{"id":4400,"date":"2022-10-31T21:59:25","date_gmt":"2022-10-31T21:59:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/?p=4400"},"modified":"2023-07-20T01:00:55","modified_gmt":"2023-07-20T01:00:55","slug":"the-grill","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/2022\/10\/31\/the-grill\/","title":{"rendered":"The Grill"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

I\u2019ve written about Michel Foucault\u2019s work, going through his best-known work, focusing on a number of concepts that are, one way or another, related to his concepts of power<\/em> and power relations<\/em>, including but not limited to discipline<\/em>, biopower<\/em>, govermentality<\/em>, panopticism<\/em>, as well as discourse<\/em>, including but not limited to knowledge<\/em>, episteme<\/em>, regime of truth<\/em>, the author function<\/em>, parrhesia<\/em>, sexuality<\/em>. Then there\u2019s also the apparatus<\/em> or dispotive<\/em>, which links the discursive<\/em> to the non-discursive<\/em>. I\u2019m sure I\u2019m missing something, like the stuff on subject<\/em> and individuality<\/em>, but that\u2019s beside the point. That\u2019s already quite the toolbox for anyone interested in \u2026 well \u2026 how the world works. We might even call his conceptual arsenal a tool shop, as F\u00e9lix Guattari did following Foucault\u2019s death, as mentioned by him (173) in \u2018Microphysics of Power\/Micropolitics of Desire\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[Y]ou ought not as a result be surprised in seeing me today rummaging through Foucault’s conceptual tool shop so that I might borrow some of his own instruments and, if need be, alter them to suit my own purposes.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This leads me, quite conveniently, to the topic of this essay: what was the relationship between Foucault and Guattari. Oh, and no, I\u2019m really interested in whether they hung out, because they probably did, not all the time, but at least occasionally. I\u2019m more interested in who influenced who, as opposed to pondering about who was the most hospitable, buying others a round of drinks or the like. The influence of Deleuze on Foucault and vice versa is clearer, or, well, at least to me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Guattari (169) mentions in a previous interview, better known as \u2018Lacan Was an Event in My Life\u2019, that Foucault wasn\u2019t a big deal for him:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[Q]uite the contrary to Deleuze, I was never influenced by Foucault’s work. It interested me, of course, but it was never of great importance.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

As that interview also took place after Foucault\u2019s death, albeit prior to that talk he gave in Turin, subsequently dubbed as the \u2018Microphysics of Power\/Micropolitics of Desire\u2019, it\u2019s quite interesting that he says such. My take is that he wasn\u2019t thinking through that properly. I mean, sure, he did his own thing, as did Deleuze, as did Foucault, but I\u2019d say it\u2019s pretty obvious that he was influenced by Foucault. How so? What do I mean? Well, just think of it. Deleuze knew Foucault well and both read each other\u2019s works. While they may have not always been the closest of friends, they did keep tabs on each other\u2019s work. Deleuze also worked with Guattari quite a bit, so it\u2019d be strange if Foucault\u2019s ideas weren\u2019t conveyed to Guattari, regardless of how familiar Guattari was with Foucault\u2019s work. If you are not convinced, just think of how closely Deleuze and Guattari used to work, as acknowledged by Guattari (333) in notes section of his book \u2018The Machinic Unconscious: Essays in Schizoanalysis\u2019, which was written when the two were working together on \u2018A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cAlthough I wrote them alone, these essays are inseparable from the work that Gilles Deleuze and I have carried out together for many years. This is why, when I am brought to speak in the first person, it will be indifferently with that of the singular or plural. Let one not see there especially a business of paternity relating to the ideas which are advanced here. There as well as here it is all a question of \u2018collective assemblages.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In other words, at that point, he really had no idea who came up with what, he, Deleuze, or someone else. That\u2019s the point he makes about the collective assemblages of enunciation<\/em> here. The world spoke through them, if you will, and they weren\u2019t always sure of whose voice spoke through whom. Plus, as their shared book title suggests, they don\u2019t even care about such, who the author is, who should get credited for what, as, I\u2019d say, that\u2019s a very, very capitalist notion for them. I reckon that ownership of ideas just seemed, so, so, very, unproductive to them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If you ask me, it\u2019s funny, really, how the world did just fine without patents and copyrights, while now it seems that life is all about them. Oh, and I know, I know, that\u2019s rather ironic of me to say, considering that I hold the copyright to \u2026 I\u2019m not even sure \u2026 but let\u2019s ballpark it \u2026 more than a hundred thousand photos (to be accurate, I actually only own the \u2018right to a photographic picture\u2019 for 50 years from when the photo was taken, which is like a limited version of copyright in the Finnish jurisdiction).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I remember being a bit \u2026 up in arms \u2026 about my photos being used without a license, what most people would just call a permission (but hey, gotta know the jargon!), but these days, well, I think the world would be a better place without such systems. I mean, a lot of the stuff that\u2019s protected by copyright is basically just copied from existing works that didn\u2019t enjoy such protections back in the day. That\u2019s the point Guattari (333) also makes in that comment about paternity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Plus, the way the system works actually works only for those who can make it work for them, by which I mean those (companies) that have enough money to keep lawyers on their payroll to enforce those copyrights, possibly in multiple jurisdictions. An individual can only hope to get compensated for copyright infringement. You can try to press the matter, sure, but, well, what do you do if they ignore you or just say no? It\u2019s like you and what army? Yeah, exactly, I thought as much! You can\u2019t really do jack shit if that happens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now, to be clear, I\u2019m not against people getting their fair share, me included (as I certainly have been taken advantage of in the past). It\u2019s rather that, in the end, when push comes to shove, no one gives a fuck who came up with what. Plus, in lot of the cases, we honestly can\u2019t say that this and\/or that person came up with this and\/or that idea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now, going beyond copyright, which pertains to the work, not what\u2019s contained in the work, this and\/or that idea, academics is particularly perverse in this regard. There\u2019s this obsession with who said what. Oh, and don\u2019t get me wrong, I\u2019m fine with giving credit where credit is due, by which I mean pointing out what\u2019s from where. I think that\u2019s doing a solid to the reader as it helps the reader to find more about what\u2019s been said. That\u2019s great. It\u2019s like having a hyperlink. The problem is rather that, as I just pointed out, we can\u2019t often even be sure who came up with what as a lot of the evidence has simply been lost. When I read, I often think that a text seems oddly familiar to me, as if I had seen it before, only to realize that, well, yeah, no wonder, it\u2019s like Plato could have written it. This is, of course, rather ironic, considering how that\u2019s something that Alfred North Whitehead (39) states in \u2018Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology:\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writing. