{"id":5073,"date":"2023-06-20T22:46:25","date_gmt":"2023-06-20T22:46:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/?p=5073"},"modified":"2025-03-10T18:03:01","modified_gmt":"2025-03-10T18:03:01","slug":"hang-on-this-isnt-structuralism-or-is-it","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/2023\/06\/20\/hang-on-this-isnt-structuralism-or-is-it\/","title":{"rendered":"Hang on, this isn\u2019t structuralism! Or is it?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>It took me a couple of weeks to get everything done, even though I only had like 10 pages left to cover. Yeah, I ended up on all kinds of tangents. Anyway, this time I&#8217;ll be going through \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019 by Gilles Deleuze. It can be found in \u2018Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953\u20131974\u2019. It is simply attributed to him, but in actuality it is a collection of a bit of this and that, as edited by David Lapoujade. In this article length text, twenty or so pages, he provides an answer to that question mentioned in the title of the text.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But before we get going, he (170) mentions people like Roman Jakobson, Claude L\u00e9vi-Strauss, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser and Roland Barthes, who could all be labeled as <em>structuralists<\/em>, at least in some sense, but not all of them would have accepted that label. Plus, in some cases they may have been or may have been considered structuralists at some point, but then, later on, not so. In any case, he (170) wants to point out that some of them would agree and would happily use the word <em>structure<\/em> or <em>structural<\/em>, while others would not, while referring to the same thing as <em>system<\/em>, \u00e0 la Saussure. I&#8217;ll be using those two terms more or less interchangeably in this essay, just so you know.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Similar to Ernst Cassirer in \u2018Structuralism in Modern Linguistics\u2019, Deleuze (170) reckons that while Saussure is particularly important to <em>structuralism<\/em>, being that name that people often associate with it, it can also be credited to Moscow and Prague linguistic circles. He doesn\u2019t explicitly mention it, but it\u2019s worth noting here that Jakobson was a member of both circles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It is at this point where things get interesting as Deleuze (171) states some stuff that might ruffle some feathers. It\u2019s not offensive, no, but let\u2019s say that his views are somewhat \u2026 unconventional. He (170-171) states something as bold as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIn fact, language is the only thing that can be properly be said to have structure, be it an esoteric or even non-verbal language.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Now, that may make you think that he is in favor of <em>structuralism<\/em>, especially in linguistics, but that\u2019s not exactly the case (or, rather, we need to take a step back and think of his definition of it, once we get there). He (171) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&nbsp;\u201cThere is a structure of the unconscious only to the extent that the unconscious speaks and is language.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>If you\u2019ve read his collaborations with Guattari, this is not at all that surprising, considering he had already worked with him at this point. If you haven\u2019t read those books, namely \u2018Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia\u2019 and \u2018A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia\u2019, this needs further elaboration. To prevent me from going on a tangent, let\u2019s just say that <em>unconscious<\/em> doesn\u2019t need <em>structure<\/em>. It just is what it is. I\u2019ll return to this point later. Anyway, what he (171) helps us to better understand this by stating that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThere is a structure of bodies only to the extent that bodies are supposed to speak with a language which is one of the symptoms.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In other words, whenever we invoke <em>structure<\/em> or <em>system<\/em>, if you prefer the Saussurean term, we are already in the realm of language. How so? Well, what\u2019s outside language or, more broadly speaking, semiotics, has no need for such. It just is and gets by without such. It is <em>we <\/em>who insist on \u2026 speaking \u2026 in these terms, imposing on the world. He (171) highlights this by adding that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cEven things possess a structure only in so far as they maintain a silent discourse, which is the language of signs.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Following this, he (171) reminds us of the <em>structuralists<\/em> again, moving once more from <em>structuralism<\/em> to structuralists, only make a further move by asking us, his readers, to focus on what makes them structuralists. To be more specific, he (171) wants us to focus on them, to investigate our own views of them, as well as their own views of themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To do that, he lists seven criteria that helps us to recognize structuralism: (I) the <em>symbolic<\/em>, (II) <em>local<\/em> or <em>positional<\/em>, (III) the <em>differential<\/em> and the <em>singular<\/em>, (IV) the <em>differenciator<\/em>, <em>differentiation<\/em>, (V) <em>serial<\/em>, (VI) the <em>empty square<\/em>, (VII) from the <em>subject<\/em> to <em>practice<\/em>. I will go through these, one by one. There will be a tangent or two, or several, but bear with me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Symbolic<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Firstly, Deleuze (171) reminds us that we are in the habit of thinking in terms of something being either <em>real<\/em> or <em>imaginary<\/em>. In other words, it\u2019s either for real or it\u2019s made up, <em>true<\/em> or <em>false<\/em>. Either it\u2019s real or you are just hallucinating. In addition, we are conditioned to think that there\u2019s a <em>dialectical<\/em> relation between the two, so that one affects the other, as he (171) points out. So, we can think of there being a <em>real order<\/em> and an <em>imaginary order<\/em>, as noted by him (171). What <em>structuralism<\/em> adds to this is another component, the <em>symbolic<\/em>, so that there&#8217;s also a <em>symbolic<\/em> <em>order<\/em>, which should not be confused with the real order, nor with the imaginary order (we\u2019ll get to this shortly, why that is), as he (171) points out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To make more of sense of that, the <em>real<\/em>, the <em>imaginary<\/em> and the <em>symbolic<\/em>, think of words. They are thought to refer to things and to their images. That covers the first two orders. He (172) provides us with an example that you\u2019ll find in psychoanalytic literature, the father that is real, like someone\u2019s actual dad, and the image of a father, like what we think that a father is like. That said, you can also have the symbolic, which is neither the real father, nor the image of dad, but rather the symbolic father, as he (172) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cNot just the real and the imaginary, but their relations, and the disturbances of these relations, must be thought as the limit of a process in which they constitute themselves in relation to the symbolic.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Or, more simply put, it is the principle behind the real and the imaginary, as he (172) points out:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[T]he symbolic as element of the structure constitutes the principle of a genesis: structure is incarnated in realities and images according to determinable series.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>So, in summary, something like a father can be A) <em>real<\/em>, an actual dad, whoever that may be, B) <em>imaginary<\/em>, an image of a father, or C) <em>symbolic<\/em>, a <em>symbolic element<\/em> among other symbolic elements in a <em>system<\/em>. I won&#8217;t further elaborate the distinctions here, because I&#8217;ll return to this soon enough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Skipping some of the examples here (because I\u2019m not that well versed in psychoanalytic literature, sorry), he (172) moves on to characterize these three orders with a statement that may also puzzle you a bit: \u201cperhaps these numerals\u201d, \u201c1, 2, 3\u201d, \u201chave as much an ordinal as cardinal value.\u201d It took me a moment to get this, what he means by this, but once you get it, it\u2019s like oh, yeah! It\u2019s pretty clever alright.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>So, let\u2019s start from the first order, the <em>real<\/em>. It\u2019s not only first, but also <em>one<\/em>, as he (172) points out. Then there\u2019s the second order, the <em>imaginary<\/em>. It\u2019s not only second, but also <em>two<\/em>, because it doubles the real, as he (172) noted by him. I told you he\u2019s clever! If you don\u2019t get it from that already, just think of a case where your imagination has gone wild, when you have doubted something. You are no longer sure that it\u2019s this, that you have this one explanation for it, but a possible second explanation for it, so at least two explanations for it. That\u2019s how the imaginary is capable of doubling the real, through doubt, as he (172) points out. He (172) exemplifies this again with a father and an image of the father, which are two different things, one being this or that father, a real father, whereas the other one is applicable to more than one father, at least two of them. He (172) summarizes this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThe imaginary is defined by games of mirroring, of duplication, of reversed identification and projection, always in the mode of the double.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Then there\u2019s the third order, the <em>symbolic<\/em>. How is it not only third, but also three? Well, in his (172) view, it is three in the sense that the relation between two things, one and two, here the first and second orders, the <em>real <\/em>and the <em>imaginary<\/em>, is never <em>structural<\/em>. You need at least three things for something to be thought as structural, to have a <em>structure<\/em>. So, if we have one and two, we can think of their relation as a <em>dialectic<\/em>, but if we have three, it\u2019s already triadic, as he points out, more like a <em>trialectic<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Henri Lefebvre\u2019s spatial triad that he deals with in \u2018The Production of Space\u2019 can be understood in this way. He (38-39) refers to the first order, the <em>real<\/em>, as the realm of <em>spatial practice<\/em>, i.e., <em>physical space<\/em>, the second order, the <em>imaginary<\/em>, as <em>representations of space<\/em>, and the third order, the <em>symbolic<\/em>, as <em>representational spaces<\/em>. Without getting too tangled up on this, physical space and representations of space match the real and the imaginary quite neatly. Representational spaces is not as clear a match here as he (39) mentions it being about images and symbols, as opposed to being just about the symbols. Then again, he (33) summarizes it as \u201cembodying complex symbolisms\u201d, being coded to this or that extent, as \u201cto be defined less as a code of space than as a code of representational spaces.\u201d Plus, he (39) also reckons that it \u201cis the dominated \u2013 and hence passively experience \u2013 space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate.\u201d In other words, it\u2019s not, strictly speaking, imaginary, in itself, but what tends to get dominated by the imaginary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Stuart Elden (110-111) summarizes this triad his article \u2018There is a Politics of Space because Space is Political: Henri Lefebvre and the Production of Space\u2019. Firstly, there\u2019s \u201cspace as physical form, <em>real<\/em> space\u201d. Secondly, there\u2019s the \u201cspace as a mental construct, <em>imagined<\/em> space.\u201d Thirdly, there\u2019s \u201cspace as produced and modified over time\u201d, \u201cinvested with symbolism and meaning\u201d, \u201cspace as <em>real-and-imagined<\/em>.\u201d I\u2019m slightly irked by the last bit, it being real-and-imagined, but, then again, it sort of is, inasmuch as we take that domination into account.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Building on Lefebvre\u2019s triad, for Edward Soja, the <em>symbolic<\/em> order is what he refers to as the <em>thirdspace<\/em> in \u2018Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places\u2019. To be more specific, for him (10), this thirdspace is <em>real<\/em> and <em>imagined<\/em>, at the same time, thus combining the <em>firstspace<\/em> that pertains to \u201cthe concrete materiality of spatial forms, on things that can be empirically mapped\u201d, what he reckons is \u201coften thought of as \u2018real\u2019\u201d, and the <em>secondspace <\/em>that pertains to how space is conceived through ideas, how it is doubled or re-presented in this way, what he reckons is often thought of \u201cas \u2018imagined.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>What I particularly like about the way he (9) likens <em>thirdspace<\/em>, i.e., the <em>symbolic<\/em>, as \u201ca different way of looking at the same subject\u201d, whatever that may be, \u201ca sequence of neverending variations on recurrent spatial themes.\u201d It has openness to it. Like no matter how fixed and closed things may appear to us, they are always changing and open. Simply put, it has the potential to change the way we think about <em>space<\/em>, as he (11) points out. I think he (11) is, however, being far too modest here. I think it has not only the potential to change the way we think about space, but also about the way we think, you know like, <em>how<\/em> we think \u2026 of just about anything.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He (11) also laments how this potential is typically wasted because people are in the habit of doing what they\u2019ve been taught to do, to think either in terms of the <em>firstspace<\/em> or the <em>secondspace<\/em>, the <em>real<\/em> or the <em>imaginary<\/em>. He (11) states that he has witnessed this in geography, that being his field or discipline. I\u2019d say that it\u2019s also like that elsewhere, and that not much has changed in nearly three decades. I reckon he (11) is right that there is this \u201cformidable rigidity of the Firstspace-Secondspace dualism into which geographers\u201d, as well as many others in other fields or disciplines, \u201chave been so tightly socialized.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Right, back to Deleuze (172) who states that the third order, the <em>symbolic<\/em>, is \u201cat once unreal, and yet not imaginable\u201d, the point here being that it is not <em>real<\/em>, nor <em>imaginary<\/em>. Why? Well, because if it were one of those, it would be either of those two and not its own thing. Things get even more interesting when he (173) points out that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cWe can say at least that the corresponding structure has no relationship with a sensible form, nor with a figure of the imagination, nor with an intelligible essence.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>So, in other words, he is indeed stating that the <em>symbolic<\/em> is not the sensible, that is to say the <em>real<\/em>, nor what we imagine or think it is, that is to say the <em>imaginary<\/em>. What is it then? Well, he (173) goes on to add that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIt has nothing to do with a <em>form<\/em>: for structure is not at all defined by an autonomy of the whole, by a preeminence \u2026 of the whole over its parts, by a <em>Gestalt<\/em> which would operate in the real and in perception.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>So, to be clear, it is not to be confused with any kind of pre-existing <em>form<\/em>. That would be <em>imaginary<\/em>. That would be us imagining some for that defines something <em>real<\/em> (like some Platonic <em>idea<\/em>, <em>form <\/em>or <em>essence<\/em>). It is something completely different, as stated by him (173):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cStructure is defined, on the contrary, by the nature of certain atomic elements which claim to account both for the formation of wholes and for the variation of their parts.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>What we have is a <em>whole <\/em>that is constructed of <em>parts <\/em>or, rather, we understand these <em>elements<\/em>, whatever they may be, as constituting a whole due to the way they are related to one another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIt has nothing to do with \u2026 imagination, although structuralism is riddled with reflections on rhetoric, metaphor and metonymy, for these figures themselves imply structural displacements which must account for both the literal and the figurative.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>To paraphrase this, to get to the gist of this, figures of imagination, such metaphors and metonyms are second order phenomena, quite literally so, because they pertain to the second order (haha, that was clever!). The <em>symbolic<\/em> <em>order <\/em>and its figures are more fundamental than the <em>imaginary<\/em> <em>order <\/em>and its figures. After explaining what it is not, he (173) finally explains what it is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[I]t is more a combinatory formula \u2026 supporting formal elements which by themselves have neither form, nor signification, nor representation, nor content, nor given empirical reality, nor hypothetical functional model, nor intelligibility behind appearances.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>The gist of what it is right there, at beginning of the sentence. It\u2019s a <em>formula<\/em> that explains <em>how<\/em> the <em>elements <\/em>are arranged in <em>relation <\/em>to one another at any given time, <em>parts <\/em>that combine as <em>wholes <\/em>accordingly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For those who have read Althusser, he (173) reckons that whatever it is that we call <em>theory<\/em> is, in fact, this <em>structure<\/em> that he is going on and on about and the <em>symbolic<\/em> <em>order <\/em>is what\u2019s responsible for its production. If you ask me, it does make sense that the structure is the theory, as produced by the symbolic order, in the sense that it is that formula according to which it all makes sense. The problem that I have with theory is, however, that it is often understood as this \u2026 something that\u2019s not connected to everyday life. It\u2019s like this other plane that is disconnected from reality. Then again, I\u2019m not saying it is like that, but rather that it\u2019s often understood as such, as something otherwordly. I\u2019ve mentioned this in the past, but, yeah, I get puzzled looks whenever I start with theory. It\u2019s like why all this \u2026 theory \u2026 and why not just get to the point? In my experience, there\u2019s this opposition to theory. This is why I prefer to call it a conceptual framework.  Explaining it as something that has to do with concepts and how they are used to make sense of things just seems to work better.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The local or the positional<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Jumping to the second criterion, to the <em>local<\/em> or <em>positional<\/em>, he (173) reckons that, once more, that it\u2019s best to explain what <em>structure<\/em> is not, according to this criterion, before attempting to explain what it is, according to this criterion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In summary, unlike the <em>real<\/em> and the <em>imaginary<\/em> <em>orders<\/em>, the <em>symbolic order<\/em> cannot be understood as being referential, that is to say referring to something that exists, i.e., a <em>thing<\/em>, or that we imagine to exist, i.e., an <em>image<\/em>, by which he (173) means that \u201cthe elements of a structure\u201d do not involve \u201cextrinsic designation, nor intrinsic signification.\u201d To explain what the symbolic order is then, he (173-174) states that it is all about <em>sense<\/em>, in this context specified by the translator as pertaining to <em>meaning <\/em>and <em>direction<\/em>, which is why this criterion is <em>positional<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He (173-174) actually credits point to L\u00e9vi-Strauss. I was able to find the text in question, \u2018Reponses a quelques questions\u2019 and then cross check the pages with its subsequent English translation that you can find published as \u2018A Confrontation\u2019. In this context, he is responding to Paul Ric\u0153ur (64) who states that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c<em>But if I do not understand myself better by understanding them, can I still talk of meaning? If meaning is not a sector of self-understanding, I do not know what it is<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>To be honest, I\u2019m not entirely sure what they are even talking about at this point as, to me, they seem to be talking past one another. Anyway, L\u00e9vi-Strauss responds to this (64):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cBut as we are prisoners of subjectivity where that is concerned, we cannot try to understand things both from the outside and from the inside at once[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>To which he (64) eventually adds that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThere is no such choice [between syntax and semantics] because the phonological revolution that you [Ric\u0153ur] have invoked on several occasions consists of the discovery that meaning is always the result of a combination of elements which are not themselves significant.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In other words, the key thing here is that <em>meaning<\/em> is always anchored in <em>non-meaning<\/em>, that <em>sense<\/em> is derived from <em>nonsense<\/em>. In his (64) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[B]ehind all meaning there is a non-meaning, while the reverse is not the case.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>As a side note, the difficulty here is that we need to be clear on the terminology. It often not clear whether <em>meaning <\/em>is just meaning, something that&#8217;s supposedly given, or whether by meaning we mean something like <em>textual <\/em>or <em>semantic meaning<\/em>, like dictionary definitions (which are, not really meanings, at all, but rather ballparking it, helping you\u2026), and by sense we then mean what <em>we<\/em> mean by whatever it is that we are trying to get across (\u2026to understand what\u2019s meant by something, in some <em>context<\/em>). Another way of putting that would be to talk of semantic meaning and <em>pragmatic meaning<\/em> or of textual meaning and <em>contextual meaning<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The problem for me is that people often think that <em>meaning <\/em>is just self-evident. At its worst, people think that <em>words <\/em>correspond with <em>things<\/em>, even though they don&#8217;t. Not as bad, but bad nonetheless, they think that meaning is contained in the words themselves (or expressions themselves), so that all you need to do is to consult a dictionary, even though all you get is words being explained in other words, in infinite regress.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In my view, <em>meaning <\/em>is something that always emerges, here and now. I&#8217;d go as far as to say that it is <em>intuitive<\/em>. It&#8217;s like either you get it or you don&#8217;t. Then again, people are so used to thinking of meaning the way they do, unlike me, so I&#8217;ve come to prefer <em>sense <\/em>over meaning. It doesn&#8217;t really matter what you call it, as long as you get it, but, yeah, I prefer one over the other in order to avoid that confusion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>So, back to Deleuze (174) who clarifies that while <em>meaning<\/em> or <em>sense<\/em>, what\u2019s properly <em>structural<\/em>, pertaining to the <em>symbolic<\/em> <em>order<\/em>, is <em>local <\/em>or <em>positional<\/em>, it\u2019s not about this and\/or that location in <em>real<\/em> space, nor in some <em>imaginary<\/em> space. Instead, it\u2019s all about <em>structural<\/em> or <em>topological<\/em> space that is not extensional. I think this meshes well with Soja\u2019s (11) views that <em>thirdspace<\/em> should not be reduced to <em>firstspace<\/em>, nor to <em>secondspace<\/em>, because it is not reducible to either of the two. In any case, what matters for Deleuze (174) is that this third order is all about the <em>relationality<\/em>, how this and\/or that elements is in <em>relation<\/em> to this and\/or that element. In his (174) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[P]laces in a purely structural space are primary in relation to the things and real beings which come to occupy them, primary also in relation to the always somewhat imaginary roles and events which necessarily appear when they are occupied.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Simply put, the <em>symbolic<\/em> <em>order<\/em>, the <em>structure<\/em>, is all about the <em>relations<\/em> between the <em>relata<\/em>, which may be this and\/or that. The latter matter, but the former matter more, which is why he (174) goes on to add that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThe scientific ambition of structuralism is not quantitative, but topological and relational[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This is actually why I\u2019m fond of the works of Gabriel Tarde or Pierre Bourdieu. They are both interested in <em>society<\/em>, that is to say the human society or, rather, societies, and approach it <em>quantitatively<\/em>, not because they are all for quantification, as such, thinking that it\u2019s simply better than doing research <em>qualitatively<\/em>, but because it allows them to think <em>topologically<\/em>, in terms of <em>relations<\/em>. While Bourdieu shifted from qualitative work to quantitative work, what I like about this shift is the way he ended up visualizing it through what\u2019s known as <em>correspondence analysis<\/em>, because it helps us to think differently, in terms of topologies or relations, as aptly summarized by Jean-Paul Benz\u00e9cri (4) in his \u2018Correspondence Analysis Handbook\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThose who have considered data tables with some attention know that the relations between numbers are more interesting than the numbers themselves.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>While I was doing my PhD, I had a lot of people tell me that opting to study something social the way I did, <em>quantitively<\/em>, made no sense and I got plenty of flak for it. This is, however, exactly what they tended not to understand. It\u2019s not about the numbers. It\u2019s about the <em>relations<\/em> between the numbers. It\u2019s about the <em>correspondences<\/em>, what tend to co-occur, and what do not tend to co-occur. That\u2019s what it\u2019s all about.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To be clear, looking at the <em>relations<\/em> and the <em>relata<\/em> does not mean that you are claiming that one thing leads to another. If one thing tends to appear alongside another thing does not mean that one causes the other, or vice versa. That could be the case, but that\u2019s not the point. You are simply looking at the relations between things. We can, of course, ponder <em>why<\/em> this tends to co-occur with that, but not with something else, but the co-occurrences themselves do not explain such.