accordance to their surroundings. Now, again, for me this is, of course, just nonsense. The area<\/em>, the region<\/em>, the landscape<\/em>, doesn\u2019t make anyone do anything as such, nor does society<\/em>, culture<\/em>, nature<\/em>, ideology <\/em>or any superorganic <\/em>or transcendent <\/em>(otherworldly) entity. However, that is not to say that people don\u2019t buy into that narrative, so I reckon that\u2019s what they do. If you ask me, being slave one\u2019s own reasoning is pretty crazy, but that’s what most people do, all day everyday. To quote Katy Perry\u2019s \u2018Hot N Cold\u2019, because why not, it\u2019s \u201c\u2018cause you’re hot then cold, you’re yes then you’re no, you’re in then you’re out, you’re up then you’re down, you’re wrong when it’s right\u201d; \u201cand you over-think\u201d; \u201cgot a case of love bipolar, stuck on a roller coaster, and I can’t get off this ride\u201d. And yes, I just explained what Gilles Deleuze and F\u00e9lix Guattari think of the contemporary image of thought<\/em> in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia\u2019 with a pop song, because it\u2019s fun, and fitting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n James Duncan (271) summarizes this issue particularly well in his book chapter \u2018The Social Construction of Unreality: An Interactionist Approach to the Tourist\u2019s Cognition of Environment\u2019, as contained in \u2018Humanistic Geography: Prospects and Problems\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cMarx developed the notion of reification most fully in the first volume of Capital<\/em> in his discussion of the fetishism of commodities; and Lukacs generalized the concept further in his History and Class Consciousness<\/em>. Reification<\/em> refers to the process by which man produces a world both of abstractions \u2013 that is, ideas, values, norms conduct \u2013 and of real concrete objects, which, although they are his own product, he nevertheless permits to dominate him as objective unchanging facticities. Alienation<\/em> refers to the fact that man forgets that this world is his own product, thus allowing it to act back on him. By reifying the world as he has produced it, by forgetting that it was he who gave it a \u2018life of its own,\u2019 and by allowing it to have a power over him, man becomes alienated.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Now, Duncan goes on to further explain this, contrasting it with other views, but I\u2019m sure you can read that all by yourself, so I won\u2019t go on with that. Linkola\u2019s article deals with these very issues in the Finnish context, albeit from a discursive perspective rather than a Marxist one. In short, the classifications based on Gran\u00f6 have resulted in them living lives of their own, so that people come to expect the countryside that they drive throught to look like something out of the early 1900s when Finland was largely rural and agrarian, with neatly cultivated fields, haystacks, horses and cattle, crudely constructed barns for storage, all-wooden cattle fences and wooden farm buildings. If it doesn\u2019t match the \u2018description\u2019, when, in fact, there are no barns, no all wooden cattle fences, no wooden farm buildings, but, instead, pales of hay wrapped in plastic (waiting to be picked up), big tractors and combine harvesters, grain drying facilities made out of sheet metal and houses that differ little from the houses they encounter in cities, they are up in arms about it. Why does no one care about the environment<\/em>? This is a travesty! These farmers mustn\u2019t be allowed to ruin the landscape<\/em>! Then some bureaucrats in some office in the capital are alerted about such travesties taking place and they end up giving out press statements about how the country folks should know better and that maybe they should be fined for such infractions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To further explain this in Marxist terms, the way that all works is fairly (petty) bourgeoisie. I mean, there is this established notion of how things should <\/em>be and it is taken for granted. People who live elsewhere, and probably just drive through the countryside while on holiday, come to dictate how the world should <\/em>look like even in places where they don\u2019t live themselves. It\u2019s, as if, there are no people living in the countryside or, as if, if they are taken into consideration, they are to curate the countryside, to retain its look, you know, like an open-air museum, for pleasure and comfort of others. Something tells me that the people working there in the countryside don\u2019t share this view, because it\u2019s where they live and work. For them it probably makes more sense to live here and now, to build this and\/or that based on what they need to run things, not on whether it looks like it fits some early 1900s ideal that is based on some city dwellers view of the world that their own grandparents or great-grandparents happened to create back