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through them.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Should I have actually given Whitehead credit for that, prior to mentioning this? Should I always do that, considering it was Whitehead who expressed that, in that book? Now, see, it\u2019s rather ironic. If we say yes, that we should always give Whitehead the credit for that, when we notice that someone else seems to be stating what Plato once stated, then, by all logic, we should also always give credit to Plato, whenever we state something that he once stated. If you don\u2019t get the point, the problem with that logic is that all of our speeches and all of hours writings would just consist of, as Whitehead (39) puts it, \u201ca series of footnotes to Plato\u201d. Simply put, we\u2019d be forever paying homage to Plato, and obsessing about it, especially if people don\u2019t do it (how suspicious!), as opposed to getting on with our lives, hopefully making the world a better place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Oh, and that\u2019s exactly what Guattari did. He just stumbled upon some conceptual toolbox or, better yet, a conceptual tool shop, and borrowed whatever seemed to be handy for his purposes and, perhaps, even altered them if he wasn\u2019t entirely happy with whatever he happened to have borrowed. Did he ask for a permission for that? No, fuck no. Don\u2019t believe me? Well, he did say that himself. Let me explain and, forgive me for not telling you exactly where it is from, prior to explaining it to you. It\u2019s just that the title will spoil it for you. I\u2019ll let you know soon enough. Don\u2019t worry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, there\u2019s this interview, where his interviewer, Robert Maggiore (22), states that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cYou forge specific tools for specific fields of research<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

His interviewer (22) also asks him to clarify why he does that, why he creates all these conceptual tools, for certain purposes, as opposed to for all purposes. Guattari (22) replies to him, noting that he isn\u2019t interested in conceptual tools that must work universally, like for sure, in all cases (as they can, of course, work in other settings and, in my experience, his tools do work in a lot of settings, way more universally than a lot of other tools out there). Instead, what matters to him (22) is that the tools work. If they don\u2019t work, he\u2019ll come up with some other tools, as he (22) points out. It\u2019s that simple.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He (22) exemplifies this with being given a calculator. Either it works for you or it doesn\u2019t, as he (22) points out. You may have no use for it, or not know how to use it, but inasmuch as you have use for it and know how to use it, it just works for you as that\u2019s what a tool is, as pointed out by him (22). If you fail to make sense of this, it\u2019s exactly like that with conceptual tools, as he (22) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cIn my view, the same thing happens with theoretical expressions that should function as tools[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

It\u2019s not that clear from the interview itself, unless you can piece it together yourself, but, related to this, he (22) isn\u2019t having it that people need to be first educated before they are given a set of conceptual tools. Now, to be clear, I don\u2019t think he (22) is against education. I don\u2019t think he (22) is against teaching and learning, as such. It\u2019s rather that people don\u2019t need to be taught first and then, only later on, be given the tools, when those who, supposedly, know better think that they are ready for it. In his (22) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cIn the nineteenth century one thought that the proletariat had to be educated first in order to reach a level of comprehension, like the ability to read certain fundamental texts, then it would translate into practice… But really, things do not work that way!\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Now, like I just pointed out, this might not open up to you, hence all that I just went on to clarify. If you fail to grasp the specific reference here, the context is the lead up to Russian Revolution in the late 1800s and early 1900s. I\u2019m working out of memory here, but that\u2019s basically Lenin\u2019s view of the proletariat. He thought that people needed to be led (by him) and that they wouldn\u2019t get where they needed to get (according to Karl Marx), if they didn\u2019t have the right leadership (Plato, sorry, Lenin) that saw to it to educate the masses, to make sure they know how to use a calculator, abstractly, before being given a calculator.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anyway, the interviewer (22) states to Guattari that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[Y]ou lift elements of your vocabulary from different, more or less heterogeneous, disciplines<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

To which Guattari (23) then replies that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[Jacques] Lacan accused a third of the members of his Freudian School of being falsifiers. I claim the term falsifier<\/em> for myself, being an idea-thief and shuffler of second hand concepts.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Haha! You just gotta love him! His honesty! The gall, the gall! Okay, now, you may think that he is just amusing his interviewer, being all hyperbolic, but no, he is not. He (23) goes on to make sure of that he isn\u2019t:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cBorrowing is not a problem in itself, except on the level of the semantic foundation of a new word.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