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Deleuze (174) provides some examples. Firstly, he (174) notes that, for Althusser, what matters in <em>economy <\/em>or, to be more accurate, <em>economic structure<\/em>, is how this and\/or that is positioned in relation to something else, whatever that may be. So, if we think of the economy, we do not focus on this and\/or that person, the <em>subjects<\/em>, as interesting as that might be, nor the specific roles they play in that economy, the <em>objects<\/em>, nor the specific events in which this all takes place. No. Absolutely not. Instead, what matters for Althusser is that we focus on the <em>relations <\/em>of their production. In other words, we do not focus on people, what they do, nor where and when they do what they do, but rather on <em>how<\/em> they come or, I guess, rather, may come to occupy such and such position, in relation to such and such other position occupied by someone else, in a certain context. Secondly, he (174) notes that this also the case for Foucault, to whom something like \u201cdeath, desire, work, or play\u201d is not a matter \u201cof empirical human existence, but above all \u2026 the qualifications of places and positions which will render those who come to occupy them as mortal and dying, or desiring, or workman-like, or playful.\u201d In both cases, the focus is not on the subjects, nor on the objects, nor in actual events concerning both, but in the conditions that have come to determine them. This means that what\u2019s interesting is not who it concerns, what it deals with, when and where it takes place, but rather <em>why<\/em> it comes to be <em>arranged <\/em>that way in the first place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This is, perhaps, best explained by Lacan, to whom Deleuze (174) refers to in this context. So, Lacan covers this in his \u2018Seminar on \u201cThe Purloined letter\u201d\u2019 (I\u2019m referring to the Yale French Studies article, so the pagination matches that). He (59-60) notes that we can \u201cconceive of the signifier as sustaining itself only in a displacement\u201d and that, contrary to what people think, and like to think, \u201cthe displacement of the signifier determines\u201d them. He (60) is very adamant about how this works, so I think it\u2019s worth highlighting here:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[It] determines the subjects in their acts, in their destiny, in their refusal, in their blindnesses, in their end and in their fate, their innate gifts and social acquisitions notwithstanding, without regard for character or sex, and that, willingly or not, everything that might be considered the stuff of psychology, kit and caboodle, will follow the path of the signifier.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Now, here it\u2019s worth keeping in mind that <em>signification<\/em> pertains to the <em>imaginary<\/em> <em>order<\/em>. The <em>subject<\/em> does not determine itself, but is determined by the <em>signifiers<\/em>, because of that, because the <em>real<\/em> and the <em>imaginary <\/em>are determined by the <em>symbolic<\/em>. In other words, it works that way because the symbolic is responsible for the <em>structure<\/em>, how those signifiers are aligned in relation to one another, as well as how people are aligned in relation to one another. As reiterated by Deleuze (175), <em>meaning<\/em> or, rather, <em>sense<\/em> is not something that we can refer to in the real, nor imagine, but rather \u201can optical effect, a language effect, a positional effect\u201d that has its origins in <em>non-meaning<\/em> or <em>non-sense<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Deleuze (175) also makes note of how <em>structuralism<\/em> is often associated with play and theater. I will not get carried away by this, so, I\u2019d say, the gist of this point is that like in many games, such as card games, and in theater, what\u2019s important about <em>structure <\/em>is the <em>positionality<\/em>. You have certain positions that can be occupied, and their functions are tied to the other positions. Whoever or whatever occupies that place is therefore a mere <em>placeholder<\/em> (we&#8217;ll get to this soon enough).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To explain that key insight in simple terms, when we invoke a <em>structure <\/em>or a <em>system<\/em>, it&#8217;s crucial to understand that it&#8217;s all about the <em>relations <\/em>and the <em>relata<\/em>. Those <em>positions <\/em>are occupied by some <em>symbolic elements<\/em>. If we have <em>real <\/em>or <em>imagined <\/em>people or things, <em>subjects <\/em>or <em>objects<\/em>, occupy those positions, as we often do, they are not of great importance as its that <em>arrangement <\/em>that matters much more.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To exemplify that key insight, think of a hierarchical <em>structure<\/em>. It can be anything, but let&#8217;s say a feudal monarchy. What we have is a <em>system <\/em>that has certain key <em>positions<\/em>. I won&#8217;t go through them all. The gist of this <em>arrangement <\/em>is that you have someone at the top, typically a king or a queen (or an emperor or an empress). That&#8217;s a position for you. There are also other positions. You&#8217;d typically have dukes or duchesses, counts or countesses and barons or baronesses. The actual people who occupy those positions aren&#8217;t that relevant. When they die, they are replaced by others who come to hold those positions. This means that to actually change anything, you need to change the system, that structure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Back to Deleuze (175) who also notes that <em>structuralism<\/em> is tied to \u201ca new materialism, a new atheism, a new anti-humanism\u201d, because \u201cthe place is primary in relation to whatever it occupies it\u201d, which is why I think it\u2019s only apt to refer to whoever or whatever occupies it as a mere <em>placeholder<\/em>. Anyway, his (175) point is that as it\u2019s all about the <em>relations<\/em> and the <em>relata<\/em>, you don\u2019t have something like God as the final cause that you can resort to explain how things work. Much like nature, culture, humanity, ideology, economy and even discourse, it is certainly possible to imagine that <em>structure<\/em> works that way though, but that\u2019s the thing, we are then dealing with the <em>imaginary<\/em>, not with the <em>symbolic<\/em>. It is then we who ascribe it such status, not the structure itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>What\u2019s particularly interesting here is his (175) quick remark on how the <em>structure<\/em> is capable of mutation. This is a rather unorthodox view on <em>structuralism<\/em>, but it is what makes his take on it interesting. It\u2019s not explained in this context, so you just need to wait for him to cover more ground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The differential and the singular<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Moving on to the third criterion, which is the <em>differential<\/em> and the <em>singular<\/em>, he (176) emphasizes the importance of understanding <em>positionality <\/em>through reciprocal determination of the <em>relata<\/em>. Simply put, the things that are in <em>relation <\/em>to one another make no sense if considered in isolation from one another. He (176) exemplifies this with <em>phonemes<\/em>. If you are familiar with phonology or phonetics, what he (176) points out, that \u201c[p]honemes do not exist independently of the relations into which they enter and through which they reciprocally determine each other\u201d,&nbsp; should not come as anything new to you. So, if you are trying to learn a language, or a dialect, it is of little use to you to focus solely on certain elements. You also need to grasp those elements in relation to one another, as a <em>system<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He (176) moves on to list three types of <em>relations<\/em> that correspond with the <em>real<\/em>, the <em>imaginary<\/em> and the <em>symbolic<\/em>. I\u2019m going to deviate here a bit and use the terms he (171) uses in \u2018Difference and Repetition\u2019: the <em>determined<\/em>, the <em>determinable <\/em>and the <em>undetermined<\/em>. Firstly, in a real relation the <em>relata<\/em> are determined, like the numbers you use in calculation. For example, think of something simple like 4+5=9, 4&#215;5=20, or 4\/5=0,8. Secondly, in an imaginary relation the relata are determinable. For example, thing of an equation with Xs and Ys, like 2X-1Y=4, and then fill in the blanks. Thirdly, in a symbolic relation the relata are undetermined on their own, for example dy or dx, having no \u201dexistence, nor value, not signification\u201d in isolation, as emphasized by him (176), but determinable as dy\/dx and ultimately determined once the blanks are filled in. Listing the criterion in &#8216;How Do We Recognize Structuralism?&#8217;, he (176) indicates that the differential relationship dy\/dx is determined or, rather, <em>determining<\/em>, but I opted to use the formulation he (171) uses in \u2018Difference and Repetition\u2019 because it simple makes more sense to refer to it as determinable, as opposed to determined, as long as the blanks are not filled in. I have no idea why he deviates from his previous formulation, which I think is more accurate. Okay, undetermined might actually be a bit misleading, so perhaps determining is apt. Anyway, what matters is that you get the point, which is that the relata are determined relationally, in relation to one another, not in isolation from one another, and it is the relationship or the <em>system <\/em>of these relationships that are responsible for determining the rest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Staying on mathematics in &#8216;How Do We Recognize Structuralism?&#8217;, he (176) cautions you not to think of <em>structures<\/em> as <em>systems of axioms<\/em>, by which I believe he means a set theory, but as <em>systems of differentials<\/em>, as based on differential calculus, which he defines as \u201ca pure logic of relations.\u201d What we get out of this arrangement is <em>singularities<\/em>, which are mapped as \u201ccurves or figures\u201d between \u201csingular points\u201d, his (176) prime example being how we understand a triangle as having lines between three points. Those who\u2019ve studied phonology or phonetics will probably also understand his (176) other example that deals with how the phonetic system of a language result in singularities, marked by certain vocalizations and significations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He (177) summarizes structures as <em>differential<\/em> and <em>singular<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cEvery structure presents the following two aspects: a system of differential relations according to which the symbolic elements determine themselves reciprocally, and a system of singularities corresponding to these relations and tracing the space of the structure.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Only to further condense this (177):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cEvery structure is a multiplicity.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>So, we are, in fact, dealing with <em>multiplicities<\/em>, that are <em>differential<\/em> and <em>singular<\/em>. When we analyze them, we must look at the <em>relations <\/em>and the <em>relata<\/em>, or, as he (177) puts it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThe question, \u2018Is there structure in any domain whatsoever?,\u2019 must be specified in the following way: in a given domain, can one uncover symbolic elements, differential relations and singular points which are proper to it?\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>There is a certain difficulty to this though. We are dealing with the <em>symbolic<\/em> <em>order <\/em>here. It is not <em>real<\/em>, i.e., <em>material<\/em>, nor <em>imaginary<\/em>, i.e., <em>semiotic<\/em>, so how does one do this analysis? His answer to that is, perhaps, simpler than what you might expect, even though it only makes sense, if you ask me. Firstly, concerning the real, he (177) states that<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cSymbolic elements are incarnated in the real beings and objects of the domain considered; the differential relations are actualized in real relations between these beings[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This is what I\u2019d call <em>materialization<\/em> or <em>manifestation<\/em>, which is what Deleuze and Guattari refer to it here and there in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019 in addition to <em>incarnation<\/em>. Speech is a good example of this. Each <em>expression <\/em>is certainly <em>material<\/em>. You do need a physical <em>body <\/em>that acts in relation to another body, so that you get that vibration of air. You can\u2019t study speech without that, like in the abstract. But, of course, speech is more than just materiality, as he (177) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[T]he singularities are so many places in the structure, which distributes the imaginary attitudes or roles of the beings or objects that come to occupy them.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>As this is probably difficult to comprehend, he (177) rephrases this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[T]he symbolic elements and their relations always determine the nature of the beings and objects which come to realize them.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Simply put, the <em>symbolic<\/em> determines the <em>real<\/em> and the <em>imaginary<\/em>, the things that we deal with and what we think of them, as already mentioned. Anyway, he (177) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[T]he singularities form an order of positions that simultaneously determines the roles and the attitudes of these beings in so far as they occupy them.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>So, once the <em>symbolic<\/em> has determined the <em>real<\/em> and the <em>imaginary<\/em>, what we have is these <em>positions <\/em>that define various roles and the attitudes toward these roles. Now, of course, it keeps on <em>determining<\/em> them as the <em>structure<\/em> does also undergo mutations, as also already mentioned. So, yeah, don\u2019t go thinking that there is such a thing as a fixed<em> symbolic order<\/em> according to which the <em>real <\/em>and the <em>imaginary orders<\/em> are determined once and for all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Before I continue, it\u2019s worth noting that you can only study the <em>symbolic<\/em> <em>order <\/em>through the <em>imaginary<\/em> <em>order <\/em>which cannot be studied in the absence of the <em>real<\/em> <em>order<\/em>. The good thing is that we already do that, without it taking us much effort, really. Even when we think, we need a <em>real <\/em>body (<em>material<\/em>) that is capable of thinking. So, for example, to the best of our understanding a rock is not capable of thinking. But a <em>body <\/em>alone is not enough. We also need the <em>imaginary<\/em> (<em>semiotic<\/em>). The bad thing is that we think or, rather, like to think that this is enough, that all we need is a body that can think. What we also need is something that is determines how it all comes together. That\u2019s <em>structure<\/em> for you. That&#8217;s the <em>system <\/em>for you. That\u2019s the symbolic order for you.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I think you should already be able to grasp this, but let\u2019s further exemplify this with his (177) example of familial <em>relations<\/em>. So, you have parents and grandparents (parents of parents, really) and siblings, brothers and sisters. Let\u2019s assume that you have children and grandchildren (children of children, really), which means that you probably have a spouse, husband or a wife and that your children probably have spouses, husbands or wives. Let\u2019s also assume that your siblings have children, which means that you are an uncle or an aunt (the sibling, the brother or the sister of the mother or father of their children). They are then your nieces and nephews. To one another they are siblings, brothers and sisters, or cousins. Now, if we have <em>real <\/em>people, then these have been <em>determined<\/em>, and if we have <em>imaginary <\/em>people, like perhaps we are guessing, these are <em>determinable<\/em>, but we can also think of these <em>symbolically<\/em>, as mere <em>positions <\/em>in a <em>system <\/em>of (familial) relations, without ever mentioning specific real or imaginary people. This thought process, of thinking about these (familial) relations does, of course, require a real <em>body <\/em>that is capable of thinking, of imagining it all, but that\u2019s not the point here. No matter what I think, I\u2019m determined as a son, as a brother, a cousin and an uncle, and determinable as a father and as a husband, in an <em>undetermined<\/em>, yet <em>determining <\/em>system of (familial) relations through which my real and imaginary positions are comprehended.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Deleuze (177-178) shifts to explain <em>appellations<\/em> and <em>attitudes<\/em>. For him, the resulting <em>singularities<\/em> correspond with the <em>symbolic<\/em> <em>order<\/em>, with its <em>relata <\/em>and its <em>relations<\/em>, but they do not resemble that order. In other words, that relation is entirely symbolic, as one might have guessed. The <em>symbolic relations<\/em> are <em>differential relations<\/em>. They are responsible for the <em>distribution <\/em>of <em>singular points<\/em> and once they are determined, once those blanks are filled in, they are <em>incarnated <\/em>in <em>species<\/em>, what I\u2019d rather call <em>categories <\/em>or <em>classifications<\/em>. They are the appellations, dealing with <em>variables<\/em>, which only makes sense, considering you are dealing with something that can <em>determined <\/em>in numerous ways. In contrast, the singularities are the incarnations of these relations between the singular points. They are attitudes, dealing with <em>functions<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To make more sense of that, as Deleuze\u2019s (177-178) take on that is, perhaps, a bit dense and I\u2019m probably making it only worse by summarizing it, even more densely, I think it\u2019s helpful to take a closer look at how L\u00e9vi-Strauss deals with this, considering that Deleuze\u2019s borrows these terms from him. In \u2018Structural Anthropology\u2019, L\u00e9vi-Strauss (310) mentions two kinds of systems: the <em>system of terminology<\/em> and the <em>system of attitudes<\/em>. But before I explain these, I think it\u2019s worth clearing up a potential terminological confusion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Right, <em>terminology<\/em> pertains to naming, to what Deleuze (177-178) refers to as the <em>appellations<\/em>, which corresponds to the name given to it by L\u00e9vi-Strauss (343) in the French original, \u2018Anthropologie structurale\u2019. This is one of those cases where Deleuze\u2019s translators, Melissa McMahon and Charles Stivale, have opted for another term than the one used in the translation of the cited work, probably because, I\u2019d say, appellation makes you think of the act of naming, or categorizing, whereas terms or terminology make you think of something that already been termed such and such. In other words, appellation is, perhaps, the more apt than term or terminology, as it has that dynamic sense of act of naming, whereas term or terminology lacks that, appearing to us as static or, at least, more static than appellation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In any case, to explain the <em>system of terminology<\/em> (or <em>appellations<\/em>), it pertains to the naming of the different <em>positions<\/em>, as explained by L\u00e9vi-Strauss (310) in \u2018Structural Anthropology\u2019. In contrast, the system of attitudes pertains to the <em>attitudes <\/em>that are expressed by those <em>terms <\/em>or <em>appellations<\/em>, the names we\u2019ve given to such and such, as he goes on to add (310). These attitudes could be about \u201crights, duties, obligations\u201d or about \u201cprivileges, avoidance\u201d, as noted by him (310).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I think Deleuze\u2019s (178) take should now make more sense, how, on one hand, you have the <em>variables<\/em>, whatever <em>positions <\/em>they might pertain to and whatever <em>placeholders <\/em>they might involve, and then, one the other hand, the <em>functions<\/em> that those who or what comes to occupy those positions have in those positions. So, think of the <em>singular points <\/em>and the <em>relations<\/em> between them. We can name this and\/or that position, which only makes sense in relation to the other positions, and once we\u2019ve <em>determined <\/em>who or what occupies it, that singularity, we can understand its function in relation to the other singularities, that also have their functions, as determined by those <em>differential relations<\/em> that determined the distribution of those <em>singular points<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For example, I can and do occupy certain kinship <em>positions<\/em>, as already noted. They are the <em>variables<\/em>, the Xs, the Ys, and the Zs, and the like. We could also call them <em>categories <\/em>or <em>classifications<\/em>. It doesn\u2019t really matter what you call them, as long as you get the point. Anyway, these positions have certain <em>appellations<\/em>, which is a fancy way of saying names. We could refer to them as Xs, Ys or Zs, but typically they are common nouns, such as son, brother and cousin, to mention the earlier kinship positions again. Once I occupy such a position, what we could refer to as a <em>nominal variable<\/em>, which is only apt, giving the names of the variables are common nouns, there are certain <em>attitudes<\/em> that come with that position. For example, as a brother, I am expected to behave in relation to my siblings in a certain way, by my siblings and by others who know that we are siblings. In other words, a brother is not merely a label among other labels, but it also has a certain <em>function<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If you struggle to comprehend this, think of the <em>variables<\/em>, aka <em>categories <\/em>or <em>classifications<\/em>, as what we might call <em>quiddities<\/em> (<em>quidditas<\/em>, whatness), and the <em>functions<\/em> as pertaining to <em>singularities<\/em>, what we might call <em>haecceities<\/em> (<em>haecceitas<\/em>, thisness), if we follow Duns Scotus\u2019s (d. 3, p. 1, q. 4, n. 76) \u2018Ordinatio II\u2019 on this. The former is what something or someone is called, for example a rock or a brother. The latter is the particular rock or the person in question, in relation to what else is there. That\u2019s <em>singularity<\/em> for you. It\u2019s like you know it, you just know it, it\u2019s this or that, a <em>vague essence<\/em> and a <em>molecular collectivity<\/em>, as Deleuze and Guattari (369) refer to haecceities in \u2018A Thousand Plateau\u2019. To be clear, it\u2019s not what we think we are, nor what we think something or someone is, but what it has, already, <em>become<\/em>, in relation to what else is there, as they (263) point out:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cClimate, wind, season, hour are not of another nature than the things, animals, or people that populate them, follow them, sleep and awaken within them. This should be read without a pause: The animal-stalks-at-five-o&#8217;clock. The becoming-evening, becoming-night of an animal, blood nuptials. Five o&#8217;clock is this animal! This animal is this place!\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>I wanted to mention this because it would be a mistake to think of us, something or someone else, as <em>singularities<\/em>, in the absence of what else is there. No. It\u2019s absolutely crucial to understand that who you <em>are<\/em>, what you\u2019ve <em>become<\/em>, at any given moment, is constituted <em>relationally<\/em>, in <em>relation <\/em>to what else is there, which alo functions the same way, so that \u201c[t]aking a walk is a haecceity\u201d, as they (263) point out, just as me writing this essay is a <em>haecceity<\/em>. The <em>attitudes<\/em> do, however, shape our understanding of all that, so that we are aware that everything has certain <em>functions<\/em>, which creates certain expectations and guides our actions, from one <em>position <\/em>to another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Deleuze (178) further exemplifies this with Althusser\u2019s and \u00c9tienne Balibar\u2019s work, which can be found in their collaboration \u2018Reading Capital\u2019. In this book, Althusser, for his part, comments on Marx\u2019s view of relations of production. He (177) rejects Marxism as historicism, as in this leading to that, and states that we should instead focus on the way in which various <em>forms <\/em>vary so that we get a certain <em>formation<\/em>, a <em>combination<\/em>, in which different <em>elements <\/em>are configured in a certain way, so that we get a certain <em>gestalt<\/em>, which is a fancy way of saying a <em>whole <\/em>that is more than the sum of its <em>parts<\/em>. Deleuze (186) comments on this in \u2018Difference and Repetition\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[A] variety of relations, with its corresponding distinctive points, is then incarnated in the concrete differenciated labours which characterise a determinate society, in the real relations of that society (juridical, political, ideological) and in the actual terms of those relations (for example, capitalist-wage-Iabourer).\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>He (186) then explains why Althusser and Balibar are correct in their objection of Marxism as historicism:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[T]his structure never acts transitively, following the order of succession in time; rather, it acts by incarnating its varieties in diverse societies and by accounting for the simultaneity of all the relations and terms which, each time and in each case, constitute the present[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This is why the <em>symbolic<\/em> <em>order <\/em>is <em>undetermined<\/em>, as he (171) points out elsewhere in the book, and why it is also <em>determining<\/em>, as he (176) points out in \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019. He (186) notes in \u2018Difference and Repetion\u2019 that we shouldn\u2019t think of <em>economy<\/em> as something pre-existing:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[T]hat is why \u2018the economic\u2019 is never given properly speaking, but rather designates a differential virtuality to be interpreted, always covered over by its forms of actualisation; a theme or \u2018problematic\u2019 always covered over by its cases of solution.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In other words, the <em>economy<\/em> is always a <em>synthesis <\/em>in the making, as he (186) goes on to point out. Now, this should help us understand his (178) more to the point commentary of Althusser\u2019s and Balibar\u2019s work in \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[A]bove all, the relations of production are determined as differential relations that are established, not between \u2026 concrete individuals, but between objects and agents which \u2026 have a symbolic value (object of production, instrument of production, labor force, immediate workers, immediate non-workers, such as they are held in relations of property and appropriation).\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>That is a very good and concise summary of Althusser\u2019s and Balibar\u2019s views in that book. What I like here is the emphasis on how this is not personal. This is not about me, you, Deleuze, Althusser or Balibar, nor about any other specific <em>real <\/em>or <em>imaginary <\/em>person for that matter, but about those <em>variables<\/em> and <em>functions<\/em>, those <em>appellations<\/em> and <em>attitudes<\/em>. We are not interested in the actual people. Like not at all. Instead, we are interested in how people come to function in that <em>system<\/em>. He (178) really wants you to get this point:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[I]f it is obvious that concrete [people] come to occupy the places and carry forth the elements of the structure, this happens by fulfilling the role that the structural place assigns to them (for example the \u2018capitalist\u2019), and by serving as supports for the structural relations.