{"id":895,"date":"2018-03-11T13:07:50","date_gmt":"2018-03-11T13:07:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/?p=895"},"modified":"2024-06-16T20:19:31","modified_gmt":"2024-06-16T20:19:31","slug":"say-swiss-cheese","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/2018\/03\/11\/say-swiss-cheese\/","title":{"rendered":"Say Swiss Cheese!"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

I\u2019ve been a bit busy lately, now working as a researcher in a project. It\u2019s not exactly what I do in my own research, but when it comes theory<\/em>, it\u2019s still within my reach and pushes me to use it in different context, as well as to expand my reading into areas where others tend to make use of the same authors I happen to read, namely Foucault. I ended up reading Lilie Chouliaraki\u2019s book \u2018Spectatorship of Suffering\u2019, which led me to Bent Flyvbjerg\u2019s book \u2018Making Social Science Matter\u2019. That led me to read a bit by Michel Foucault. I also ended up reading Gerard Delanty\u2019s book \u2018Modernity and Postmodernity: Knowledge, Power and the Self\u2019 as some of the terms used by Chouliaraki reminded me of Immanuel Kant\u2019s work when it comes to aesthetics. Anyway, I intentionally used the word theory <\/em>there in the second sentence, because I wanted to write about theory. When I was writing an essay on ocularcentrism<\/em>, privileging vision <\/em>over other senses, I remember reading Jacques Derrida mentioning the origin of the word theory<\/em>, which, to be honest, I had never even thought of before that, not in English, not in Finnish, not in any language. I\u2019m unsure if this is it, but I was able to trace this to the notes section of \u2018Writing and Difference\u2019, where it is noted (398) that Derrida points to the origin of the word, \u201cfrom theorein: to look at, behold\u201d. This was not of particular interest at that point, beyond the marvel that what is known as theory<\/em>, this abstract <\/em>cut from the world in your head contemplation, has to do with seeing<\/em>, as it is indicated in a dictionary, such as the Oxford English Dictionary (OED, s.v. \u201ctheory\u201d, n.):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[A]ncient Greek \u03b8\u03b5\u03c9\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 action of viewing, contemplation, sight, spectacle, in Hellenistic Greek also speculation, theory\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

It’s fascinating how what tends to be considered as abstract <\/em>thinking actually has to do with something as mundane and practical <\/em>as seeing<\/em>. Anyway, that\u2019s actually just a side note to theory <\/em>as this probably matters not to most people. Instead, as I was reading Flyvbjerg\u2019s book, more specifically the chapter on Aristotle and Foucault, aptly titled \u2018Empowering Aristotle\u2019, I started thinking something I came across a while ago, something I had read already in the past. That happened to be an interview that took place in 1972, translated into English as a transcript under the title \u2018Intellectuals and Power\u2019. In that interview Foucault and Gilles Deleuze discuss the role of an intellectual<\/em>, as the title already suggests. Here I\u2019m not as interested in the role of the intellectual<\/em>, but what they mean by theory<\/em>. It\u2019s of course tied to the role of the intellectual<\/em>, but that\u2019s not the main point here. I covered that aspect more in my previous essay, so I won\u2019t be addressing it much here. Anyway, early in the interview Deleuze (205) states:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cAt one time, practice was considered an application of theory, a consequence; at other times, it had an opposite sense and it was thought to inspire theory, to be indispensable for the creation of future theoretical forms.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, in other words, theory <\/em>is generally thought to be separate yet linked to practice<\/em>. There\u2019s nothing particularly controversial here. Anyway, Deleuze (205) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cIn any event, their relationship was understood in terms of a process of totalization.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Again, in other words, there was always this grand scheme of things, coming up with a better, clearer or accurate understanding of something. One would either apply theory <\/em>and attempt to make it better, if not both. Deleuze (205), who also seems to be speaking on behalf of Foucault, counters this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cFor us, however, the question is seen in a different light. The relationship between theory and practice are far more partial and fragmentary.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In other words, Deleuze does not hold theory <\/em>to be a totality<\/em>, as he already mentioned. He (205-206) continues:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cOn one side, a theory is always local and related to a limited field, and it is applied in another sphere, more or less distant from it. The relationship which holds in the application of a theory is never one of resemblance.