So, yeah, this is not the essay you were looking for (unless it is the essay you were looking for) because in the last essay I stated that I’d most likely be finishing what I started last month. If that’s what you were looking for, then this is not it. This is what I came up with, while working on another essay, which was not the essay you may have been looking for (this might, of course be just what you were looking for, like, if you already read this and just wanted to return to this).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Anyway, now that you know that this is not what you were looking for, unless it is, of course, this time I\u2019ll be taking a closer look at what F\u00e9lix Guattari has to say about desire<\/em> and sexuality<\/em>, in an interview with George Stambolian, titled as \u2018A Liberation of Desire\u2019 in \u2018The Guattari Reader\u2019. The interview can also be found under the same heading in \u2018Soft Subversions: Texts and Interviews 1977\u20131985\u2019. It was originally published in \u2018Homosexualities and French Literature: Cultural Contexts\/Critical Texts\u2019, bearing the same title, but I\u2019ve gone with \u2018The Guattari Reader\u2019 here as the original book is hard to come by.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I realize that I have commented on this before, on how these are presented in \u2018Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia\u2019, in Guattari’s first collaboration with Gilles Deleuze, but something made me want to return to this topic. So, I did.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The gist of this, of desire<\/em> and sexuality<\/em>, is to desexualize sexuality or, to be more accurate, to deindividualize or depersonify it, which is then about desexualizing desire, as I pointed out in that previous essay (which could also be what you are looking for, instead of this essay). In simpler terms, the idea is to focus on desire and sexuality, on their own terms. As I realize that this may come across as odd, to say the least, but I think it should start making sense once its exemplified. So, just bear with me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Anyway, to get things going, Guattari (204) comments on how sexuality<\/em> is generally thought of in a society. In his (204) view, it\u2019s typically a taboo topic, so that it\u2019s largely censored. It\u2019s very much hush hush then and if someone doesn\u2019t keep their mouth shut, that person will be silenced. That\u2019s very clear cut. But there\u2019s also alternative to that. It may seem better than the wholesale rejection of the topic as inappropriate, but he (204) isn\u2019t convinced by that. Tolerance might not be as good a thing as we tend to think it is. As he (204) points out, people are still not at ease with the topic. It\u2019s like it is allowed to exist, but only on the condition that it\u2019s presented in a certain, normative way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He (204) elaborates on this tolerance and unease with the topic by noting how, firstly, it is fine to talk about heterosexuality<\/em>, and, secondly, even homosexuality<\/em>, but a sexuality <\/em>that is undefined, \u201cgoing in all directions\u201d is what troubles the powers that be. He (204) exemplifies that with how something as mundane as masturbation can be very shocking to people, especially the authorities. Why might that be? Well, doesn\u2019t comment on that specifically, why masturbation causes such a ruckus, but I think his (205-206) commentary of one\u2019s \u201crelation to the body\u201d or \u201csemiotics of the body\u201d as defined by authorities and upheld by people is rather revealing of this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So, interestingly, he (205) points out that men don\u2019t have a body <\/em>in the dominant semiotics of the body<\/em>, whereas women do. What he (205-206) means by this is that women\u2019s sexuality is much broader than men\u2019s, not because that\u2019s inherently the case, but because women have greater surface area of the body that can give them joy and pleasure than what men have. The problem with men is that sexuality <\/em>is not even about sexuality, but about domination<\/em>, as he (206) goes to explain. I think he (206) manages to explain this particularly well by commenting how men often talk about sex:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c\u2018I possessed you\u2019, \u2018I had you\u2019[.] Look at all the expressions like these used by men: \u2018I screwed you\u2019, \u2018I made her\u2019[.] It’s no longer the totality of the body’s surface that counts, it’s just this sign of power: \u2018I dominated you\u2019, \u2018I marked you\u2019[.]\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n While this does not mean that all men act this way, that they speak of sex in these terms, as about doing something to a woman, it is pretty common. I\u2019d say that it is generally considered acceptable for men to speak about sex in this way, in these terms as \u2018I [verb] her\u2019, like \u2018I fucked her\u2019, there being an active participant and a passive recipient, whereas it is not considered acceptable for women to speak like that, to say things like \u2018I fucked him\u2019. Why? Well, while \u2018fuck\u2019 is generally a really flexible word, to the point that you can say things like \u2018abso-fucking-lutely\u2019, in this context, when it\u2019s specifically about sex, there is this subject-verb-object construction that is considered to apply only to men. While I can\u2019t be sure, as perhaps I\u2019m missing something here, it appears that it is very \u201cphallocentric\u201d, all about the penis, as he (205) points out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As women don\u2019t have a penis, as they are thus deemed to be lacking a penis, it\u2019s the not having or the lack <\/em>of penis that is deemed to define their role in sex. I remember talking about sex, asking something like, \u201cwell, did you fuck him?