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>You may not like this, because it does negate your sense of autonomy, by which I mean your feeling of being able to do as you see fit, but that\u2019s exactly how it is. You are only occupying a certain <em>position <\/em>in <em>relation <\/em>to others who occupy other positions. This creates certain limits to what you can do at any given time, in relation to others who have such limits as well. He (178) explains this is broader terms:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThis occurs to such an extent that \u2018the true subjects are not these occupants and functionaries&#8230; but the definition and distribution of these places and these functions.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Note how it\u2019s all about the <em>position <\/em>and what <em>functions <\/em>those positions have and not about those who occupy those positions and what we think of them. Again, this is not about the <em>real<\/em>, nor about the <em>imaginary<\/em>. We do have work through them, yes, but it&#8217;s the <em>symbolic <\/em>that matters. This is not to say that there aren\u2019t actual people, nor that actual people don\u2019t matter. There are actual people, and the actual people do matter. They are, however, of secondary interest, because they are replaceable, inasmuch as the people replacing them are capable of occupying the same place and function the same way. For him (178), the gist of this criterion is then that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThe true subject is the structure itself: the differential and the singular, the differential relations and the singular points, the reciprocal determination and the complete determination.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>To go back a bit, this is exactly what Deleuze and Guattari (263) mean by <em>haecceities<\/em>, when they state in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019 something as seemingly bonkers as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c\u2018The thin dog is running in the road, this dog is the road,\u2019 cries Virginia Woolf.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>So, instead of thinking about the dog and the road, or the perceived movement of the former and the lack of movement of the latter, separately, we need to consider them as inseparable, there and then, as part and parcel to that moment. They (263) continue:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThat is how we need to feel. Spatiotemporal relations, determinations, are not predicates of the thing but dimensions of multiplicities.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Only to add that (263):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cA haecceity has neither beginning nor end, origin nor destination; it is always in the middle. It is not made of points, only of lines. It is a rhizome.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Like I just pointed out, it\u2019s all about the here and now, or there and then. It\u2019s a bit of this and a bit of that, very <em>vague<\/em>, yet <em>essential<\/em>. It\u2019s very <em>intuitive<\/em>. Either you get it, or you don\u2019t. If you end up thinking about it in terms of distinct entities, doing distinct things, you are already thinking in terms of <em>quiddities<\/em>, in terms of whatness, and then you don\u2019t get it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Anyway, Deleuze (178) manages to put this even more concisely in \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cEach mode of production is thus characterized by singularities corresponding to the values of the relations.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Simply put, a <em>singularity<\/em> or a <em>haecceity<\/em> is all about the <em>relations <\/em>and the <em>relata<\/em>, how this and\/or that are connected to one another, at any given time. Conversely, it is not about thinking of them in isolation from one another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The differenciator and differentiation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Moving on to the fourth criterion, which is the <em>differenciator<\/em> and <em>differentiation<\/em>, as named by him (178). In this case, before explaining why he opts to call them what he calls them, it makes sense to cover the two terms he (178) introduces in this context: the <em>actual<\/em> and the <em>virtual<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To my understanding, this distinction mirrors Charles Sanders Peirce, who provides us a very handy definition of the two terms in his dictionary entry on \u2018Virtual\u2019 (763):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cA virtual <em>X<\/em> (where <em>X<\/em> is a common noun) is something, not an <em>X<\/em>, which has the efficiency (<em>virtus<\/em>) of an <em>X<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This means that when something is <em>virtually<\/em> the same, it is as if it were the same, yet it isn\u2019t, whereas if something is <em>actually<\/em> the same, it <em>is <\/em>the same. For example, I have this cheap keyboard, a Logitech K120. It\u2019s dirt cheap and gets the job done. It\u2019s easily replaceable. So, I could simply get another one and it would get the job done. I wouldn\u2019t know the difference. It\u2019s therefore virtually the same keyboard. It is, however, not actually the same keyboard as <em>this <\/em>keyboard is <em>this <\/em>keyboard and <em>that <\/em>other keyboard is <em>that <\/em>other keyboard. I could also replace it with some different keyboard and I could still say that it&#8217;s virtually the same as the one that I have, inasmuch what matters to me is that it has its place, a <em>position<\/em> that can be occupied by any other keyboard that also does the job for me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Peirce (763) also reminds his readers not to confuse <em>virtual<\/em> with <em>potential<\/em> and, I might add, with what\u2019s considered <em>possible<\/em>. He (763) summarizes this concisely by stating that when something, an X, has a certain potential, that potential is tied to that something, to that X, whereas a virtual something, that virtual X, is what functions akin to that something, to that X, but without being that something, that X, because if it actually was that something, that X, it would actually be that something, that X, and not something else.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He (763) exemplifies this with velocity, so that if we replace it with a <em>virtual <\/em>velocity, it is \u201cequivalent to a velocity in the formula\u201d, without being a velocity. He (763) provides another example in which the American colonies were represented in the British Parliament, but only <em>virtually<\/em>, by which he means that they, in fact, had non-representation in the parliament, rather than representation. If they had representation, that is to say <em>actual <\/em>representation instead of <em>virtual <\/em>representation, by which the British meant they were represented, just like anyone else, even though they were not elected by the colonists, they would not have protested. So, to be clear, from the British standpoint, the colonists had representation. It was not <em>actual <\/em>representation, because the colonists had not <em>actually <\/em>chosen these people to represent them. It was <em>virtual <\/em>representation because the people chosen by others <em>functioned <\/em>in the place, as if to represent them, as if they had been chosen by the colonists to represent them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Deleuze (208) explains this in \u2018Difference and Repetition\u2019, further clarifying what the <em>virtual<\/em> is and what it isn\u2019t, as well as what it should not be confused with. Firstly, it does not exist in opposition to the <em>real<\/em>. Instead, it stands in opposition to the <em>actual<\/em>. Secondly, both the actual and the virtual are, in fact, real.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Right, this should help us to understand what Deleuze means in \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism\u2019 when he (178-179) states that a <em>structure<\/em> is not <em>actual<\/em>, but <em>virtual<\/em>. To be more precise, structure is actual, but only in the sense that it is <em>incarnated<\/em> (<em>materialized<\/em> or <em>manifested<\/em>) in something actual, as apparent to us by the constitution of whatever incarnation (materialization or manifestation) we are dealing with. He borrows a line from Marcel Proust\u2019s \u2018In Search of Lost Time\u2019, from \u2018Time Regained\u2019, as specified in the notes (306), as he (179) states that structure is \u201c<em>real without being actual, ideal without being abstract<\/em>.\u201d This can indeed be found in that book and at least the translation that I\u2019m looking at has Proust (218) stating that. The difficulty here is that you need to know that, in this context, being ideal but not abstract does not mean an image, or an abstract idea, as Deleuze (179) points out, as, to my understanding, that would make it part of the <em>imaginary<\/em> <em>order<\/em>. The ideality of it also seems to be drawn from the works of L\u00e9vi-Strauss, but unfortunately Deleuze (179) doesn\u2019t specify that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>What Deleuze (179), however, has to say about this is that <em>structure<\/em> is about \u201cvirtuality of coexistence which pre-exists the beings, objects and works\u201d of a domain that the structure pertains to. In short, a structure is therefore \u201ca multiplicity of virtual coexistence\u201d, as he (179) points out. Once more, he (179) relies on Althusser to exemplify this, so let\u2019s see what he (97) has to say about this in \u2018Reading Capital\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c<em>[T]he structure of the social <\/em>whole must be strictly interrogated in order to find in it the secret of the conception of history in which the \u2018development\u2019 of this social whole is thought[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In other words, to understand a <em>society<\/em> and how it views itself, we must look at how the society is <em>structured<\/em>. I agree. That makes sense. Anyway, he (97) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[O]nce we know the structure of the social whole[,] we can understand the apparently \u2018problem-less\u2019 relationship between it and the conception of historical time in which this conception is reflected.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>The point here is that to understand how a <em>society<\/em> views itself, having this historical time, a past, a present and a future. To give this a bit of context, he (97) is criticizing Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel\u2019s conception of <em>time<\/em>, which is, in his (94-96) view, wholly unsatisfactory, because it is seen as continuous <em>progress<\/em>, moving on, <em>dialectically<\/em>, from one instance to another. He (98) takes issue with that because it doesn\u2019t explain anything about a society, because it takes that society for granted, and because it assumes that one thing leads to another. Okay, maybe it does, gotta give Hegel that, but, then again, maybe it doesn\u2019t, so that kind of ruins it. Deleuze (179) summarizes this as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[T]he originality of Marx (his anti-Hegelianism) resides in the manner in which the social system is defined by a coexistence of elements and economic relations, without one being able to engender them successively according to the illusion of a false dialectic.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>So, simply put, don\u2019t go assuming that this leads to that, because you reckon that it does. Okay, maybe it does, but the point here is that we can\u2019t be sure of that, we can\u2019t just say that we got from there to here, just because. Again, maybe it does, but, then again, maybe it doesn\u2019t.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I think Deleuze (178) provides a better example when he addresses phonemes. As he (178) points out, following Jakobson\u2019s and Morris Halle&#8217;s discussion of the topic in \u2018Fundamentals of Language\u2019, a <em>phoneme<\/em> is not a sound (as that would be a <em>phone<\/em>), a <em>letter<\/em> (as that would be a <em>graph<\/em> and pertain to <em>graphemes<\/em>), nor a <em>syllable<\/em> (as that be about a sequence of phonemes or, more concretely, of phones). Jakobson and Halle (22) indeed points out that phonemes are, in themselves, nonsensical, which is actually a point he credits to Edward Sapir (33) who states in \u2018Sound Patterns in Language\u2019 that \u201csounds and sound processes of speech cannot be properly understood in \u2026 simple, mechanical terms\u201d and that a phoneme \u201chas no singleness, or rather, primary singleness, of reference.\u201d Why? Well, as explained by Sapir (34), a phoneme \u201chas no direct functional value\u201d as \u201cit is merely a link in the construction of a symbol\u201d and its subsequent reception as such, as a symbol, in a certain context. Sapir further comments this is a related article, \u2018The Psychological Reality of Phonemes\u2019, as he (47) reiterates how speech cannot be reduced to mere sounds:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIn the physical world the na\u00efve speaker and hearer actualize and are sensitive to sounds, but what they feel themselves to be pronouncing and hearing are \u2018phonemes.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>He (47) then further elaborates his definition of them:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThey order the fundamental elements of linguistic experience into functionally and aesthetically determinate shapes, each of which is carved out by its exclusive laws of relationship within the complex total of all possible sounds relationships.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>To make more sense of that, he (47) likens the distinction between <em>phonemes<\/em> to blunt weapons, noting that no matter how a phonetician (a practitioner of <em>phonetics<\/em>, not <em>phonology<\/em>) tells you that there is a middle ground between two phonemes, something in between, there isn\u2019t, categorically, just as there isn\u2019t something that\u2019s between a club and a pole. You could, of course, invent one in between, but that would mean introducing something alongside the two. In his (47) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIf a phonetician discovers in the flow of actual speech something is neither \u2018club\u2019 nor \u2018pole,\u2019 \u2026 [the] phonetician \u2026 has the right to set up a \u2018halfway between club and pole\u2019 entity. Functionally, however, such an entity is a fiction, and the na\u00efve speaker or hearer is not only driven by its relational behavior to classify it as a \u2018club or a \u2018pole,\u2019 but actually hears and feels it to be such.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>So, as I just pointed out, while we could set up an extra category between the <em>phonemes<\/em>, just as we could set up an extra category between a club and a pole, based on something, whatever that may be, that\u2019s not what people do. The point here is that you already have a number of phonemes and you can\u2019t just whimsically add more of them. So, to be clear, while he (47-48) is fully aware of how we can analyze speech <em>phonetically<\/em>, as opposed to <em>phonemically<\/em>, the thing is that it\u2019s largely a pointless endeavor to most people, because when speaking and listening, people are generally trying to make <em>sense <\/em>what it is that the other person is saying, as based on those distinctions that matter, and not focusing on what someone sounds like, because that doesn\u2019t matter to them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To connect this to Deleuze\u2019s (178) discussion of <em>structure<\/em> in \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019, we should think of <em>phonemes<\/em> also in this way. This is what Sapir (61) points out in \u2018A Study in Phonetic Symbolism\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[T]he meaningful combinations of vowels and consonants (words, significant parts of words, and word groupings) derive their functional significance from the arbitrary associations between them and their meanings established by various societies in the course of an uncontrollably long period of historical development.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Simply put, to reiterate an earlier point, we get <em>sense<\/em> from <em>nonsense<\/em>, <em>meaning<\/em> from <em>nonmeaning<\/em>. He (61) summarizes this as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThis completely disassociated type of symbolism is of course familiar; it is of the very essence of linguistic form.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This is, of course, only one way of looking at how language is <em>structured<\/em>. Focusing solely on <em>phonemes<\/em> has its limitations, as he (61) goes on to add. I\u2019ve been teaching spoken American English for a couple of years now and I can vouch for this (not that Sapir needs my agreement). It is not only <em>what<\/em> you say, accurately, in a clearly articulated manner (remember, <em>articulation<\/em> is about <em>segmentation<\/em>, like it is with phonemes), but also <em>how<\/em> you say it. In his (61) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cAs examples may be given in the interrogative tone in such a spoken sentence as \u2018You say he\u2019s dead?\u2019 in comparison with the simple declarative tone of the corresponding \u2018You say he\u2019s dead\u2019[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Exactly! To be clear, we can also think of two different <em>utterances<\/em>, such as the way one says \u2018teeny\u2019, with clear emphasis, and the way one says \u2018tiny\u2019, without any emphasis, as he (61) points out. So, yeah, don\u2019t go thinking that it\u2019s all about <em>what<\/em> you say. No, no. It\u2019s a lot about <em>how<\/em> you say whatever it is that you say.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Anyway Jakobson and Halle (27-28) do indeed also point out that <em>phonemes<\/em> should not be confused with letters of the alphabet as there is no one to one correspondence between them, as anyone who\u2019s ever written and read English can point out to you. Even in languages such as Finnish, where the orthography is pretty spot on, you still have stuff that simply don\u2019t add up, as they (28) point out:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThere is no such thing in human society as the supplantation of the speech code by its visual replicas, but only a supplementation of this code by parasitic auxiliaries, while the speech code constantly and unalterably remains in effect.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>To give you an example, knowing that Finnish is written in a way that is considered to be very close to how it is spoken, you might be fooled to think that something like \u2018kenk\u00e4\u2019 (a shoe) can thus be expressed (I know, this is just the phonemic transcription of it, actually, but it\u2019s the best I can do here) as \/\u02c8kenk\u00e6\/, but no, it isn\u2019t. It\u2019s \/\u02c8ke\u014bk\u00e6\/. Oh, and believe me, it gets even trippier once take into account the inflection (but let\u2019s not go there, just no, no, no\u2026). So, as Jakobson and Halle (28) put it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cLetters either totally ignore or only partially elicit the different distinctive features on which the phonemic pattern is based and unfailingly disregard the structural interrelationship of these features.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>So, like I just pointed out, even when you think it\u2019s about right, it isn\u2019t. You can\u2019t think of it this way, as the (28) go on to add, while contrasting language with music:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cOne could state neither that musical form is manifested in two variables \u2013 notes and sounds \u2013 nor that linguistic form is manifested in two equipollent substances \u2013 graphic and phonic.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Yeah, it just doesn\u2019t work that way. This is, of course, not to say that <em>writing <\/em>isn\u2019t handy, nor that musical notation isn\u2019t handy (I mean, why would I otherwise even write?). It\u2019s rather that you are missing the point if you think that language, or music, can be reduced to something visual. This also applies to <em>phonetics <\/em>and <em>phonology<\/em>, which both rely on writing. Again, that\u2019s all well and good, but <em>speech <\/em>cannot be reduced to something that we depict visually, as they (28) reminds us:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cFor just as musical form cannot be abstracted from the sound matter it organizes, so form in phonemics is to be studied in relation to the sound matter which the linguistic code selects, readjusts, dissects and classifies along its own lines. Like musical scales, phonemic patterning is an intervention of culture in nature, an artifact imposing logical rules upon the sound continuum.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Agreed. So, yeah, don\u2019t go confusing these things and reducing language, nor any other semiotic mode of expression to something that it is not (I&#8217;ll return to this issue later on).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Right, back to Deleuze (179) summarizes how this all works. In summary, what matters is that a <em>structure<\/em> is a <em>system of relations<\/em> that involves the <em>actualization <\/em>of some, but not all \u201cparticular relations, relational, and distributions of singularities\u201d, \u201chere and now\u201d, whereas the others remain <em>virtual<\/em>, being \u201cactualized elsewhere or at other times\u201d, as he (179) points out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To make more sense of that, but without getting lost in all the details, he (179) uses <em>language<\/em> as an example of that, how it cannot be totalized, because it is merely a <em>structure<\/em>, a <em>system<\/em> <em>of relations<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThere is no total language <em>[langue]<\/em>, embodying all the possible phonemes and phonemic relations.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Before I let him continue, and comment on this myself, I\u2019ll explain the terms he is using here. They are borrowed from Ferdinand de Saussure\u2019s \u2018Course in General Linguistics\u2019. So, Deleuze is referring here to what Saussure calls <em>a<\/em> system of language (<em>langue<\/em>), such as English or Finnish, which he then contrast with language (<em>langage<\/em>) in general, including the actual use of language, what Saussure calls speech (<em>parole<\/em>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Anyway, so, <em>a<\/em> language is always particular, having particular <em>phonemes<\/em> and <em>relations <\/em>between them. In other words, you do not have a language of languages, from which languages, such as English and Finnish, derive from. To be clear, this does not mean that languages are not related, but rather that you do not have one language that has all the phonemes and their relations and from which all the languages, such as English and Finnish, then simply pick certain phonemes and the relations between them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This, of coruse, applies to all features of language and not just to <em>phonemes<\/em>. They are just a handy example, considering how I went on and on about them, with recourse to Jakobson, Halle and Sapir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Now, that all said, Deleuze (179) goes on to add that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cBut the virtual totality of the language system <em>[langage]<\/em> is actualized following exclusive rules in diverse, specific languages, of which each embodies certain relationships, relational values, and singularities.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>If this seems puzzling, like how can there be no <em>totality<\/em>, only for there to a totality, it\u2019s because <em>a<\/em> language (<em>langue<\/em>), such as English or Finnish, is always something that is <em>actual<\/em> or, rather what\u2019s been <em>actualized<\/em>, whereas language (<em>langage<\/em>) in general is a <em>virtual<\/em> <em>totality <\/em>and not an <em>actual totality<\/em>. If we connect these to two remarks by Deleuze (179), you should be able to notice that <em>a<\/em> language (<em>langue<\/em>) is always actualized, on the basis of the virtual, which in this case is language (<em>langage<\/em>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To put this in plain terms, think of <em>a<\/em> language as one way of <em>articulating<\/em> or <em>segmenting<\/em> the world, among other ways of doing that, which are the other languages. Language, as a <em>system<\/em>, is then simply a particular semiotic mode in which we do that. Now, of course, we could object to this by bringing up all the <em>varieties<\/em> that are not considered languages. Yes, but that doesn\u2019t change anything as <em>a<\/em> language is, in itself, merely <em>a<\/em> variety among other varieties. It has simply been given a status of language, which means that there\u2019s politics involved. I think that&#8217;s worth noting here, but I don&#8217;t want to get tangled up on that aspect. I want to move on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He (179) uses another example, which functions the same way:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThere is no total society, but each social form embodies certain elements, relationships, and production values (for example \u2018capitalism\u2019).\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Again, there\u2019s no <em>society<\/em> from which <em>a<\/em> society picks a bit of this and a bit of that, so that you have this in relation to that. Instead, in each case you have certain <em>elements <\/em>that are <em>actualized <\/em>and others that are not, as he (179) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cWe must therefore distinguish between the total structure of a domain as an ensemble of virtual coexistence, and the sub-structures that correspond to diverse actualizations in the domain.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Pay attention to how he refers to this <em>structure <\/em>or <em>system <\/em>as having to do with <em>virtual<\/em> <em>coexistence<\/em>, which could be just about anything, like <em>virtually<\/em> anything, and how it is contrasted with the <em>actual existence <\/em>of this and\/or that, what we <em>actually<\/em> encounter, what has been <em>actualized<\/em>, e.g., <em>a<\/em> language or <em>a<\/em> society. If we think of coexistence as something actual, none of this makes sense. So, yeah, don\u2019t do that. Don\u2019t think in that way. Why? Because the whole point here is to have an <em>open-ended system<\/em> that is not predetermined. That\u2019s why. It\u2019s supposed to be maybe, maybe not, or, for now, until it isn\u2019t or, rather, might not be. If it were all actual, it\u2019s like there\u2019s a warehouse from which you simply take something readymade. The whole point is that whatever you take from that supposed warehouse is unspecific and once you put it into use it becomes specific, in a way that is unlike something else that has also become specific, so that you can distinguish between the two and so that you can\u2019t have each of them be each other, this and that, at the same time. You want that mutual exclusivity. That does not, however, prevent it all becoming something unspecific, from which you\u2019d then get something specific again, nor turning something specific into something that is not what it was. That\u2019d be absurd as the whole point is to have an open-ended system in which you have all kinds of mutations or transformations that are, nonetheless, not whimsical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He (179) explains what I just did, but in fancier terms:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cOf the structure as virtuality, we must say that it is still undifferentiated (c), even though it is totally and completely differential (t).