That\u2019s pretty damn brazen, if you ask me. Just think of it. He is saying that borrowing is only a problem for the person from whom it\u2019s borrowed. Haha! That\u2019s so funny, but only because that\u2019s true. If you take something from someone, it\u2019s only your problem if the person whom you take it from makes it your problem. That\u2019s what he means by it being a problem at the level of foundation. If you give a word a new spin, which happens all the time, it\u2019s not an issue, except to the word itself, to its prior usage. Still don\u2019t believe me? Okay, he (and Deleuze) are often credited for coming up with the concept of deterritorialization<\/em> (and reterritorialization<\/em>), but he (and Deleuze) didn\u2019t really do fuck all, except give an existing word a new spin (for which you can, of course, give him or them credit for), as he (23) goes on to point out:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cFor example, our term \u2018deterritorialization\u2019 was based on a concept of territory borrowed from American anthropology.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Exactly. If you want to understand what Deleuze and\/or Guattari mean by de<\/em>– and reterritorialization<\/em>, it\u2019s as simple as starting from territoriality<\/em> (what they also, at times, call territorialization<\/em>). If you thought that they, on their own, or together, came up with that, well, the joke is on you. They did not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, the next time you think that territoriality, de<\/em>– and reterritorialization<\/em> are conceptual tools invented by them, that\u2019s not the case (at least not strictly speaking). They have simply borrowed some tools from someone else\u2019s shed and made them their own, by which I mean that they have altered the tools to be of use for them. You can, of course, give them credit for that, fair is only fair, but, like everyone else, they\u2019ve actually invented stuff on the basis of what already exists. I think it\u2019s fair to say that they\u2019d agree with me on this, that it is the world that prompted them to do come up with such conceptual tools and not their extraordinary intelligence or wisdom that resulted in that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is like me going to a hardware store to buy a flat head screwdriver and then use another tool, like a hammer, to remodel the head, so that it turns into a dagger. It was someone else\u2019s design, originally, but I turned it to something else. To be clear, I have not intentionally turned a flat head screwdriver into a dagger. I\u2019m just using it as an example, because one of my small flat head screwdrivers turned into one when I had to apply considerable force to it in order to dig into a stripped Phillips head screw (I need to correct myself, as it was actually a JIS head screw, because of Japanese bike parts). It did work, problem solved, but it did turn my screwdriver into something that would, most likely, now count as a dagger. I\u2019ve been wondering how to fix it, to turn it back into a flat head (of a larger size though), but, so far, I haven\u2019t figured out a way to do that properly. Maybe one day.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To make that philosophical again, if you\u2019re familiar with the works of Baruch Spinoza and\/or Friedrich Nietzsche, a lot of what may strike you as novel in the works of Deleuze and\/or Guattari isn\u2019t as novel as you may think it is. Similarly, if you\u2019ve read your Spinoza, Louis Hjelmslev\u2019s glossematics may seem familiar to you, there being this one substance <\/em>or matter <\/em>that is then understood in two ways. Yeah, that\u2019s Spinozist alright. Does this mean that Deleuze and Guattari are just copycats? No. I don\u2019t think they are. That also applies to the other people mentioned here, Hjelmslev, Nietzsche and Spinoza. Did they borrow a lot from others? Yeah, I\u2019m pretty sure they did.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anyway, to the title given to that interview is \u2018I Am an Idea-Thief\u2019, which is why I didn\u2019t want to mention it earlier, to avoid spoiling all the fun. I can now point that out, without spoiling anything. But the fun isn\u2019t over just yet, as he (23) still has more to say:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThis reference was quickly forgotten and the term integrated into very different disciplines, where it took on syntactic, rhetorical and even stylistic dimensions, which in turn guided us in certain ways.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, his point is that it\u2019s not actually fair to give him (and\/or Deleuze) the credit for such concepts, given that he (and\/or Deleuze) have just borrowed some conceptual tools and used them for their own purposes, possibly altering them to make them work for those purposes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Following this, there is this \u2026 how to put it \u2026 not an impasse \u2026 but a misunderstanding, as Guattari (23) replies to his interviewer. Right, so, his interviewer (23) asks him if he (and Deleuze) had to search high and low for it all to work without it resulting in just one take, but a number of takes. He (23) responds to this by noting that he (and Deleuze) does (do) not borrow a bit of this and a bit of that just because they deal with so many things in so many different fields. Yes, they deal with a lot of things that are, typically, the prerogative of certain fields, but that\u2019s not it. That\u2019s not the reason for it. Instead, it\u2019s about traversing those fields, as he (23) points out:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cI’m not keen on an approximative interdisciplinarity. I’m interested in an \u2018interdisciplinarity\u2019 that is capable of traversing heterogeneous fields and carrying the strongest charges of \u2018transversality.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Simply put, he is not fond of interdisciplinary<\/em> or what he (133) also goes on to call transdisciplinary<\/em> research in another text (I think it\u2019s all the same to him, because the disciplines remain, no matter what the arrangement happens to be). Why? Isn\u2019t he all about that? Well, you\u2019d think he\u2019d be all in for that, but, I\u2019d say, he wants us to go beyond that. He (131) explains this better in that other text that bears the title \u2018Transdisciplinary Must Become Transversality\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cEveryone is aware that the complexity of the objects of research in the domain of the human and environmental sciences demands an interdisciplinary approach.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Now, before I let him continue, it\u2019s worth noting that he isn\u2019t against bringing in knowledge from various fields<\/em> or disciplines<\/em>. It\u2019s rather that he wants to question these very notions, as he (131) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cBut the encounter between disciplines does not permit a decompartmentalization of the problematics and modes of expression brought together.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In other words, the problem with something interdisciplinary<\/em> is that it retains this idea of neatly compartmentalized disciplines<\/em>. You still have experts that are one trick ponies. There is this cross-over, yes, but it\u2019s more like a bridge, as he (131) points out. You can cross that bridge, but you are always expected to go back. For him, (132) this is a very self-serving model that only benefits the experts in these fields or disciplines, and not the wider public:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe [UN] Charter of Human Rights ought to include an article on the right of everyone to research. All social groups, all professions, minorities . . . have a need of the research that concerns or implicates them.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Imagine that! Just imagine that as human right! Fucking madness! Research? For everyone? Fuck off! Just fuck off already! We (Plato, is that you?) can\u2019t have just about everyone do just about anything, now can we? I mean, we aren\u2019t even close to letting people have open access to research, because \u2026 no one can really tell why not (okay, okay, they could, but they don\u2019t want to, because it\u2019s all about money and status) \u2026 so \u2026 yeah \u2026 I don\u2019t foresee this happening (because of self-serving \u2026 goddamn Plato!).