\u201d, only for her, a female friend of mine, to reply to me, casually, that he didn\u2019t fuck her at that time or that she wasn\u2019t fucked by him. It\u2019s so ingrained that men are the ones doing the fucking that women themselves also end up speaking in those terms. While I realize that in many situations this isn\u2019t a major concern, as I\u2019m sure people have can and do have lovely sex and as it\u2019s not my job to tell people what kind of sex they should be having, it\u2019s still telling of how sexuality <\/em>is produced discursively <\/em>as very male centric. I prefer expressions where it\u2019s about having sex or fucking with<\/em> someone, like \u201cI fucked with<\/em> her\u201d, or leaving out who it is that one had sex with<\/em>, like \u201cwe<\/em> fucked\u201d. I prefer such because it doesn\u2019t reinforce any notions of domination<\/em>, where it\u2019s like something that comes with bragging rights about having had this and\/or that body. Anyway, he (206) summarizes what this does to men then:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThis obsession with power is such that man ultimately denies himself all sexuality.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Why is masturbation such a hot topic then? What is it about that troubles people and especially authorities. Well, if we are to take Guattari\u2019s (205-206) word for it, masturbation is considered problematic by the many because by masturbating you aren\u2019t dominating <\/em>anyone, because a man isn\u2019t fucking a woman. It\u2019s also worth noting that he (204) refers to masturbation in general, as a matter of pleasing oneself, on one\u2019s own terms, not as male or female masturbation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We could, of course, object to masturbation, inasmuch as it is just about the climax, about the \u201crupture of ejaculation\u201d, to use his (206) wording of dominant male sexuality, as it may be and likely often is for men. Deleuze and Guattari (154) comment on this in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia\u2019 by noting that masturbation is a substitute<\/em> pleasure<\/em>. Then again, I don\u2019t think the orgasm is the problem here. In my view, their (154) criticism of masturbation is not limited to masturbation. Instead, it\u2019s about casting sexuality <\/em>as a lack<\/em>, that you need<\/em> sex, to get that pleasure<\/em> from it, so that everything is relegated to it, as they (154) point out. This then explains why masturbation, giving yourself pleasure, is deemed to be a substitute pleasure. So, what they (154) really object to is the reduction of pleasure to a certain kind of pleasure. That certain kind of pleasure, what you get from that release, is certainly pleasurable, I don\u2019t think people doubt that. It\u2019s rather that there are many other things that are pleasurable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If we look at the other aspect mentioned by Guattari (206), I think it\u2019s the lack of domination <\/em>in masturbation that bothers people. So, from this perspective, the problem is about subordinating the orgasm to the domination of others, about relegating others to serving you, to giving you that orgasm. If it there\u2019s no one else, body on body, then there\u2019s no one to dominate. That\u2019s just impossible. It\u2019s just you enjoying you, the way you see fit. What\u2019s the problem with that? Well, nothing really, as you certainly aren\u2019t taking advantage of anyone. It is, however, typically viewed as problematic as it is not a regulated form of sexuality<\/em>, as you don\u2019t need a permission to do it and as you can do it in any way you like, as you don\u2019t need anyone else\u2019s consent, nor approval.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It\u2019s also worth noting that, for him (205), there are men who have a body <\/em>or, rather, a relation to the body that is markedly different from what is generally expected of them. He (205) mentions homosexuals, as well as dancers. Now, I\u2019m going to skip the homosexuals here, no offence, and focus on the dancers. What\u2019s so special about a dancer? Well, what I think is special about them is exactly their relation to their bodies. They can do so many things with their bodies that most people can\u2019t or aren\u2019t even aware of. It\u2019s the same with figure skaters. It\u2019s all about the body and the movement of the body, in relation to other bodies. If you\u2019ve seen a dancer dance, or, better yet had the chance to dance with one, you know what I\u2019m talking about. It\u2019s the same with figure skaters. I consider myself a very good skater. Okay, I\u2019m not an excellent skater, nor would I claim to be one, but, still, I\u2019m a pretty good skater. I don\u2019t even know how to explain that, what it is that makes me a good skater, how it is that I have a certain relation to my body that makes it so, nor how I became a good skater, but that\u2019s the case. I was like that already as a child. My guess is that I just did it so much, on my own, enjoying it, that it just happened. That said, every time I see a figure skater on ice, I realize that I\u2019m not really that great a skater. It is just impressive how good they are. How smooth it is. I think I would have made an excellent figure skater. Too bad it\u2019s a bit late for that. Then again, I don\u2019t think it does anyone any good to think that way, because that\u2019s subordinating what it is that you\u2019ve come to desire<\/em>, in this case skating, to success, for example in competitions, which is to say that it is then constituted as a lack<\/em> that one seeks to fulfil. You can then only get pleasure from it if you succeed. Success is then that substitute pleasure<\/em> that Deleuze and Guattari (154) mention. You seek to attain it and even if you reach it, you can only enjoy it for a brief moment, before you need succeed again, and again, and again, never really able to maintain it. I don\u2019t know about you, but I think that\u2019s a pretty miserable way to live. So, yeah, oddly enough, that\u2019s exactly how sexuality <\/em>tends to viewed, as not enjoying the ride, but the end of the ride.