\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>So, firstly, there\u2019s the <em>structure<\/em>, that is to say the <em>system<\/em>. It\u2019s unspecific or, as he (179) puts it, <em>undifferentiated<\/em>, yet fully <em>differential<\/em>. He (179) goes on:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cOf structures which are embodied in a particular actual form (present or past), we must say that they are differentiated, and that for them to be actualized is precisely to be differentiated.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>So, secondly, what we encounter, what\u2019s <em>actual<\/em>, having this or that <em>form<\/em>, here and now, is that which has become <em>differentiated<\/em>, having been <em>actualized<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I know this is getting pretty repetitive, but to make sure you get the point he (179) wants to get across, things are therefore not <em>different<\/em> just because they <em>are<\/em>, as if there was this warehouse that contained all the wares from which they were distributed into the world. No. No. No. Absolutely not. Instead, things are different because they\u2019ve been <em>differentiated<\/em>, not from one another, as that\u2019d would be like saying that there are these pre-existing different things, but from what there simply <em>is<\/em> at all times, <em>undifferentiated<\/em>, yet <em>differential<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If you want to simplify this further, if you are struggling with <em>differentiation<\/em>, it\u2019s more or less the same as <em>actualization<\/em>, as he (179) points out there. Conversely, if you are dealing with the <em>virtual<\/em>, you are dealing with the <em>undifferentiated<\/em>, which has the capacity to be <em>differentiated <\/em>as it is <em>differential<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I think <em>differentiation<\/em>, how you get something <em>different<\/em> from the <em>undifferentiated<\/em>, makes a lot of sense, but you do really need to understand what it is about. If you don\u2019t get it, it doesn\u2019t do you much good to use those terms. That\u2019s why I find the <em>virtual<\/em> and the <em>actual<\/em> really handy. It shouldn&#8217;t take a whole lot of effort to understand them. Then again, if you crave for a more comprehensive explanation, you do need to take your time and figure out the differentiation part.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Moving on, he (179) states that <em>differentiation <\/em>works in two ways. Firstly, there\u2019s the <em>species<\/em>. To use his (179) exact words, \u201c[t]he differential relations are incarnated in qualitative distinct species\u201d. Secondly, there are the <em>parts <\/em>and extended <em>figures<\/em>, in which \u201cthe corresponding singularities are incarnated\u201d, as stated by him (179). To connect the two, it is the latter that give character to the former, as he (179) points out. If this wasn&#8217;t the case, then there\u2019d just be these things, as if they\u2019d been pulled out of that great warehouse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In both cases, make note of <em>incarnation<\/em> again, which is what I already noted as being the same <em>manifestation<\/em> or <em>materialization<\/em>. Another way of thinking about that is <em>taking form<\/em>. Later on, he (180) also refers to this as <em>realization<\/em>. In &#8216;A Thousand Plateaus&#8217;, they (41) also mention it as a matter of <em>actualization<\/em>. Anyway, no matter what term you use for that, the point is that <em>relations<\/em> require <em>relata<\/em>. To exemplify this with language, be it spoken or written, language does require the material world. Speech does require a <em>body <\/em>to produce it, another body to receive it, as well as other bodies to transmit it. It\u2019s the same with writing. It\u2019s just that air is replaced by a material surface, such as a sheet of paper or a computer screen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He (179-180) further elaborates the difference between the <em>virtual<\/em> and the <em>actual<\/em>, or the <em>undifferentiated<\/em>, yet <em>differential<\/em>, and the <em>differentiated<\/em>, by stating that the actual is always constrained by its temporality. In other words, whatever is actualized, depends on that actualization. Simply put, it lasts as long as it lasts. He (180) then adds a layer of complexity to this by stating that the <em>parts <\/em>of the actual, whatever has been actualized, have their \u201cparticular rhythms.\u201d To put that another way, he (180) summarizes this as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[T]he position of structuralism is thus quite clear: time is always a time of actualization, according to which the elements of virtual coexistence are carried out at diverse rhythms.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Now, I don\u2019t think he means that the <em>virtual<\/em> is timeless, as such, but rather that it is <em>infinite<\/em>, whereas as the <em>actual<\/em> is <em>finite<\/em>, having this or that temporality. Think of life span. That\u2019s it. That\u2019s your time here. Anyway, what he (180) adds to this does seem to support that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cTime goes from the virtual to the actual, that is, from structure to its actualizations, and not from one actual form to another.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>So, yeah, the <em>virtual<\/em> is not timeless. It\u2019s rather that time is understood differently once we are dealing with the <em>actual<\/em>. As a side note, notice how he once more retains this pairing, avoiding thinking in terms of the actual alone. Anyway, you might wonder what the deal with <em>rhythm<\/em> is then? Well, for time to make sense in the actual, it has to pass, to move on, if you will. In his (180) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[T]ime conceived as a relation of succession of two actual forms makes do with expressing abstractly the internal times of the structure or structures that are realized at different depths in these two forms, and the differential relations between these times.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Here we go back to the <em>structure<\/em> or the <em>system<\/em>, which is the <em>virtual<\/em>. Again, what&#8217;s particularly important here is that we can\u2019t think merely in terms of the <em>actual<\/em>. To go back a bit, once more, note how he mentions this as a matter of <em>realization<\/em>, which is the same as <em>incarnation<\/em>, <em>manifestation<\/em>, <em>materialization<\/em>, <em>taking form<\/em> or <em>actualization<\/em>, as already noted a couple of times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To get somewhere, that is to say be productive (sorry for the pun, you\u2019ll see), he (180) adds to this that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cAnd precisely because the structure is not actualized without being differentiated in space and time, hence without differentiating the species and the parts which carry it out, we must say in this sense that structure <em>produces<\/em> these species and these parts themselves.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Note here that he is indeed stating that it is the <em>structure<\/em> that is responsible for the production of the <em>species<\/em> and the <em>parts<\/em> or, as I\u2019d like to call them, the <em>wholes<\/em> and the <em>parts<\/em>, the <em>partial objects<\/em>, which he and Guattari (42) cover in \u2018Anti-Oedipus\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cWe no longer believe in the myth of the existence of fragments that, like pieces of an antique statue, are merely waiting for the last one to be turned up, so that they may all be glued back together to create a unity that is precisely the same as the original unity.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>I\u2019ll try to get back on track here, as soon as possible, but I wanted to include this because it explains why there isn\u2019t like this warehouse that has it all and from which we pick something. They (42) are talking about the <em>virtual<\/em> and the <em>actual<\/em> here as well, albeit without using those terms. What they (42) are saying is that it is futile to list all that\u2019s actual, in hopes of accounting for all that is actual. Another way of saying this is that it\u2019s not like a puzzle that you can piece together, as they (35) point out in \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThey are not pieces of a jigsaw puzzle but rather the outcome of throws of dice.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>If they were like a pieces of a puzzle, you wouldn&#8217;t know if you have all the pieces. You couldn&#8217;t ever hope to complete that puzzle. Plus, you wouldn&#8217;t even know if they are parts of the same puzzle and some of them would have lost their distinct shape. The upside of that is, of course, that you can do whatever with those pieces. Pick and mix. See what happens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Anyway, to elaborate on what they mean by throws of dice, or what I believe they mean by it, Deleuze explains this in \u2018The Logic of Sense\u2019. He (58-59) notes that there are two kinds of games: <em>games of skill<\/em> and <em>games of chance<\/em>. The former game has a set of rules that are fixed, so that it\u2019s all about the skill of the players. You are expected to <em>discover <\/em>the rules by going through some rulebook. If we use dice throws to explain how that works, it\u2019s as simple as stating that each throw has a fixed outcome, typically either good or bad for the player. To be clear, there is room for some chance, as he (59) points out, but it\u2019s largely about the skill of the player. This is also how it is many sports. What differentiates the players from one another is their skills and what\u2019s often most valued is their ability to make plays (playmaking) or, as he (59) refers to it, their development in \u201cthe art of causality.\u201d In other words, a good playmaker can see what\u2019s about to unfold. In stark contrast, the latter game has no fixed rules. He (59) states that it has \u201cno preexisting rules\u201d, which does not mean that it has no rules, but rather that the rules are not fixed from the get-go. Instead, the rules are <em>invented <\/em>as you play the game, so that \u201ceach move invents its own rules; it bears upon its own rule\u201d, as he (59) points out. Now, that doesn\u2019t mean that this kind of game doesn&#8217;t have rules. I mean you do always start from somewhere. So, yeah, you do have a set of rules at the start, but each move in the game is capable of transforming those rules. In his words (59):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThese throws are successive in relation to one another, yet simultaneous in relation to this point which always changes the rule, or coordinates and ramifies the corresponding series as it insinuates chance over the entire length of each series.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In other words, each throw is certainly conditioned by the previous throw, which is also conditioned by the previous throw. Simply put, the rules change or, I\u2019d say, may change with each throw. How much can they change? Well, that depends on the previous throw. To think that in the opposite way, whatever rules you have are subject to change each time the dice are thrown. This is why, for him (59-60):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThe unique cast is a chaos, each throw of which is a fragment.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Here the point is, or, rather, the point I want to make is that you can\u2019t go back to the start. Why? Because there is no beginning, nor an end. Just infinite number of throws. You start the game midgame, or so to speak. Anyway, he (60) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cEach throw operates a distribution of singularities, a constellation.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This is what he (60) goes on to call a <em>nomadic distribution<\/em>, in opposition to the <em>non-sedentary distribution<\/em> of the other type of game. To make sense of that, he (60) states that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[I]nstead of dividing a closed space between fixed results which correspond to hypotheses, the mobile results are distributed in the open space of the unique and undivided cast.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>To account for <em>structures <\/em>or <em>systems<\/em>, he (60) adds that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[W]herein each system of singularities communicates and resonates with the others, being at once implicated by the others and implicating them in the most important cast.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In summary, the throws of dice mentioned by Deleuze and Guattari (35) in \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019 have to do with everything that is not only connected to everything else, both spatially and temporally, but also co-constituted that way. This is also why (60) Deleuze adds to this that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIt is the game of problems and of the question, no longer the game of the categorical and the hypothetical.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Indeed. As like to put it, largely because of what I\u2019ve taken from Deleuze and Guattari, having read them, give me a <em>problem <\/em>and I\u2019ll try to come up with a <em>solution <\/em>to it, or give me a <em>question <\/em>and I\u2019ll try to give you an <em>answer <\/em>to it. It\u2019s that simple. You just move from one problem or question to another. The thing is, however, that each problem, once solved, each question, once answered, may create new problems or questions, and by that I mean that they may only come to being because certain problems or questions have been solved or answered and not because they exist or have always existed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Now, you might object to this, as acknowledged by Deleuze (60). What kind of game has no rules or, rather, what kind of game allows the rules to change like that? Well, none actually, none that make any sense, anyway, as conceded by him (60). The thing is, however, that this is how we think, as he (60) points out:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[P]recisely for this reason, it is the reality of thought itself and the unconscious of pure thought.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This is what it means to be <em>creative<\/em>, as he (60) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIf one tries to play this game other than in thought, nothing happens; and if one tries to produce a result other than the work of art, nothing is produced. This game is reserved then for thought and art.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>It\u2019s an odd game, that\u2019s for sure. But I\u2019d say that it\u2019s odd only because we are so used to thinking in terms of fixed rules. There are no winners and losers in this game, only winners, inasmuch as you can think this way, as he (60) goes on to specify this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIn it there is nothing but victories for those who know how to play, that is, how to affirm and ramify chance[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>To comment on this, it\u2019s about taking chances, being like, hmmm, what if, what if instead of just taking things for granted, i.e., playing by the rules that you think exist, you\u2019d just see what happens. It\u2019s all about <em>experimentation<\/em>. It might not be productive. There\u2019s that. But it might. It just might and there\u2019s only one way to find out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He (60) contrasts this strange game with the other kind of game in which it is all about \u201cdividing it <em>in order to<\/em> dominate it, <em>in order to<\/em> wager, <em>in order to<\/em> win\u201d, which is pretty much every game there is. It\u2019s not really a game, if you think of it, because most people wouldn\u2019t consider it a game. It\u2019s more like a journey.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Why don\u2019t we do this then? Well, because we\u2019ve become so acquainted with thinking of the world in as this <em>game of skill<\/em> that has fixed rules. That\u2019s the gist of it. I\u2019d also say that people don\u2019t really want to change their thinking, not because they couldn\u2019t, as I\u2019m sure they could, but the thing with a game in which each move changes the rules, or is capable of changing them anyway, is pretty chaotic, as noted by Deleuze (59-60). It is much safer and comforting to think of reality, of it all, as having fixed rules, even <em>if<\/em> or, rather, even <em>when<\/em> those rules work against you.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He (61) also comments on the <em>infinity<\/em> of this, noting that there are therefore not only an infinite number of throws of dice, so that one occurs after another, as they do, but an infinite number of divergent throws of dice, at all times. In other words, the <em>virtual<\/em> isn\u2019t infinite merely in the sense that it accounts for all the moments in time, one thing leading to another, and so on and so forth, having one infinite path, but rather that it can go anywhere from there, having infinite divergent paths. This is the point about each throw of dice changing the rules of the game, just explained in other words.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Right, I want to expand on what Deleuze and Guattari have to say about this in \u2018Anti-Oedipus\u2019. They (42) tell us that we shouldn\u2019t be looking back, longing for a harmonious past, nor assume that there is a certain goal that we ought to reach:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cWe no longer believe in a primordial totality that once existed, or in a final totality that awaits us at some future date.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This is followed by repeating the second bit, which I take to be in reference to Hegel (and, in a sense, Aristotle):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cWe no longer believe in the dull gray outlines of a dreary, colorless dialectic of evolution, aimed at forming a harmonious whole out of heterogeneous bits by rounding off their rough edges.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Now, following that quip, to return to the <em>parts <\/em>and <em>wholes<\/em>, I like the way they (42) explain how you still can have <em>totalities<\/em>, i.e., wholes, without having a totality of totalities, the whole of wholes:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[I]f we discover such a totality alongside various separate parts, it is a whole <em>of<\/em> these particular parts but does not totalize them; it is a unity <em>of<\/em> all of these particular parts but does not unify them; rather, it is added to them as a new part fabricated separately.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Simply put, we have <em>wholes<\/em> that are composed of <em>parts<\/em>, which are also wholes that are composed of parts, and so on and so forth, to infinity. To connect this to the topic of this essay, it is the <em>structure<\/em> or the <em>system<\/em> that defines their <em>composition<\/em>, producing them as such and such, in <em>relation <\/em>to one another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To avoid thinking that <em>structure<\/em> is something that exists, on its own, outside it all, \u201c[w]e must insist on this differenciating role\u201d, which Deleuze (180) emphasizes in \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019 that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cStructure is in itself a system of elements and of differential relations, but it also differentiates the species and parts, the beings and functions in which the structure is actualized. It is differential in itself, and differentiating in its effect.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In other words, as I just pointed out, you cannot think of <em>relations<\/em> in absence of the <em>relata<\/em>, nor the other way around, for that matter. I won\u2019t tangled up on this, but I\u2019d also make note of the <em>functions<\/em> here, as function is a word that he and Guattari like to use in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019 to make sense how this, whatever it is, is connected to that, whatever it happens to be.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Moving on, once more, Deleuze (180) reminds us in \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019 that we shouldn\u2019t confuse the <em>imaginary<\/em>, that second order, with the <em>symbolic<\/em>, that third order. He (180) notes that the former tempts us to think that we can understand everything through it, in the sense that we can imagine something <em>actual <\/em>through something else, which is also actual. That said, that\u2019s merely a surface effect that hides the <em>structure <\/em>or the <em>system <\/em>behind it, how all that is actual has been <em>actualized<\/em>, how it is produced from the <em>virtual<\/em>, as he (180-181) points out. This does not, however, mean that we should therefore simply ignore the <em>imaginary<\/em>. No. It\u2019s rather that we should be aware of how it has that effect, how it doubles the <em>real<\/em>, and how makes it all seem like that\u2019s all there is to the real, that the real is simply mirrored by the imaginary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As the last point pertaining to this fourth criterion, he (181) adds that <em>structures <\/em>or <em>systems <\/em>are not only <em>differential<\/em>, and responsible for the production of what\u2019s <em>real<\/em>, as well as <em>imaginary<\/em>, but they are also <em>unconscious<\/em>. So, to go back to what I quoted very early on in this essay, it is not the unconscious that is structured, as he (171) points out, but rather that structures are unconscious, as he (181) points out in this context. He (181) also wants to remind us, again, for the umpteenth time by now, that we can\u2019t separate the <em>actual<\/em> from the <em>virtual<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[S]tructure never exists in a pure form, but is covered over by the \u2026 relations in which it is incarnated.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In other words, we can only make sense of a <em>structure<\/em> or a <em>system<\/em> as <em>incarnated<\/em> (i.e., <em>manifested<\/em>, <em>materialized<\/em>, <em>realized <\/em>or <em>actualized<\/em>) in what it is responsible for producing, be it <em>real<\/em> or <em>imaginary<\/em>. He (181) is pretty adamant about this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cOne can only <em>read<\/em>, find, retrieve the structures through these effects.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Again, this goes back to my earlier example of how language is always <em>incarnated<\/em>, <em>manifested<\/em>, <em>materialized<\/em>, <em>realized<\/em>, <em>actualized<\/em>, <em>taking <\/em>a certain <em>form<\/em>, so that it is not only something linguistic, or <em>semiotic<\/em>, but also <em>material<\/em>. This is also the case of <em>discourse<\/em>. We can certainly think of language and discourse, as separate from the material world, like abstractly, but even then something material, a body, like my body, is responsible for that abstraction, for those thoughts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I think Ron Scollon and Suzanne Wong Scollon (183, 203) exemplify this well with pedestrian crossings, aka zebra crossings, in their book \u2018Discourses in Place: Language in the Material World\u2019, as does Jan Blommaert (36) in his book \u2018Ethnography, Superdiversity and Linguistic Landscapes: Chronicles of Complexity\u2019, the point being that we have a regulatory or health and safety <em>discourse <\/em>that only comes to make <em>sense <\/em>as <em>incarnated<\/em>, <em>manifested<\/em>, <em>materialized<\/em>, <em>realized <\/em>or <em>actualized <\/em>(or whatever word you want to use for that) once layers of paint are applied to a road surface. We can certainly think of road safety abstractly, but you do need roads, road markings, road signs, as well as some sort of traffic on those roads, for any of that to make sense to us as such. Oh, and I know I\u2019ve used this example before, at least a couple of times, but it is such a good example that it is worth mentioning again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If you prefer to use Spinozist terms, another way of explaining that, how we make <em>sense <\/em>of something like a pedestrian crossing, or anything for that matter, as this applies to everything, in the past, in the present and in the future, to what has existed, what exists and what may exist, is say that it\u2019s all <em>immanent<\/em>. If you are familiar with his work, as best exemplified by his \u2018Ethics\u2019, there is only one <em>matter<\/em> that appears to us in two ways, either as <em>bodies<\/em> or as <em>thoughts<\/em>, as what we\u2019d contemporarily call the <em>material<\/em> side of things and the <em>semiotic<\/em> side of things respectively. That matter is formed in certain ways, so that it appears to us as <em>formed matter<\/em>, as those bodies and thoughts. Those <em>forms<\/em>, what we might also call <em>structures<\/em>, are inseparable from the matter in the sense that we can only make sense of them, as forms or structures, by analyzing the formed matter, be it material or semiotic, kind of like working our way back from it. While the two sides are distinct from one another, material being material and semiotic being semiotic, they are, nonetheless, of the same matter. Plus, you can\u2019t have one without the other. You can\u2019t have thoughts without bodies and the notion of bodies make no sense without us having thoughts. It\u2019s all immanent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Deleuze (181) points to Louis Althusser\u2019s work once again, as well as to Jacques-Alain Miller\u2019s work, but I\u2019ll cover them one by one. The former, giving credit to the latter, addresses this in \u2018Reading Capital\u2019. He (188) notes that we can\u2019t think of <em>structure<\/em> as something that is outside, as this absent cause. In his (188-189) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThis implies therefore that the effects are not outside the structure, are not a pre-existing object, element or space in which the structure arrives to imprint its mark[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>To which he (189) adds that the exact opposite is the case:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[O]n the contrary, it implies that the structure is immanent in its effects, a cause immanent in its effects in the Spinozist sense of the term, that the whole existence of the structure consists of its effects, in short that the structure, which is merely a specific combination of its peculiar elements, is nothing outside its effects.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Exactly. <em>Structure<\/em> is not <em>transcendent<\/em>, something beyond or external to reality. Instead, it is <em>immanent<\/em>. But what about Miller? What does he have to say about this? Well, he covers this in \u2018Actions of the Structure\u2019. His (71) take is indeed similar to Althusser\u2019s take:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cStructure no more subtracts an \u2018empirical\u2019 content from a \u2018natural\u2019 object than it adds \u2018the intelligible\u2019 to it.