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now, this may seem like it isn\u2019t a thing, but that\u2019s probably because you (the reader) aren\u2019t in the academics, part of that world, or, alternatively, you are part of that world, but you happen to be one of those who benefit from things being the way they are, by which I mean that you don\u2019t see that as a problem (that\u2019s team Plato for you). But just look at social media, Twitter being, perhaps, the prime example. There’s always that someone who just can’t help it, who just has to point to that degree, to let everyone know who is educated and who is not, thus implying that they are right and that everyone else who doesn’t agree with them is wrong. That’s how you eliminate rivals, pre-emptively (again, that’s Plato for you).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Oh, and it does not stop there. If you think giving people access to research is bananas or that letting them do research, to figure out stuff that concerns them, as opposed to waiting for someone to do that for them, out of some odd sense of \u2026 charity, is even more bananas, he (132) more in store for you:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[The] target would cease to be the Truth with a capital T but instead a localized modelling, incarnated in a social body whose destiny is in question.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Well, shit, we can\u2019t have that now, can we? People first need to be educated before they are allowed to use \u2026 wait \u2026 wait, wait, wait \u2026 how does this seem familiar so familiar? Well, because it is (hint: this is what Plato did, this is what Lenin did).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Does this mean that it becomes a free for all, that all standards are thus thrown out of the window? Well, no. It must all still remain rigorous, as he (132) wants to emphasize it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe enlarging of the horizons of research, its being taken in charge by social relays that are always more numerous, does not, however, imply a loss of rigour, but a change of attitude with regard to its interlocutors.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The perfect example here is the autodidact. I don\u2019t mean to toot my own horn, but I\u2019m a fucking wizard, not because I have a fancy degree in some field or discipline (which I do have, but that\u2019s not the point), but because I try my best to be what Guattari (134) refers to as transversal<\/em> and what he and Deleuze (362-363, 365, 367-369) refer to as nomadic<\/em> in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019. There\u2019s none of that telling people how things are, followed by telling how things ought to be, one study after another, repeating the same stuff, because, surely, only a man (yes, a man<\/em>, to be extra offensive about that, like really, really sexist here) with the highest academic degree can tell you that. Instead, it\u2019s all about giving them the conceptual tools to figure out things themselves, if they wish to do so, for whatever purposes they see fit. No, no! Better yet, it\u2019s all about giving people access to the conceptual tool shop and letting them borrow stuff. That\u2019s it! That\u2019s even better! Thanks Guattari! I love the way you once put it!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To be clear, he isn\u2019t saying that, all the sudden, it\u2019s like whatever, it\u2019s all the same. No, that\u2019s not it. It isn\u2019t all the same. Instead, he\u2019s (133) against setting up these pseudo-democratic systems where, regardless of how things pan out, you have some higher ups deciding things for the masses. He\u2019s (133) particularly unhappy about how things could change, how there\u2019s that potential, but it keeps on being squandered because, as you might guess it already, it\u2019s just way, way more convenient for the select few to keep doing what they are doing, year after year:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cA collective awareness of the fact that the means of changing life and of creating a new style of activity, new values, are within reach, at least in our developed societies, has not yet been gained.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Note how he (133) reckons that the potential is there, and the means of making an actual difference are there, within reach, but, alas, no, people are prevented from using such conceptual tools themselves. Why? Well, I can\u2019t speak for Guattari, nor for anyone else, but my guess is that doing research, one study after another, getting some results and then indicating that the study needs to be repeated to better understand what\u2019s going on, works great for the researchers. That way the researcher retains that status, having the privilege to the conceptual tools and the resources to utilize them, so that others cannot do that. Simply put, it\u2019s self-serving. To be fair, that kind of research might still do good, I\u2019m not saying that, but, ultimately, the reasons for doing research are then self-serving. I think he agrees with me, albeit he (133) doesn\u2019t put it so bluntly:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cDesire and the will to move in the direction of such transformations depend in large part on the orientation of social labour and research.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Ah, yes, the division of labor<\/em> (Marx, is that you?). I have mentioned this in the past, but he and Deleuze (368-369) bring this up in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[T]he way in which a science, or a conception of science, participates in the organization of the social field, and in particular induces a division of labor, is part of that science itself.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In other words, science, not matter what kind of science it is, cannot escape this issue that pertains to the division of labor<\/em>. We are dealing with people, after all. Anyone who works around the system is viewed with suspicion, hence my earlier remark about autodidacts. In their (368) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe State does not give power \u2026 to the intellectuals or conceptual innovators; on the contrary, it makes them a strictly dependent organ with an autonomy that is only imagined yet is sufficient to divest those whose job it becomes simply to reproduce or implement of all of their power[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Now, to make more sense of that, as that may come across as a rather bold claim, let\u2019s say that you can be totally impartial, like you just do whatever you do. You don\u2019t give a damn about the politics. You just do what you are good at and go home. Sounds lovely, eh? Well, the thing is, however, the money that is needed to hire you does come from somewhere. You get to do whatever it is that you do because someone agreed that your project is worthy of the funding and, conversely, that someone else\u2019s project isn’t. So, even if we assume that you somehow manage to be impartial, without any self-interest (which I doubt), you are part of a system that is self-interested.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

