{"id":4574,"date":"2022-12-07T22:18:21","date_gmt":"2022-12-07T22:18:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/?p=4574"},"modified":"2023-06-20T20:33:47","modified_gmt":"2023-06-20T20:33:47","slug":"you-are-not-what-you-think-you-are","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/2022\/12\/07\/you-are-not-what-you-think-you-are\/","title":{"rendered":"You are not what you think you are"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

I\u2019ve explained how Gilles Deleuze and F\u00e9lix Guattari deal with identity<\/em> and subjectivity<\/em>, but I think a bit of repetition won\u2019t hurt. I\u2019ll try to keep this as simple as possible, like I did in the previous essay, trying to avoid their jargon as much as possible, even though that\u2019s quite tricky, considering how complex this issue is. Anyway, there\u2019s an interview in which Jean-Charles Jambon and Nathalie Magnan ask Guattari to explain what\u2019s the deal with identity and subjectivity. It has been published in English as \u2018Toward a New Perspective on Identity\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, the interviewers (215) prod Guattari to tell them why subjectivity<\/em> is so important to him. He (215) answers them that it\u2019s important because it\u2019s largely taken for granted, as \u201calready given, fitted and packed\u201d, but it\u2019s actually something that\u2019s produced. What he (215) wants people to do is to realize that and to pay attention to how<\/em> it is produced. The problem for him (215) is that the production largely results in a passive or tranquilized subjectivity. I think Michel Foucault would call this type of subjectivity a docile body<\/em>, as discussed by him (135) in \u2018Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I like the way Guattari (215) explains this here, in this interview, calling the subjectivity<\/em> that we are used to dominant subjectivity<\/em>, and what he promotes in its stead chaosmic subjectivity<\/em>. Simply put, the former is this fixed entity, autonomous, free and capable, supposedly, whereas the latter is chaotic and cosmic, by which I believe he means that it\u2019s creative, always undergoing transformations. I think he (215) manages to put it particularly well when he summarizes his own intentions:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThis is just the opposite of turning toward a being already there, already formed, because being is above all becoming, event, production.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This challenges the dominant subjectivity<\/em>, because if things change, all the time, to this and\/or that degree, you can\u2019t hold on to a fixed sense of self. It’s that simple. If you get that, if you are like yeah, that’s how it is, that you are just what you are and not what you think you are, or, more broadly speaking, that everything is just the way it is and not the way you think it all is, then the rest of this essay shouldn’t be too hard to understand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anyway, the interviewers (215) ask him to elaborate on how this is connected to homosexuality, probably because he (215) mentions homosexuality as a good example of that, of being<\/em> as becoming<\/em>. For him (215), homosexuality is not some anomality, some fixation to wrong genitals, because such conception relies on the dualisms of masculine and femininity. In other words, he (215) isn\u2019t buying that men have a penis and fear of no longer having one and that women don\u2019t have one, but would like to have one, hence their attraction to men, and then, I guess, somehow, men not wanting other men because they already have a penis. In this view, because men don\u2019t want men, homosexuality is then, by all logic, explainable as a stage from which one can progress, once one realizes that one is fixated on the wrong thing. It\u2019s, as if, homosexuals, men and women, are just waiting to get it, to accept their fate, to have and to not have and to desire <\/em>to have, as he (215) points out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Okay, okay, that\u2019s a crude way to put it, to explain the castration complex<\/em> that he (215) refers to in this context, but that\u2019s the gist of it. He (215) doesn\u2019t like that because, rather obviously, that penis is taken for granted, as the yardstick, according to which everything is then arranged, even though there\u2019s no reason why it would be that way. Why would one start from the penis and not the pussy? I mean, come on, that\u2019s pretty dumb. We might as well pick any feature and give it that status. It could the color of your eyes or your hair, anything, really.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now, this also means that what\u2019s been covered so far, hetero- and homosexuality are, in fact, illusory. Why? Well, because that baseline is arbitrary. In his (216) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[E]ven if we come to be homosexual, before being homosexual we have to become homosexual, to make ourselves homosexual.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Even this is too much for him. How so? Well, there is still this distinction between being<\/em> and becoming<\/em>. He (216) clearly doesn\u2019t buy it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cHere we have the idea of an existential praxis of homosexuality[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