in the day, out of necessity, to make things work for them at that time, in that place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now, where was I? So, right, the questions posed by Spolsky (25) are by no means easy questions and attempting to answer them does involve quite a bit of theoreticizing. In my experience it involves going on quite a wild tangent, kind of like what I just did there but on a much grander scale of course. I agree with Spolsky (26) in that the advantage of studying our surroundings, i.e. the landscape<\/em>, if you will, is highly useful in its simplicity and thus attractive. I sometimes explain what I do and why I do it the way I do by pointing out that it\u2019s a bit like going through people\u2019s garbage to understand their behavior instead of asking people about their habits. For example, we could ask people whether they sort their refuse or not, but who is going to answer that they don\u2019t? It makes way more sense to look at the refuse. That\u2019ll tell us whether people actually separate different types of refuse, say plastic, metal and carton. One could also compare it with the way sewage is analyzed for traces of pharmaceuticals, that is to say drugs, in order to understand how common some use of drugs is in a certain area (matching the extent of the sewage system, of course) because the findings are bound to be more reliable than what we can get by asking people if they use drugs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I also agree with Spolsky (26) on that despite the methodological advantage, there is typically very little theory involved. To my knowledge, the discussion of the issue, that is to say what is landscape <\/em>or what is meant by it when it is used to distinguish a (sub)field or a (sub)discipline, is very hard to find in the existing publications outside geographic landscape studies (where it is, in stark contrast, typically explicitly defined). Unless I\u2019m mistaken, I believe the sole exception (in addition to my own work) in this regard is the introduction of \u2018Semiotic Landscapes: Language, Image, Space\u2019 in which Adam Jaworski and Crispin Thurlow dedicate about eight pages to address that question. Could it still be a more extensive and a more thorough treatment? Yes. Of course it could be and, perhaps, it should be. Then again, I\u2019m quite delighted by those eight pages. Their book also expands the issue, shifting the focus from linguistic <\/em>to semiotic<\/em>, going from one mode <\/em>to multiple modes, and thus broadens the object of inquiry considerably. I think this is the right way to go about it, even though that does put the label \u2018linguistic landscape\u2019 into question.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Is it even necessary to call what linguistic landscape researchers do linguistic landscape studies? Wouldn\u2019t it be better to call it semiotic landscape studies, as done by Jaworski and Thurlow? I find it only apt that Gorter (130) points out in his review of the book that considering that Jaworski and Thurlow dub all landscape <\/em>as semiotic<\/em>, it is, perhaps, unnecessary to even speak of semiotic landscapes<\/em>, rather than just landscapes due to the redundancy involved in that statement. I agree. I wholeheartedly agree with this observation. To me, a landscape is semiotic, in itself, because it functions as a surface effect, as an overlay, always there, wherever you may roam, unless you happened to live prior to its development by Renaissance artists (or you are in a room without lights or just visually impaired to the extent that you are unable to see), as I\u2019ve discussed that numerous times. That\u2019s why it is so crucial to address it, to make sense of it, to explain it to the reader. There are, of course, some pathways out of that, but let\u2019s not get carried away here, as I\u2019ve also discussed that in the past.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Anyway, I reckon that the lack of theory is still the case, over ten years later from the publication of this book chapter written by Spolsky, as pointed out by Thurlow (99-100) in his commentary \u2018Semiotic creativities in and with space: binaries and boundaries, beware!\u2019. Getting back on track here, Malinowski (62) makes note of this criticism, in reference to a review written by Joshua Nash \u2018Is linguistic landscape necessary?\u2019. He (62) summarizes Nash\u2019s position:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[F]irst \u2026 LL does not substantially advance the study of landscape per se, and second, that what passes for most LL research amounts basically to old sociolinguistic wine in new bottles. As he writes, \u2018The methodological and theoretical thrust of LL can be posed as a logical extension of any detailed consideration of elements of analysis necessitated under what can be considered traditional sociolinguistics\u2019[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n For the sake of transparency, let\u2019s clarify this in Nash\u2019s (381) own words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cMoreover, if LL is old (linguistic) wine freshly housed in new (sociolinguistic and landscape) bottles,what do the expressions linguistic landscape(s) and linguistic landscape studies add to these fields? Although LL might be new to landscape studies and may be a recently developed appellative in linguistics, I believe the details of LL have been, at least philosophically, addressed in earlier linguistic work.