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Moving on to practice <\/em>then, he (206) comments:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cPractice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one practice to another. No theory can develop without eventually encountering a wall, and practice is necessary for piercing this wall.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Together then, he (206) argues while commenting the role of the intellectual <\/em>in society<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cWho speaks and acts? It is always a multiplicity, even within the person who speaks and acts. All of us are \u2018groupuscules\u2019. Representation no longer exists; there\u2019s only action \u2013 theoretical action and practical action which serve as relays and form networks.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Okay, that might not work for you. Deleuze is not exactly easy to come to terms with unless you are familiar with his parlance. Foucault (208) is far more clear on this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[T]heory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice. \u2026 [I]t is local and regional, as you said, and not totalizing.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, in summary, we can’t think of this as either or, as theory <\/em>vs. practice<\/em>. Deleuze (208) responds to Foucault:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cPrecisely. A theory is exactly like a box of tools. It has nothing to do with the signifier. It must be useful. It must function. And not for itself.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In other words, theory <\/em>is practical <\/em>and in reverse, practice <\/em>is theoretical<\/em>. To clarify one bit here, it’s unlike signifier <\/em>because, as Deleuze holds it, signifier <\/em>never actually refers to any signified <\/em>but another signifier <\/em>in a never ending chain of signification<\/em>. I actually think it\u2019s highly comical to think otherwise. You can\u2019t have one without the other. It makes me wonder if there is a reason to ever consider something as either theoretical <\/em>or practical<\/em>. Say, if I theoretize <\/em>something and make up an example for it, is that not practical<\/em>? Am I not doing it right now? I reckon I am, theoritizing<\/em>, thinking out loud, except on paper, or so to speak, not that this involves speaking or paper, but I take it you know what I mean. Is it only practical <\/em>when it is manifested <\/em>in the real world, or, well, supposed real world. What is real<\/em>? Isn\u2019t this part of what is real<\/em>? How would this be unreal<\/em>? Here I am, writing, pondering, contemplating, whatever you want to call it, but is this not me pressing buttons on a keyboard? Am I not doing something which is actually meshed in practice<\/em>? Conversely, if I do something, something that is typically deemed practical<\/em>, very hands on if you will, say, shoot a puck at a local rink, is it only practical<\/em>? I\u2019ve never been super good at it and as a kid I\u2019d always wrist it instead, not that I was that good at that either. I actually was more of a playmaker, setting others for the shots. Anyway, as an adult I can do it alright, having practiced <\/em>it enough. Fair enough, you could just point out that it\u2019s all about the physics involved. Indeed it is, but I never took up a physics textbook or watched a related documentary and then went to apply the theory <\/em>at the rink. I tried different things, different swings, stepped in differently, leaned on to it differently, had my hands positioned differently etc. You name it, I did it. By doing that, all that in practice<\/em>, did I not engage in theoretizing<\/em>? Did I not gradually get the gist of it, how to use my body in it effectively? For me, learning to do it was not some mental armchair exercise, pondering how it should work, then simply applying that to great satisfaction and achievement. I came up with a theory <\/em>by doing <\/em>something, constructing it on the basis of various experiences<\/em>. I didn\u2019t have a flawed understanding of physics that simply needed application and certain fine tuning according to its application. I figured out how to make use of my body, on the spot. Of course, it\u2019s not that I don\u2019t know how to make use of my body and all things involved, namely the ice, a stick and a puck. You could say that I already had theoreticized<\/em> something, but that\u2019s sort of the point. It\u2019s all very localized, knowing <\/em>something, at least sort of, and making use of it<\/em> and extending it elsewhere. It\u2019s also the other way around, doing something practical<\/em>, which pushes your theory <\/em>of this or that into certain directions. It\u2019s the same with walking. I don\u2019t need a grand theory <\/em>of walking, explaining all the bits that go into it in order to walk and have an understanding how that is. It\u2019s the same the other way around, I don\u2019t need to do all kinds of set up experiments related to everything that bears relevance to walking in order to come up with a grand theory <\/em>explaining it, as well as other things. So, as Deleuze (205-206) points out, theory <\/em>is always local, applicable in a limited sense, not something grand, all