That\u2019s great, because he (216) is all for this practice <\/em>or praxis<\/em>, which is linked to an \u201cemergence of becoming\u201d. But, the problem with his initial take is that it still relies on that dominant subjectivity<\/em>, which, in turn, relies on a transcendent subject<\/em>, as he (215-216) points out and as he (216) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[But] it refers ultimately to the most banal homosexual conjugality, one which rejoins the world of dominant significations.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

To put that in other words, what he objects to is not homosexuality, as a becoming<\/em>, but homosexuality as a being<\/em>. The problem for him is that homosexuality is viewed as this transcendent object<\/em>, as this fixed idea, of men on men and women on women, just like men on women or women on men, you know, configured as a couple. To be fair, as he (216) isn\u2019t trying to be dismissive, to mock anyone\u2019s sexuality, not to mention to be homophobic, he (216) acknowledges how people cling on to such fixed notions:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cWe can hardly dispense with the constitution of micro-territories into which we retreat in order to experience being, to feel recognised.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Ah, yes, it is indeed about recognition, or, rather, about the desire <\/em>to be recognized. But that\u2019s not what he is advocating for, as he (216) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cIt is a matter of a perspective on identity which has no meaning unless identities explode.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, in other words, he wants to reconstitute identity<\/em> and being<\/em> as dependent on constant becoming<\/em>. One may, of course, be still recognized as such and such, but that\u2019s there and then. It doesn\u2019t matter what you were or what you\u2019ll be in the future. It is what it is. You are what you are. No need for labels. If you ask me, that\u2019s the best way to put it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now, to be clear, he isn\u2019t judging anyone for their sexuality. He isn\u2019t questioning any of that. He (216) does express siding with minority groups, such as homosexuals, but in terms of micro-politics<\/em> and not of macro-politics<\/em>. I don\u2019t think he had any problems with men bumming men or women going down on women, or the like, feel free to use your imagination, and he would have opposed all kinds of homophobic behavior. For example, I reckon he would have found expressions like \u2018no homo\u2019 very interesting, because, on one hand, it does appear to express prejudice against homosexuals and homosexuality, but, on the other hand, there\u2019s this defensiveness to it, this distancing of oneself from it, which stems from its origins in rap and hip hop. To clarify the second part, Joshua Brown explains this particularly well in his article \u2018No homo\u2019 (I know, I know, I’ve mentioned this before, but it’s such a good example, so I’ll go with it again), when he (302, 308) points out that it was originally something that African-American men would say to one another, to make sure that the other men wouldn\u2019t think of them as homosexuals, because while homosexuality might have been (and probably still is) considered as something negative, it was considered as something much more negative among African Americans. In other words, that expression came to be, not because someone was, necessarily, homophobic, but because it was expressed to shield oneself from being viewed negatively, among a group that was already (and still is) viewed negatively, to prevent oneself from carrying a double burden, as he (308) points out. So, simply put, it\u2019s more telling of the struggles of the African Americans than anything else. The members of the community feel so oppressed that it makes sense to them to avoid being oppressed even more.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

C. J. Pascoe and Sarah Diefendorf (123) summarize this neatly in their article \u2018No Homo: Gendered Dimensions of Homophobic Epithets Online\u2019 by stating that this all about \u201ca form of gendered norm enforcement\u201d, which \u201creflect[s] current cultural expectations of masculinity.\u201d I think they hit the nail on the head on this when they (123) state that this is about \u201ca gendered practice that works to define parameters of normative masculinity.