All refereeing or review processes are flawed in this sense. You don\u2019t get to do research unless you jump through those hoops. The first hoop is the funding. You need to convince others that your project is the real deal, appealing to their desires <\/em>and beliefs<\/em>. The second hoop is to get your project out there, published. Again, you need to convince others that your project is the real deal, appealing to their desires and beliefs. If you fail to convince those people initially, that means no money. Now, to be clear, you can still do research without proper funding, like I did for years (fuck y\u2019all), but even then you need to make ends meet. Even that money comes from somewhere. Plus, even if you manage to get past the first set of gatekeepers of academics, you still need to deal with the second set of gatekeepers, those who review your work. If you\u2019ve read my essays, or happen to have similar experiences, this is such a painful process, not because it takes long (even though it does) and not because system has to rigorous (it has to be), but because the people you deal with are typically self-interested, just as they are when you apply for funding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I think it’s worth pointing that this is not something that only Deleuze and Guattari have noticed. This issue is way, way older than them. I\u2019m going to go through some examples.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Max Weber (51) makes note of this in \u2018\u201cObjectivity\u201d\u2019 in Social Science and Social Policy\u2019 when he points out that certain science<\/em>, in his case sociology, only came to being with the support of the state, to benefit the state, to help it formulate policy<\/em>. He (51-52) isn\u2019t fond of this, because it subordinates science to policy. He (52) clear about the issue:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201c[I]t can never be the task of an empirical science to provide binding norms and ideals from which directives for immediate practical activity can be derived.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In short, he (60) argues that latter, being objective<\/em>, is what counts as science<\/em>, whereas the latter, being subjective<\/em>, is, at best, about policy<\/em>. He (60) is very adamant about this, albeit my take is that it has more to do with trying to curb people from using some academic journal to propagate their own political views. To be clear, he (52) isn\u2019t saying that that there shouldn\u2019t be any room for what he refers to as value-judgments<\/em>, but rather that it\u2019s not the job of the researcher to tell people how they should or shouldn\u2019t live their lives. In fact, he (52) reckons that there must be some room left for them:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cCriticism is not to be suspended in the presence of value-judgments.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Or, as he (52) puts in it in other words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cIt is certainly not that value-judgments are to be withdrawn from scientific discussion in general simply because in the last analysis they rest on certain ideals and are therefore \u2018subjective\u2019 in origin.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

To further comment that, I think he is right about that. All analysis would simply be impossible if there was a strict requirement of impartiality. So, what he (52-53) suggests instead is being aware of one\u2019s own desires<\/em>, that we are driven to do what do and think what we think, because you can\u2019t have it all and it comes at a certain cost. In other words, everything has its pros and cons and no matter what you do, it has consequences. Even doing nothing has consequences. Even that counts as doing something, as he (53) goes on to point out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In summary, he (53) thinks that a researcher is tasked to explain whatever it is that we are dealing with, followed by explaining how it works, because that\u2019ll help people to understand the situation and then move on from there. This does not, however, mean that the researcher gives primacy to one course of action over another, as he (53) goes on to emphasize:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cTo apply the results of [one\u2019s] analysis in the making of a decision, however, is not a task which science can undertake; it is rather the task of the acting, willing person: [one] weighs and chooses from among the values involved according to [one\u2019s] own conscience and [one\u2019s] personal view of the world.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In other words, a researcher may<\/em> suggest a certain course of action, indicating how it might<\/em> be beneficial in a certain sense, but, ultimately, the researcher does not get to choose it for anyone else. I\u2019d go as far as saying as that as tempting as any recommendation might be, for whatever reasons, the researcher cannot make the choice for anyone else. It\u2019s impossible, unless, of course, people have been foolish enough to let that researcher dictate policy<\/em> that, in turn, dictates something affects people, stripping them of some choice over whatever it is that the policy pertains to. If you read some research article that recommends this and\/or that course of action, there\u2019s absolutely nothing that can make you act accordingly. The choice is yours. That\u2019s always the prerogative of the reader<\/em>, not the writer<\/em>, as I pointed out in a couple of recent essays, in reference to how Marcel Proust (265-266) explains that in \u2018Time Regained\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Highly importantly, that choice<\/em> is also your responsibility<\/em>, as Weber (53) points out. This is what I particularly like about Weber\u2019s take. I like the way he (52-53) emphasizes that it\u2019s all up to you, that it\u2019s you who gets to choose, and not someone else. That said, I also like how he (53) emphasizes that as it\u2019s not only you who gets to choose, but you who must choose, and if you think that you can just not choose, it\u2019s also a choice that you are responsible for.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why do I think that his take great? Well, because it allows the researcher to hold views, those value-judgements<\/em>, and to even advocate for them, to indicate why a certain course of action would be beneficial and, conversely, why some other course or courses of action would not be beneficial. It\u2019s also great because it does not give the researcher license to speak for<\/em> others, nor to make decisions for<\/em> them. It\u2019s your<\/em> analysis, which may or may not be of use to its readers. I think he puts it quite well he (54) states that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cThis does not overstep the boundaries of a science which strives for an \u2018analytical ordering of empirical reality[\u2019.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Hallelujah! Amen, brother! Again, just to make sure you get the point, you<\/em> can<\/em> say all kinds of things. You<\/em> can<\/em> even recommend something. You can<\/em> go as far as to advocate for a certain course of action. None of this, however, means that people should act or think the way you<\/em> want. That\u2019s up to them<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, in line with what\u2019s been discussed so far, in reference to Deleuze and\/or Guattari, Weber (54) argues that the researcher is tasked to make people aware of how we come to desire<\/em> something, whatever it is that drives us to do something, which will then help them to make decisions in everyday life. To be clear, no one is stripping people of their agency<\/em> in the process, as he (54) goes on to emphasize:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cAs to whether the person expressing these value-judgments should<\/em> adhere to these ultimate standards is his personal affair: it involves will and conscience, not empirical knowledge.