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, yeah, Nash is indeed stating that linguistic landscape studies tend to be old wine in brand new bottles. And I agree. But, like Nash\u2019 (381) goes on to add, it\u2019s not that linguistics or sociolinguistics don\u2019t bring something to the table. In my own discussion with geographers, those who do landscape research, there seems to be a general hesitance to address language <\/em>because it seems like a rather daunting task, something better left to the linguists. This is exactly where one might see fruitful cross-over and\/or collaboration. If you look at prior geographic landscape research, there\u2019s very little discussion of language, how it is manifested <\/em>in the landscape <\/em>and what is its function or functions. There are couple of studies where this is discussed but it took me some proper digging to even find the articles. There are, of course, countless studies where this is handled implicitly, as it is painfully obvious judging by the photos used to illustrate landscape studies. This probably has to do with the hesitation of addressing the issue of language as a non-linguist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Malinowski (63) makes note of how Nash finds the works he reviews lacking in terms of how they relate landscape studies rather than sociolinguistic studies, while still using the label ‘landscape’. I agree with Nash on this one and I\u2019ve received plenty of flak for pointing this out, to the point that I\u2019ve must been shot down a couple of times for such belligerence, that is to say not knowing my place. Malinowski (63) provides his take on the issue:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cFrom within the disciplinary foci of LL studies as it has come to be known in sociolinguistics and language policy and planning circles (to name a few), such critiques may appear trifling or even irrelevant: as popular glosses of the very term \u2018linguistic landscape\u2019 make abundantly clear, language (multilingualism, code-mixing, pragmatics and so on) is the focal object of analysis and is contextualised by the landscape \u2013 and not the other way around.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Okay, so, in other words, those who do linguistic landscape research, or semiotic landscape research, if we want to be more inclusive of other modes<\/em>, can happily ignore the issue of what is landscape <\/em>because the focus is on language<\/em>, not on landscape? I think it makes sense to focus on the linguistic aspects, language in the landscape, or so to speak, especially because geographic landscape scholars haven\u2019t really done that (possibly out of fear of trying something which might anger the linguists, stepping on their toes, or something). This is just fine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The issue that I take, as does Nash, is exactly the attitude that it\u2019s fine to gloss over the landscape <\/em>part because the focus is on language <\/em>and that critiques such as the one by Nash may thus come across as \u201ctrifling or even irrelevant\u201d, to use Malinowski\u2019s (63) own wording. There\u2019s all this talk the talk about how language matters and what\u2019s new about this new thing is this emphasis on spatiality<\/em>, taking into account the spatial turn, if you will, but when it comes to explaining what the deal with spatility is, be it in terms of space<\/em>, place <\/em>or landscape (environment<\/em>, surroundings<\/em>, etc.), it tends to be just empty rhetoric, speaking of space, place or landscape (or other similar concepts) but thinking of them just as a mere backdrop or a mere container for human action, as Thurlow (99-100) points out in his commentary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This attitude is somewhat surprising, considering Malinowski\u2019s (64-65) discussion of Henri Lefebvre\u2019s spatial triad. I mean Lefebvre is known for being extremely critical of use of concepts such as space <\/em>for whatever reasons that happen to fits one\u2019s needs in one\u2019s field or discipline. Just look it up in his (2-4) book \u2018The Production of Space\u2019. For further commentary, look up the added preface to the third\/fourth edition of the French original, which can be found translated in the compilation work \u2018Henri Lefebvre: Key Writings\u2019. Similar criticism can be found in Doreen Massey\u2019s article \u2018Politics and Space\/Time\u2019. She (66) points out that while it might seem like a delight for a geographer like her to notice that space and spatiality <\/em>are finally recognized as important in other fields or disciplines, it is actually often highly disappointing:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cSuddenly the concerns, the concepts (or, at least, the terms) which have long been at the heart of our discussion are at the centre also of wider social and political debate. And yet, in the midst of this gratification I have found myself uneasy about the way in which, by some, these terms are used.