\u201d So, to be clear, what\u2019s important here is not homosexuality, as such, but rather the constitution of masculinity <\/em>as exclusively heterosexual. It is an odd one though, as they (124) go on to add, considering that the phrase is expressed following some, generally speaking, positive remark or a compliment. As they (124) point out, it\u2019s like a way to express one\u2019s approval of someone, while also distancing oneself from that person, just because homosexuality was viewed and is still to viewed negatively. In other words, if it wasn\u2019t viewed so negatively, as a transgression of the norm, there wouldn\u2019t a need for it, as they (124) go on to indicate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, in short, it\u2019s basically about insecurity, typically among men. I\u2019ve mentioned this in the past, but I think Lonely Island\u2019s song \u2018No homo\u2019 manages to explain that particularly well, how it\u2019s about insecurity, considering that it\u2019s all about just telling how you feel, which is, supposedly, the most unmasculine, i.e., feminine, thing to do, to tell how you feel; \u201cTo tell a dude just how you feel, no homo\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pascoe and Diendorf (129-130) actually go on to point this out, how in their study of online behavior, it is much more common for people to use the phrase positively, accompanying compliments given to others and expressing friendship, than to use it negatively. While the results of their study should not be generalized, it being based on a fairly small sample, as they (134) also point out, it does suggest that it has more to do with masculinity <\/em>vs. femininity <\/em>than it has to do with homosexuality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What\u2019s interesting about this is how puzzling it is, as Pascoe and Diendorf (132) point out. So, whenever you say \u2018no homo\u2019, following a compliment, what you really are saying is \u2018homo\u2019, but in a way that it is not then taken as a transgression of norms, even though, it can be argued that it\u2019s exactly what you are doing then. Pascoe and Diendorf (132) reckon that it functions to immunize the person expressing it, preventing others from using it against that person. So, oddly enough, while it can be used in a negative manner, to judge other people, it is often used in a negating manner, as they (132) go on to add. I agree, but I think it also be thought as a valve, because it\u2019s also about letting out your emotions, in a controlled manner, so that others don\u2019t think of your behavior as a sign of deviant masculinity<\/em>, by what they would then think of as feminine<\/em>. So, yeah, oddly enough, I\u2019d say that distancing yourself from gayness is, arguably, the gayest thing you can do, because you are, in fact, only saying it because you want to say it. That’s desire <\/em>for you and I think that\u2019s also the gist of the Lonely Island song lyrics (as I’ve also mentioned in the past, because it’s such a good example, much better than anything that I could come up with some wordplay).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To put this another way, that phrase is particularly interesting because it assumes that homosexuality is all about intercourse, because, in fact, it assumes that all sexuality is about intercourse. It\u2019s, how to put it, an attempt to reframe sexuality, to make it all about intercourse, so that what\u2019s actually said is then not sexual and thus acceptable. To explain this the way Guattari (216) does in the interview, the problem here is that all sexuality, including homosexuality, ends up being reduced to conjugality, by which I take him to mean that it\u2019s then all about procreation and thus serious business. Now, while with homosexuality it\u2019s clearly not about having offspring, it\u2019s still the same logic, just without the offspring. It\u2019s all very \u2026 proper<\/em>. Anyway, while Pascoe and Diendorf (132) don\u2019t put it this way, it is indeed about \u201c[d]rawing [b]oundaries\u201d. I totally agree with their (132) take on this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThe deployment of \u2018no homo\u2019 reifies particular meanings of masculinity (as unemotional, unattached, rational, for instance) while simultaneously creating space for the expression of these sentiments.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

They (133) refer to this as hybrid masculinity<\/em>, which is, well, like having your cake and eating it. It builds on this premise that, as a man, you are supposed to be this stoic figure, unshaken, no matter what, someone who knows what\u2019s what and doesn\u2019t get carried away with emotions, you know, like a woman, while, at the same time, secretly being all emotional, you know, like a woman. Now, I don\u2019t believe that premise holds, it\u2019s laughable, really, but the thing is that people think it does.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Related to this, Brown (309) also mentions something that Guattari (216) would agree on, how minority groups are also capable of being oppressive once the adopt to dominant logic. Brown (309-310) exemplifies this with how some homosexual men don\u2019t mind calling other homosexual men \u201cfags\u201d as an insult to question their masculinity. So, as I\u2019ve tried to explain, the issue people take with homosexuality is that it challenges heterosexuality. It is the practice<\/em> that deeply troubles them, as Guattari (216) points out. Once it’s turned into a fixed identity, alongside the heterosexual identity, basically giving it the heterosexual conjugal form, people can be controlled through it by judging their behavior, assessing whether it conforms to the norm of homosexuality. So, if you are a homosexual, you are now expected to act accordingly, whatever that means, and if you don\u2019t act accordingly, you are, once more, a sexual deviant, perhaps one of the \u201cfags\u201d, to use Brown\u2019s (309-310) example.