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Now, I think it\u2019s also worth adding here that one should not blindly credit women as better than men or homosexuals as better than heterosexuals, as the problem is not about identity<\/em>. As explained by Guattari (204), no group is inherently better than another group and groups and even the most progressive and liberatory contain repressive elements. In other words, there are always those who are willing to betray the group for their own good. Deleuze and Guattari explain this particularly well in \u2018Deleuze and Guattari Fight Back\u2026\u2019 when they (217) state that people are capable of revolutions, there\u2019s no doubt about that, they can change the system, but their leaders, I\u2019d say the ones who are the most vocal about the revolution, are the ones who subvert the revolution by remaining loyal to the ways the old system functions. There is this temptation to conform or to set up a system of conformity to replace a previous system of conformity, because conforming tends to be rewarded. It\u2019s not necessarily the case that non-conforming is punished, but rather that the reward of conforming, what we might also call selling out, is so tempting that non-conforming comes across a punishment as life is harder then. A sweet gig is a sweet gig.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Guattari (207) exemplifies that by noting that it would appear to make sense that homosexuals write about homosexuality <\/em>and sexual liberation, but it\u2019s not as clear cut as that as one may end up turning all that into something highly repressive. In other words, assuming that what\u2019s interesting about homosexuality is tied to homosexuals, and can thus be explained only by homosexuals, essentializes it, relegating it to a fixed identity<\/em>. That means reducing sexuality to a set of classifications, as he (209) points out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The specific example mentioned by him (207) is French writer Andr\u00e9 Gide. Even though Guattari (207) refers to Gide as a great writer, he also criticizes Gide for having \u201calways transcribed his homosexuality and in a sense betrayed it.\u201d I\u2019m not familiar with Gide\u2019s works, so I cannot comment on that. Guattari and his interviewer do not really expand on the issue, thus leaving you hanging here, but they do mention Gide\u2019s book \u2018Corydon\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Guy Hocquenghem (62) mentions Gide\u2019s \u2018Corydon\u2019 in his book \u2018Homosexual Desire\u2019, which helps to contextualize what the issue might be for Guattari, why he is critical of Gide, the homosexual, for betraying homosexuality<\/em>. The problem with Gide\u2019s account of homosexuality is that it is presented as biologically natural, as explained by Hocquenghem (62). What\u2019s the problem with that then? Isn\u2019t it natural, just like heterosexuality? Well, yes, inasmuch anything is natural, in the sense that it is possible. But that\u2019s not really what Guattari and Hocquenghem are after. As explained by Hocquenghem (62), homosexuality was not really a thing prior to the 1800s, when it was defined as something, supposedly, unnatural, which, in turn, helped to define heterosexuality as natural. I think Michel Foucault (43) explains that point even better in the first volume of \u2018History of Sexuality\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n The point here is not to claim that homosexuality <\/em>didn\u2019t not exist prior to 1800s, that\u2019d be absurd, but rather that it was constituted differently, as sodomy, as supposedly deviant sexual behavior and not an identity<\/em>. As Foucault (37-38) points out, they were acts that were lumped together with other acts deemed as deviant, such as \u201cdebauchery (extramarital relations), adultery, rape, \u2026 incest\u201d and \u201cbestiality\u201d, and thus illicit, because they were against the licit matrimonial relations and marital obligations. Simply put, prior to the 1800s, what you did<\/em> was considered to be wrong, not who you were<\/em>. This then changed when sexuality was deemed to be something who you are<\/em> and not as what you do<\/em>, as explained by Hocquenghem (62):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe term \u2018unnatural\u2019, used by the police in the nineteenth century to describe homosexuals, finds its true definition: it describes the person who is against nature as the guarantor both of desire and of its repression.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n The problem with Gide\u2019s \u2018Corydon\u2019 is not that it deals with homosexuality<\/em>, from the perspective of a homosexual, no, that\u2019s not it, nothing wrong with that, but that it falls prey to its own logic which it shares with the authorities who deem it unnatural<\/em>, as Hocquenghem (62) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWhen Gide in Corydon<\/em> attempts to construct a homosexuality which is biologically based, by means of a comparison with other species, he is simply walking foolishly into the trap, which consists of a need to base the form of desire on nature.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In other words, presenting homosexuality <\/em>as natural, like heterosexuality<\/em>, subordinates desire to nature, which is not a given, but is treated as a given. Anything that is therefore not part of nature<\/em>, that is to say natural<\/em>, is therefore unnatural<\/em>. It\u2019s then deviant<\/em>, something that deviates from the norm<\/em>. Having recourse to nature then functions like having recourse to the Will of God. This is fine, because it\u2019s natural, because it is the Will of God, but that is not fine, because it\u2019s unnatural, because that\u2019s against the Will of God. This is also an odd one, considering how people like to think that they act according to our individual wills, that is to say autonomously, and rationally, that is to say ignoring superstitions, yet, there is this regressive and theological appeal to nature, as explained by Hocquenghem (62).