What I have in store this time is not like in the previous essay which included some polemical elements. This is probably rather drab in comparison to it. Of course, what\u2019s interesting and what\u2019s not, what\u2019s polemical and what\u2019s not, etc. depends on people. I find this quite fascinating, but I also reckon that for many this is as boring as it gets. I was actually not even going to write on this, addressing the plateau titled \u20187000 B.C.: Apparatus of Capture\u2019 in \u2018A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia\u2019, but I changed my mind while reading it, like you should, just reading it, not getting stuck on every little fine detail. What I do first is just read, then doing another reading, one that is a close reading or at least closer reading than the initial one. Anyway, I changed my mind because I was sort of familiar with what Gilles Deleuze and F\u00e9lix Guattari are on about, not because I\u2019m an expert in what they discuss, far from such, but because I happened to come across the same formulations in a grand strategy game, \u2018Crusader Kings II\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Anyway, not unlike at the beginning of other plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari (424) start abruptly, following Georges Dum\u00e9zil in \u2018Mitra-Varuna\u2019, proposing that \u201c[p]olitical sovereignty has two poles\u201d, the first pole being occupied by:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cthe fearsome magician-emperor, operating by capture, bonds, knots, and nets[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
They (424) also call the magician-emperors<\/em> \u201cOne-Eyed men<\/em>\u201d who \u201cemit[] from their single eye signs that capture, tie knots at a distance.\u201d If you are confused by this, look up Odin, who, indeed is known as one-eyed. Anyway, they (424) indicate that the second pole is occupied by:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cthe jurist-priest-king, proceeding by treaties, pacts, contracts[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
They (424) also call the jurist-priest-kings<\/em> the \u201cOne-Armed<\/em> men who raise their single arm as an element of right and technology, the law and the tool.\u201d If you are puzzled by this, look up T\u00fdr and you\u2019ll notice that he is indeed often depicted as an amputee. As listed by the two (424), another one you can look up is Gaius Mucius Scaevola, known for thrusting his right hand into a fire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
They (424) add that outside or between the two poles of political sovereignty<\/em> is war. They (425) clarify that this does not mean that neither statesmen, the one-eyed emperors<\/em> and the one-armed jurist-kings<\/em>, don\u2019t get involved in or mixed up with war. They (425) elaborate that the emperor <\/em>wages war by sending others, those who serve him, to battle and in the rare occasion that the emperor <\/em>appears on the battlefield he doesn\u2019t use weapons but rather captures <\/em>and binds <\/em>the battle with his eye<\/em>. In contrast, they (425) add that the jurist-king<\/em> organizes <\/em>war, making it principled<\/em>, regimented <\/em>and subordinated <\/em>in order for it to serve other purposes, turning the war machine<\/em> into a state apparatus<\/em>, what is generally known as an army. This was already mentioned on the plateau on segmentarity<\/em>, how as part of a state <\/em>the war machine<\/em> becomes sedentary <\/em>and its function is reduced to only to waging war. It\u2019s worth noting that (425) Deleuze and Guattari are not saying that the war machine<\/em> does not involve war and what comes with it, violence, on its own. It\u2019s rather that, as they (425) argue, once appropriated by the state<\/em>, by either having been made to serve the emperor <\/em>or to enter an alliance with the jurist-king<\/em>, the war machine<\/em> is elevated to another level of death and destruction. They (425) link this back to being One-Eyed<\/em> or One-Armed<\/em>, that is to say mutilated<\/em>, arguing that such is the consequence of war but also a necessary condition,<\/em> a presupposition of state organization<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Deleuze and Guattari (426) state that if the two poles <\/em>and what\u2019s in the middle are considered together, they