I was gonna write another essay on parasitism, not because I had a whole lot to say about that after the previous essay, except that reading Michel Serres\u2019 \u2018Parasite\u2019 also gave me some heavy Baruch Spinoza vibes. I guess that\u2019s worth it\u2019s own essay, but, well, we\u2019ll see if I ever get around to write something on that. Maybe. Maybe not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Right, so, why another essay about that was something that I was gonna do? Well, your\u2019s truly somehow, just like somehow, managed to get another parasite this month. Fun times, once again. Okay, seriously, this was super chill compared to the last one, which was like something from another planet. A couple of days and it was fine, no problem, but, well, I miss some stuff because of that, as a precaution, so there\u2019s that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But if I\u2019m not going to deal with parasitism <\/em>again this time, what\u2019s the deal then? Well, how about some perspectivism<\/em>? Or how about some hyperreality<\/em>? I\u2019ve covered these in the past, but more like in passing, in reference to Friedrich Nietzsche\u2019s work and Jean Baudrillard\u2019s work, so, I guess it would make sense try to do something with these concepts. I\u2019ll cover Nietzsche this time and, perhaps, Baudrillard another time. We\u2019ll see.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So, perspectivism<\/em>? What\u2019s the deal? Well, without looking up anything, working solely on my memory, it\u2019s all about one\u2019s perspective<\/em>, the one you happen to have, here and now or, well, any given moment in your life. That means that no matter what, no matter what happens, your view, that perspective, is never impartial, like full or complete, and thus any kind of appeal to objectivity <\/em>is just, well, at best, na\u00efve or, at worst, stupid, like really, really idiotic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But that\u2019s just me, working from memory, so it\u2019s better to consult some sources. What does something as reputable as the Oxford English Dictionary have to say about this? So, let\u2019s see the entry for perspectivism<\/em> (OED, s.v. \u201cperspectivism\u201d, n.):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[T]he theory that knowledge of a subject is inevitably partial and limited by the individual perspective from which it is viewed, or that objectivity is impossible.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n This is also clearly attributed to Nietzsche, with the first ever entry being in reference to one of his works or, rather, to one of the translations of his works. Anyway, the dictionary has a bit more to say about this (OED, s.v. \u201cperspectivism\u201d, n.):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cAlso \u2026 the partiality and limitation inherent in knowledge according to this theory.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n I think these are pretty good definitions of perspectivism<\/em>. Okay, they are not the only definitions out there, fair enough, but still, I think these two offer us a good summary. The main thing here is that there is no such thing as impartiality. That also means that while can talk about the objective world, like how the world really is, fair enough, there\u2019s no objectivity, at least not in the sense that would be accessible to us or that we could somehow put together by combining a number of perspectives. This is not to say that understanding the world from other perspectives is not useful, no, that\u2019s not it, because that\u2019s highly useful, but rather that you can never reach any kind of completion that way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But, what did the man himself have to say about perspectivism<\/em>? In \u2018On the Genealogy of Morality\u2019 he (87) notes, right after referring in passing to Immanuel Kant\u2019s views of intelligible things, which I take to be the things-in-themselves<\/em>, that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[L]et us be more wary of the dangerous old conceptual fairy-tale which has set up a \u2018pure, will-less, painless, timeless, subject of knowledge\u2019, let us be wary of the tentacles of such contradictory concepts as \u2018pure reason\u2019, \u2018absolute spirituality\u2019, \u2018knowledge as such\u2019[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In other words, there is no one, absolutely no one whose perspective is disinterested. To think otherwise is, in his (87) view or, should I say, perspective<\/em>, is simply absurd:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[W]e are asked to think an eye which cannot be thought at all, an eye turned in no direction at all, an eye where the active and interpretative powers are to be suppressed, absent, but through which seeing still becomes a seeing-something, so it is an absurdity and non-concept of eye that is demanded.