<\/p>\n\n\n\n So, what you have is an appeal to a third party that acts as the arbiter of truth, which is, in fact, one of the parties involved, as I\u2019ve discussed in some of my previous essays. That\u2019s how you rig a game and that\u2019s exactly what the problem here is. In Hocquenghem\u2019s (62) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIf the [criminal] code retreats into obscurantism here it is because, when faced with homosexuality, it requires the backing of a universal authority on heterosexual normality.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n To be clear, sexuality <\/em>is not, of course, the only thing that is made to function in this way. This is what Deleuze and Guattari (177) refer to as biunivocalization<\/em> in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019, utilizing one to define the other, which, in turn, reinforces that as a binary<\/em> configuration:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[I]t is a man or a woman, a rich person or a poor one, an adult or a child, a leader or a subject, \u2018an x or a y.\u2019\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n It doesn\u2019t matter what the first term is, what that \u2018x\u2019 is, as the point is that it is to be juxtaposed with another term, with a \u2018y\u2019, that then reinforces the first term, that \u2018x\u2019. They (177) list other pairings:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[A] teacher and a student, father and son, worker and boss, cop and citizen, accused and judge[.]\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n We could also set up heterosexuality <\/em>as the \u2018x\u2019 and juxtapose it with homosexuality <\/em>as the \u2018y\u2019, so that the former is the normal<\/em> one and the latter is the deviant<\/em> other. This is the point Hocquenghem (62) makes and what Guattari (207) implies in the interview. What Gide then does, according to both Hocquenghem (62) and Guattari (207) is to posit heterosexuality and homosexuality as the \u2018x\u2019. This may seem like a good move, and, in a sense, it is, inasmuch it improves the lives of homosexuals. Then again, we still retain that biunivocal<\/em> relation<\/em> in which we have an \u2018x\u2019, a natural<\/em>, normal<\/em> or desirable<\/em> sexuality, and a \u2018y\u2019, which is an unnatural<\/em>, unnormal<\/em> or undesirable<\/em> sexuality. This means that people will still be discriminated against based on their sexuality and\/or something else which is defined in this way, biunivocally<\/em>. That\u2019s the problem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Foucault (40) notes in the first volume of \u2018The History of Sexuality\u2019 that back in the day, in the 1800s, \u201c[t]here emerged a world of perversion\u201d. There were, all the sudden, all these perverts<\/em>, people who were deemed to be a bit off, if you will, as he (40) goes on to explain. These perverts, what we could also call deviants<\/em>, to avoid thinking of this only in terms of sexuality<\/em>, albeit that\u2019s the topic of this essay, were deemed to their own \u201csub-race\u201d of the human race, as he (40) points out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What concerns Foucault (40-41), in particular, is how the shift from acts<\/em> to identity<\/em>, from doing<\/em> to being<\/em>, in the 1800s also shifted the way sexuality <\/em>was handled by the authorities. He (40-41) considers it particularly noteworthy that while in the past illicit acts such as sodomy could result in a severe punishment<\/em>, the shift to it being about the person made it a matter of discipline<\/em> and control<\/em>. In other words, sexuality used to be something that you did<\/em> and you could be punished for what you did, inasmuch it was deemed illicit. The thing here is that what your acts did not define you. You were, perhaps, punished, but that was it and you moved on with your life. As things changed, your acts were seen not as defining you, as such, but rather defined by who you were deemed to be. Now, of course, the acts, what you did, did indeed end up defining you. Shifting things on their head was just a ruse that allowed authorities to control<\/em> people. As you could be identified as a pervert<\/em>, i.e., a deviant<\/em>, it could then be used as grounds to discipline you. So, while it may have seemed to be a good thing that the punishments became less severe in the process and that the cases were deferred to medical professionals, it was a ruse, as Foucault (40-41) points out. Why is that bad? Well, because it makes the person source of perversion<\/em> or deviance<\/em>, as Foucault (43) goes on to explain:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, no matter what you do, it can then be attributed as having been caused by that, because you are deemed to be born with it, as he (43) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIt was everywhere present in him: at the root of all his actions because it was their insidious and indefinitely active principle; written immodestly on his face and body because it was a secret that always gave itself away.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In practice, it\u2019s like when someone questions what you did, perhaps poorly, and thinks that it must be because this person is a homosexual. To be clear, that\u2019s not how it is, but that\u2019s how people often think it is. He (43) summarizes all that, further highlighting the shift from acts <\/em>to identity<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIt was consubstantial with him, less as a habitual sin than as a singular nature.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n This is also the case with other kinds of supposed perverts <\/em>or deviants<\/em>, as he (43) goes on to list them:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[T]here were Krafft-Ebing’s zoophiles and zooerasts, Rohleder’s auto-monosexualists; and later, mixoscopophiles, gynecomasts, presbyophiles, sexoesthetic inverts, and dyspareunist women.