can presented as series of 1, 2 and 3. So, on one hand, sorry eye<\/em>, one (1) is marked by, for example, Odin, known for lacking an eye<\/em>, who wishes to hold Fenrir in a magic bond<\/em>. Fenrir, the wolf of war<\/em>, is two (2) in the series and not exactly keen on being bound<\/em>. To appease Fenrir, the third (3) in the series, T\u00fdr offers his hand as a hostage <\/em>and places his hand in Fenrir\u2019s mouth. This is how T\u00fdr becomes one handed<\/em>. They (426) offer another example in which Publius Horatius \u2018Cocles\u2019, also known for lacking an eye<\/em>, hence the agnomen \u2018Cocles\u2019, defends a crucial bridge against the Etruscans, who then lay siege, only to be appeased by Gaius Mucius \u2018Scaevola\u2019 who burns his hand in order to persuade the Etruscans to abandon the siege and a sign a pact<\/em>. They offer (426) yet another example through the works of Marcel Detienne (see notes, 564), explaining that the ancient Greeks had something similar going on as sovereigns had their war machines<\/em>, their warriors, not originating with the sovereigns<\/em>, the warriors having their own rules, yet being tied <\/em>to the sovereigns<\/em>, only to be reformed <\/em>into hoplites, armies of citizen-soldiers. The function of the second in the series, the war machine<\/em>, is thus, according to the two (426), to intervene, to \u201cassur[e] and necessitat[e] the passage from one [pole] to the other [pole].\u201d However, they (427) insist that this schema is not to be taken as having a causal <\/em>meaning. To be more specific, they (427) clarify that the war machine<\/em> is not prebaked into the system and while it is presented as in the middle, as in the milieu<\/em>, it is actually exterior to it and thus in opposition <\/em>of it. They (427) add that if it\u2019s part of the system<\/em>, then it has become part of it, either through a bond <\/em>or a pact<\/em>. So, as they (427) explain, even when the war machine<\/em> intervenes in the affairs of either poles<\/em>, it\u2019s in conjunction with other factors, thus not simply the one and only factor in any passage from pole <\/em>to pole<\/em>, no matter which way it swings. Moreover, they (427) emphasize that if and when such swing occurs from one pole <\/em>to the other pole<\/em>, the opposite pole <\/em>does not cease to exist by collapsing to the other. They (427) add that what\u2019s in the middle<\/em>, what\u2019s interior<\/em>, the milieu <\/em>also subsists. Fitting the title of the plateau then, what appears in the middle<\/em>, no matter whether it\u2019s originally interior <\/em>(e.g. money, property) or exterior <\/em>(the war machine<\/em>) to it, is what they (427) call capture<\/em>, that is to say what is captured<\/em>. What\u2019s particularly important in this formulation is that it\u2019s all already there and the series is not a linear progression in which what was, 1-2 or 2-3, cease to exist after the system evolves. Because of this, they (427) state that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cWe are always brought back to the idea of a State that comes into the world fully formed and rises up in a single stroke, the unconditioned Urstaat<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
I probably just spoiled the next part of the plateau by stating that the poles <\/em>and what\u2019s in the middle <\/em>are not treated preferentially by the two. Anyway, to contextualize the first pole<\/em>, they (427) refer to it as the imperial <\/em>or despotic pole of capture<\/em>. If you\u2019ve read other plateaus, then you may be quite familiar with all things imperial <\/em>and despotic<\/em>, making this plateau easier to comprehend, even if the examples they use assume quite a bit of knowledge. The good thing is, of course, that unlike in the early 1980s or even the late 1980s when the translation came out, you can look up these examples in a matter of minutes, instead of having to take their word or spending time in libraries, hoping that they have such and such book. They (427-428) go all the way back to Neolithic and Paleolithic times, but getting stuck on the details here is not that important, well, unless you are into such, of course. What\u2019s important here is that an emperor<\/em>, a despot overcodes <\/em>primitive communities, relegating everything into the sole possession of the emperor<\/em>. In other words, everything