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Similarly to Lefebvre, who she does refer to in this context, her ire is directed at the trendy use of geographic concepts, of which space <\/em>is the one she (66) pays most attention:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cMany authors rely heavily on the terms \u2018space\u2019\/\u2018spatial\u2019, and each assumes that their meaning is clear and uncontested. Yet in fact the meaning that different authors assume (and therefore\u2014in the case of metaphorical usage\u2014the import of the metaphor) varies greatly.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n I particularly like how she (66) highlights a certain paradox:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[A]uthors who in so many ways excel in logical rigour will fail to define a term which functions crucially in their argument[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Indeed. I\u2019ve encountered this as well. I\u2019ve had to endure excruciating criticism and I\u2019ve been obliged to define every nut and bolt, in minute detail, whatever it is that someone is unhappy with, typically dealing with some methodological issue pertaining to language <\/em>or multimodality<\/em>, often in vain, mind you, yet my rigorous examination of central spatial concepts is treated with everything ranging from bewilderment to contempt. Also, when I point out that how someone else\u2019s work lacks theoretical or conceptual rigor, I\u2019m seen as rocking the boat, not knowing my place, or the like. It\u2019s only apt that she (66) calls this \u201ca debate that never surfaces \u2026 because everyone assumes we already know what these terms mean.\u201d What was it again that Deleuze and Guattari state about discussions in \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019? Oh yeah, they (28) state that discussions never happen because no one seems to have time for discussion, because people find something better to do when someone suggests actual dialogue. As they (28-29) point out, typically no one wants actual dialogue because they are too busy being right, promoting their own interests, and when someone actually challenges them, not in bad faith<\/em> but to be productive, like I think Nash does, they deflect the criticism by resorting to ressentiment<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Right, back to Massey. You really have to ask yourself, does she have a point? What does landscape <\/em>mean? What does landscape mean when it\u2019s included in linguistic landscape? Does anyone know? Or do we just assume that everyone knows and it\u2019s better to not ask stupid questions? I\u2019m with her (66) on this one and reckon that \u201c[a]t least there ought to be a debate about the meaning of [these] much-used term[s].\u201d Then again, something tells me that people are too busy to do that. Oh how convenient!<\/p>\n\n\n\n Related to this, I\u2019m not exactly convinced by Malinowski\u2019s (64-65) presentation of Lefebvre\u2019s spatial triad. Some of this may be because it also appears to be partially based on a reading of Nira Trumper-Hecht\u2019s take on Lefebvre, as presented in a book chapter \u2018Linguistic Landscape in Mixed Cities in Israel from the Perspective of \u2018Walkers\u2019: The case of Arabic\u2019, as included in the \u2018Linguistic Landscape in the City\u2019. I reckon they are both a bit off when they state that it is the perceived space<\/em>, what we may also call the physical space<\/em>, deals with \u201cactual distribution of language on signs that can be observed and documented by camera\u201d, according to Trumper-Hecht (237), and \u201cthe plainly visible and audible \u2018perceived spaces\u2019 to the eye and the ear of the LL researcher\u201d, according to Malinowski (65). To my understanding, the perceived space is the physical space and what happens in physical space (spatial practice<\/em>), at any given moment (if we freeze time). For me, it\u2019s just about the physical bodies <\/em>and their interminglings, where and when. It\u2019s just what happens on the physical level. I don\u2019t think you can assess anything at this level, in itself, because it does not pertain to language <\/em>or semiosis <\/em>(beyond involving the manipulation of bodies, such as parts of one\u2019s body producing sounds which are vibrations of another body, the air).