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, to be crystal clear, that\u2019s all on you<\/em>. That knowledge<\/em> is there for you, inasmuch it is accessible to you, of course. It\u2019s then a matter of whether you choose to acknowledge or not. Assuming you do have the access to it, it\u2019s then up to you to either make use of it or not. If you ignore it, and let others speak for<\/em> you, instead of getting acquainted with it and\/or using your<\/em> voice, well that\u2019s totally on you<\/em>. I think he is totally right when he (54) explains how this is not for the researcher to decide for<\/em> you:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cAn empirical science cannot tell anyone what [one] should<\/em> do \u2014 but rather what [one] can<\/em> do \u2014and under certain circumstances \u2014 what one wishes to do.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In other words, good research will tell you how things are<\/em>, how it may<\/em> have come to being, and how it may<\/em> exist in the future, which is another way of saying that the researcher is tasked to explain how it all works<\/em>, as rigorously analyzed by the researcher. This can then help people to understand how the world works<\/em>, which, in turn, can<\/em> help them to choose a certain course of action. There is, of course, no guarantee that the reader<\/em> will understand the writer<\/em>, in this case the researcher, nor that the reader will<\/em> benefit from reading what\u2019s been writer by the researcher. It\u2019s definitely a maybe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To give you an example, one that\u2019s related to my own work, I\u2019m fine with stating that landscape<\/em>, as we know it, is not your friend. Far from it. You may take pleasure in a landscape, sure, but it\u2019s not your friend. Okay, okay, I\u2019m willing to concede that it may well be your friend, but only if you happen to match the ideals manifested<\/em> in it. Then you can use it to your benefit, which, of course, means that you are fine with fucking people over. How so? Well, not everyone can<\/em> match those ideals, so, again, it\u2019s totally on you for being with that. You may not be aware of that, how that works<\/em>, which is where I come in. It\u2019s my job to explain that to you<\/em>, how it all works<\/em>, which involves assessing how things are<\/em>, how they may<\/em> have come to that and how they may<\/em> be in the future. That\u2019s the knowledge<\/em> part of it. Now, as an academic, it\u2019s up to me<\/em> provide you<\/em> that knowledge, so that you<\/em> can then think for yourself, to weigh the pros and cons, to ponder whether landscape is your friend or not and whether you are, indeed, fine with fucking people over. I can\u2019t make that decision for<\/em> you, nor will I be advocating for that decision to be given to me, just because I happen to know how the world works in that regard. That\u2019s not my<\/em> prerogative, nor my<\/em> responsibility. That\u2019s all on you<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That may, of course, seem like I\u2019m<\/em> telling you<\/em> how you should<\/em> live your<\/em> life, but that\u2019s not it. What I<\/em> am doing, however, is telling you <\/em>how you might<\/em> live your <\/em>life. I am allowed to persuade you, to provide a compelling argument, but only in hopes of helping you to think for yourself. It is then up to you to think of it what you will. If you don\u2019t agree with me, fine by me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It may seem odd, given the sheer amount of shit that I give them, but the idea here is to be like Plato, or Lenin, i.e., really compelling to your audience (you gotta give them credit for that), but, unlike them, then leave it up to the people to choose their own path. If they take your advice, they do. If they don\u2019t take your advice, they don\u2019t. You can\u2019t force people to think for themselves. This is exactly what Weber means when he (56) acknowledges the importance of disputes<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But why are disputes<\/em> important then? Well, because, as he (57) goes on to point out, only dogmatic beliefs<\/em>, those of religious sects, are said to be unconditionally true, among those of the sect, of course. That\u2019s the gist of dogmatism<\/em>, which I think he (57) explains quite well. To add a bit of commentary here, while I think he is correct here, I think underplays how commonplace such dogmatism is even among academics. It\u2019s definitely not restricted to religious sects. I do, however, like what else he (57) has to say about this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cThe fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Indeed, it is we who give meaning to something, so that it emerges there and then. It is not something that we discover, out there, as if it was waiting for us to find it. If that doesn\u2019t convey it to you, then what else he (57) has to say might just do the trick for you:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201c[We] must recognize that general views of life and the universe can never be the products of increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move us most forcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred to others as ours are to us.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, long story short, we create<\/em> meaning. We do not discover<\/em> it. In addition, there\u2019s always that dispute<\/em>. Meaning<\/em> is therefore always in the making. It\u2019s what we make of things.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Disputes<\/em> are, of course, rather tricky. It\u2019s difficult to get along if people don\u2019t agree with one another. It would seem to make sense to have consensus then, so that people would agree. That\u2019s not, however, how he (57-58) thinks what we should strive for. While he (58) acknowledges different points of view, that is to say perspectives<\/em>, he doesn\u2019t think that we should strive for a synthesis of those views or for a compromise between them. For him (58), we just deceive ourselves if we think we can get along that way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While he is not explicitly mentioned in \u2018The Logic of the Social Sciences\u2019, Karl Popper challenges the views held by Weber. Popper (97) reckons that it\u2019s impossible to stay objective in one\u2019s research. In a way he (97) is not actually disagreeing with Weber, but rather wants to point out that objectivity<\/em> is also a value<\/em>, among other values. In his (97) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cIt is, therefore, not just that objectivity and freedom from involvement with values (\u2018value freedom\u2019) are unattainable in practice for the individual scientist, but rather that objectivity and freedom from such attachments are themselves values<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