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Indeed, so like Althusser, he (71) reckons that <em>structure<\/em> is always <em>immanent<\/em>. Note how, for him (71), it\u2019s not something that has been subtracted from something else, nor something that is added to something else. He (71) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIf we remain content with articulating objects within the dimension of a network in order to describe how its elements are combined, then we isolate the product from its production, we establish between them a relation of exteriority[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Yep. If we think of <em>structure <\/em>as something separate from what it is that we are dealing with, then we think of it as external to whatever it is that we are dealing with. In other words, we end up thinking of structure as a <em>transcendent cause<\/em>, as opposed to an <em>immanent cause<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In Miller\u2019s (71) view, it\u2019s also important to think of <em>structure <\/em>in terms of its <em>structuration<\/em>, by which he means \u201cthe action of the structure\u201d, so that we can think of in terms of <em>structuring<\/em> structures and <em>structured<\/em> structures. What\u2019s the deal with that? Well, if we think of a structure as something that is structured, it\u2019s clear that a structure is not something that simply exists, the way it exists, as something that doesn\u2019t change. If we think of structure as structuring, then it pushes us to think of that structure as having an effect on something, i.e., being active in some sense, as opposed to being passive. Now, take both into consideration, so that a structure is a structured structuring structure, and add <em>immanence <\/em>to it. What you get from that combination is mutation or transformation. Pretty cool, eh?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He (74) likens this with the <em>subject<\/em>, pointing out that we can\u2019t simply start from it, think of it as the subject <em>of<\/em>, but rather as, simultaneously, the subject <em>to<\/em>. I&#8217;ll return to this point soon enough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To link this to the earlier discussion of the <em>virtual<\/em> and the <em>actual<\/em>, Miller (71-72) considers <em>structuring<\/em> to be about the virtual as that point we remain open, not dealing with something that\u2019s already actual, constituted as such and such, and the <em>structured<\/em> to about the actual, as at that point whatever we are dealing it is already actual. If you ask me, that does make sense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It&#8217;s probably not exactly the same, but I do want to point out that this reminds me of how Pierre Bourdieu (53) defines <em>habitus<\/em> in \u2018The Logic of Practice\u2019, thinking of them as \u201csystems of \u2026 structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures\u201d. He (171) condenses that further in \u2018Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste\u2019, mentioning them as \u201cstructured and structuring structure[s]\u201d in a figure. I think Lo\u00efc Wacquant\u2019s take on this is helpful, as covered by him in \u2018Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu\u2019s Sociology\u2019, as included in \u2018An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology\u2019 by him and Bourdieu. He (18) poses this as a question:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[W]hy is social life so regular and so predictable?\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Ah, yes, why is it that I can often figure out what people are going to say or do? Because people are very similar to one another, way, way more similar than they like to think. That\u2019s why. I could explain that through Gabriel Tarde\u2019s work, but I\u2019ve done that in the past and I don\u2019t want to get tangled up on that here. Anyway, Wacquant (18) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIf external structures do not mechanically constrain action, what then gives it its pattern?\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Now, I\u2019ve already given an answer to this, which is that <em>structure<\/em> is not <em>transcendent<\/em>. Instead, it\u2019s <em>immanent<\/em>, as explained by Althusser and Miller. This is also what Wacquant (18) goes on to point out:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cHabitus is a structuring mechanism that operates within agent[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>If we want to think of <em>structures<\/em> as being external, then we need to think of them as something that are internalized, as done by Wacquant (18) in this context. They are, nonetheless, still <em>immanent<\/em>, in the sense that they always operate from within, and not from without. He (18-19) also wants to emphasize that structures are not fixed. Instead, they are \u201chistorically constituted\u201d and \u201cimmanent in a historical system\u201d, as he (19) points out. We can think of them as external or transcendent in the sense that this or that structure is not attributable to some individual, transcending that individual, being beyond it, as mentioned by him (19), but that\u2019s not the same as thinking of that structure as being <em>transcendent<\/em>, operating on its own, higher plane of reality or the like.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>According to Miller (71) then, a <em>structure <\/em>is \u201cthat which puts in place an experience for the subject that it includes.\u201d I don\u2019t know about you, but that is pretty darn close to how one can understand Bourdieu\u2019s <em>habitus<\/em>. Anyway, what\u2019s important in both accounts is that the <em>subject<\/em> does not experience the world <em>individually<\/em>, as such, but rather <em>collectively<\/em>, according to the <em>structure<\/em> that sets its limits, establishing what can and cannot be thought, said or done at any given moment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Miller (77-78) further specifies this by pointing out that we can\u2019t give primacy to the <em>subject<\/em> when we are dealing with language. Speech (or writing) does certainly require a speaker (or a writer), as well as a recipient, a listener (or reader), intended or not, but that\u2019s beside the point here, as he (77-78) points out. If I\u2019ve understood his (75-76) beef with this correctly (of which I can\u2019t be sure as I\u2019m not that well versed in psychoanalysis), the subject nonetheless misunderstands this and is led to think that it is something which it is not, principally the subject <em>of<\/em>, while happily ignoring how we got there, how the subject is, rather, principally, the subject <em>to<\/em>. In other words, the problem here is (or seems to be) that the subject ends up thinking in terms of the <em>imaginary<\/em>, instead of the <em>symbolic<\/em>, so that we get something like a split or <em>doubled subject<\/em> who thinks reflexively, about oneself, thinking of itself as its own cause. This is then what he (79) refers to as <em>metonymic causality<\/em>, how it is the subject that \u201ctakes the effect <em>for the cause<\/em>\u201d, and what Deleuze (181) refers to as Althusser\u2019s <em>structural causality<\/em> in \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I think it\u2019s time to move on to address thinking of <em>structures<\/em> as <em>unconscious<\/em>. Riffing on Althusser\u2019s take (which also reminds me of Bourdieu\u2019s <em>habitus<\/em>) on this matter, Deleuze (181) states that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[T]he unconscious by itself forms the problems and questions that are resolved only to the extent that the corresponding structure is instantiated \u2026 and always according to the way that it is instantiated.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This mirrors what Miller (75-76) has to say about the production of <em>subjectivity<\/em>. Note how <em>problems <\/em>and <em>questions <\/em>are tied to the <em>structures<\/em>, so that only certain problems and certain questions come being, while others do not. It\u2019s the same with the <em>solutions <\/em>and the <em>answers<\/em>. They are also tied to the structures, so that we get only certain solutions and certain answers to certain problems and questions, not just any solutions, nor any answers. In Deleuze\u2019s (181) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cFor a problem always gains the solution that it deserves based on the manner in which it is posed, and on the symbolic field used to pose it.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>The first part should be rather self-explanatory by now. The second part may require some further elaboration. If you are having difficulties with that, like what does he mean by <em>symbolic field<\/em>, remember that when we are dealing with the first order, we are dealing with the <em>symbolic order<\/em>. So, instead of thinking of it as this one <em>structure<\/em>, think of a number of structures that correspond to certain symbolic fields. That should do it. He (181) exemplifies this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cAlthusser can present the economic structure of a society as the field of problems that the society poses for itself, that it is determined to pose for itself, and that it resolves according to its own means, that is, according to the lines of differentiation along which the structure is actualized[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>We could replace that <em>economic structure<\/em> with something else, let\u2019s say <em>social structure<\/em> or <em>psychological structure<\/em>. We\u2019d then move from the field of economy to the field of society or to the field of psyche. He (182) does this by moving on to exemplify this we how Serge Leclaire deals with this in psychoanalysis, but I won\u2019t get tangled up on that (as I&#8217;m not that familiar with psychoanalytic work). You can do that yourself. I\u2019ll move on, once more.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The serial<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The fifth criterion listed by Deleuze (182) is <em>serial<\/em>. What\u2019s been covered so far, the <em>symbolic<\/em>, the <em>local<\/em> or the <em>positional<\/em>, the <em>differential and the singular<\/em>, the <em>differenciator<\/em> and <em>differentiation<\/em>, account only for half of the <em>structure<\/em>, as noted by him (182). To be accurate, that\u2019s four out of seven, so a bit over half of it, but he (182) seems to be thinking about it in a different way. What\u2019s important about this criterion is that it\u2019s what animates structure, as he (182) points out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The gist of this criterion is that all <em>symbolic elements<\/em>, the <em>relata<\/em>, and their <em>differential relations<\/em> are organized in <em>series<\/em>, as summarized by him (182). To complicate that, as that\u2019s not all there is to this, these series, themselves constituted by other symbolic elements and their differential relations, are related to other series, as he (182) goes on to add. So, while we can think of them in isolation, these series don\u2019t exist in isolation from one another. He (182) uses the previous examples, phonemes and morphemes, and indicates that they are both organized in series, on their own, in their own way, but they are not entirely isolated from one another. Anyway, that\u2019s why it\u2019s all <em>serial<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To summarize Deleuze (182-183), the difficulty that comes with the <em>series <\/em>or, rather, <em>seriality<\/em>, is figuring out their <em>positions<\/em>, how they are related to one another, which supports which and which co-exist alongside one another. Simply put, let\u2019s say that it is all quite the mess.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Deleuze (183-184) also emphasizes the importance of not thinking of these <em>series <\/em>as reflecting one another. Why? Well, if the series and their constitutive <em>elements<\/em>, as well as their <em>relations<\/em>, did reflect one another, we\u2019d be dealing with the <em>real <\/em>and the <em>imaginary<\/em>. We\u2019d simply be doubling, remember. Instead, what we have are certain <em>slippages<\/em> or <em>displacements<\/em>, as he (183-184) points out. He (184) also notes in this context that this is why <em>metaphors <\/em>and <em>metonyms <\/em>pertain to the <em>symbolic<\/em> and not to the imaginary. To make sense of that, it\u2019s important to know that, according to a dictionary, such as the Oxford English Dictionary, metaphors (OED, s.v. \u201cmetaphor\u201d, n.) are expressions that are similar, but not the same, used to explain something in place of something else, hence the aptness of thinking of it as a displacement, as opposed to thinking of one thing as reflecting another thing. It\u2019s the same with metonyms (OED, s.v. \u201cmetonym\u201d, n.), in the sense that one thing associated with another is used in its place, but without lapsing into thinking that they are interchangeable. I think Deleuze (184) explains this quite well by stating that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cFar from being imaginary, they prevent the series that they animate from confusing or duplicating their terms in imaginary fashion.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Indeed, in both cases, with metaphors and metonyms, one thing does not simply reflect the other. That\u2019s why \u201cthey express the two degrees of freedom of displacement, from one series to another and within the same series\u201d, as noted by him (184).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The empty square<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The sixth criterion, the <em>empty square<\/em>, relates to what appears from the <em>serial<\/em>. To be more accurate, there is \u201cthis singular object\u201d, this \u201cconvergence point of the divergent series\u201d that characterizes this criterion for him (184). But what is it? What is this <em>convergent<\/em> thing that emerges from the series that are, by necessity, <em>divergent<\/em> (as otherwise they\u2019d be the same series)? That\u2019s a good question, which is why he (184) points out that we might therefore refer to it as the \u201c[o]bject = x\u201d, as \u201cthe riddle [o]bject\u201d, or as \u201cthe great [m]obile element\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I might be wrong, as this is pretty difficult, but my answer to that question is that it is that which moves about, connecting one series to another. It could be anything really, hence the x. I\u2019d also say that it is about the <em>function<\/em> of that x, what it <em>does<\/em>, and not what it is, nor what it resembles. Anyway, he (185) exemplifies this with the refrain of a song as it is where the verses that are the divergent series converge. Another good example that he (185) mentions is how a crown connects to two series, the ruler and the heir, <em>symbolically<\/em>, as there can only be one ruler at the time, as I pointed out earlier. In other words, in this case the crown is the x that marks one\u2019s position at the top of the hierarchy. This example is also good in the sense that it helps us to understand why it is so important not to confuse the <em>imaginary<\/em> and the <em>symbolic<\/em>. It is not a matter of resemblance. The crown or, rather wearing it, is not a matter of imagining oneself as the ruler, as he (185) points out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>What is particularly important about this object = x, this mobile element, is that it is <em>singular<\/em>. He (185) elaborates this point by noting that it is the thing we are looking for when it goes missing. It has its place in the <em>symbolic<\/em> <em>system<\/em>, wherever it may be, but if it is not there, where we expect it to be, it is thought to be missing, as further elaborated by him (185). In contrast, in terms of the <em>real<\/em>, that thing is not missing. It is always in the right place, as he (185) points out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To summarize what has covered thus far, the sixth criterion gets it name, the <em>empty square<\/em>, not from a fixed place in the system, as that\u2019d be a square, but from the <em>displacement<\/em> of the object = x, as explained by him (185). It is also why he (184) calls it the mobile element. For it to move, it needs somewhere to move, like an empty square in a game, as noted by him (185). If all the squares were already occupied, the structure would be fixed, hence his (182) earlier emphasis on how important it is to conceive the <em>structure <\/em>as something that moves or, rather, as something that is animated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Jacques Derrida offers us another way of looking at this. In \u2018Of Grammatology\u2019, he refers to this <em>displacement of meaning<\/em>, how a word never corresponds to a thing (to give you a very na\u00efve example), as <em>diff\u00e9rance<\/em>. To start from somewhere (as I\u2019m not that well versed in this either), he (62) first reminds us not to confuse diff\u00e9rance with <em>difference <\/em>(which is, by the way, exactly what my autocorrect wants to do, every single time):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIt is not the question of a constituted difference here, but rather, before all determination of the content, of the pure movement which produces difference.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In other words, you want to look at the production of differences, not the differences that we can observe. It\u2019s also worth noting that he is not saying that <em>difference <\/em>is not important, but rather that it\u2019s more important to understand how it all gets to be that way. He (62) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[Diff\u00e9rance] does not depend on any sensible plenitude, audible or visible, phonic or graphic. It is, on the contrary, the condition of such a plenitude.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>See. I told you. Anyway, I\u2019ll let him (62) finish this point:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cAlthough it does not exist, although it is never a being-present outside of all plenitude, its possibility is by rights anterior to all that one calls sign (signified\/ signifier, content\/expression, etc.), concept or operation, motor or sensory.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Now, if you aren\u2019t familiar with the word \u2018anterior\u2019, in this case it\u2019s about something that\u2019s before something else, as in \u2018prior to\u2019, or as defined in a dictionary (OED, s.v. \u201canterior\u201d, adj.): \u201c[t]hat comes before in time or logical order; preceding, former, earlier, prior.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>So, long story short, <em>diff\u00e9rance<\/em> is always primary and <em>difference <\/em>is always secondary, no matter what. There needs to be that <em>differentiation<\/em> for something to be different. In my opinion, it\u2019s actually better to use the word \u2018differentiated\u2019 instead of \u2018different\u2019, because it implies that whatever it is that we are dealing with is the result of differentiation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Derrida also refers to <em>diff\u00e9rance<\/em> as <em>arche-writing<\/em> and as <em>trace<\/em>. He (56-57) reckons that it is apt to think of it as writing, not because it is like actual <em>writing<\/em>, like words on a paper, or on a screen, but because writing, in that sense that I just mentioned, expresses \u201cthe most formidable difference.\u201d By this he (56) wishes to emphasize that writing is not merely some derivate version of <em>speech<\/em>. He (29) makes note of how writing is typically treated this way, as secondary to speech, and thus considered to be merely derivative of speech. There is this view that writing is more <em>durable<\/em> than speech, having a longer <em>duration<\/em>, an extended life span, which is the case, unless we count audio recordings of speech as speech, as also acknowledged by him (41), but this is considered problematic among linguists, notably by Saussure, because that durability gives it prestige, as noted by him (41). Writing is more permanent, you know, like a permanent record (only like, because, of course, writing can also cease to exist), which is why it is considered problematic. I actually agree with this. People do think that writing is proper, whereas speech is this, how to put it, unruly manifestation of language. This is not, however, the point Derrida wants to make in \u2018Of Grammatology\u2019. I think he was well aware of how language is standardized and then how that standardized language is imposed on people. What he (41-42) objects to is viewing writing, in itself, as having a negative impact on language:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cFor it is indeed within a sort of intralinguistic leper colony that Saussure wants to contain and concentrate the problem of deformations through writing.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Haha, leper colony, he called it a leper colony! I don\u2019t read his texts enough, but this is why I love Derrida! He certainly didn\u2019t hold back! I reckon most academics would consider such jibes as inappropriate, and thus inexcusable in academic texts, but I don\u2019t mind. Sure, he is being hyperbolic, and this could be expressed in other ways, but something tells me that it wouldn\u2019t be as amusing then.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Anyway, the issue that Derrida (41-42) takes with thinking of <em>writing<\/em> in this way, as corrupting <em>speech<\/em> and thus causing unwanted deformations in language, is that <em>change<\/em>, what he also likes to call <em>play<\/em>, is seen as something inherently negative. He (41-42) exemplifies this with how people may end up pronouncing a word differently when they base it solely on writing, not knowing how to pronounce it, which then may end up having effect on speech, on how people pronounce those words. He (41) encapsulates the underlying problem in a series of questions:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cWhere is the sacrilege? Why should the mother tongue be protected from the operation of writing? why determine that operation as a violence, and why should the transformation be only a deformation?\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Indeed. The problem with this view is that any transformations of language attributable to writing are not seen as mere transformations, without any judgement as to whether is for better or for worse, but as deformations, in the sense that the word is commonly used as indicating a change for the worse (OED, s.v. \u201cdeformation\u201d, n.):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThe action, process, or result of altering the form or character of something \u2026 for the worse[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Dictionary definitions (OED, s.v. \u201cdeformation\u201d, n.) also suggest that the word is typically understood as pertaining to \u201cdisfigurement\u201d and \u201cdefacement\u201d. It is also thought of as having to do with deviation (OED, s.v. \u201cdeformation\u201d, n.):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cA deviation from the normal structure of a part of a person, animal, or plant; the condition of having such a deviation[.] \u2026 Also[,] the process resulting in such a deviation.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In summary, the problem with viewing <em>writing<\/em> this way, as deformative, is that it takes it for granted that there is a certain existing <em>form<\/em> that is, in itself, perfect or, at least, superior to the form that is then deemed as deformed. So, as explained by Derrida (45, 58), the problem here is that it cannot be verified that that <em>speech<\/em> is language and that writing is a poor graphic representation of speech, yet it is presupposed that it is the case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Anyway, back to <em>arche-writing<\/em>, which is, for him (60), prior to <em>speech<\/em> and <em>writing<\/em>, or any other mode of expression, for that matter. He (59-60) credits Louis Hjelmslev for deprivileging speech, so that it is then on par with writing, but also criticizes the Dane for relying on \u201ca popular conception of writing.\u201d I\u2019m not entirely sure what Derrida (60) means by that, but I reckon that he means that Hjelmslev ends up, nonetheless, privileging speech over writing as in the popular or vulgar conceptions that\u2019s how it is. In any case, he (60) argues that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIt is very dependent and very derivative with regard to the arche-writing[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>He (60) then further specifies this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThis arche-writing would be at work not only in the form and substance of graphic expression but also in those of nongraphic expression.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In other words, <em>arche-writing <\/em>pertains to everything, both the <em>substance<\/em> and the <em>form<\/em> <em>of expression<\/em>. To further comment on that, the substance and the form of expression are, themselves also substances and forms of content, in relation to other substances and forms of expression, which also function the same way, as noted by Deleuze and Guattari (44) in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u201cIn short, we find forms and substances of content that play the role of expression in relation to other forms and substances, and conversely for expression. These new distinctions do not, therefore, coincide with the distinction between forms and substances within each articulation; instead, they show that each articulation is already, or still, double.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Anyway, Derrida (60) still has more to say about <em>arche-writing<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIt would constitute not only the pattern uniting form to all substance, graphic or otherwise, but the movement of the <em>sign-function<\/em> linking a content to an expression, whether it be graphic or not.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>I think he is right about this. His views on Hjelmlev\u2019s take on language seem to be pretty spot on. For Derrida (60), something is, however, missing:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThis theme could not have a place in Hjelmslev&#8217;s system.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>I agree. I think Hjelmslev does wonders with his formulations, making us think not in terms of <em>signs<\/em>, but rather in terms of <em>sign-functions<\/em> or, to put it more simply, in terms of <em>functions<\/em>. That said, there is still something that\u2019s a bit static for my taste, which is what I believe Derrida (60) points out in this context:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIt is because arche-writing, movement of differance, irreducible archesynthesis, opening in one and the same possibility, temporalization as well as relationship with the other and language, cannot, as the condition of all linguistic systems, form a part of the linguistic system itself and be situated as an object in its field.