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It’s also worth emphasizing how Guattari (216) opposes micro<\/em>– and macropolitics<\/em>. It\u2019s not too clear what he means by this, if you aren\u2019t familiar with the terms, but you can find them defined in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia\u2019. He and Deleuze (213) mention them in the context of politics:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[E]verything is political, but every politics is simultaneously macropolitics<\/em> and micropolitics<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The former pertains to rigid segments, for example social categories, such as men and women, whereas the latter pertains to supple segments, which then challenge these notions, as they (213) go on to clarify. To put that in terms that shouldn\u2019t be too hard to understand, we may think that men and women are these fixed categories, i.e., transcendent objects<\/em> which we then just happen to represent, or, at least, as these discursively constructed categories, i.e., social constructs, but, in any case, there are these clear-cut categories. We may also take a closer look at them, to examine what counts as masculine <\/em>or feminine<\/em>. When we do this, we are bound to notice that it\u2019s not at all that simple, that you are either masculine or feminine, nor that you have some masculine features and some feminine features. It is the micropolitics<\/em> that challenge these macropolitical<\/em> notions. In their (213) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[T]he two sexes imply a multiplicity of molecular combinations bringing into play not only the man in the woman the woman in the man, but the relation of each to the animal, the plant, etc.: a thousand tiny sexes.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Now, it\u2019s tempting to think from this that micropolitics<\/em> is what we should strive for, instead of macropolitics<\/em>. That\u2019s right. I\u2019d say so, yes, but at the same time, one needs to keep in mind that micropolitics can turn ugly or, as they (214-215) put it, cancerous. The point here is that macropolitics is pretty old school, or classical, as they (214-215) point out. It\u2019s rigid, yes, but it\u2019s also easy to deal with, whereas micropolitics is supple, bordering fluid, and thus difficult to deal with when things turn ugly. This is exemplified by the two with the paradox of anti-fascism:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cLeftist organizations will not be the last to secrete microfascisms. It\u2019s too easy to be antifascist on the molar level, and not even see the fascist in inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both personal and collective.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

To explain the terms, they refer to the macro<\/em> as the molar<\/em> and the micro<\/em> as the molecular<\/em>. So, what they (215) want to get across is that the latter is not, in itself, any better than the former. Like I pointed out, making things more supple or fluid is, overall, the way to go, but you got to let go of the segmentation as otherwise you are only making finer distinctions. In their (215) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[F]ine segmentations are as harmful as the most rigid segments.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Why? Well, because they are still segments. They are smaller, i.e., more molecular<\/em>, than the rigid, i.e., the more molar<\/em>, segments, yes, but they are still segments. Then there\u2019s the related issue of scale. As they (215) point out, we are tempted to think of the small as pertaining to individuals and small groups of individuals and the large pertaining to the whole society, but this is wrongheaded. The small can permeate the whole of society, you know, like a virus, and the large can be found manifested in an individual, which is the case when someone is highly rigid in one\u2019s own thinking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On top of that, neither negates the other. Instead, they work in tandem, as they (215) point out. In fact, the more something is organized in either way, the more it is open to turning into the other, as they (215) go on to add. So, the more rigid something is, the more susceptible it becomes to being challenged. They (215-216) exemplify this with two examples that I think are still valid contemporary. Firstly, there\u2019s globalization, which means that work is now a planetary phenomenon. You can hardly escape it. So, it\u2019s molar<\/em>, yet, it is very, very molecular<\/em> as it\u2019s all about the individuals. Secondly, security is a state matter, all about macropolitics<\/em>, but it\u2019s fueled by micropolitics<\/em>, by all those fears that people have. They (216) mention separatists, but that\u2019s almost quaint by now. We\u2019d call them terrorists these days. Then there are the immigrants, who, supposedly, are there to take your jobs, despite not knowing the language, nor having the skills needed to do the job. They don\u2019t mention immigrants, but Guattari (170-171) does mention them in \u2018Everybody Wants to be a Fascist\u2019 and foresees the flow of immigrants to Europe from Africa and the Middle-East, as well as to the US from Central and South America.