I take this as riffing on Weber\u2019s take, taking it to its logical conclusion. Popper is simply pointing out that it\u2019s pointless to hang on to objectivity<\/em>. Does this matter? Well, I\u2019d say no. So, yeah, I agree with Popper (97-98) that this is not really a problem in research, inasmuch as we let this paradox disappear by letting go of the demand for objectivity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anyway, back to Deleuze and Guattari (368) who explain the underlying issue better than I do, so I\u2019ll let them further comment on this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cIn any case, if the State always finds it necessary to repress the nomad and minor sciences, if it opposes vague essences and the operative geometry of the trait, it does so not because the content of these sciences is inexact or imperfect, or because of their magic or initiatory character, but because they imply a division of labor opposed to the norms of the State.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In other words, the academic world is not unlikely any other workplace. You get to do what you do, the way you do, which is great, I\u2019m not disagreeing with that, but on the condition that you don\u2019t challenge the way this arrangement works. Simply put, it\u2019s about knowing your place in the production of knowledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Max Horkheimer addresses this in his essay \u2018Traditional and Critical Theory\u2019. While he (195-196) gives credit to those who take values<\/em> into consideration, so that whatever you are dealing with has real life consequences, he (196) isn\u2019t happy with how those values are ignored in research:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201c[I]n reality this sense of practical purpose, this belief in the social value of his calling is a purely private conviction of the scholar.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He (196) further elaborates this, adding that one way or another, you cannot separate the private<\/em> life from the working<\/em> life:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201c[The scholar] may just as well believe in an independent, \u2018suprasocial,\u2019 detached knowledge as in the social importance of his expertise: such opposed interpretations do not influence [the scholar\u2019s] real activity the slightest.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, it doesn\u2019t matter what you think<\/em> about the issue, whether you are objective<\/em> or subjective<\/em>, as this is not just about you<\/em>. We need to take a step back, which is what he (196) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe scholar and [the scholar\u2019s] science are incorporated into the apparatus of society.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, as already mentioned, you are expected to ask permission to conduct research. While it may not involve a formal approval process, such as an ethics review, it is still reviewed a number of times, by people do not put their neck on the line in the review process. That\u2019s an apparatus<\/em> for you.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To be clear, some research never gets published because of that academic apparatus<\/em>. There are just too many gatekeepers on the way and people just shift to something else, which is likely something tried and true as that then gets past the gatekeepers. Some research might also never get started because of it. The idea might be great, but because you know that it is very, very unlikely to get funded, it won\u2019t even end up in review.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I was mad enough to defy that academic apparatus<\/em> during my doctoral studies and, with perseverance, I succeeded. Was I happy with how it went? No, absolutely not. I had to do too many compromises. I had to do a bit of this and a bit of that, take this out and take that out, and then add a bit of this and a bit of that in their place. I wasn\u2019t too happy about that. It was often just taking shit from people who didn\u2019t even understand what I had written, probably because they had never read the stuff I build on. It\u2019s pretty frustrating to a rejection from an expert, on the grounds that they don\u2019t the expert knowledge required to fairly assess your work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Okay, not all of it was bad. No. Sometimes others helped to get rid of something and suggested something that I simply wasn\u2019t aware of and meshed well with what I had written previously. That\u2019s great. I wish that happened more often. It\u2019s just that usually you end up having to deal with someone who doesn\u2019t like you and\/or what you\u2019ve written, for reasons that are then not disclosed, someone who doesn\u2019t understand you, because they aren\u2019t familiar with what you build on, or someone who holds an opposing view and, of course, uses that opportunity to keep you in check.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why people do such then? Well, because there\u2019s basically no consequences for such. If you had to put your name on the review, you\u2019d be staking your reputation on that. It would be like in an everyday conversation with someone: if you say something that the other person doesn\u2019t agree with, expect to be challenged for saying that. You\u2019d get called out on that. You might still be right, but you couldn\u2019t expect the other person to just take your word for it. You\u2019d have to convince the other person, with evidence, and allow the other person to convince you, with evidence. Then again, that\u2019s not how it works, which is why end up having to deal with such behavior.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Oh, and appealing is pointless. It\u2019s a numbers game. Two or three reviewers, plus the editor, vs. one writer? What are the odds that you are right? They might actually be pretty high, but that\u2019s not how it\u2019ll come across. You look like a sore loser at that point.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anyway, where was I? Right, Horkheimer (196) has more to say about this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[A]chievements are a factor in the conservation and continuous renewal of the existing state of affairs, no matter what fine names [one] gives to what [one] does.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In other words, it\u2019s very tough to create anything when you are expected to do just more of the same. Why do people end up doing more of the same? Well, that\u2019s because those who run the system want things to remain the same. Why would they want that? Well, they want that because they retain their position and their status if things stay as they are. If someone manages to change things, let\u2019s say that some newcomer manages to convince others that something isn\u2019t as it was previously thought to be, or that works in a different way, that\u2019ll undermine the works of the powers that be, which then undermines them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Does that prevent change? No, it doesn\u2019t, but that\u2019s not the point here. What matters is that the system works against change, unless it, of course, benefits those who occupy central positions in the system. In his (196) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cExperiment has the scientific role of establishing facts in such a way that they fit into theory as currently accepted.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