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Note here how he reckons that <em>arche-writing <\/em>is <em>archesynthesis<\/em>, the movement of <em>diff\u00e9rance<\/em>. The point here is that you need that movement. If it\u2019s part and parcel with the forms, you don\u2019t have that movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>What\u2019s also particularly important about <em>arche-writing<\/em> is that it is a non-origin, as he (61) points out. By this he means that there is no origin that we can go back to. The <em>system<\/em>, the <em>structure<\/em>, is not fixed. It may appear fixed and even have certain fixity, but it is not unchanging. Parts of it are erased, all the time, as he (61) points out:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThe trace is not only the disappearance of origin-within the discourse that we sustain and according to the path that we follow it means that the origin did not even disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, the trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Here the discussion shifts from <em>arche-writing<\/em> to <em>trace<\/em>, although they are, really, the same thing as they are both about <em>diff\u00e9rance<\/em>, as he (62) goes on to point out. He (62) further comments this non-origin:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cHere the appearing and functioning of difference presupposes an originary synthesis not preceded by any absolute simplicity.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>If I\u2019ve understood this correctly, the point about <em>trace<\/em> is that, in line with <em>diff\u00e9rance<\/em>, whatever we have, whatever is <em>different<\/em> from something else, always contains traces of what it is not, that is to say of its <em>differentiation<\/em>, having been <em>differentiated<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I think I\u2019ve done enough to explain or to attempt to explain Derrida\u2019s take on this and how it is relevant to this essay and I think it\u2019s time to return to \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019. Commenting Lewis Carroll\u2019s work, Deleuze (186) notes something as strange as:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIt is incorrect to say that such a word has two meanings; in fact, it is of another order than words possessing a sense.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>That may seem strange. Why? Well, because we are used to saying that words have <em>meanings<\/em>. Words do not <em>have<\/em> meanings. They do not <em>possess<\/em> any meanings. Instead, we <em>make<\/em> meanings. We understand words in a certain <em>sense<\/em>, that\u2019s for sure, but even then we are actively making sense of something. So, oddly enough, it\u2019s that making of it that\u2019s important, as he (186) goes on to point out:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIt is the nonsense which animates at least the two series, but which provides them with sense by circulating through them.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In short, this criterion is all about making <em>sense<\/em> from <em>nonsense<\/em>. So, as bananas as that may seem, all <em>meaning<\/em> is based on <em>nonmeaning<\/em>. There is, however, a bit more to this, as he (186-187) points out:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIt is this nonsense, in its in its perpetual displacement, that produces sense in each series, and from one series to another, and that ceaselessly dislocates \u2026 the series in relation to each other.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Now, to connect that back a bit, to that object = x, it is what, in Saussurean terms, simultaneously <em>functions<\/em> as the <em>signifier<\/em> and the <em>signified<\/em>, the former being one series and the latter being another series, hence the importance of the series or <em>seriality<\/em>, as he (187) goes on to add. Again, the point here is that <em>meaning<\/em> or, as I prefer to call it, <em>sense<\/em> (as people often just think that meanings are contained in the words) is something that emerges, not something simply exists and is possessed by words. This is exactly what he (187) wants to get across:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cSense \u2026 emerges as the effect of the structure\u2019s functioning, in the animation of its component series.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>To make (more) <em>sense <\/em>of that (pun intended here), people use words such as \u2018thingamajig\u2019 or \u2018thingie\u2019, in the absence of something specific, yet they are able to get the message across, as exemplified by him (187). So, there\u2019s this \u201cexcess of sense\u201d that we get, each time, emerging as the series are connected to one another, as summarized by him (187).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It is also in this context that it becomes (or should become) clear why it\u2019s object = x. It is whatever it is, once it is <em>determined<\/em>. It cannot be explained beforehand, which is why he (187) states that \u201c[i]t is and must remain the perpetual object of a riddle, the <em>perpetuum mobile!<\/em>\u201d That can be tricky to understand, but the point here is to reiterate the earlier point about the emergence of <em>sense<\/em>. It can be anything, depending on the <em>series<\/em>. Even dictionary definitions work this way, connecting certain series, which have been drawn from other series, often with names, dates and circumstances being explained in quite the detail. No matter what you do, you can\u2019t pin it down. You cannot indicate that it is this word, because a word is only ever explained through other words, in this and\/or that sequence, as part of this and\/or that series.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It is this very indeterminacy underlying the <em>structure<\/em>, the <em>system<\/em>, leads Deleuze (187) to point out how paradoxical this is, because it is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[I]t is good that the question <em>How do we recognize structuralism? <\/em>leads to positing something that is not recognizable or identifiable.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Note how it is something that cannot be recognized, nor identified. Why? Well, because <em>meaning <\/em>or <em>sense <\/em>is always emergent. Like I just pointed out, you can\u2019t pin it down. You can\u2019t simply find it somewhere, just waiting for you to identify it. That\u2019s why.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Jumping ahead, skipping the examples drawn from psychoanalysis (as I\u2019m not that well versed in all that), Deleuze (188-189) clarifies the position or role of different <em>structures<\/em> or <em>systems<\/em> in relation to one another. In summary, there are many of them, what he (188) here refers to as <em>structural orders<\/em>, and none of them have predetermined primacy over the others. In his (188) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThe structural orders\u2014linguistic, familial, economic, sexual, etc.\u2014are characterized by the form of their symbolic elements, the variety of their differential relations, the species of their singularities, finally and, above all, by the nature of the object = x that presides over their functioning.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Note how it may appear that all we need to do is to define that object = x, but that\u2019s a mistake, as he (188) goes on to state. Why? Well, the point about that object = x is that is not <em>undetermined<\/em> (or it is), nor <em>determined<\/em> (once it is determined), but rather <em>determinable<\/em> (being undetermined only inasmuch as it has not been determined), as (188) noted by him. It can\u2019t be this and\/or that, as that would make that, what\u2019s determined, fixed, as emphasized by him (188). That\u2019s why it\u2019s an <em>empty square<\/em>, as reiterated by him (188):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u201cAs a result, for each order of structure the object = x is the empty or perforated site that permits this order to be articulated with the others, in a space that entails as many directions as orders.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This is why a <em>structure<\/em> or a <em>system<\/em> is paradoxical, as further elaborated by him (188):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[Object = x] thus has no identity except in order to lack this identity, and has no place except in order to be displaced in relation to all places.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This is also why he (188-189) is unwilling to give any <em>structure<\/em> or <em>system<\/em> primacy over other structures or systems. In his (189) view, no structures can \u201cpass as symbolic elements\u201d, nor \u201cas ultimate signifiers.\u201d What would happen if we do that? What happens if privilege a certain structure or a system and determine that object = x? Well, he doesn\u2019t explain it here, but my take is that we end up with promoting some <em>signifiers<\/em> as <em>master signifiers<\/em>, arbitrarily elevating them to the position of what Derrida refers to as <em>transcendental signifieds<\/em> in \u2018Of Grammatology\u2019, according to which everything would, supposedly, be understood.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">From subject to practice<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p><span lang=\"EN-US\"><\/span>The seventh, and the last criterion emphasizes <em>practice<\/em> and de-emphasizes the <em>subject<\/em>. The gist of this is that while nobody would deny the existence of subjects, this and\/or that person, what\u2019s much more interesting is their <em>position <\/em>in <em>relation <\/em>to other subjects, as he (189) is quick to point out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To expand on that, there are certain <em>positions <\/em>that are \u201cfilled or occupied by real beings\u201d,&nbsp; inasmuch as \u201cthe structure is \u2018actualized\u2019\u201d, as he (189) points out. In other words, you have something that\u2019s <em>virtual<\/em>, until it\u2019s considered <em>actual<\/em>. This is not something that\u2019s put into question here by him. So, people are <em>real<\/em> and therefore important, at least to themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But what\u2019s more important is the <em>structure<\/em> in question, and the <em>various symbolic elements<\/em> that constitute a <em>system of relations<\/em>, in which they are then the <em>relata<\/em>. Why? Well, as he (189) points out, \u201cwe can say that places are already filled or occupied by symbolic elements\u201d and that \u201cthe differential relations of these elements are the ones that determine the order of places in general.\u201d In other words, the structure or the <em>system of differential relations<\/em> is responsible for determining the placement of the symbolic elements, that is to say what is in relation to what else is there and how and to what extent they are related to one another, as well as to what else is there.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To simplify that a bit, to focus on just one thing, instead of trying to explain all of that, a place or a <em>position <\/em>in the <em>system<\/em> is, in a sense, already occupied by some <em>symbolic element<\/em>, before it is filled by something <em>real<\/em> or something <em>imaginary<\/em>, as he (189, 191) points out, reiterating a point he made earlier (181). To put that another way, in reverse, we don\u2019t find the <em>symbolic<\/em> out there, like on its own, because it always appears to us <em>immanently<\/em>, as <em>manifested<\/em> or <em>incarnated<\/em> in something real or imaginary, as mentioned by him (172, 177-178, 181) a couple of times before explaining this criterion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>What is the consequence of this? Well, if you are researcher who approaches the world in this way, people aren\u2019t that important to you. Instead, what\u2019s interesting are the <em>positions <\/em>they come to occupy in the <em>system<\/em>. Of course, to make sense of what we could also refer to as the <em>virtual<\/em>, we need to take a look at the <em>actual<\/em>. Why? Well, I just explained it, but it\u2019s because a <em>structure<\/em> or a system does not have an otherworldly existence. It\u2019s not <em>transcendent<\/em>. It\u2019s <em>immanent<\/em>. That means that it\u2019s within, not without. So, the way you do that is to deal with actual people, who produce actual expressions, in actual circumstances. You focus on what it is that they\u2019ve said or done. Why? Because there\u2019s no other way. The <em>symbolic <\/em>is always <em>incarnated <\/em>in the <em>real <\/em>and the <em>imaginary<\/em>, as these two are its effects, as he (181) points out by stating that \u201c[s]tructures are unconscious, necessarily overlaid by their products or effects.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This is also my approach when I do research, as I\u2019ve mentioned in the past. It might not be in fashion, but it is what it is. I get plenty of hate for it and so will you, if you opt to do things that way, but, again, it is what it is. It\u2019s not a great look when it comes to personal life either. Most people don\u2019t like it if you challenge their sense of autonomy, no matter how well you can explain it to them. They are so stuck in the <em>imaginary<\/em> that they ignore the <em>real<\/em> and the <em>symbolic<\/em>, to use the key terms of this essay. I certainly haven\u2019t made many friends that way. People may even think that you\u2019ve lost your sanity, but that\u2019s just their defense mechanism. Thinking differently is tough. It\u2019s rewarding, but tough. At first it feels like someone is tearing you apart, hence the knee jerk reactions to it. So, yeah, be warned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Anyway, I\u2019m interested in certain things, often revolving around what I\u2019ve come to refer to as the <em>collective production of subjectivity<\/em>, following Guattari\u2019s (25) interest in \u201ccollective subjectivity\u201d and \u201cthe production of subjectivity\u201d in \u2018Chaosmosis: an ethico-aesthetic paradigm\u2019, which I believe is apt to approach in this way. It\u2019d be pointless to focus on the <em>subjects<\/em>, to listen to what they think about themselves or something else, because I\u2019m not interested in any of that, be it <em>real<\/em> or <em>imaginary<\/em>. Of course, I could include people, but I still wouldn\u2019t be interested in them or what they think. Instead, I\u2019d be assessing how they appear to me as they do, doing what they do, saying what they, thinking what they think, and the like. The thing is, however, that if I include them and if I do any of that, I\u2019m not examining their place in the system, in relation to something, what it is that I\u2019m interested in. How so? Well, I\u2019m then also playing a part, occupying a certain place in the system, in relation to them, which also changes their place in the system. I\u2019ve mentioned this before, but it\u2019s worth repeating this is what William Labov refers to as the <em>observer\u2019s paradox<\/em> in his book \u2018Sociolinguistic Patterns\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Reiterating another point he made earlier, Deleuze (189) also reminds us not to think of this as something that can be done once and for all. The thing with examining a <em>structure<\/em> or a <em>system<\/em> is that you are looking at it right here, right now. Don\u2019t go thinking that it\u2019s going to stay the same. It will change. It may appear to us something that doesn\u2019t change, but it\u2019s because most structures or systems change so slowly that it is difficult to notice the change. If you ask me, what typically changes is who or what occupies a certain place or a <em>position <\/em>in the system, but not the system itself. But that\u2019s not really a change, unless that change results in a change in the system itself and for that to be the case, it must alter the <em>symbolic<\/em> <em>order<\/em>. Anyway, for him (189) this is attributable to the sixth criterion, which is the <em>empty square<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>What\u2019s the deal with that? How does the <em>empty square<\/em> explain that? Well, if you fill it, what\u2019s empty will no longer be empty. That\u2019s the simple answer. You\u2019ve halted <em>signification<\/em>, congratulations, but you\u2019ve done it in an underhanded way, by elevating some <em>signifiers<\/em> to the position of <em>master signifiers<\/em> or <em>transcendental signifieds<\/em>, as discussed earlier. You haven\u2019t uncovered how the world works. You are only saying that you did.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>His answer to that is more complicated. He (189) does acknowledge that the <em>empty square<\/em> mustn\u2019t be filled, like duh, but he (189) also emphasizes that it cannot even be filled, not even by a <em>symbolic element<\/em>. To be more specific, he (189) states that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIt must retain the perfection of its emptiness in order to be displaced in relation to itself, and in order to circulate throughout the elements and the variety of relations.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Again, to go back a bit, you need that perpetual <em>displacement<\/em>. If you don\u2019t have that <em>empty square<\/em>, you won\u2019t have that <em>slippage<\/em>, that displacement. In other words, it needs to keep moving. If you think you\u2019ve filled it, well, you haven\u2019t. You only think you have. It still keeps moving and the world keeps changing, no matter what you do.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He (189-190) also characterizes the <em>empty square<\/em> as eternally lacking its occupant, so that it\u2019s this <em>void<\/em>, only to clarify that \u201c[t]his void is, however, not a non-being\u201d, like something negative, something that\u2019s missing something, waiting to be filled, once and for all, but rather something positive, like <em>an<\/em> answer to <em>a<\/em> question or <em>a<\/em> solution to <em>a<\/em> problem, as opposed to being <em>the<\/em> answer to <em>the<\/em> question or <em>the<\/em> solution to <em>the<\/em> question. In the notes (308) it is indicated that this issue is also covered in \u2018Difference and Repetition\u2019 and in \u2018The Logic of Sense\u2019. If you take a closer look at the latter book, there is indeed a relevant passage in which he (54) explains this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cA problem is determined only by the singular points which express its conditions.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In other words, a problem is only a problem inasmuch as there is something that is comes to appear to us as a problem, as he (54) goes on to specify:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIt seems, therefore, that a problem always finds the solution it merits, according to the conditions which determine it as a problem.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Indeed. Now, if we look at the former book, he (196) states that, ever since Plato, we\u2019ve been conditioned to think in terms of certainty or necessity, as opposed to possibility or contingency. This is exactly why I formulated this as being like coming up with <em>an<\/em> answer to <em>a<\/em> question or <em>a<\/em> solution to <em>a<\/em> problem, as opposed to thinking it in terms of there being <em>the<\/em> answer to <em>the<\/em> question or <em>the<\/em> solution to <em>the<\/em> problem. The point here is to keep it open-ended, instead of thinking that there are these questions or these problems that are always already there, in a closed system, just waiting for us to come across or uncover them and to find <em>the<\/em> right answers or solutions to them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He (197) exemplifies this with being questioned. In this example, there is one person who knows something, at least supposedly, and another person who is tasked to find out that something the person supposedly knows. Furthermore, there is a problem that the other person needs a solution to, and it is through questions that the person seeks answers that lead to that solution. There\u2019s a great line in the film \u2018The Guard\u2019. The character played by Brendan Gleeson, an Irish Guard (a police officer) answers the phone, replying \u201cThat\u2019s for us to know and you to find out\u201d, following a question asked by a character played by Liam Cunningham, \u201cHow many murders have you had in the last 24 hours?\u201d, after ignoring the caller\u2019s initial attempt to probe into police affairs. This way subverting the expectations is a recurring thing in the film, but that\u2019s the charm of that character. It\u2019s perfect here, because it reveals there\u2019s something that\u2019s constituted as a problem. The person asking the questions is trying to solve a problem by asking that question. The murder is only a problem to the caller, one of the murderers, inasmuch as the guards are on to the murderers. By acting unaware, followed by refusing to explain police affairs to random callers, the guard outsmarts the caller. It still counts as a tip, something to take into account, but by acting that way on the phone, the murder remains a problem for the murderers, as they have no way of knowing whether the guards will investigate their involvement. Now, you may be a bit confused by that, like how is a murder not a problem, like isn\u2019t it always a problem? I get it, and yes, it is a problem, but what\u2019s important is to ask to whom it is a problem? To the guards? Yes. To the murderers? Maybe, depending on whether they are off the hook. To others? Maybe, depending whether it concerns them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Deleuze (198) expands on that, once more likening it to throws of dice, just like he also does in \u2018The Logic of Sense\u2019, as already discussed. The gist of his (198) take in \u2018Difference and Repetition\u2019 is that the only rule there is the throwing of the dice, but I think it\u2019s worth expanding just a bit, as he (198):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThe singular points are on the die; the questions are the dice themselves; the imperative is to throw.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>To unpack that, as I reckon that can be difficult to comprehend if you are not that familiar with the contents of the book, we have that throwing, which he (198) considers to be imperative, and what we throw are the dice, which are the questions. That should be fairly easy to comprehend. But what are <em>singular points<\/em>? Well, to go back a bit, he (176) distinguishes between singularities, which are mapped as &#8220;curves or figures&#8221; between &#8220;singular points&#8221;, as already noted, and exemplifies this with how we have a triangle as that what has three lines between three points. He (153, 176) expands on that, indicating that there are <em>ordinary <\/em>or <em>regular points<\/em>, as well as <em>distinct <\/em>or <em>singular points<\/em>. He (163) states that in relation to a problem, distinctive or singular points are what determine it. To give you some more examples, he (177) reckons that \u201cdips, nodes, focal points\u201d and \u201ccent[ers]\u201d are examples of distinctive or singular points on curves. There are, of course, also those ordinary or regular points, but they are like, ordinary or regular, because there isn\u2019t anything that makes them stand out from the other points, unlike the distinctive or singular points. So unpack those examples pertaining to curves, a curve is only a curve if it curves and it curves because there are some points which define it as curving.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To give you a better example, as Deleuze\u2019s examples are a bit, well, terse, Daniel Smith\u2019s commentary of this in \u2018Deleuze on Leibniz: Difference, Continuity, and the Calculus\u2019 is particularly helpful. He (143) explains this quite neatly with a very simple example:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cA square, for instance, has four singular points, its four corners, and an infinity of ordinary points that compose each side of the square[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>It&#8217;s the same with Deleuze&#8217;s (176) own example: the triangle. It just has three sides, which we can think of being composed of <em>ordinary <\/em>or <em>regular points<\/em>, and the <em>distinctive <\/em>or <em>singular points<\/em>, those corner points. So, in short, the triangle and the square are the <em>singularities <\/em>in these examples. Now, of course, if we were to have a number of triangles or squares, we&#8217;d have to figure out their distinctive or singular points in order to understand how this triangle is this triangle and not that triangle, or that how this square is this square and not that square.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Smith (143) provides a couple of other examples, but this will do just fine. It\u2019s aptly simple and explains what Deleuze is after, as summarized by him (143):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThe singular is distinguished from or opposed to the regular; the singular is what escapes the regularity of the rule.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>So, think of that square again. Think of drawing it. It can be understood as having an infinite or, rather, indefinite number of <em>ordinary points<\/em>. They are those sides. Those lines you draw. But it also has those four points, one in each corner. Those are the points that define it as a square. That\u2019s where the magic happens, or so to speak. They are the <em>singular points<\/em>. In his (143) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[M]athematics distinguishes between points that are singular or remarkable and those that are ordinary. Geometrical figures can be classified by the types of singular points that determine them.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Exactly! If you find this difficult, as I do, as I\u2019ve always sucked in mathematics, he (144) is also kind enough to provide some more concrete examples, so that this becomes relevant to everyday life. Those <em>singular points<\/em> are, for example, what \u201cmark a change of phase\u201d, such as \u201cboiling points, points of condensation, fusion, coagulation, crystallization\u201d and the like, as noted by Smith (144). That&#8217;s how you get singularities and can distinguishes between this and that. Oh, and yes, it&#8217;s a bit more difficult than that to explain what distinguishes this form that, but I think you get the point.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>So, to unpack what <em>singular points<\/em> are in relation to dice throwing, each throw of dice has something singular to it. If a die only had ordinary or regular points, everything would remain the same. Now, of course, this is not to be confused with <em>games of skill<\/em>, as they have fixed rules, as noted by Deleuze (198) in \u2018Difference and Repetition\u2019, and as noted earlier already.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To get back on track here, to account for the <em>void<\/em>, again, Deleuze (190) reckons in \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019 that his friend Michel totally gets it, what he is after with that. As a total spoiler, just by mentioning the title of the book, or, rather, title of the English translation, it is in \u2018The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences\u2019 that Foucault (373) points out that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cFor this void does not create a deficiency; it does not constitute a lacuna that must be filled. It is nothing more, and nothing less, than the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>So, to reiterate an earlier point, the void that is the <em>empty square<\/em> is not something negative. It is, in fact, positive. That square must remain empty, for this exact reason, so that it is, once more, possible for us to think, as Foucault (373) puts it here. But, for that to happen, we need to take cues from Friedrich Nietzsche, as Foucault (373) points out in this context:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIt is no longer possible to think in our day other than in the void left by man\u2019s disappearance.