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n To make sense of that list of perverts<\/em> or sexual deviants <\/em>that he (43) refers to by their \u201cstrange baptismal names\u201d, what I could gather is that zoofiles are animal lovers, zooerasts are animal fuckers, auto-monosexualists are masturbators, mixoscopophiles are voyeurs, aka Peeping Toms, gynecomasts are breast lovers, presbyophiles are those who like older men, sexoesthetic inverts are those who behave like the opposite sex, and dyspareunists are those to whom intercourse is painful. Now, there are, of course, countless other labels for all kinds of perverts or sexual deviants, but I think his (43) list shall suffice. Then there\u2019s the highly controversial topic of children\u2019s sexuality, which Foucault (41-42) brings up in the same context. It\u2019s still that way and it\u2019s one of those things that you don\u2019t want to deal with, because it is a taboo, that\u2019s for sure. Now, to be clear, Foucault (42) isn\u2019t addressing molestation here, but rather children\u2019s sexuality, on children\u2019s own terms:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cEducators and doctors combatted children\u2019s onanism like an epidemic that needed to be eradicated.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n He (42) further comments this, noting that children\u2019s sexuality became like a thing for adults, like an obsession, if you will:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWherever there was the chance they might appear, devices of surveillance were installed; traps were laid for compelling admissions; inexhaustible and corrective discourses were imposed[.]\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Paranoia might be another good word for that, considering what Foucault (42) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[P]arents and teachers were alerted, and left with the suspicion that all children were guilty, and with the fear of being themselves at fault if their suspicions were not sufficiently strong[.]\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, the point here is that it mattered or matters not what children actually do. Instead it\u2019s the suspicion that they might be up to something that\u2019s supposedly reserved only for adults, as codified by adults, mind you, that matters. No again, this is not about molesting children, what some adults do to children, but about meddling with children\u2019s sexuality. Also, it\u2019s not about children acting like adults. It\u2019s more like adults getting hung up on the issue on sexuality<\/em>, there being that suspicion, which then gives them the license to discipline children, to interfere in their lives. I think Foucault (42) summarizes this well:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe child’s \u2018vice\u2019 was not so much an enemy as a support; it may have been designated as the evil to be eliminated[.]\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n He (42) further clarifies this by adding that this required enormous effort, which was simply a waste of time. It was all in the heads of the adults. It was the adults, the \u2018x\u2019, who were thinking that the children, the y\u2019, were up to no good, whereas the children most likely didn\u2019t have the faintest clue what this whole ordeal was. That did not, however, stop the adults from staying on it, like, I\u2019d say, a paranoiac whose suspicions just keep getting reinforced when there really isn\u2019t anything to come across, as he (42) points out. Simply put, children\u2019s sexuality, whatever that means, as it\u2019s difficult to comprehend their world from an adult standpoint, seems to have been deemed a perversion <\/em>by the adults, the \u2018x\u2019, so that any supposedly deviant<\/em> act, from an adult standpoint that is, from the standpoint of \u2018x\u2019, was then considered a sign of perversion or deviancy, of \u2018y\u2019, which, in turn, would then be a sign that the person might, in fact, be a pervert<\/em> or a deviant<\/em>, possibly even born as such, as a \u2018y\u2019. Why the suspicion then? Well, if you are an adult, an \u2019x\u2019, not deemed a pervert or a sexual deviant, a \u2018y\u2019, then it concerns you that your children are also \u2018x\u2019 and not \u2018y\u2019, hence all the suspicion, spying and potential disciplining of the children by the adults. This would, by all logic, be even more problematic for the adults, the \u2018x\u2019, if their children are \u2018y\u2019, because that would serve as indication that the adults themselves, especially the parents and the educators, are not, in fact, \u2018x\u2019, but \u2018y\u2019, only claiming to be \u2018x\u2019, as either the children have become \u2018y\u2019 under their watchful eyes, possibly even learning such from them, or, worse, they were born that way, as \u2018y\u2019, which would then indicate that the perversion or deviancy is inherently from their parents, thus making the parents also \u2018y\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Anyway, the point he (43) wants to make is that there are these fancy names given to people seem rather different, let\u2019s put it that way, as neutrally as possible, these psychiatric names given for people whose actions are deemed to be perverted<\/em> or sexually deviant<\/em>, as defined binunivocally<\/em> as the \u2018y\u2019 categories. I like the (43) way he characterizes this labelling process:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThese fine names for heresies referred to a nature that was overlooked by the law, but not so neglectful of itself that it did not go on producing more species, even where there was no order to fit them into.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n That\u2019s such an apt way of putting it, calling them heresies<\/em>. There\u2019s this, supposed, God given order, that \u2018x\u2019 belief, and then these \u2018y\u2019 heresies that threaten it. I think the second point is also important here, how this results in a production of more and more identities. He (43-43) then emphasizes this second point:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe machinery of power that focused on this whole alien strain did not aim to suppress it, but rather to give it an analytical, visible, and permanent reality: it was implanted in bodies, slipped in beneath the modes of conduct, made into a principle of classification and intelligibility, established as a raison d’\u00eatre<\/em> [reason for existing] and a natural order of disorder.