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now, none of this is to say that, in molar <\/em>or macro-political<\/em> terms, that minority groups, in this case homosexuals, should just keep to themselves, let things slide, just because there is this danger, of becoming the oppressor, despite having being oppressed. To be clear, this applies to everyone, not just to homosexuals or any minorities that you can think of. In fact, I believe that you should put up a fight, to challenge the system, but, at the same time, you have to keep in mind why you are doing it and not compromise it, to make a difference, because there is no shortage of cases where people have sought to challenge the powers that be, only to end up the powers that be, no better than the people who they opposed. To give you an example, what did protestants do? Well, they protested. That’s where the name comes. Why? Because they thought the system was pretty corrupt and served the people who run the show. Was it that way? Ahm, yes. I’d say that they were totally right about that. But what did they end up doing? Well, they eventually ended up with their own system that while, perhaps, better than the old system, is not unlike the old system. This is what Friedrich Nietzsche points out in \u2018Beyond Good and Evil\u2019 when he (69) states that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cWhoever fights with monsters should see to it that he does not become one himself. And when you stare for a long time into an abyss, the abyss stares back into you.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Anyway, it is at this point that Guattari\u2019s interviewers (216) ask him to define identity<\/em>. Now, he (216) does not give you the typical definition of identity, that of being, that you are this and\/or that, as that would invoke a transcendent object<\/em>. Instead, he (216) wants to define it as an existential territory<\/em>. What is it? Well, if you\u2019ve read either of the volumes of \u2018Capitalism and Schizophrenia\u2019, \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019 and\/or \u2018Anti-Oedipus\u2019, you won\u2019t have encountered it. Guattari mentions it at times, here and there, but the most thorough take on it can be found in his \u2018Schizoanalytic Cartographies\u2019. In that book, he (26-27) refers to it as a dynamic domain that lacks a fixed identity and as something that is very real, yet virtual. If you want the long answer, read my essay on that book or, even better, just read the book yourself. To give you a short answer, it\u2019s all about how the given is given. It\u2019s about what\u2019ve become, at any given moment. It\u2019s the given, but not from the perspective of the given, taking it as just the given, but from the perspective of the giving of the given.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cIt is a matter not only of tolerating another group, another ethnicity, another sex, but also of a desire for dissensus, otherness, difference.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, in other words, we must abandon such notions of identities<\/em> altogether and think in terms of difference<\/em>. To put it another way, it\u2019s the giving of the given that we must build on and not on the given. Difference is therefore not something that\u2019s what\u2019s been this and\/or that identity, something subsidiary to identity, but something that is primary to identity, something that is constitutive of identity, as Deleuze (xv) points out in \u2018Difference and Repetition\u2019. Anyway, Guattari (216) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cAccepting otherness is a question not so much of right as of desire. This acceptance is possible precisely on the condition of assuming the multiplicity with oneself.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Note here that it\u2019s about multiplicity<\/em> and not of multiple<\/em>. Why? Well, because the former could be anything, even something that we don\u2019t even know yet, whereas the latter is limited to this and\/or that. Again, to explain this the way Deleuze (xv) wants us to think, think of identity<\/em> as that what is given to us by difference<\/em> and not as something that is simply different from something else, as this given that is given because it is simply different from another given.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While I may have strayed a bit and didn’t manage to avoid some of the jargon, I like this two page short interview, because it keeps things relatively simple. You should be able to get the point he wants to make about identity <\/em>and subjectivity<\/em>, even if you are not familiar with his and\/or Deleuze\u2019s works. It’s certainly central to their works, as well as to the works of Foucault, but it’s presented in a fairly accessible form. Oh, and I totally agree with what he says in this interview. My own work also deals with these with identity and subjectivity and while I recognize their importance, I find them problematic, just like Deleuze, Guattari and Foucault do. I get it that people want to cling to their identities, what we may thus also call dominant subjectivities<\/em>, because going against that logic is tough, because it challenges the way you think, while also providing you a sense of self. Giving it up is asking a lot, but that’s exactly what’s needed. It’s also difficult, because your sense of self, as this and\/or that, has been ingrained in your, likely for decades, so giving it up must feel like someone is tearing you apart. Oh, and that’s not a joke. Find a copy of ‘A Thousand Plateaus’ and read the plateau \u2018How do you make yourself a body without organs?