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>To make more sense of that, in light of what\u2019s been covered, which is, I know, I know, like almost forty pages now (or more, depending on how that\u2019s measured), not only must we therefore no longer cling on to a world that we think is possible to uncover, but we must also no longer give primacy to ourselves. In other words, we need to abandon thinking in terms of what\u2019s <em>objective <\/em>and what\u2019s <em>subjective<\/em>. That gets us nowhere. Deleuze (190) explains what we must do instead:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThe subject is precisely the agency which follows the empty place: \u2026 it is less subject than subjected \u2026\u2014subjected to the empty square \u2026 and to its displacements.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>So, as already emphasized, quite a bit, he (190) asks us to think of the <em>subject<\/em> as subjected, as someone that something is done to, as subject <em>to<\/em>, as opposed to using it a starting point, as someone that does something as subject <em>of<\/em>. This does not mean that the latter doesn\u2019t matter, but rather that we must also account for the former, before we account for the latter, as he (190) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cStructuralism is not at all a form of thought that suppresses the subject, but one that breaks it up and distributes it systematically, that contests the identity of the subject, that dissipates it and makes it shift from place to place, an always nomad subject, made of individuations, but impersonal ones, or of singularities, but preindividual ones.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In short, this is about questioning yourself: w<em>ho<\/em> or, rather, <em>what<\/em> are you anyway? <em>How<\/em> did you come to be the way you are or, rather, how do you come to be the way you are, at any given moment? He (190) mentions how, for Foucault, this about <em>dispersion<\/em>. I think it\u2019s highly apt to reiterate that this is about the <em>collective production of subjectivity<\/em>. That\u2019s that dispersion for you. Instead of simply being one, one is always many. It\u2019s that simple. It\u2019s, perhaps, not flattering, but it is what it is. There\u2019s a lot that\u2019s <em>ordinary<\/em> or <em>regular<\/em>, which is what makes you a lot like others, but there\u2019s also that something that, nonetheless, makes you <em>distinctive<\/em> or <em>singular<\/em>. This is also what I believe is what makes us all trans, as in <em>transindividual<\/em>, as Gilbert Simondon (19) refers to it in \u2018L&#8217;individuation psychique et collective\u2019 (sorry, no English translation is available).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But I probably wouldn\u2019t be writing this essay if that\u2019s how we thought. Instead, we tend to think in an exact opposite way, privileging the <em>object<\/em> or the <em>subject<\/em>, holding an <em>objectivist<\/em> or a <em>subjectivist<\/em> view of the world. It is for this reason that Deleuze (190) indicates that two things can and, I\u2019d say, do happen. Firstly, it is possible that we end up treating that <em>empty square<\/em> as an <em>lack<\/em> an object. It\u2019s like as if only I could achieve that and then it would be great. Now, as already mentioned, the trick with the empty square is that it\u2019s always leaping ahead, never to be achieved, as such. You got to keep going, which is why he (190) mentions that the subject that follows or accompanies the empty square is <em>nomadic<\/em>. Secondly, the exact opposite can happen, so that one settles for oneself. This type of a subject is thus <em>sedentary<\/em>. It\u2019s all about the me, me, me and, once more, me. To summarize the two, he (190) reckons in Nietzschean fashion that in the first case it\u2019s all about God and in the second case, in its absence, it\u2019s about humans taking that role. To end that with a bang, he (190) goes as far as to state that this is \u201cthe reason why man and God are the two sicknesses of the earth, that is to say of the structure.\u201d I did swap out man in the previous sentence, but I chose to keep it here, because I think it\u2019s even more apt to retain that sexism, considering that I reckon that it is, by and large, men who have been responsible for all that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To avoid that, so that we\u2019d get there, to that <em>transindividual<\/em>, to that <em>nomad subject<\/em>, what we might also refer to a matter of <em>transversality<\/em>, we need to be aware of how we end up doing either of those things that foil it, as noted by him (190). This means that we need to be aware of the <em>structure<\/em>, because that\u2019s about the <em>symbolic order<\/em>, whereas anything real, like real beings, such as real human beings, and their images of the real, like themselves, are about the <em>real order<\/em> and the <em>imaginary order <\/em>and owe their existence to the symbolic order, being its effects, as he (190-191) goes on to elaborate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I don\u2019t think this is highly important, but I guess it\u2019s worth bringing up that he (190-191) refers to these two ways of foiling the way <em>structure <\/em>works as <em>accidents <\/em>or great accidents. Why does he call them accidents? Well, they are accidents in the sense that they are occurrences, incidents or <em>events<\/em>, like something that takes place, or have taken place, as we tend to think of accidents as something that have already happened, and in the sense that they are <em>negative<\/em> events. However, that\u2019s only one way to think of an accident, in the most everyday sense, as a dictionary (OED, s.v. \u201caccident\u201d, n.) will surely point out to you. It can also be understood as having to do with something that isn\u2019t considered to be essential (OED, s.v. \u201caccident\u201d, n.). He (190-191) seems to be using the word in two ways. Firstly, he acknowledges that an accident is indeed an unfortunate event. It is not, in itself, unfortunate, but it is understood as such in his treatment. I mean, he (190) does refer to the two accidents as \u201csicknesses\u201d. Secondly, there is no essential vs. non-essential divide here, which is something you probably won\u2019t find in a dictionary. His (191) point is, however, all about making sure that you understand that anything that happens, i.e., an <em>event<\/em>, is <em>immanent<\/em> to the structure and not something that comes from outside the structure. He (191) also wants to stress that structure is not an <em>essence<\/em>, so don\u2019t go thinking that accident is something <em>non-essential<\/em> in his understanding of the word. Simply put, there isn\u2019t this perfect structure that is then, occasionally, struck by accidents, like these flukes or something.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He (191-192) doesn\u2019t have a whole lot more to say on the criteria that he lists in order to help us make sense of <em>structuralism<\/em>, but, before wrapping things up, he wants to emphasize how a <em>structure<\/em> is not something fixed or static. He (191) exemplifies this with the work done by Althusser and Foucault, noting that structures undergo mutations and involve transition of forms. He (191) summarizes this quite neatly:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIt is always as a function of the empty square that the differential relations are open to new values or variations, and the singularities capable of new distributions, constitutive of another structure.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Note here not only what\u2019s been already covered, as all of this has already been covered, but also how we go back to the start of this essay by the end of that sentence. Simply put, <em>structures<\/em> are <em>structured<\/em> and structures are also <em>structuring<\/em>, just as Bourdieu defines <em>habitus<\/em> in \u2018The Logic of Practice\u2019 (53) and in \u2018Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste\u2019 (171). I think mutation and transition are apt words for that. I believe transformation would also work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Deleuze (191) also accounts what our role is in relation to structures. In short, it\u2019s about what he (190) refers to as the <em>nomad subject<\/em>, what Simondon (19) refers to as a transindividual in \u2018L&#8217;individuation psychique et collective\u2019. In Deleuze\u2019s (191) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[T]here is a structuralist <em>hero<\/em>: neither God nor man, neither personal nor universal, it is without an identity, made of non-personal individuations and pre-individual singularities.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Exactly. It is this hero that you\u2019ll also find appearing in his own works and in his works co-authored with Guattari. It is also the kind of hero I like and strive to be. Oh, and I know, I know, it\u2019s contradictory to be that kind of hero, because to be that kind of hero, you mustn\u2019t be anything, this and\/or that, but rather constantly not <em>be<\/em> anything, this and\/or that, but rather keep <em>becoming<\/em>, which is the same as being without an identity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In this context, Deleuze (191) also emphasizes the importance of that structuralist hero. Simply put, structure needs such a hero in order to change. If that <em>empty square<\/em> is not treated as a <em>trajectory<\/em> that takes us somewhere, wherever that may be, as he (190) also refers to it, but rather as <em>lack<\/em>, as something that we must chase in order to fill that lack, or as something that we must fill with ourselves, the structure won\u2019t change. The system will stay the same or at least largely the same. To put this in another way, as he (191) does, that hero is needed to throw the dice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This leads us to why Deleuze\u2019s reckons that the final criterion has to do with <em>practice<\/em>. For him (191), without it, we are stuck in an unchanging system. He (191) is particularly adamant about this, noting that \u201cthis practice\u201d, whatever it may be like, for example \u201ctherapeutical or political\u201d, it is what \u201cdesignates a point of permanent revolution, or of permanent transfer\u201d which takes us \u201cfrom one structure to another\u201d through those mutations or transitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For me, the last page includes nothing of great importance. All he (192) does is wrap things up, reminding of how important, yet difficult all of this is. I agree. He spends only some three pages covering this last criterion and it took me for ages to get through it. There\u2019s just so much packed in there that unraveling it took me a lot of time. It\u2019s also difficult to understand how it is about <em>practice <\/em>as he doesn\u2019t really explain what he means by it. He does explain the <em>subject<\/em>, and how this is not about a <em>sedentary subject<\/em>, but about a <em>nomadic subject<\/em>, but I think he leaves you hanging when it comes to practice. Okay, it\u2019s sort of there in some of his (191) statements like \u201csafeguarding the displacements\u201d as that implies that still must be done, at all times, so that it\u2019s not just one action, but rather constant action, so something that must be understood as a practice. This is a highly important point, so I wish he\u2019d expanded on that a bit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Some thoughts<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019 is certainly an interesting text. It was first published in 1972 in volume eight of \u2018Histoire de la philosophie\u2019, which is the same year that \u2018Anti-Oedipus\u2019 was published. It&#8217;s similar to what\u2019s included in \u2018Anti-Oedipus\u2019 and, later on, in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019, but he no longer uses many of the terms covered in this text in those books. In that sense this is more in line with \u2018Difference and Repetition\u2019 and \u2018The Logic of Sense\u2019. I don\u2019t know the reason for opting to use other terms in his subsequent works. My guess is that he found other terms to be more apt for his purposes, as I&#8217;ve mentioned in the past as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The great thing about this text is that it explains his view on <em>structuralism<\/em>, which is something that can be difficult to find in his subsequent works as the terms have changed. I\u2019m basing this solely on what I remember, but he comes across as way more hostile to structuralism in his subsequent works, especially when collaborating with Guattari. For example, he and Guattari (5) mention that structuralism is plagued by &#8220;[b]inary logic and biunivocal relationships&#8221;, as are psychoanalysis, linguistics and information science. They also criticize it for being static, when they (237) state that it &#8220;does not account for &#8230; becomings&#8221; as &#8220;a correspondence of relations does not add up to a becoming.&#8221; They (237) are very adamant about this issue:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;When structuralism encounters becomings of this kind pervading a society, it sees them only as phenomena of degradation representing a deviation from the true order and pertaining to the adventures of diachrony.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>What&#8217;s worth noting here is <em>diachrony<\/em>, which is a term used in linguistics when accounting for linguistic change, as explained by Saussure (81) in \u2018Course in General Linguistics\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;Everything that relates to the static side of our science is synchronic; everything that has to do with evolution is diachronic. Similarly, synchrony and diachrony designate respectively a language-state and an evolutionary phase.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>He (80-81) prefers <em>synchrony <\/em>over <em>diachrony<\/em>, despite calling it &#8220;the science of language-states&#8221; and, somewhat ironically, &#8220;static linguistics&#8221;. Now, that&#8217;s ironic, because the problem for many is that synchrony is about something being static. To my understanding, he is using that word, &#8216;static&#8217;, in different sense, as in &#8216;state-ic&#8217;, in order to convey that it&#8217;s about the states, as opposed to the phases. It&#8217;s also presented this way in the French original, so that&#8217;s on him and not his translators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Anyway, Deleuze and Guattari (237) oppose <em>structuralism<\/em>, as exemplified by that passage, because <em>structuralists <\/em>like Saussure happily ignore <em>diachrony<\/em>. To be more accurate, it is not that someone like Saussure aren&#8217;t aware of diachrony. He (80-81) explicitly addresses both and thinks that both are needed, only to point out something like this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;The first thing that strikes us when we study the facts of language is that their succession in time does not exist insofar as the speaker is concerned.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Okay, fair enough, that&#8217;s not that odd, but wait for it. He (81) continues by noting that a speaker is always in a certain state and not in a phase, so:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;That is why the linguist who wishes to understand a state must discard all knowledge of everything that produced it and ignore diachrony.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>To be fair, note how he isn&#8217;t saying that <em>diachrony <\/em>is irrelevant in all cases. It&#8217;s only irrelevant if you wish to understand language as a state. Much of this is, in fact, attributable to this opposition of doing things the way they were done at the time, diachronically, as he (82) goes on to explain. Again, you can give him credit for that, for doing his own thing, as I&#8217;ve pointed out in the past. He (82) also opposed thinking of considering a certain language state as &#8220;normative&#8221; and lending itself &#8220;the role of prescribing rules&#8221;, instead of being content with &#8220;recording facts&#8221;. I can give him credit for that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>While I can give him credit where its due, the problem with Saussure is that while does acknowledge <em>diachrony<\/em>, he is clearly against it, to the point that he (84) states that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;Diachronic facts are not &#8230; directed toward changing the system. Speakers [do] not wish to pass from one system of relations to another; modification does not affect the arrangement but rather its elements.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Or, as (84) he goes on to reiterate it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;Here we again find the principle enunciated previously: never is the system modified directly. In itself it is unchangeable; only certain elements are altered without regard for the solidarity that binds them to the whole.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>To give him credit, it&#8217;s only likely that most changes are related to the <em>elements<\/em>. Fair enough. Then again, he clearly indicated here that the <em>system <\/em>is unchangeable, so that all you have are these elements that function as <em>placeholders<\/em>. In other words, he doesn&#8217;t see how it could be possible that you have changes in the <em>arrangement <\/em>itself. He (85) keeps on saying this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;[C]hanges are wholly unintentional while the synchronic fact is always significant.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Simply put, no matter what happens, no matter change takes place, it&#8217;s always unintentional, accidental or, better yet, inconsequential.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>That said, he (86) flip-flops between the two, noting that you have a <em>system <\/em>that cannot be changed, only to point out that you get change as this &#8220;fortuitous and involuntary result of evolution.&#8221; I get what he is after when, for example, he (87) stresses that the whole system doesn&#8217;t change, as only parts of it change, but I don&#8217;t really understand how he doesn&#8217;t see the system as changing from within. Okay, <em>a<\/em> system does remain <em>a<\/em> system regardless of any changes to the system, fair enough, I&#8217;ll happily grant him that, but what about it?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He also contradicts some of his other views. For example, despite his (9, 82) recognition and opposition of <em>normativity<\/em>, in the context of grammar, he (9) reckons that language (<em>langue<\/em>) as a system is normative:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;[F]from the very outset we must put both feet on the ground of language and use language as the norm of all other manifestions of speech.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In other words, we have language (<em>langage<\/em>) in general, which includes speech (<em>parole<\/em>), but <em>a<\/em> language (<em>langue<\/em>) as system, such as English or Finnish, is nonetheless considered to be normative, so that speech (<em>parole<\/em>) is then to be assessed on the basis of its conformivity with a language (language) as a system. This is exactly what Deleuze and Guattari (237) object to and explains why they refer to <em>structure <\/em>as something that they oppose (6, 8, 11, 16-17, 21) or are, at least, not too happy with (41):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;The word &#8216;structure&#8217; may be used to designate the sum of these relations and relationships, but it is an illusion to believe that structure is the earth&#8217;s last word.&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>As you can see, it&#8217;s like yes, but no. Why? Well, because <em>structure <\/em>comes across as static. That&#8217;s why. I think that&#8217;s also why they ended up preferring to use <em>machine<\/em>, instead of structure. I mean, I guess you could still use structure and not machine, but it does have this issue. It does tempt you to think in static terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It&#8217;s also worth noting that, while certainly critical of structuralism, the two (236) also give it credit for rejecting the <em>imaginary order<\/em> and pushing us to think in terms of the <em>symbolic order<\/em>. If you&#8217;ve struggled so far with what the difference is between the two, they (237) provide a good example that should help you make more sense of that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>&#8220;A man can never say: &#8216;I am a bull, a wolf&#8230;&#8217; But he can say: &#8216;I am to a woman what the bull is to a cow, I am to another man what the wolf is to the sheep.'&#8221;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In other words, the great advance of <em>structuralism <\/em>is to allow us to think terms of <em>relations <\/em>and <em>relata<\/em>, instead of in terms of <em>resemblance<\/em>. This is then carried over to <em>post-structuralism<\/em>, but I&#8217;ll expand on that soon enough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Anyway, in \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019 you get Deleuze explaining it all, the pros and cons, without taking shots at <em>structuralism<\/em>. That said, I\u2019d say that only the first half, or so, is about structuralism as it is generally understood, both by its proponents and opponents, and the latter half goes beyond, way beyond that. That\u2019s why I\u2019d say this is more of a look at structuralism, from a <em>post-structuralist<\/em> viewpoint.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To be clear, much of what Deleuze covers in his text is in line with existing definitions of <em>structuralism<\/em>. For example, to give you a dictionary definition, it (OED, s.v. \u201cstructuralism\u201d, n.) has to do with:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cAny theory or method in which a discipline or field of study is envisaged as comprising elements interrelated in systems and structures at various levels, the structures and the interrelations of their elements being regarded as more significant than the elements considered in isolation.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Yes, and I think Deleuze would agree with that definition. That\u2019s the gist of the first four criteria covered in his text. When it comes to linguistics, which is where much of <em>structuralism<\/em> originates, a dictionary (OED, s.v. \u201cstructuralism\u201d, n.)&nbsp; will tell you that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cAny theory or mode of analysis in which language is considered as a system or structure comprising elements at various phonological, grammatical, and semantic levels, the interrelation of these elements rather than the elements themselves producing meaning.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Again, I think that Deleuze would agree with that. This is what\u2019s covered in the fifth and the sixth criteria. Something has to account for <em>meaning<\/em> or, as I prefer to call it, <em>sense<\/em>, because the <em>elements <\/em>themselves cannot account for it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Much of what Deleuze covers in his text is, however, not in line with <em>structuralism<\/em>. It goes beyond it, to the point that a structuralist probably wouldn\u2019t agree with his take. Simon Blackburn helps us to understand why that might be the case, as explained by him (353) in \u2018The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThe common feature of structuralist positions is the belief that phenomena of human life are not intelligible except through their interrelations. These relations constitute a structure, and behind local variations in the surface phenomena there are constant laws of abstract structure.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>The first sentence, which I only included here to make more sense of the second sentence, is not the issue here. It is the second sentence which highlights the issue for someone like Deleuze. <em>Structuralists<\/em>, as defined here, and as exemplified by Saussure, have this belief that you can account for whatever you may encounter with recourse to an unchanging <em>structure<\/em>. That\u2019s the problem. That\u2019s also why I\u2019m against <em>structuralism<\/em>, as I\u2019ve pointed out in the past, and for <em>post-structuralism<\/em>, as I\u2019ve also pointed out in the past.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>What is <em>post-structuralism<\/em> then? Well, my answer is that it\u2019s what comes after <em>structuralism<\/em>, what\u2019s beyond it. The problem with that answer is that it\u2019s hardly satisfactory. It doesn\u2019t really tell you anything. I\u2019ll let Blackburn (285) explain what it is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[Post-structuralism] does not share the structuralist view that the unconscious, or the forms of society, will themselves obey structural laws, waiting to be discovered.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>For me, it is that notion of <em>discovery <\/em>that distinguishes <em>post-structuralism<\/em> from <em>structuralism<\/em>. For a post-structuralist, there is nothing that is simply given, just waiting for us to discover it. If we wish to use that word, what we discover are <em>inventions<\/em>, things have come to being instead of having always been there.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As that\u2019s just one book, I\u2019ll have a quick look at some others. \u2018The Routledge Dictionary of Philosophy\u2019 by Michael Proudfoot and Alan Robert Lacey includes many things, many of which are interesting, but, alas, no entries for <em>structuralism<\/em>, nor for <em>post-structuralism<\/em>. \u2018The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy\u2019 by Robert Audi does include such entries. The entry for the former by Audi (1029-1030) is not as clear as the entry by Blackburn, but he (1029) does indicate that its Saussurean take involves \u201ca closed system of elements and rules, which account for the production and the social communication of meaning.\u201d They key thing here is that the <em>system <\/em>is thought to be <em>closed<\/em>, as opposed to <em>open<\/em>. Accounting for the latter, Audi (851, 1030) covers it in both entries. What catches my attention is how he (851) states that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[P]oststructuralism rejects the structuralist emphasis on the synchronic, extratemporal analysis of systems[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This is related to viewing a <em>system<\/em> as something that\u2019s <em>closed<\/em>, in the sense that a <em>structure<\/em> is thus understood to be timeless and unchanging. This is something that I believe Deleuze would agree with and consider it to be marking the difference between <em>structuralism<\/em> and <em>post-structuralism<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>What about other disciplines? How about linguistics? Well, Keith Brown and Jim Miller (351, 421) account for both in \u2018The Cambridge Dictionary of Linguistics\u2019, but don\u2019t really expand on how they differ from one another. Similarly, David Crystal (289, 457-458) accounts for both in his \u2018A Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics\u2019 in relation other entries, but doesn\u2019t really elaborate on them, nor how they differ from one another. A much more useful discussion of both can be found in the \u2018Encyclopedia of Language &amp; Linguistics\u2019, under the \u2018Poststructuralism and Deconstruction\u2019 by Thomas Broden. He (795) notes that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[P]oststructuralism critiques the scientific character of structuralism\u2019s project, together with its deontology of objectivity[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This is in line with what\u2019s been covered so far. He (795) also notes that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cPoststructuralism contests many of the founding traits structuralism attributed to its structures, especially totality and autonomy, giving emphasis instead to fragmentation, multiplicity, and hybridity.