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Indeed, what is an all-seeing eye? What is an eye that has nothing else attached to it? Can such an eye even see? If it can see, what\u2019s the point of such seeing? I don\u2019t know, nor does he, hence the absurdity of it. Anyway, he (87) still has more to say about this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThere is only<\/em> a perspectival seeing, only<\/em> a perspectival \u2018knowing\u2019; the more<\/em> affects we are able to put into words about a thing, the more<\/em> eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our \u2018concept\u2019 of the thing, our \u2018objectivity\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n What\u2019s particularly noteworthy here is that he isn\u2019t saying that there\u2019s isn\u2019t objectivity<\/em>, but rather that it is poorly defined, as it results in absurdity. So, as I pointed out, based solely on my memory, and on my understanding of this matter, it\u2019s highly beneficial to see the world from different perspectives<\/em>. That\u2019s what he means by having more eyes. That said, it\u2019s not simply more eyes, those of the same perspective, because that\u2019s just more eyes, not more perspectives. That\u2019s why you want various eyes, not just eyes in general. This way we get more<\/em> complete understanding of something (that should really be italicized in that bit, but whatever). That does not, however, mean that we\u2019ll ever get a compete understanding of something, just a more<\/em> complete understanding of it, as he clearly points out there and he (87) goes on to emphasize:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cBut to eliminate the will completely and turn off all the emotions without exception, assuming we could: well? would that not mean to castrate<\/em> the intellect?\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, in summary, what we think of as objectivity<\/em> is not only out of reach, like it is for Kant, but also incomprehensible, unlike it is for Kant. At the same time, subjectivity<\/em>, like it being just about you<\/em> and your<\/em> opinion, is equally absurd for him, as it is for me. It\u2019s like who\u2019s me<\/em>, the \u2018I\u2019, anyway? He (267) addresses this is \u2018The Will to Power\u2019, first by addressing the problem with objectivity:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cAgainst positivism, which halts at phenomena\u2014’There are only facts<\/em>\u2019\u2014I would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact \u2018in itself\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Note here how he mentions that there\u2019s no such thing as things-in-themselves<\/em>, not even in the sense that Kant thinks of them as these, well, what we cannot truly know, but still there. Nietzsche (267) continues, now addressing the problem with subjectivity<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c\u2018Everything is subjective,\u2019 you say; but even this is interpretation. The \u2018subject\u2019 is not something given, it is something added and invented and projected behind what there is.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n This may tempt you to interrupt him, to point that, ha, but if there\u2019s no subject<\/em> and thus no subjectivity<\/em>, then who\u2019s doing the interpretation, like wouldn\u2019t that mean that there\u2019s then a subject and thus subjectivity? Ha! Well, no. Just no, as he (267) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[I]s it necessary to posit an interpreter behind the interpretation? Even this is invention, hypothesis.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Why would that be? Well, because it doesn\u2019t really make any difference what you call it, subject<\/em> or interpreter<\/em>, it\u2019s all the same. What about knowledge<\/em> then? Well, he (267) has that covered as well:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIn so far as the word \u2018knowledge\u2019 has any meaning, the world is knowable[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Yeah, I agree. We are in the habit of speaking about knowledge<\/em>, like all the time, especially in the academics. It\u2019s, however, also something that we say in everyday life, like, all the time. I know, I know, I say I know, I know, like all the time, but do I really know? And if I really know, what is it that I really know? I don\u2019t know, it\u2019s just something that I say in recognition of something, like as a concession, acknowledging that it\u2019s only likely that I actually don\u2019t know. Anyway, this gets me to his (267) next point:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[B]ut it is interpretable<\/em> otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings.\u2014’Perspectivism.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, yeah, to repeat an earlier point, knowledge<\/em> is therefore rather something that we\u2019ve created by taking into account many, many perspectives<\/em>. Is it perfect? No, because it can\u2019t be perfect, because it cannot be perfected. We can look at something, from many, many perspectives, but never from all perspectives. That\u2019s\u2019 the point about there being countless meanings, because there are countless perspectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In other words, there are infinite interpretations<\/em>. But does that mean that all interpretations are thus equally valid? In a sense, yes, but, in another sense, no. In general, yes, as we cannot know for sure. In practice, no, as the perspectives are not tied to the subject<\/em>, as already pointed out. By this I mean that there are always finite number of interpretations at any given moment, but, beyond that moment, the number of interpretations is not bounded. To be clear, if there were no bounds, anything would go and nothing would make sense, but that’s clearly not the case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I think Valentin Volo\u0161inov explains this well in his \u2018Marxism and the Philosophy of Language\u2019 