encompassing and universally <\/em>applicable. So, right, reiterating what Foucault (208) states, theory <\/em>is practice<\/em>. This is also the point Deleuze (208) makes in reference to Marcel Proust who he characterizes as someone known as a \u201cpure intellectual\u201d:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[I]t was Proust \u2026 who said it so clearly: treat my book as a pair of glasses directed to the outside; if they don\u2019t suit you, find another pair[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Deleuze (208) is very adamant on this, noting that theory <\/em>is worthless if it isn\u2019t functional<\/em>, if it doesn\u2019t bear relevance outside itself, as already noted in an earlier quote. Also, returning to an earlier point made by Foucault (208), theory <\/em>\u201cdoes not express, translate, or serve to apply practice\u201d because it is practice<\/em>. In other words, it\u2019s instrumental<\/em>, as explained by Deleuze (208):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cA theory does not totalize; it is an instrument for multiplication and it also multiplies itself.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

What it is opposed to then, Deleuze (208) adds, in reference to Foucault:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cIt is in the nature of power to totalize and it is your position, and one I fully agree with, that theory is by nature opposed to power. As soon as a theory is enmeshed in a particular point, we realize that it will never possess the slightest practical importance unless it can erupt in a totally different area.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Of course, it\u2019s worth noting that Foucault and Deleuze are discussing much more pressing matters than I am, explaining this with my silly examples. I acknowledge that it\u2019s a bit silly to explain shooting a puck, something I do for leisure, when they are discussing how state institutions<\/em> apply totalized theories <\/em>on individuals<\/em>. The point on totalizing <\/em>applies nonetheless. As their discussion on prison reform bleeds into other institutions<\/em>, namely those of the education system, something that I also research, it\u2019s worth letting them further explain it. The crux in this discussion is that theory <\/em>is generally seen as totalized <\/em>and applied top-down<\/em>. Reforming it is seen as beside the point, tinkering with something, not really addressing the issue, experts <\/em>talking on behalf of others, regardless of whether the people wish to be represented by experts<\/em>. Deleuze (209) states:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cIf the protests of children were heard in kindergarten, if their questions were attended to, it would be enough to explode the entire educational system.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Now, it\u2019s worth noting that this is from the early 1970s and in reference to French educational system. So there\u2019s that and you have to take it into account. I really can\u2019t comment on how it was back then, nor how it is these days. That said, the discussion is still relevant as it deals with the role of intellectuals<\/em>, or experts<\/em>, and whether the people that go through the system should or shouldn\u2019t have a say in how it functions<\/em>. This then bears relevance to theory<\/em>. There is a theory <\/em>of education, how people ought to be educated. This is then applied in the educational system. When it comes to reform, it\u2019s a mere revision of an existing theory<\/em>, as indicated by Deleuze (208). It ignores those involved and bears little relevance to practice<\/em>. Those who know better know better because they know better.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Foucault\u2019s and Deleuze\u2019s views on theory <\/em>should now be quite evident. In summary, they oppose totalized <\/em>and universalized theory <\/em>that exists by itself, not to mention for itself, to be subsequently applied in practice<\/em>. Moreover, they oppose such view on theory <\/em>not only because theory <\/em>is seen as distinct from practice<\/em>, but because it elevates the intellectual<\/em>, the expert<\/em>, the one who theorizes<\/em>, above others, telling how it is on their behalf. Foucault (207-208) actually points out that the intellectuals <\/em>should be aware of their position<\/em>, how they can be made use of by others. This is something that I came across in Flyvbjerg\u2019s (128) \u2018Making Social Science Matter\u2019 and led me to read Foucault’s \u2018Politics and Ethics: An Interview\u2019. In this interview, itself actually a compilation of question posed by a number of other authors, Foucault (373-374) points out that anything can be used for whatever purposes, including purposes that are in contradiction of the original purposes:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201c[T]he \u2018best\u2019 theories do not constitute a very effective protection against disastrous political choices; certain great themes such as \u2018humanism\u2019 can be used to any end whatever[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Now, Foucault is not saying that just because anything can be spun into something, even to its polar opposite, that theory <\/em>doesn\u2019t matter, whatever, chuck it, can\u2019t be bothered or the like. He (374) is actually very clear on that. He (374) is hardly against theory<\/em>. He\u2019s (374) rather concerned about coming up with great theories <\/em>that do seem to work on paper but then fail in practice<\/em>. He (374) points out that theory <\/em>requires \u201ca demanding, prudent, \u2018experimental\u2019 attitude\u201d and being aware of how thinking <\/em>and saying <\/em>are linked to doing<\/em>. He (374) clarifies his view:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cIf I have insisted on all this \u2018practice,\u2019 it has not been in order to \u2018apply\u2019 ideas, but in order to put them to the test and modify them.