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, the point is to derive all these identities<\/em> from certain acts<\/em> and classify them accordingly as discoveries<\/em>, as if there were all these identities, hiding in our midst, just waiting for the psychiatrists to find them, uncover them and elaborate them. As I already pointed out, it then comes across, subsequently, that any such perverted or deviant acts happen because the person is a pervert<\/em> or a deviant<\/em>. It\u2019s a switcheroo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Foucault (44) also wants to emphasize how this is not about social exclusion<\/em>, having \u2018x\u2019 that exclude \u2018y\u2019 from the society, but rather about identifying the \u2018y\u2019 so that they can and kept tabs on. Deleuze and Guattari (178) elaborate this in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[T]here is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be. The dividing line is not between inside and outside but rather is internal to simultaneous signifying chains and successive subjective choices.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n The thing to notice here is that people are not excluded from the society. They are not kicked out. Instead, they are kept in it. The idea is to make a \u2018y\u2019 into an \u2018x\u2019. If that doesn\u2019t work out of you, you are still marked as a \u2018y\u2019 and treated accordingly, as a deviant<\/em>. Deleuze and Guattari (178) further problematize this by noting that in some cases it is impossible to do that, to conform to \u2018x\u2019, when, for example, your skin color happens to be wrong. They (178) state that racism is therefore not about exclusion<\/em> but about inclusion<\/em> and that tolerance<\/em> is a ruse as it is about tolerating the supposedly wrong skin color under certain conditions, forcing them to be identified<\/em> as such, as deviants<\/em>, and judged according to their deemed degree of divergence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Why do people do that then? Well, as already mentioned, being the \u2018x\u2019 is a sweet gig, whereas being \u2018y\u2019 is not. If there\u2019s no \u2018y\u2019 to identify in our midst, then there\u2019s also no \u2018x\u2019. That\u2019s pretty much how discrimination<\/em> works. Label someone else as \u2018y\u2019 in order to promote yourself as the \u2018x\u2019, which, rather conveniently, matches your characteristics. It gives you legitimacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The \u2018x\u2019 is, of course, made up, as is the \u2018y\u2019, but that\u2019s exactly the point, making things up to legitimize<\/em> your own position, allowing you to exercise power<\/em> over others. That\u2019s the sleight of hand in this. You state that you know how it is, what \u2018x\u2019 is, because that\u2019s how it is, naturally<\/em>, culturally<\/em>, or the like, i.e., according to the Will of God, even though it really is just your will for it to be that. Once that\u2019s set, once you\u2019ve managed to define \u2018x\u2019, you have the license to label what it is not as \u2018y\u2019. This allows you to bend people to your will, to demand the \u2018y\u2019 to be \u2018x\u2019, and gives you the license to mistreat those who resist or cannot meet that demand. Mistreat is maybe not a strong enough an expression as it can also be more straight forward, so more like persecution, as Foucault (42) labels it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The other part of Guattari\u2019s interview concerns desire<\/em>. The interviewer (205) asks him to define desire. If you struggle with how he presents in his works, with or without Deleuze, you are in luck as he (205) gets to the point here:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[D]esire is everything that exists before<\/em> the opposition between subject and object, before<\/em> representation and production. It’s everything whereby the world and affects constitute us outside of ourselves, in spite of ourselves.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Note here how he isn\u2019t saying that there aren\u2019t subjects<\/em> and objects<\/em>, nor representations<\/em>, no, that\u2019s not it, but rather that they shouldn\u2019t take for granted, as simply given, as the starting point. In other words, he (205) is interested in how they are produced under certain conditions. Anyway he (205) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[W]e define it as flow [flux<\/em>].\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Only to add to this that (205):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cSo we speak of machines, of \u2018desiring machines\u2019, in order to indicate that there is as yet no question here of \u2018structure\u2019[.]\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n It\u2019s also worth noting here, before I let him continue, that the opposition of structure here is not against structures or forms, but rather against fixed structures or forms. I take this as a rejection of structuralism. Anyway, having defined desire, he (205) defines desiring machines<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cMachines arrange and connect flows. They do not recognize distinctions between persons, organs, material flows, and semiotic flows.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Okay, so, as you may wonder, but what\u2019s the link between desire<\/em> and sexuality<\/em>? Well, desire is something much more general than sexuality, but desire tends to be understood in terms of sexuality, even though it\u2019s not sexuality. The problem for his with sexuality is exactly that it tends to rely on fixed systems of classification, i.e., on identities, as already noted and as he goes (211) on to elaborate:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cSexual liberation is a mystification.