when he (87) contrasts two ways of thinking about experience<\/em> or, rather, how one experiences something on the basis of prior experience. Firstly, there\u2019s the I-experience<\/em>. Secondly, there\u2019s the we-experience<\/em>. For him (88), the former can be achieved only at the expense of sense, by which he means that one can only have a truly individual experience inasmuch it is a physiological response. For example, if you scream in pain, wailing in agony, that\u2019s your individual experience. The latter he (88) considers to be the way we experience the world. We experience the world as members of various groups of people, that is to say in relation to other people, as he (88) goes on to specify. To tie this with Nietzsche\u2019s view, this means that our perspectives are based on the perspectives of other people. To be clear, this does not mean that we experience the world just like everyone else, like clones, as Volo\u0161inov (88) points out. Our perspectives are, in a sense, unique and individual, but not because we are born that way. It\u2019s rather that we become unique and individual, what he (88) prefers to call differentiated<\/em>, through our interaction with other people as members of various groups of people, that is to say through differentiation<\/em>. So, paradoxically, the more you deal with people and the more people there are for you to deal with, the more differentiated you are likely going to become and vice versa, as he (88) goes on to explain:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe stronger, the more organized, the more differentiated the collective in which an individual orients himself, the more vivid and complex his inner world will be.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n I know I\u2019ve explained this before, like a couple of times already, using the same example, so I won\u2019t get tangled up with this for much longer, but, in summary, he (88-89) asks us to think of something like how people deal with hunger, principally in two polar opposite ways. Of course, there are ways of dealing with just about anything, as acknowledged by him (88), but that\u2019s not the point here. So, on one hand, you have people who aren\u2019t well organized. For them, hunger is just something that you have to deal with. It\u2019s all about food. Their experience is therefore virtually the same, even though they may not even be aware of each other\u2019s existence. On the other hand, you have people who are well organized. They experience hunger not only as a concrete thing, as a shortage of food, but as a social issue and seek to address the issue. Now, this alone does explain how experience is differentiated<\/em> as it\u2019s just one instance, but it starts to make sense if you think of yourself as a member of various different groups, so not only as, let\u2019s say, a peasant or a factory worker, to use his (88-89) example, and take into account that this also applies to other people. It\u2019s also important to acknowledge that not everyone is part of the same groups of people, what he (88-89) calls collectives. This is what I meant with how experience is marked by the relations we have with other people. They influence us and we influence them, but as not everyone influences everyone, it\u2019s all bound to be differentiated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He (89) also warns us to flatter ourselves. It is rare that to have those I-experiences<\/em>, as already pointed out, but that\u2019s not really what he takes issue with in this context. For him (89), there\u2019s a certain kind of self-contradictory we-experience<\/em> that fools us think that we are unique individuals from the get-go, what he calls individualistic self-experience<\/em>. It\u2019s marked by confidence and a sense of autonomy, which, nonetheless, the person owes to other people, as he (89) points out:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe individualistic type of experience derives from a steadfast and confident social orientation, Individualistic confidence in oneself, one\u2019s sense of personal value, is drawn not from within, not from the depths of one\u2019s personality but from the outside world.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n This is exactly how it is self-contradictory. We like to think that there\u2019s the \u2018I\u2019, the self, fully autonomous and unique, one of a kind from the start, but, ironically, we owe all that to other people as it is through our interaction with other people we become conscious of, well, just about anything in the first place. That\u2019s what he mean\u2019s when he (88) likens the I-experience<\/em> with animals and the we-experience<\/em> with humans. As a sidenote, I don\u2019t think that would hold anymore, as such, because that makes it seem like animals don\u2019t experience the world as members of a group, as a collective, which I believe they do, but we just don\u2019t understand them or, well, our understanding of how all that works is rather limited. Anyway, he (89) expands on that contradiction:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIt is the \u2026 interpretation of one\u2019s social recognizance and tenability by rights, and of the objective security and tenability provided by the whole social order, of one\u2019s individual Iivelihood.