\u2019. If you feel like you are being torn apart, like you’ve been lied to your entire life, yeah, that’s what I’m talking about. The feeling is like you are bordering insanity. That’s how I’d put it. It’s your way of thinking that wants you to keep you from thinking in any other way. Do stop reading at that point though and only return to it a good night sleep or so, when you feel like you can handle the challenge. It may take a while, sure, but once you can handle that, it’s pretty sweet. You are no longer occupied by thoughts about yourself, who you think you are. You just are. That’s what’s so revolutionary about. You’ve become revolutionary, not by moving from this to that, but by becoming-revolutionary<\/em>, as Deleuze and Guattari (292) put it in ‘A Thousand Plateaus’:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“Becoming-revolutionary remains indifferent to the questions of a future and a past of the revolution; it passes between the two.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, once you manage it, once it’s about becoming-revolutionary<\/em>, you no longer think of yourself as this and\/or that, in the present (which is actually in the past already), in the past, nor in the future. You just are what you are, here and now. It’s as simple as that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
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  • Brown, J. (2011). No Homo. Journal of Homosexuality<\/em>, 58 (3), 299\u2013314.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Deleuze, G. ([1968] 1994). Difference and Repetition<\/em> (P. Patton, Trans.). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Deleuze, G., and F. Guattari ([1972] 1983). Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia<\/em> (R. Hurley, M. Seem and H. R. Lane, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Deleuze, G., and F. Guattari ([1980] 1987). A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia<\/em> (B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Foucault, M. ([1975] 1995). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison<\/em> (A. Sheridan, Trans.). New York, NY: Vintage Books.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Guattari, F. ([1992] 1996). Toward a New Perspective on Identity (J-A. Fern\u00e1ndez, Trans.). In F. Guattari, The Guattari Reader<\/em> (G. Genosko, Ed.) (pp. 215\u2013217). Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishers.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Guattari, F. ([1974] 2009). Everybody Wants to be a Fascist (S. Fletcher and C. Benamou, Trans.). In F. Guattari, Chaosophy: Text and Interviews 1972\u20131977<\/em> (S. Lotringer, Ed., D. L. Sweet, J. Becker and T. Adkins, Trans.) (pp. 154\u2013175). Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e).<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Guattari, F. ([1989] 2013). Schizoanalytic Cartographies<\/em> (A. Goffey, Trans.). London, United Kingdom: Bloomsbury.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Lonely Island (2011). No Homo<\/em> (A. Samberg, A. Schaffer, J. Taccone, B. Long and B. Byrd, Wr., B. Long, Pr.). New York, NY: Universal Republic Records.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Nietzsche, F. ([1886] 2002). Beyond Good and Evil<\/em> (R-P. Horstmann and J. Norman, Eds., J. Norman, Trans.). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Pascoe, C. J., and S. Diefendorf (2019). No Homo: Gendered Dimensions of Homophobic Epithets Online. Sex Roles<\/em>, 80, 123\u2013136.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    I\u2019ve explained how Gilles Deleuze and F\u00e9lix Guattari deal with identity and subjectivity, but I think a bit of repetition won\u2019t hurt. I\u2019ll try to keep this as simple as possible, like I did in the previous essay, trying to avoid their jargon as much as possible, even though that\u2019s quite tricky, considering how complex […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3554,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[1494,71,1613,48,123,1614,1497,1615,318,1612],"class_list":["post-4574","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-essays","tag-brown","tag-deleuze","tag-diefendorf","tag-foucault","tag-guattari","tag-jambon","tag-lonely-island","tag-magnan","tag-nietzsche","tag-pascoe"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4574","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3554"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4574"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4574\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5130,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4574\/revisions\/5130"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4574"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4574"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4574"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}