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n He does go on to say more about this issue, but before I explain that, it\u2019s worth noting that what he is against here is viewing sexuality <\/em>as this and\/or that, as a matter of identity<\/em>, like there being heterosexuals, homosexuals, bisexuals etc., because it relies on an idea that are all these given, pre-existing sexual identities, just waiting to be liberated, so that people can then be who they are, according to these identities. To put that another way, the problem with treating, for example, homosexuality<\/em>, as a distinct identity is that ends up being just another heterosexuality<\/em>, which he (213) defines as the lack of desire<\/em>, when there no longer is any desire, nor sexuality. Now, he (211) is not against people who think this way, because they\u2019ve been led to think this way, and a minor change in their lives is still a good thing for them:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cI believe in, and will fight for, the taking of power by other castes and sexual systems[.]\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, just because thinking of sexuality<\/em> in terms of identity<\/em> is based on a myth and thus, ultimately, counter-productive, he acknowledges he can\u2019t be against such, in the moment, because that\u2019d be like saying that, for example, homosexuals should just stop complaining about being poorly treated, beaten up and the like. He (212) is also well aware that while he is \u201ca homosexual in [his] own way\u201d, he isn\u2019t \u201ca homosexual in the world of reality or of the group\u201d, by which he means that he can\u2019t speak for the, as \u201cit\u2019s up to the homosexuals\u201d then.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He further elaborates this issue in another interview, this time with Christian Poslianec, as published as ‘The Adolescent Revolution’, when he (131) addresses what his interviewer refers to as sorting people into little boxes:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “I still have to take them into account because that’s what most people do.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Indeed. This is something that I like to emphasize when I build on his and\/or Deleuze’s works in my own texts. I reckon that it’s one thing to present an alternative, let’s say a non-representational<\/em> account of something, and another thing to convince people that there’s something wrong with the representational <\/em>account in the first place or, rather, that there can even be an alternative. I don’t like the little boxes, but I have to deal with them and it’s my job to explain to people what the problem with the little boxes is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Deleuze and Guattari have this reputation of being a bit … hippy-dippy, far out, untethered from reality and what not. That said, if you’ve read their works, I’d say that they are littered with little boxes, not because Deleuze and Guattari are for little boxes, but because they are against them. I mean it’s kind of hard to tackle something unless you can explain what it is that you are tackling and why it is that you think it’s worth tackling. Anyway, Guattari (131) has more to say to Poslianec:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “The little boxes begin in nursery school when the little girl jumping rope has to arrange her body in a certain way and progressively submits to all kinds of behaviors and images.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Or, as he (131) goes on to summarize that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “The boxes are everywhere.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Well, they are not everywhere, if you let yourself think otherwise, as he (131-132) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “But on the level of what I call the economy of desire, there are no boxes.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In short, he and Deleuze are against a world where it’s all just boxes and for a world that has no boxes. That’s also what I think. I’m against boxes and for having no boxes. That said, like he (131-132) points out, I’m not saying that there aren’t boxes, that most people don’t think that way, in terms of boxes, nor that they aren’t subjected to that, to being sorted into various boxes. That’s why my own work is very much concerned with boxes, not because I’m for boxes, but because that’s the way I can explain why I’m against boxes. It’s those “narrow segregationist attitudes” that need to go for things to change, as Guattari (139).<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is why he (211) wants to emphasize in ‘A Liberation of Desire’ that, ultimately, the system (of boxes) needs to change, not the classifications in the system (the boxes themselves):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[B]ut I believe that liberation will occur when sexuality becomes desire, and that desire is the freedom to be sexual, that is, to be something else at the same time.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In other words, sexuality<\/em> will keep being set up in terms of lack<\/em> if you rely on it being about identity<\/em>. Guattari also deals with this in ‘The Adolescent Revolution’. He (135-136) likens identity to having a certificate or a diploma of normalcy<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Have you passed your puberty certificate? Are you sure that you’re normal?”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n He (136) then comments on this, how it’s not something that just the authorities and the experts are interested and invested in, but something much more widespread:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “The jury in this kind of competition is often the merciless opinion of your closest buddies, your sweet girlfriend… It’s a dirty deal.