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, in short, it\u2019s the outside that explains the inside and not the other way around. It\u2019s pretty simple really. You owe your existence to others, materially speaking, and your understanding of the world, your consciousness of it, to others as well, semiotically speaking. You are the offspring in both senses, as is everyone else. So, yeah, don\u2019t flatter yourself, as he (90) goes on to reiterate:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThus the personality of the speaker, taken from within, so to speak, turns out to be wholly a product of social interrelations.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n This means that your personality, that is to say what makes you interesting, is not something that you can take credit for. Instead, it\u2019s something that you must give others credit for. He (90) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cNot only its outward expression but also its inner experience are social territory. Consequently, the whole route between inner experience (the \u2018expressible\u2019) and its outward objectification (the \u2018[expression]\u2019) lies entirely across social territory.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n I think this is a particularly neat passage as here he points out that what we think, on our own, the expressible<\/em>, and what we express in ways that others can become aware of it, the expression<\/em>, is not attributable to the \u2018I\u2019, the self<\/em> or the subject<\/em>. Okay, I guess we can still speak of the \u2018I\u2019, the self and the subject, but they then longer understood the same way. Each individual, me, you, anyone, is then only explainable in reference to other individuals, as he (90) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWhen an experience reaches the stage of actualization in a full-fledged utterance, its social orientation acquires added complexity by focusing on the immediate social circumstances of discourse and, above all, upon actual addressees.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In other words, no matter what we say or what we do (or just do, if we think of saying as doing), it only makes sense inasmuch we account for discourse, which in turn only makes sense inasmuch we account for other people. This is also why I\u2019m all about pragmatics and discourse analysis and, well, couldn\u2019t really care less for what most linguists have focused on and many still focus on. To me, language just doesn\u2019t make any sense without people, in the objective<\/em> sense, as having some existence separate from people, or in the subjective<\/em> sense, as attributable to the subject<\/em>, as this thing that allows us to make sense of what else is there, these objects<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He expands on this issue also in another book, \u2018Freudianism: A Marxist Critique\u2019, when he addresses how this is handle in psychology (of his time, of course). He (18-22) starts by noting that there are two camps: the objective<\/em> camp and the subjective<\/em> camp. In summary, both insist on the exact opposite. The former builds on external observation<\/em>, whereas the latter relies on internal observation, aka introspection<\/em>. At a glance, it would seem like relying on introspection just doesn\u2019t cut it, simply because we have no access to that inner experience, that expressible<\/em>, so we must judge everything solely on observation, that is to say on the expressions<\/em>. He (22) even explicitly gives the former credit for this, for pointing that it is not what explains, but what must be explained. That said, just as we can\u2019t trust other people\u2019s accounts of their introspection, as there\u2019s no way we can be sure that the expression is the same as the expressible, as people do lie, like all the time, we can\u2019t trust the observer either, because that also applies to the observer. There\u2019s no guarantee that what the observer goes on to express, for others to apprehend, is the same as the expressible, what the observer thinks. To be clear, this does not mean that we somehow fail at that, because we don\u2019t, because we do experience the world the same way, as our covert, inner speech<\/em> is exactly like our overt, outwardly expressed outer speech<\/em>. It\u2019s rather that, firstly, we can\u2019t be sure of whether people say what they think, and that, secondly, there is no experience and thus no observation that isn\u2019t already marked or, as he (20) puts it, compromised by language. Simply put, no matter what happens, no matter how we try to get around the issue, there\u2019s no brute, purely material experience that we can communicate to others, although that I-experience<\/em> comes close to it, as all experience is marked by language. He (29) summarizes this in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language\u2019:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201c[A]nything and everything occurring within the organism can become the material of experience, since everything can acquire semiotic significance, can become expressive<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n However, thinking is more than material. It requires something else, which he (29) goes on to clarify:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cAny psyche that has reached any degree of development and differentiation must have subtle and pliable semiotic material at its disposal, and semiotic material of a kind that can be shaped, refined, and differentiated in the extra-corporeal social milieu in the process of outward expression. Therefore, the semiotic material of the psyche is preeminently the word\u2014inner speech<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Simply put, thinking is sign based or, as it is more contemporarily often expressed, a matter of semiosis. This helps us to understand how he (36) defines introspection<\/em> as self-observation:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWe do not see or feel an experience\u2014we understand it.