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

So, as Deleuze (206) puts it in the interview with Foucault, \u201c[p]ractice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one practice to another\u201d and theory <\/em>can\u2019t develop without having practice <\/em>poke holes in it. I have experienced this for sure in my own research. For example, I had certain preconceptions in the initial stages of data gathering, but as I working in the field, practice <\/em>poked so many holes into my theory <\/em>that it ended up being Swiss cheese. That meant I had to go back to the drawing board, adjust accordingly and come up with something new instead. To use a more concrete example, I just wasn\u2019t happy with annotating my data as authored by this or that participant. It just made little sense when it was evident that, for example, a poster on a wall was designed <\/em>by some external entity, such as a company that is in the business of making teaching materials, yet that entity is not responsible for it being issued on that wall. They don\u2019t have that kind of control. Now, someone could point out that the designer <\/em>is irrelevant, only the issuer <\/em>matters. Fair enough, it sort of makes sense, yet, it seems obvious to me that if you let others create content for you, that you just make use of, then you are yielding control of its contents to someone else. Of course, you are still in control of what gets issued, but by not doing the materials yourself you are forced to select from a finite number of options. Plus, one way or another you grant influence to others. As a result, I had to modify the agency <\/em>category in my own research, splitting it to designer <\/em>and issuer<\/em>. I also included an audience <\/em>category in order to address the intended audience<\/em>. Of course, of course that did not go well down in review, because I did something that was unorthodox in theory<\/em>, despite being blatantly obvious in practice<\/em>. Fair enough, some of it needed some rewording, there\u2019s that, as well as exemplifying it. Then again, did I really need photographic evidence to support my claim? Absolutely not. For me, this strikes at the core of this theory <\/em>vs. practice <\/em>hubbub. If I can explain here, for example, that, as in the poster example that I just provided, whoever designed <\/em>or created <\/em>something is not necessarily the same person or entity responsible for its placement <\/em>somewhere, why is it that I need to provide further evidence of it? This thought process, as actualized by me by poking at pieces of plastic on a plastic board, how is it not sufficient? How is it outside practice<\/em>? I reckon it\u2019s very much of this world, as I pointed out earlier on. There\u2019s nothing unreal <\/em>to it. If I can pose this as a practical problem<\/em>, without any evidence beyond what is posed, in writing, how is it not valid? Is the parallel that I then drew between Derrida\u2019s example of postcard, as discussed in \u2018The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond\u2019 and \u2018Limited Inc.\u2019, necessary? No, it is not, no offense to Derrida. I just happened to stumble across the same issue as he did when he pointed out that anyone can write anything and have someone else put their signature <\/em>on it as if they had written it. The same with the audience<\/em>. A postcard is addressed to someone, but it can be potentially read by anyone. These features are hardly limited to postcards though, not that Derrida stated that these are exclusively related to them. That\u2019d be hilarious if he did. This applies also here. These essays could nominally be under my name, yet created by someone else. There\u2019s no way to actually prove that it\u2019s me who wrote these, no matter that the system requires a personal login. Someone could be using my credentials. How would you know? You wouldn\u2019t, simple as that. This could be extended to the teleportation issue. If someone is teleported from one place to another, hypothetically that is, is that person still the same person or a copy of the person who no longer exists, a simulacrum<\/em>? I reckon it makes no difference really, even if it sort of does. The clone or supposed clone isn\u2019t aware of being a simulacrum<\/em>, in this case an exact copy of something without an origin to point to. That\u2019s probably too hypothetical, but really, it\u2019s the same question you could ask yourself when you wake up in the morning. You wouldn\u2019t know the difference, clone