<\/p>\n\n\n\n They both are, however, more or less correct about how conceived space<\/em> is about how the physical space<\/em> is conceptualized (representations of space)<\/em>, typically by people who have the privilege of doing so, including but not limited to \u201cscientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers\u201d, as well as \u201cartist[s] with a scientific bent\u201d, as listed by Lefebvre (38).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Malinowski (65) emphasizes the importance of the third part of Lefebvre\u2019s triad, the lived space<\/em>, stating that linguistic landscape researchers have typically focused on the perceived space<\/em> and\/or the conceived space<\/em>, thus largely overlooking the lived space, how, for example, local inhabitants come to understand \u201cthe significance of the appearance of Arabic, Hebrew or English on this sign or that, for instance, in ways that might well diverge from the top-down (conceived) or researcher\u2019s (perceived) interpretations.\u201d Trumper-Hecht (237) is actually a bit more hesitant about this when she points out that lived space in considered to be the experimental part of Lefebvre\u2019s triad, that is to say how inhabitants come to experience their surroundings. Regardless of the differences between the two, I think both misunderstand (and\/or misrepresent) lived space. Lefebvre (39) explains representational spaces<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[S]pace as directly lived<\/em> through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of \u2018inhabitants\u2019 and \u2018users\u2019[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n The way I understand this is that lived<\/em> space <\/em>is about how people come to engage with the world. It\u2019s not what they think<\/em> of the world (their conceptions<\/em> about it), nor what they do<\/em> physically (their spatial practices<\/em>). Lefebvre (39) further clarifies this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThis is the dominated \u2013 and hence passively experienced \u2013 space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Here, it\u2019s worth emphasizing that he defines it as a passively experienced<\/em> space. It is therefore not how one conceptualizes<\/em> one\u2019s surroundings, for example, when asked about it. That would result in representations<\/em> of space<\/em>, not unlike the conceptualized<\/em> spaces <\/em>of the aforementioned experts. It is also not the physical<\/em> space <\/em>because the imagination seeks to appropriate it. Anyway, Lefebvre (39) clarifies this even further:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIt overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Indeed, it is an overlay, a surface effect, that one imagines<\/em>. It doesn\u2019t change the perceived<\/em> space<\/em>, the physical<\/em> space<\/em>, because the states of affairs, the relation of bodies <\/em>does not change. Nothing happens to the bodies as such as only bodies can change bodies, the states of affairs. What it does instead is to organize physical<\/em> space<\/em>, to dominate it through imagination<\/em>, to give it order<\/em>. In Lefebvre\u2019s (39) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThus representational spaces may be said, thought again with certain exceptions, to tend towards more or less coherent systems of non-verbal symbols and signs.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, in summary, firstly, I don\u2019t agree with Malinowski, nor Trumper-Hecht, that lived<\/em> space <\/em>has to do with the local inhabitants in the sense that it\u2019s somehow some specific group of people, rather than just how anyone passively experiences<\/em> their surroundings, i.e., space<\/em>. To be clear, I consider anyone, including the researchers as living<\/em> in space, passively experiencing<\/em> it. Conversely, contrary to what is expressed by Malinowski (65), the researcher\u2019s observations are not perceptions<\/em>. Researchers also live<\/em>, just as anyone does. What they do is to produce representations of space<\/em>, as based on their conceptions<\/em> of space. All researchers produce representations<\/em>, based on certain conceptions<\/em>. I mean everyone does that, inasmuch as they produce some representations<\/em>, in one form or another, as based on their conceptualizations<\/em>. In Lefebvre\u2019s triad, that just comes with it. That’s how it works for him. Of course, not everyone\u2019s representations<\/em> or conceptualizations<\/em> are considered as equally important, hence Lefebvre\u2019s emphasis on people who are in privileged positions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now, of course, I\u2019m just me and what I\u2019ve stated is just my understanding of Lefebvre\u2019s triad. That said, I reckon I\u2019m more or less correct about my corrections. For example, Stuart Elden seems to agree with me. He offers a very useful summary of his triad in his article \u2018There is a Politics of Space because Space is Political: Henri Lefebvre and the Production of Space\u2019. In summary, he (110) notes how, for Lefebvre:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThere is an opposition established between our conception of space<\/em> \u2013 abstract, mental and geometric \u2013 and our perception of space<\/em> \u2013 concrete, material and physical.