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, what we see, or feel, is one thing, but what we think of it is another thing. This is particularly important as it means that we have no direct access to what we experience, what it is that we have, for example, seen or felt. In other words, inasmuch we speak of having experienced this or that, it is of utmost importance that we do not confuse it with our comprehension of it, as he (36) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThis means that in the process of introspection we engage our experience into a context made up of other signs we understand.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n To paraphrase this, there\u2019s this experience, whatever it may be, which only appears to us as a sign, which we then make sense of in relation to other signs, as he (36) goes on to specify:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cA sign can be illuminated only with the help of another sign.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n It is also worth emphasizing that what we see, feel, or, more broadly speaking, sense, does retain its materiality. No one is questioning that. It\u2019s rather that none of it makes sense to us without it appearing to us as a sign, in relation to other signs. In summary, what we deal with is not our experience, nor our observation, but our understanding of our experience, or of our observation. Importantly, that all comes from the outside, as he (37) points out:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe understanding of any sign, whether inner or outer, occurs inextricably tied in with the situation in which the sign is implemented<\/em>. This situation, even in the case of introspection, exists as an aggregate of facts from external experience, the latter commentating upon and illuminating a particular inner sign.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, in summary, we are tempted to think that it all starts from us, that there\u2019s this language that has an existence of its own, no matter how linguists, especially historical linguists and, like Nietzsche, philologists, like to remind us that there is no fixed language, as such, and that we just magically have a connection to it (and that failing at that is just on you), but that\u2019s not the case. Instead, how we experience the world is always colored by language, as emphasized by Volo\u0161inov (37-38).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Anyway, back to Nietzsche. Right, so, interpretation is best we can do, totally fine by me, but it does mean that what we are in the habit of calling truth<\/em> or objectivity<\/em> are just fairy tales, something we like to tell ourselves so that we can sleep better.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But, okay, so we can\u2019t we be impartial? We can\u2019t we step back and be objective<\/em>? Well, as much as I like to promote taking a step back, there\u2019s no such thing as taking a step back so far that you become impartial and thus objective. What I mean is that it totally makes sense to chill for a moment instead of just going with whatever, like just wait a moment, compose yourself, don\u2019t get so worked up by whatever it is that you\u2019re dealing (and I know, I know, it\u2019s tough, super tough at times), because that allows you to think for a bit longer, to take other perspectives into consideration, as opposed to being self-assured that you know what\u2019s what, like without any hesitation. He (267) also comments on this, explaining much more concisely why we cannot be truly impartial, nor objective:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cIt is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, simply put, as the book title has it, it\u2019s all about the will to power<\/em>, that\u2019s why we<\/em> can\u2019t be impartial, nor objective<\/em>, even if it were possible, even if we didn\u2019t rely on language to make sense of the world, as discussed in relation to Volo\u0161inov\u2019s work. To put that in other, perhaps, more contemporary terms, we have all these desires<\/em> according to which we act. No matter what you do, you cannot suppress them. Okay, maybe you can suppress some of them and maybe you already do that, in the sense that these desires compete with one another, each having this or that perspective, as he (267) puts it, but there\u2019s no way you can put all of them on hold. If you could, well, then I reckon you\u2019d be dead as you\u2019d be no longer driven by anything, no longer striving for anything.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He further addresses subjectivity<\/em>, just in case you missed his point about it also being absurd. For him (267-268), the Cartesian formula of \u2018I think\u2019 is just stupid because it simply takes it for granted that there\u2019s this \u2018I\u2019 that can just cause the thinking to happen, as well as what else one does to happen. He (268) expands on that, noting that, okay, let\u2019s say there\u2019s thinking, but why must there then be a thinker? His (268) answer is that grammar compels us to think this way, that there must be \u201ca doer to every deed.