That\u2019s why all the work should flow through them, so that they can reject anything that doesn\u2019t mesh with their work and take credit for anything new that meshes with their work. That\u2019s division of labor<\/em> for you, as he (196) also goes on to point out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Theodor Adorno also addresses these issues in \u2018On the Logic of the Social Sciences\u2019. Importantly, he (116-117) challenges Weber\u2019s distinction between objectivity<\/em> and subjectivity<\/em>. Commenting on Karl Popper\u2019s (97-98) objection to such distinctions, Adorno (18) points out that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cScientific awareness of society, which sets itself up as value-free, fails to apprehend reality just as much as one which appeals to more or less preordained and arbitrarily established values.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He (118) also makes note of the widely known distinction between what is<\/em> and should<\/em> be and calls it a false dichotomy. Why? Well, my take is that as handy as that might be for distinguishing what\u2019s out there from what one would wish to be there, it fails to take into account that what we consider to be is not actually what is<\/em>, but what appears<\/em> to be. To be clear, thinking in terms of what is<\/em> easily leads us to think that it\u2019s all just given, whereas thinking in terms of what appears to be does to take anything for granted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If that distinction between what is and what appears to be seems like splitting hairs, well, it sort of is. There is a point to it though. They are not the same. When I state that something is<\/em> like this and\/or that, I do actually mean that it appears<\/em> to be so, not that it is<\/em>. It\u2019s really inconvenient to keep talking in terms of apparition<\/em>, so, yeah, even I am in the habit of stating that something is<\/em>, even though, strictly speaking, it most certainly isn\u2019t<\/em>. If you\u2019ve read my published works and wondered about that, why it is indicated that they deal with apparition<\/em>, it\u2019s because of this. It may seem like a minor thing, but it\u2019s actually pretty major thing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Deleuze and Foucault also agree on this, as discussed by the two in \u2018Intellectuals and Power\u2019. I\u2019ve covered that exchange of words between the two in the past, at least a handful of times, so I won\u2019t do that here. I only bring them up because regardless of what you think of Weber\u2019s take, Deleuze and Foucault agree with him that it\u2019s not the job of the researcher to tell how people should<\/em> live their lives. To be more specific, Deleuze (209) gives Foucault credit for making people aware of \u201cthe indignity of speaking for others.\u201d Why? Well, explained by Foucault (207-208), the researcher is always part of a system and thus liable to serve its interests in the production of knowledge<\/em> and in defining what counts as truth<\/em>. This is the same point that Horkheimer (196) makes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anyway, back to Guattari (133-134) who brings up a very important point in \u2018Transdisciplinary Must Become Transversality\u2019: there will be no change if there\u2019s no will to change. I also like how he (134) points out that even if we have a handful of people who want change, that\u2019s not enough. He (133-134) talks about planetary environmental level issues, but I\u2019d say this applies to a lot of other things as well. For example, I\u2019m all for what he and Deleuze advocate for, what we might call an affective<\/em> or a non-representational<\/em> way of thinking, but as much as I\u2019m all for it, I do have to take into account that I can change fuck all with my thinking, inasmuch as it\u2019s just me and, perhaps, a handful of highly educated people talking about it during a coffee break. I can\u2019t ignore the fact that people don\u2019t think that way, the way I do, and so it\u2019s up to me to convince them that their way of thinking is against their own interests. Will I succeed in that? Well, I probably won\u2019t, but I\u2019m pretty sure that I won\u2019t if I give up that will that is needed to change things. It\u2019s way, way easier to just do more of the same, one study after another, but that\u2019s exactly the problem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If you are not convinced by that, luckily Guattari addresses this issue in very simple terms in \u2018The Adolescent Revolution\u2019. In this interview, his interviewer, Christian Poslianec (131), states that he refrains from sorting people into boxes, to which he (131) replies, disagreeing with Poslianec:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cI still have to take them into account because that\u2019s what most people do.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Guattari (131) goes on to explain how early that begins, which is why it happens all the time. In any case, the point I want to make is that it\u2019d be lovely to be able to skip all that, but, as he (131) points out, people think way, all the time, pigeonholing themselves and one another. It\u2019d be na\u00efve of me to not take that into account, especially in my own research.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I started out writing this essay with a certain goal in mind, which was to elaborate what Guattari thought of Foucault and his work, but I ended up sidetracked. I think I ended up so sidetracked that I think it\u2019s best that I continue from where I left off at another time. I think I still managed to cover some ground, not on what I thought I would, but it was interesting nonetheless. I don\u2019t know about you, but at least I enjoyed it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
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  • Adorno, T. W. ([1969] 1976). On the Logic of the Socien Sciences. In T. W. Adorno, H. Albert, R. Dahrendorf, J. Habermas, H. Pilot and K. R. Popper, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology<\/em> (G. Adey and D. Frisby, Trans.) (pp. 104\u2013122). London, United Kingdom: Heinemann.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Deleuze, G., and F. Guattari ([1980] 1987). A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia<\/em> (B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Foucault, M., and G. Deleuze ([1972] 1977). Intellectuals and Power. In M. Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews<\/em> (D. Bouchard, Ed., D. Bouchard and S. Simon, Trans.) (pp. 205\u2013217). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
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    I\u2019ve written about Michel Foucault\u2019s work, going through his best-known work, focusing on a number of concepts that are, one way or another, related to his concepts of power and power relations, including but not limited to discipline, biopower, govermentality, panopticism, as well as discourse, including but not limited to knowledge, episteme, regime of truth, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3554,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[1609,71,48,123,1610,1606,1608,1607,701,1605,1000],"class_list":["post-4400","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-essays","tag-adorno","tag-deleuze","tag-foucault","tag-guattari","tag-horkheimer","tag-maggiore","tag-popper","tag-poslianec","tag-proust","tag-weber","tag-whitehead"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4400","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3554"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4400"}],"version-history":[{"count":34,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4400\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5219,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4400\/revisions\/5219"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4400"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4400"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4400"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}