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n He (110) adds that the former is incorporeal <\/em>(or decorporeal<\/em>, lacks bodies) and the latter is corporeal <\/em>(has to do with bodies). Lefebvre (40) uses the example of the body:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIn seeking to understand the three moments of social space, it may help to consider the body<\/em>. All the more so inasmuch as the relationship to space of a \u2018subject\u2019 who is a member of a group or society implies his relationship to his own body and vice versa. Considered overall, social practice presupposes the use of the body: the use of the hands, members and sensory organs, and the gestures of work as of activity unrelated to work. This is the real of the perceived<\/em> (the practical basis of the perception of the outside world, to put it in psychology\u2019s terms).\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n To be clear, crystal clear, in terms used by Jacques Lacan (107) in \u2018What is a Picture?\u2019, as contained in \u2018The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis\u2019, perception <\/em>is something that takes place on a subconscious level. To be precise, building on Maurice Merleau-Ponty\u2019s \u2018Phenomenology of Perception\u2019, he (107) calls it a perceptual level<\/em>, which is, more or less, the level which takes place prior to our conscious linguistic\/semiotic understanding of the world. Okay, I guess you could say that it does happen on a conscious level, but, then again, be as it may, regardless of how we define consciousness<\/em>, it happens on a level that is more primary or primal than the moment when we conceptualize the world linguistically<\/em>\/semiotically<\/em>. Lefebvre (27) also mentions the link between perception <\/em>and material <\/em>or physical world <\/em>as a matter of \u201cpractico-sensory activity\u201d and considers the material or physical world as consisting of aggregates of sensory data. Anyway, back to bodies<\/em>. Lefebvre (40) continues, adding how he explains body in terms of people come to conceive it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cAs for representations of the body<\/em>, they derive from accumulated scientific knowledge, disseminated with an admixture of ideology: from knowledge of anatomy, of physiology, of sickness and its cure, and of the body\u2019s relations with nature and with its surroundings or \u2018milieu\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n And, with regard to living, he (40) adds:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cBodily lived<\/em> experience, for its part, maybe both highly complex and quite peculiar, because \u2018culture\u2019 intervenes here, with its illusory immediacy, via symbolisms and via the long Judaeo-Christian tradition, certain aspects of which are uncovered by psychoanalysis.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, for example, as he (40) goes on to exemplify, an organ such as the heart or one\u2019s reproductive parts are lived<\/em> differently from how they are conceived<\/em> or perceived<\/em>. After providing these examples, Lefebvre (40) warns the reader not to not treat his triad as something abstract, a mere model, a mere conception<\/em> if you will, because, for him, it\u2019s, at the same time, all very concrete, very physical<\/em> and very lived<\/em>, which is the point he wants to make. If you just didn\u2019t understand that, he (40) is kind enough to rephrase this when he stresses that these three parts are interconnected. He (40-41) also warns the reader not to think of them as equals of a larger coherent whole as what is important and thus emphasized depends on the time and place; sometimes representations of space<\/em> subordinate the others, whereas under different circumstances this may not be the case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Elden (110) aptly summarizes this, noting that one must take into account the physical<\/em> (material<\/em>), the mental<\/em> (ideal<\/em>) and the social<\/em> (material and ideal<\/em>). Simply put, the world is physical<\/em>, but we also have our conceptions<\/em> of it and by living<\/em>, literally just by existing, we combine the two, at all times. There\u2019s no escaping that. Now, of course, that does not negate or eradicate the other two, just because we all live (until we don\u2019t). We do live<\/em> in a material<\/em> world<\/em>. So, yes, when you get something like a virus that\u2019s the physical<\/em> world <\/em>acting upon you. It does matter. That said, we do also come up with all kinds of ideas<\/em> or abstractions<\/em>. We can talk the talk about the virus, but that doesn\u2019t