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n To which he (136) adds that no matter what it is, thinking of sexuality <\/em>in this way, in terms of having this and\/or that identity<\/em>, is “an idiotic mess.” Why? Well, I’ll let him exemplify that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “[S]exuality never cease[s] to be confronted by tests like, ‘Do you come too soon? Or too late?’ ‘And your orgasm, is it too clitoral?'”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n It’s the same regardless of whether you are an adult, an adolescent or an infant, as he (136) goes on to specify, first acknowledging the infants:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “‘Does my baby suckle at the right time?'”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Then he (136) comments on the adolescents:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Does he masturbate when he should? There is something wrong, Doctor: he doesn’t masturbate yet. What do you prescribe?”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Note how he has flipped things on their head here, how he indicates that by insisting that something like masturbation is normal <\/em>or natural<\/em>, as opposed to something perverted <\/em>or sexually deviant<\/em>, the lack of masturbation then becomes a concern. So, while masturbation has been and, I’d say, still is generally considered as perverted, as sexually deviant behavior, expressing a perverted or sexually deviant identity<\/em>, something that one may have even been born with, so that one is a pervert from the start, if you will, it can also end up part of what’s considered normal or natural, so that not doing it or not doing it enough may then be considered abnormal <\/em>or unnatural<\/em>. In short, even celibacy can therefore appear as a perversion, so that, oddly enough, you can be considered a pervert for not being a pervert.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In simpler terms, this is about sexuality <\/em>being about something that you do<\/em>, as opposed to something that you are<\/em>. To use the terms he and Deleuze use in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019, it\u2019s about becoming<\/em>, taking things as they come, on their own terms, singularly<\/em>, and not about being<\/em>, relying on established categories, something being identifiable as such and such. He (211) puts this rather bluntly in ‘A Liberation of Desire’:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWhat these liberation movements will reveal by their failures and difficulties is that there really aren\u2019t any castes.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n What I take him to mean by this is that sexual liberation won\u2019t be reached until those who seek it stop relying on the very system that they seek to oppose. It\u2019s exactly what the interviewer (211) points out, that there is this dilemma of one group merely replacing another. It\u2019s really not just about going against the system, i.e., against people who seek to repress others, but also about going against oneself, against the way one thinks, as Guattari (211) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cOn the day when these movements fix as their goals not only the liberation of homosexuals, women, and children, but also the struggle against themselves in their constant power relations, in their relation of alienation, of repression against their bodies, their thoughts, their ways of speaking, then indeed, we will see another kind of struggle appear, another kind of possibility.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Indeed, that\u2019s when we see things changing. Otherwise you are moving bits and bobs, replacing a bit of this with a bit of that. It is indeed about approaching \u201cthe question of sexuality in another way\u201d, as his interviewer (212) points out. It\u2019s not about sexing the body or taking it for granted that the body is sexed, but something altogether different, as stated by Guattari (213):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe problem is how to sexualize the body, how to make bodies desire, vibrate \u2013 all aspects of the body.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n The conversation between him and his interviewer gets a bit muddled, so I\u2019ll skip ahead to the point where I think Guattari (214) manages to explain this different way of thinking about sexuality <\/em>through literature:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cTake any literary work you love very much. Well, you will see that you love it because it is for you a particular form of sexuality or desire[.]\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n That\u2019s exactly it! When you desire<\/em> or, rather, end up desiring<\/em> something, be it sexual or not, you just love it to the point that you just go with it and keep going with it, like you can\u2019t help it, like you are possessed or something, until you don\u2019t, which is probably because you\u2019ve ended up desiring something or someone else instead. So, when Guattari (214) states that reading a book is sexual, it\u2019s because it is, because it\u2019s about desire:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe first time I made love with Joyce while reading Ulysses<\/em> was absolutely unforgettable! It was extraordinary! I made love with Kafka, and I think one can say that, truly.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n It\u2019s like that. It\u2019s like when you just can\u2019t help it, like you just need to turn the page, page after page, because you are so captivated by it. It\u2019s like that with people as well. Okay, it\u2019s not like that with all people. I mean, hardly. But it\u2019s like, you know it, when you know it. And by knowing it, I mean it\u2019s like an intuition. If you hit it off, you hit it off. It works. There\u2019s a connection. Often that\u2019s not there and it makes no sense to force it. If it doesn\u2019t work, it doesn\u2019t work. Sure, it might work in the future, there\u2019s that, as desire<\/em> is open ended, but now is now and then is then.<\/p>\n\n\n\n