\u201d In his (268), Ren\u00e9 Descartes fails to prove anything about \u201creality in itself<\/em>\u201d, except his own belief in the matter, which is, merely, \u201can apparent<\/em> reality.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The underlying problem here, with truth<\/em> and knowledge<\/em>, is that objectivity<\/em> and subjectivity<\/em> both rely on the same thing, the subject<\/em>, which, for him (268), is something that we\u2019ve come to take for granted, probably because it\u2019s really, really convenient for us. As he (268) puts it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe concept of substance is a consequence of the concept of the subject: not the reverse!\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n So, yeah, subjectivity<\/em> and objectivity<\/em> both hinge on what we are in habit of referring to as the subject<\/em>, the self<\/em>, the \u2018I\u2019. But what happens if we let go of that? Nothing catastrophic. We do just fine without it. It\u2019s just that the sense of one is understood differently, as he (268) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cOne acquires degrees of being, one loses that which has<\/em> being.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n What is this acquisition of degrees of being? Well, he doesn\u2019t use the word here, but it\u2019s becoming<\/em>. One then becomes<\/em> oneself, instead of already being<\/em> oneself. This also applies to just about everything, as noted by him (268):<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cCritique of \u2018reality\u2019: where does the \u2018more or less real,\u2019 the gradation of being in which we believe, lead to?\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n To answer his own question, which I\u2019ve already answered, he (268) states that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe degree to which we feel\u00b7 life and power (logic and coherence of experience) gives us our measure of \u2018being,\u2019 \u2018reality,\u2019 not-appearance.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In other words, the important thing here is that it\u2019s all about becoming<\/em>, that there aren\u2019t these beings<\/em>, things that simply have<\/em> being. In short, it is what it is, not because it has<\/em> this and\/or that being<\/em>, but because it has become<\/em> that way. That\u2019s the reality<\/em> of it all, without any need to think of any of that in terms of truth<\/em> or falsity<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So, what is the subject<\/em> then for him? And is it of any use to us? Well, I\u2019ll let him (268) summarize that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The subject: this is the term for our belief in a unity underlying all the different impulses of the highest feeling of reality[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n The key thing to notice here is that he is indeed calling the subject<\/em> a belief. It is something that we believe in hopes of making sense of reality<\/em>, what I guess he\u2019d (268-269) be willing to call a self-centered reality<\/em>, considering that it all seems to then appear to the subject as if by the subject and for the subject.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To get back on track here, on perspectivism<\/em>, he (273) reminds us that we believe in certain things to the point that we simply take them for granted. For example, we like to think of causality as a given, a law of nature, but it is, as he (273) puts it, \u201ca very well acquired habit of belief\u201d. Such beliefs are, of course, highly useful to us, he (273) does acknowledge that, but they still just beliefs, not truths by any means.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I think this is enough, for now. But what was the point of this essay? Well, think of what you will, of course, and feel free to disagree. If it is of use to you, it is of use to you and if it isn’t, then it isn’t, as I like to tell people. Good for me. Good for you? I don’t know. I guess that depends on your … perspective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I was gonna write another essay on parasitism, not because I had a whole lot to say about that after the previous essay, except that reading Michel Serres\u2019 \u2018Parasite\u2019 also gave me some heavy Baruch Spinoza vibes. I guess that\u2019s worth it\u2019s own essay, but, well, we\u2019ll see if I ever get around to write […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3554,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[318,344,1069],"class_list":["post-5415","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-essays","tag-nietzsche","tag-serres","tag-voloshinov"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5415","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3554"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5415"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5415\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5434,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5415\/revisions\/5434"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5415"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5415"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5415"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}\n
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References<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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