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>I agree and that\u2019s certainly Deleuze\u2019s trajectory in \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019. It starts from <em>structuralism<\/em>, only to end up dealing with what\u2019s more like <em>post-structuralism<\/em>, even though it&#8217;s still quite far from what&#8217;s presented, for example, in &#8216;A Thousand Plateaus&#8217;. Anyway, Broden (795) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cIt sharply repudiates the universalist turn of so much of structuralism in the 1960s, asserting a historical and cultural specificity which radicalizes those of earlier structuralist research (e.g., Jakobson; cf. Althusser).\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>What\u2019s particularly relevant here is the repudiation of <em>universalism<\/em>, which is another way of expressing the <em>post-structuralist<\/em> opposition of <em>closed systems<\/em>, in favor of <em>open systems<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It\u2019s worth noting, however, that <em>post-structuralism<\/em> is not a wholesale rejection of <em>structuralism<\/em>. I\u2019d say it\u2019s much more like poking holes in the latter, in order to end up with the former. You reject what doesn\u2019t work, while using what works. You then come up with something that works to make up for what doesn\u2019t work. This is what Broden (795) also goes on to point out:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cPoststructuralism adapts rather than adopts certain key structuralist moves: it upholds the Saussurean concept of difference and its founding importance, while temporalizing it, and giving it a polemical interpretation.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Oh yes, I totally agree. In other words, that <em>universalism<\/em> is replaced with <em>historicism<\/em>. That notion of <em>structure<\/em> or <em>system<\/em> is retained, as is the <em>relationality<\/em>, but it is seen as constantly changing. It may not change a whole lot, so you might not ever notice it changing, but it does change, as discussed earlier already.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Broden (795) summarizes the goal of this change from <em>structuralism<\/em> to <em>post-structuralism<\/em> by noting that it seeks to understand the <em>subject<\/em> without recourse to <em>idealism<\/em>, <em>materialism<\/em>, nor any kind of body-mind <em>duality<\/em>. In his (795) view, post-structuralism is \u201ca monist syncretism of the material and the symbolic\u201d, which makes sense as it is the <em>imaginary<\/em> that\u2019s responsible for that problematic doubling of the <em>real<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I think Broden\u2019s (796) account of thinking of <em>post-structuralism<\/em> as about the <em>one<\/em> and the <em>many<\/em> is also accurate. To be more specific, I think he (796) aptly summarizes what post-structuralism is about:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cFor poststructuralists, popular and learned notions of wholeness, unity, and totality often represent erroneous, interested, or self-satisfying images which mask variegated, conflicted, and opaque situations and events.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Indeed. That\u2019s the <em>imaginary order<\/em> that Deleuze covers in his text. That\u2019s Lacan\u2019s contribution to this, as Broden (796) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cFor Lacan, in spite of ego\u2019s vision of itself as a stable whole, the subject remains different from Itself[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Yeah, like I\u2019ve pointed out in the past, you are not what you think you are. Instead, you are what you are, at any given moment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>What about geography, considering that this blog is not only about <em>discourse<\/em>, but also about <em>landscape<\/em>? In \u2018The Dictionary of Human Geography\u2019, as edited by Derek Gregory, Ron Johnston, Geraldine Pratt, Michael Watts and Sarah Whatmore, it is acknowledged (725) that <em>structuralism<\/em> as pertaining to \u201cthe enduring and underlying structures inscribed in the cultural practices of human subjects.\u201d This is largely in line with what\u2019s been covered so far, albeit it is, of course, not entirely clear whether enduring means unchanging or something that can change, but is resistant to change. Anyway, it is also noted (725) that structuralism was never really a thing in geography, largely due to other existing alternatives that had more purchase at the time, as well as due to being eclipsed by what followed, <em>post-structuralism<\/em>. In contrast, post-structuralism is stated (571) to be addressing \u201cthe perceived rigidities, certainties and essentialisms\u201d that are viewed to be the problem with structuralism. Again, this is totally in line with what\u2019s the been discussed in this essay. It is also mentioned (571) that post-structuralism is not to be understood as simple <em>anti-structuralism<\/em>, despite being against it, because much of what\u2019s central in structuralism is retained by post-structuralists. Yep, that\u2019s right. Post-structuralism is not a wholesale rejection of structuralism, as already noted a number of times. What\u2019s also notable here is that the writers (572) mention this as being particularly important to landscape studies. I agree. I\u2019d say that\u2019s pretty difficult to take anyone interested in landscape seriously if they aren\u2019t familiar with post-structuralism, which also necessitates some kind of general understanding of linguistics and\/or semiotics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>You\u2019ll also find these two &#8211;<em>isms<\/em> addressed in the 12 volume \u2018International Encyclopedia of Human Geography\u2019. It is in volume 11 that you\u2019ll find an account of <em>structuralism<\/em>, under the entry \u2018Structuralism\/Structuralist Geography\u2019, and in volume 8 that you\u2019ll find that for <em>post-structuralism<\/em>, under the entry \u2018Poststructuralism\/Poststructuralist Geographies\u2019. Addressing the former, Richard Smith (30) acknowledges some of the core issues already in the provided glossary, noting that structuralism is <em>anti-humanist<\/em>, <em>anti-empiricist<\/em>, as well as <em>anti-historicist<\/em>. Yeah, that\u2019s about right. In the entry itself, he (30) further specifies this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[S]tructuralism is holistic \u2026 because of its insistence that while observable phenomena are present, they are also absent precisely because any object\u2019s being is determined by its relationships, its relation to the whole structure to which it belongs[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>In other words, because it\u2019s <em>holistic<\/em>, accounting for the whole, it can\u2019t be <em>individualistic<\/em>, nor <em>empiricist<\/em>, as he (30) points. That said, somewhat contradictorily (as already evident is Saussure\u2019s work), the <em>structure<\/em>, the <em>system<\/em>, is, nonetheless, observable only through those individuals that one observes, you know, empirically, as also acknowledged by him (30).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I think Smith (31) also puts it very aptly when he notes that while <em>structuralism<\/em> is against many things, namely <em>empiricism<\/em> and <em>positivism<\/em>, because it has that holistic bent to it, and while it does not claim to provide us \u201ca knowable real world\u201d, only \u201cknowable structures\u201d, it nonetheless ended up being heralded as providing us \u201ca universal understanding of reality and knowledge.\u201d I think it\u2019s crucial to notice here that the claim was not to provide objective knowledge, but rather an objective, structural understanding of the world, as cautioned by him (31). They are not the same, no, but, then again, they do all aspire for that <em>objectivity<\/em>. That\u2019s exactly what irked the post-structuralists, as already noted at least a couple of times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He also makes a particularly good observation (albeit in passing), when he (37) notes that <em>structuralism<\/em> focuses on the relations between the relata, without fussing over the relata, which means that it leaves no room for some <em>transcendent<\/em> plane of <em>ideas<\/em>, <em>forms<\/em> or <em>essences<\/em>, \u00e0 la Plato, because relata are definable in relation to other relata. That\u2019s <em>immanence<\/em> for you. There is, of course, a danger of lapsing into such, if you have those aspirations for objectivity, but that\u2019s on you then, not on structuralism as such, as already noted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As a final gem, unbeknownst to me prior to this, Smith (37-38) also recommends Deleuze\u2019s \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019 as a guide to <em>structuralism<\/em>. Yeah, I didn\u2019t see that coming! Nice! What a turn of events! Anyway, I totally agree, even though Deleuze\u2019s take is pretty difficult if you are not already at least somewhat familiar with structuralism and <em>post-structuralism<\/em>. You can get so much from the text that it\u2019s totally worth all the hours that go into it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Moving on to the entry on <em>poststructuralism<\/em> by Keith Woodward, Deborah Dixon and John Paul Jones, in their (396) view it, is marked by what I\u2019d say is obvious carryover from <em>structuralism<\/em>, that aforementioned unwillingness give the terms, the relata, any kind of primacy over other terms, the other relata. I\u2019d say yeah. If you do end up doing that, perhaps out of frustration, because the terms don\u2019t mean anything in themselves, as it is if you stay true to structuralism, it\u2019s on you. You\u2019ve made that decision to privilege certain terms over other terms, treating them as <em>master signifiers<\/em> or transcendental signifieds (there are other terms, I know, but to use the ones I\u2019ve used in this essay). Anyway, I like the way they (396) emphasize this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[W]hat renders this approach distinctive is its rigorous interrogation of those core concepts \u2013 such as objectivity and subjectivity, center and margin, materialism and idealism, truth and fiction \u2013 that underpin much of modern day academia, including the majority of geographic thought and practice.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>I agree. This is also why I\u2019m known as the theory guy, the guy who just goes on and on, and on and on, about theory or, rather, as I like to think of it, on concepts. I know I\u2019m far from perfect, like there\u2019s only so much you can do, especially when you\u2019re expected to limit yourself to this and\/or that many words, but it really grinds my gears when others get to explain things through fancy concepts, some of which I also use, but without ever explaining them. I know, I know, some of that is attributable to the way academic publishing works, so there\u2019s that, as I just pointed out, but some of it is just being lazy. Now that may sound controversial, but, hey, that\u2019s what Woodward, Dixon and Jones (396) are also saying. Oh, and don\u2019t get me wrong. I get it. I totally get it. Who doesn\u2019t like being lazy? Like why bother if no one expects you to do any better? I certainly like not having to do anything. That\u2019s lazy for you. Then again, if I know something isn\u2019t right, if something just doesn\u2019t cut it, if it doesn\u2019t work out for me, if there\u2019s something about it that bothers me, I need to go back to the drawing board. I mean, I read \u2018A Thousand Plateaus\u2019 because I wasn\u2019t happy with how <em>landscape <\/em>was presented in existing landscape studies, regardless of the field or discipline. I really, really needed to do that as otherwise I would have considered myself a hack. Oh, and yeah, totally worth it. It\u2019s a life changing experience to read that book, not just because it has, in my opinion, the best account for landscape that there is, but because it takes you to places and makes you wonder. If you persist, like I did, oh boy, you no longer want to think the way you did before.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I think they (396) are correct in their observation that <em>post-structuralism <\/em>gets plenty of flak for being unconcerned with the material world, which is the <em>real order<\/em> discussed in this essay. I get this flak too. Not all the time, but I do get it. I understand why that is, but I\u2019d say it has much to do with people\u2019s unfamiliarity with post-structuralism. There\u2019s some merit to such criticism, yes, but, at the same time, the critics often fail to realize that while we do need material bodies to express anything semiotically, just having that debate about that requires us to have recourse to some sign system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I think they (397) also correct when they point out that <em>post-structuralism<\/em> knows no bounds. I\u2019d say that it makes it very difficult for anyone to stay within their supposed field or discipline. Oh, and speaking from experience, it totally irks a lot of academics. Like how dare this person cross that boundary! But, again that\u2019s just lazy thinking. These people probably know that they could do better, but it\u2019s just not in their interest to do so, because it\u2019s easier not to bother. Plus, if they let people do like whatever, then hey kind of also have to do that, engage with what else is there, outside the boundaries of they fields or disciplines. That\u2019s a lot of hard work, so it\u2019s in their interests to object to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>They (397) also acknowledge the carryover from <em>structuralism<\/em> to <em>post-structuralism<\/em>. That\u2019s why they (397) reckon that it\u2019s post- rather than <em>anti-structuralism<\/em>. I agree, but I won\u2019t get into detail here, because what they go on to elaborate is in line with what\u2019s been covered already (you know, Saussure etc.). What\u2019s worth noting, however, is their (398-399) take on Derrida\u2019s role in all this. What I find particularly important about his role in shifting from structuralism to post-structuralism is the strict adherence to structuralism. Because it\u2019s all just about the relations and the relata, you cannot privilege any of the terms, as they (399) go on to point out:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[P]ost structuralism throws doubt onto all certainties regarding researchers\u2019 ability to accurately represent reality, for our concepts do not simply represent that reality, in the sense of mirroring their referent, but represent reality within a fully relational system of understanding that does not require the referent to be cognized in the same manner by all.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Yeah, if you ask me, that\u2019s spot on. Okay, I wouldn\u2019t use say that our concepts represent anything, really, but that\u2019s only a minor gripe here. I get the point. That\u2019s <em>displacement<\/em>, that <em>empty square<\/em> for you. Plus, in their defense, they (400) do acknowledge this when explaining Foucault\u2019s role in all this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[A]n articulation is more than mere communication \u2013 it is an active intervention in the social and physical realms.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>This is also how J. L. Austin views language in \u2018How to Do Things with Words\u2019. You don\u2019t describe the world, this and\/or that object, as if it was there for you to describe it as such. Instead, you come to define it as such, each and every time, hence the emphasis on thinking of <em>discourse<\/em> as a matter of <em>practice<\/em>, as they (400) also explain it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I also appreciate their take on Deleuze\u2019s (401-402) view on this. I think they (401) are, once more, spot on when they characterize Deleuze\u2019s <em>anti-Platonism<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201c[It is] not a world of similarities shared by static objects, but rather one in which all of materiality is continuously moving, mutating, and transforming, differentiating even from itself in a constant process of becoming.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Yep. Very well put. I can only nod approvingly. They (401-402) go on to explain this, in more detail, but I don\u2019t think it\u2019s necessary for me to repeat it all. It\u2019s good reading, even beyond that, so do check it out. The last point I want to include from them (405) is this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cWhereas previous theorizations understood landscapes to be the imprint on nature of a culture, or the effect of social process such as capitalism, post structuralism has pointed to their status as a complex of significations and discourses that are intertextually bound with a host of other landscapes and discourses.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Again, very well put. I totally agree. This makes it not only difficult to comprehend, because most people aren\u2019t even aware of <em>post-structuralism<\/em>, but also difficult to pull off, because it takes a lot of effort to work this way, to deal with <em>texts<\/em> or <em>discourses<\/em>, as they are always linked to other texts or discourses. It\u2019s not neat and you won\u2019t get any neat answers. There\u2019s always more to it. In their (405) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThe landscape as text metaphor thus sees place as intersecting with an infinite number of other texts and contexts, such that we cannot demarcate where one starts and another begins.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Yeah, the difficulty with coming to terms with <em>discourse<\/em> is that can only be defined in reference to more discourse. So, to understand this and\/or that discourse, you need to understand this and\/or that other discourse, and so on, and so, forth, <em>ad infinitum<\/em>, as they (405) point out here. There\u2019s always more to it. All accounts are therefore just partial accounts. Then again, that\u2019s not to be considered a negative thing, as it means that we aren\u2019t stuck in a world where nothing changes. Anyway, this has a tremendous impact on landscape studies, as they (405) go on to specify:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>\u201cThese multiple sites of discursive propagation open a circuit beyond the earthiness of landscapes, seeping into other representational media such as film, television, cyberspace, the body, political discourse and other forms of speech, and written texts of all kinds, including maps.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>It\u2019s for this reason that I find their (407) acknowledgement of Richard Schein\u2019s work as further reading highly fitting. If you want a coherent and well written <em>post-structuralist<\/em> take on <em>landscape<\/em>, typically exemplified with a well-researched empirical example, look no further. There are others, of course, but my own views are very much the same. I just prefer the Deleuze-Guattarian way of doing it, instead of the Foucauldian way of doing it, because Deleuze and Guattari actually had something to say about landscape, whereas Foucault didn\u2019t. Plus, I think the former give me more tools to address what I want to address in my own work than the latter does. It\u2019s just a better fit for me. If Foucault works better for you, then it does. I don\u2019t mind. It\u2019s the same with Derrida. I don\u2019t mind. I do my work, the way you see fit. You do your work, the way you see fit. It\u2019s that simple.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>To end with something, it was interesting to do a close reading of Deleuze&#8217;s \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019. I tried my best not to include anything that has to do with <em>machines<\/em>, as opposed to <em>structures<\/em>, as this text is about the structures. To wrap things up, you could say that the text is about <em>structuralism<\/em>, but also not about structuralism. It&#8217;s like, well, it depends on your definition of it. The way I read it, post-structuralism is, in fact, structuralism in the sense that it takes structuralism seriously, treating structures or systems as something <em>immanent <\/em>and changing, as opposed to something <em>transcendent <\/em>and fixed. Then again, if we think of how structuralism is generally understood, what Deleuze has  to offer goes way beyond structuralism, which, then, makes it about more post-structuralism than about structuralism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>What I particularly like about the text is the way he clarifies the Lacanian terms, the <em>real<\/em>, the <em>imaginary <\/em>and the <em>symbolic <\/em>and how these are connected to everyday life. It might not do anything for you, there&#8217;s that, but I like how he explains how the <em>subject <\/em>gets trapped in the <em>imaginary<\/em>. In other words, I like how he is able to elaborate on how the subject becomes <em>doubled <\/em>in a vicious circle of <em>subjectification<\/em> and <em>signification<\/em>, so that it&#8217;s all about the me, me, me, and once more, me, while also involving the power of imagination to conjure all kinds of images of the real as the very definition of that me. You do get this covered in &#8216;A Thousand Plateaus&#8217;, but here you get another take on that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Of course, his take on <em>structuralism <\/em>and my subsequent take on it is bound to make some people unhappy. I mean, it&#8217;s not always clear whether someone is a <em>structuralist <\/em>or not, or a <em>post-structuralist<\/em> for that matter. I don&#8217;t think Deleuze, nor Guattari, would be too happy that I refer to them as post-structuralists. I think they&#8217;d be more happy with being labeled something like <em>functionalists <\/em>or <em>constructivists<\/em>. Then again, I don&#8217;t think that matters. To me they are post-structuralists. Close enough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>So, if you want a crash course on <em>structuralism<\/em>, check out Deleuze&#8217;s \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019. It&#8217;s difficult and time consuming reading, there&#8217;s that, but it&#8217;s not even close to the level of difficulty that you encounter if you read his collaborations with Guattari. This is relatively easy and straight forward in comparison to those.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Also, if you are into landscapes, like I am, albeit, perhaps, for the &#8216;wrong&#8217; reasons, as I&#8217;m sort of against them, getting to understand what the fuss about <em>structuralism <\/em>and <em>post-structuralism<\/em> is all about is something that I can only recommend. Like I had no idea that this text was recommended by a geographer, Richard Smith, and I was totally pumped once I read that. I also liked how, for once, other geographers, Woodward, Dixon and Jones, pointed out how important structuralism and post-structuralism is to the study of landscapes. It was about time someone pointed that out, like explicitly mentioning the value of those traditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">References<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Althusser, L., and E. Balibar ([1968] 1970). <em>Reading Capital<\/em> (B. Brewster, Trans.). London, United Kingdom: New Left Books.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Audi, R. (Ed.) (2015). <em>The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy<\/em> (3rd ed.). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Austin, J. L. ([1955] 1962). <em>How to Do Things with Words<\/em> (J. O. Urmson, Ed.). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Benz\u00e9cri, J\u2013P. (1992). <em>Correspondence Analysis Handbook<\/em> (T. K. Gopalan, Trans.). New York, NY: Marcel Dekker.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Blackburn, S. (2005). <em>The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy<\/em> (2nd ed.). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Blommaert, J. (2013). <em>Ethnography, Superdiversity and Linguistic Landscapes Chronicles of Complexity<\/em>. Bristol, United Kingdom: Multilingual Matters.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Bourdieu, P. ([1979] 1984). <em>Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste<\/em> (R. Nice, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Bourdieu, P. ([1980] 1990). <em>The Logic of Practice<\/em> (R. Nice Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Bourdieu, P., and L. Wacquant (1992). <em>An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology<\/em>. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Broden, T. F. (2006). Postructuralism and Deconstruction. In K. Brown (Ed.), <em>Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, Volumes 1\u201314<\/em> (2nd ed.) (pp. 794\u2013798). 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(pp. 170\u2013192). Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Deleuze, G., and F. Guattari ([1972] 1983). <em>Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia<\/em> (R. Hurley, M. Seem and H. R. Lane, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Deleuze, G., and F. Guattari ([1980] 1987). <em>A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia<\/em> (B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari ([1991] 1994). <em>What Is Philosophy?<\/em> (H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell, Trans.). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Derrida, J. ([1967] 1976). <em>Of Grammatology<\/em> (G. C. Spivak, Trans.). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Duns Scotus, J. (1994). Six Questions on Individuation from His Ordinatio, II. d. 3, part 1, qq. 1-6. In P. V. Spade (Ed. &amp; Trans.), <em>Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of Universals<\/em> (pp. 57\u2013113). 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Yeah, I ended up on all kinds of tangents. Anyway, this time I&#8217;ll be going through \u2018How Do We Recognize Structuralism?\u2019 by Gilles Deleuze. It can be found in \u2018Desert Islands and Other [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3554,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[119,1651,571,1635,1636,1650,249,96,1649,1494,1632,1648,71,168,1647,174,1283,48,1638,123,1643,1642,1639,481,574,129,1653,45,762,180,1644,200,1347,1640,1652,701,1075,1130,252,326,1645,171,765,1637,1641,255,1646],"class_list":["post-5073","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-essays","tag-althusser","tag-audi","tag-austin","tag-balibar","tag-benzecri","tag-blackburn","tag-blommaert","tag-bourdieu","tag-broden","tag-brown","tag-cassirer","tag-crystal","tag-deleuze","tag-derrida","tag-dixon","tag-duns-scotus","tag-elden","tag-foucault","tag-gregory","tag-guattari","tag-halle","tag-jakobson","tag-johnston","tag-jones","tag-labov","tag-lacan","tag-lacey","tag-lefebvre","tag-levi","tag-levi-strauss","tag-mcdonaugh","tag-miller","tag-peirce","tag-pratt","tag-proudfoot","tag-proust","tag-sapir","tag-saussure","tag-scollon","tag-simondon","tag-soja","tag-spinoza","tag-strauss","tag-wacquant","tag-whatmore","tag-wong-scollon","tag-woodward"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5073","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3554"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5073"}],"version-history":[{"count":62,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5073\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5606,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5073\/revisions\/5606"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5073"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5073"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5073"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}