make it go away, as just about anyone can confirm based on their lived<\/em> experience. Then again, we can spend our lives trying to understand the virus, to conceptualize<\/em> it, to come up with a cure for its various strands, which would certainly have an effect on our bodies, thus improving our lived<\/em> experience considerably. Now, as lived<\/em> experience tells us, those who work in labs, for that precious knowledge<\/em>, may also get the virus, which, in turn, hinders any possible progress on that cure because their bodies<\/em> are occupied with dealing with something clearly actual<\/em> and physical<\/em>. So, that\u2019s why Elden (110) stresses that it is of utmost importance not to focus solely on one of these as \u201cif only one is grasped and turned into an absolute, a partial truth becomes an error[.]\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n So, to explain myself again, why I disagree with Malinowski\u2019s and Trumper-Hecht\u2019s interpretations of Lefebvre\u2019s triad, I\u2019ll let Elden (110-111) provide an apt summary of the triad:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe first of these takes space as physical form, real<\/em> space, space that is generated and used. The second is the space of savoir<\/em> (knowledge) and logic, of maps, mathematics, of space as the instrumental space of social engineers and urban planners, that is, space as a mental construct, imagined<\/em> space. The third sees space as produced and modified over time and through its use, spaces invested with symbolism and meaning, the space of connaissance<\/em> (less formal or more local forms of knowledge), space as real-and-imagined<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Still not convinced? Maybe Elden is just a shell for my understanding of Lefebvre? Okay, okay. Let\u2019s have a look at what Rob Shields has in store for us in his book titled \u2018Lefebvre, Love and Struggle: Spatial Dialectics\u2019. He (162) states that spatial practice<\/em> (perceived space<\/em>) deals with the material<\/em> aspects of space<\/em>, the arrangements<\/em> of various bits and pieces. For example, the Church (as an organization) needs its churches, actual concrete<\/em> buildings. To be more elaborate about this, he (162) states that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cLefebvre attempts to sketch quickly the way in which spatialisation is just the gap between objects and therefore neutral, unimportant and not an object of struggle. This \u2018commonsense\u2019 understanding characterises both taken-for-granted everyday life (daily routines) and the logically rationalised urban (the milieu of routes and networks that we pass through on our way from home to work or play). We do not see that they are all linked together as part of an overarching arrangement, or spatialisation, complains Lefebvre. This commonsensical vision of space is limited to \u2018perceived space\u2019 and in fact ignores practice just at it ignores the qualitative meanings, the images and myths of places and regions. All this needs to become fully integrated into a \u2018total space\u2019, what Lefebvre refers many times as lived space.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n He (162-163) then specifies that these practices and arrangements deal with, for example, \u201cplanned suburbs, or cities connected by routes and flight paths\u201d, including various \u201cdivisions and inconsistencies\u201d such as \u201cpreserving nature in one place\u201d while \u201cpaving over arable land in another\u201d place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As you can see, similarly to Elden, and Lefebvre himself, Shields indicates that spatial practice<\/em> deals with the material<\/em> world <\/em>or the material aspects<\/em> of the world, such as paving land or not paving land. They are also not simply separate bits and pieces, paved land here, unpaved land there, church over there and a kiosk over there. To get to the kiosk or church, or wherever one might want to go, one has to traverse on some paved land or, alternatively, non-paved land. Of course, we need to consider what else is there, where the paving leads, is there traffic (moving material objects) etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Shields (163) provides a specific example, the Eaton Centre in Toronto, Ontario, which I can also comment myself, having been there myself. The way the shopping center is built, the way the walls are arranged at certain distance from one another, form a central pathway and a number of pathways that divert from it, partly on multiple levels. Anyway, Shields (163) notes that it is a spatial ensemble<\/em> or an arrangement <\/em>\u201cthat both encourages and requires (for commercial viability) a specific type of \u2018crowd practice\u2019\u201d, people wandering in a crowd, as aggregates, while funneled through the ensemble.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
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