or no clone, so you don\u2019t ask such questions. Okay, fair enough, getting back on track here, I have no intent to deceive, nor that I would want others meddling with what I do for that matter, so you have my word that it\u2019s me, unless stated otherwise. When it comes to audience <\/em>then, well, I reckon this is intended <\/em>for people interested in, erm, in landscapes <\/em>and discourse<\/em>, yet as far as I know it can be read by anyone and that\u2019s how I like it. No closed doors, no excuses for as to why it should be accessible only to supposed intellectuals <\/em>or experts<\/em>, as regulated by them in conformity <\/em>to some established standardized practices<\/em> that are held as valid <\/em>despite their arbitrariness<\/em>. If someone finds what I write useful, well, like with Proust, as explained by Deleuze (208), good, if not, too bad, find something else to read then. Maybe no one reads this. It doesn\u2019t matter to me really, one way or another. This is all very practical <\/em>to me, despite seeming all super theoretical <\/em>and esoteric to others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I\u2019ve been called \u2018the theory guy\u2019 and the like because I keep engaging with it, writing about it and spending time explaining it in presentations, probably to an extent people are overwhelmed by it. Now, for me, on the contrary, I often find presentations and papers by others underwhelming in this regard. I keep thinking to myself, what\u2019s the premise to this, where\u2019s the theory<\/em>? Why is it that we are skipping the bits that explain why this is relevant? Why is it that we are jumping to explaining the applied methods <\/em>without first explaining what it is that this is grounded upon? Am I just supposed to know what the theoretical <\/em>foundation is without any explanation? In the terms used by Deleuze and Guattari (7) in \u2018What Is Philosophy?\u2019, what is the field or the plane <\/em>that all this is based on? I guess this sets me apart from others or I guess I should say many others as it\u2019s unlikely that I\u2019m the only one thinking this way, even if that\u2019s only a handful of other people. I don\u2019t work with a given <\/em>or axiomatic <\/em>premise, assuming that there are universals<\/em>. That\u2019s not to say that I think that there aren\u2019t any historical givens<\/em>, certain premises that are held as true<\/em>, but that\u2019s not the same thing, at all. Universals <\/em>and givens <\/em>are handy in the sense that you can always refer back to them for support, to state that you are right about this or that because \u2026 you are, but I just find that to be a cop out. It may well be that there are universals<\/em>, that some things are as they are, constant<\/em>, forever <\/em>and always <\/em>and not just approximately so, fair enough, but at least I can\u2019t verify them as such and I reckon others can\u2019t either. Okay, maybe the premise is not as important when one is dealing with something that isn\u2019t fixed in place, that is to say it having less to do with whatever is examined, so the examination holds well if it\u2019s this or that premise. However, as my own research has everything to do with space <\/em>and more broadly speaking reality<\/em>, it\u2019s kind of hard to ignore the issue as some theoretical <\/em>trifle. It seems a bit dishonest not to address how everything fits in place to begin with when that\u2019s central in what you engage with. Of course, if you are a universalist <\/em>or an objectivist <\/em>(feel free to come up with other monikers) then you obviously don\u2019t even feel like addressing this as stating that there is a premise to be stated already puts that premise into question, considering that it\u2019s you who is positing it. At least I think it would make sense to simply ignore it, not that it works for me though. I can only state that something appears <\/em>to be the case, which may well be the case, but I cannot know for sure as that\u2019s beyond me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When it comes to theory<\/em>, I keep getting asked why you bring this or that up? For example, I\u2019ve been asked why I bring up the importance of calculus for Deleuze. Now, I\u2019m not blaming anyone. It must seem a bit of a stretch to bring it up. However, if you\u2019ve read Deleuze, it\u2019s more or less the example of examples for him when it comes to explaining how reality functions<\/em>. I usually start with explaining the noumena<\/em>\/phenomena <\/em>as explained by Kant, then shift from that to the virtual<\/em>\/actual <\/em>as explained by Deleuze because while the two are not the same, I think understanding how Deleuze defines real as virtual<\/em>\/actual <\/em>is easier to comprehend if you can comprehend how Kant works with the noumena<\/em>\/phenomena <\/em>as that\u2019s still very thingified<\/em>, considering that he speaks of the thing-in-itself<\/em>. Deleuze goes one step further, so what he would speak of as the noumena<\/em>, the virtual<\/em>, is not how something<\/em> is beyond our observation and understanding of it. That\u2019s already assuming that the phenomenal<\/em>, how we observe whatever it is as something<\/em> is actually a distinct entity, this or that. For example, as we observe the phenomenon <\/em>of a rock, the noumenon<\/em>, the thing-in-itself<\/em>, whatever it is, with or without a label, is unknowable. It may well be that it is what it is, say a rock, but we can\u2019t be sure. Now, regardless of whether we are sure or not, we are speaking of what we don\u2019t know as some distinct entity. When it comes to Deleuze then, this is not at all clear. He is keen on addressing how what comes to appear <\/em>to us as a distinct entity comes to appear <\/em>as such. In other words, he\u2019s interested in how something is actualized <\/em>as this or that, not whether it is this or that. Perhaps I\u2019m being unkind to Kant. It\u2019s hard to say whether he is stating that whatever we perceive as something is actually a distinct entity or not, because we can\u2019t know for sure just based on the appearance <\/em>of it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Speaking of things<\/em>, it\u2019s probably because I\u2019ve read Kenneth Olwig\u2019s work on landscapes <\/em>where this is brought up, albeit in a different context, but the word itself warrants further attention. In contemporary parlance it generally has to with what a dictionary (OED, s.v. \u201cthing\u201d, n.1<\/sup>) refers to as \u201c[a]n entity of any kind\u201d, existing individually. However, the word (OED, s.v. \u201cthing\u201d, n.1<\/sup>) is also indicated as meaning \u201c[a] meeting, or the matter or business considered by it, and derived by senses.\u201d A meeting then (OED, s.v. \u201cmeeting\u201d, n.) is defined as \u201crelating to the gathering together of people\u201d. For me, this already undercuts thing <\/em>as something (haha, it\u2019s so hard not to use that word) objectively <\/em>so. Instead, to me, it appears <\/em>that what we call a thing<\/em>, typically with some label, for example a rock, a chair or a table (feel free to add your thing <\/em>of preference), is because we\u2019ve agreed to do so, not because it objectively <\/em>is so. This then reminds me of Foucault\u2019s (49) definition of discourse <\/em>in \u2018The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language\u2019 as pertaining to \u201cpractices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.\u201d It\u2019s actually a bit ironic that we don\u2019t think of things <\/em>as having been agreed upon, for example in some meeting<\/em>, despite it being indicated as such in its etymology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anyway, to wrap things <\/em>up, this essay is just on something that I came across doing other things<\/em>. It might explain to people why I focus so much on theory <\/em>and not on practice<\/em>. It\u2019s because for me they are not at all neat and discrete entities to be held apart from one another. They typically are considered separate from one another, but that\u2019s not how I roll and I fear you are missing the point if you cannot connect the dots, see how theory <\/em>is necessary in practice <\/em>and how practice <\/em>is necessary in theory<\/em>. For me, it\u2019s all very real <\/em>and whatever I can put into words are of this world, including made up mock examples. I\u2019m very amused when people go for arguments such as pics or it didn\u2019t happen and\/or please cite some titan of science to back this up, otherwise this is merely abstract <\/em>and theoretical<\/em>. Moreover, it’s worth emphasizing that I don\u2019t want to hold theory <\/em>in some grand position, stating that this is how it is, for sure, and this is how it must be. I cringe when people make universalist <\/em>or humanist <\/em>appeals, even when it is done (supposedly) for good purpose. Why? Well, as discussed by Foucault (373-374) in \u2018Politics and Ethics: An Interview\u2019, it doesn\u2019t take much ingenuity to hijack such appeals and use them against people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
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    I\u2019ve been a bit busy lately, now working as a researcher in a project. It\u2019s not exactly what I do in my own research, but when it comes theory, it\u2019s still within my reach and pushes me to use it in different context, as well as to expand my reading into areas where others tend […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3554,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[692,695,71,168,698,48,356,701],"class_list":["post-895","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-essays","tag-chouliaraki","tag-delanty","tag-deleuze","tag-derrida","tag-flyvbjerg","tag-foucault","tag-kant","tag-proust"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/895","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3554"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=895"}],"version-history":[{"count":15,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/895\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5477,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/895\/revisions\/5477"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=895"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=895"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/landd\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=895"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}