is the property of the empire<\/em>, ruled by the emperor<\/em>. They (428) emphasize that this property is, in fact, public property, albeit under the sole ownership of the emperor<\/em>. However, as they (428) clarify, everyone has stake in the public property. What this means is that as everything is public property of the emperor<\/em>, what one has stake <\/em>in is leased to them in exchange for fealty <\/em>to the emperor<\/em>. Now, if you\u2019ve played Crusader Kings II, or its predecessor, this is very familiar to you. This is feudalism <\/em>in a nutshell. The one on top, the emperor<\/em>, for example the Byzantine Emperor, is the one to whom everyone else submits to. This makes the emperor <\/em>their liege <\/em>and those under him his vassals<\/em>. The liege <\/em>grants those who swear fealty <\/em>to him (could also be her, but typically him, if you know your history) certain holdings in exchange of rent<\/em>, typically levy and\/or tax which may be produce or money. It is in this sense that it\u2019s easy to understand how the emperor<\/em>, one-eyed<\/em> or not, makes use of soldiers not of his own. Everything in the empire <\/em>is captured <\/em>by the emperor<\/em>. It\u2019s important to understand that those who swear fealty <\/em>to the emperor<\/em>, for example dukes<\/em>, have their own vassals<\/em>, for example, counts<\/em>, who in turn have their own vassals<\/em>, for example barons <\/em>and so on. At the bottom are the everyday people<\/em>, the peasants<\/em>, who work on the land <\/em>in exchange for a certain share <\/em>that goes to their liege<\/em>. It\u2019s worth emphasizing that none of these vassals <\/em>own the land <\/em>and the liege<\/em>, the emperor <\/em>in particular, may choose to revoke one\u2019s stake <\/em>in the public property if they fail to provide rent<\/em>. It\u2019s also worth noting that, as explained by the two (428), this bond <\/em>to the one on top is not a contract <\/em>between the parties, it\u2019s not something that you opt in or out. Opting out is only an option if you are able to challenge the liege<\/em>. Of course, this is already going a bit further here. How this works then depends on, of course, how centralized <\/em>or decentralized <\/em>the system <\/em>is. The more centralized <\/em>the system <\/em>is, the more the one on top can exercise power<\/em> over the functionaries<\/em>. Conversely, the less centralized<\/em> the system <\/em>is, the less the one on top can exercise power<\/em> over the functionaries<\/em>. Anyway, in summary, this is what the two (428) call \u201cthe paradigm<\/em> of the bond, the knot\u201d, \u201cregime of the nexum<\/em>, the bond\u201d and \u201cthe system of machinic enslavement<\/em>[.]\u201d It operates by what they (433) call intraconsistency<\/em>, making everything within resonate <\/em>with the center<\/em>, by stratifying <\/em>and hierarchizing<\/em>, just as I\u2019ve explained in some of the previous essays.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Jumping to the second pole<\/em>, Deleuze and Guattari (432) argue that if the first pole <\/em>is marked by the palace<\/em>, involving a centralized <\/em>and hierarchic state system<\/em> with one on the top, the second pole <\/em>is marked by the town<\/em>, existing \u201conly as a function of circulation, and of circuits\u201d being created by the circuits <\/em>but also creating circuits<\/em>. So, as they explain (432), towns <\/em>are points in a network <\/em>of roads connecting towns<\/em>. Moreover, as they (432) add, they are also often cut off from what lies outside the points in the network<\/em>, the countryside<\/em>. They (432) provide examples, including but not limited to the Pelasgians, the Phoenicians, the Greeks and the Carthagians. Now, they (432) emphasize roads <\/em>as the correlates to the town<\/em>, as the link between them, but it\u2019s also worth noting that the towns <\/em>are also connected to another by being located on the coast, having access to sea. For example, think of the maritime republics<\/em>, such as Venice, Genoa, Pisa and Amalfi. Among others, we could add the Hanseatic League here as well, as indicated in the notes (565). Speaking of notes, it\u2019s emphasized there (565) that the town <\/em>does not work the same way as the state<\/em>, resulting in a lack of functionaries <\/em>(vassals<\/em>), armies as well as legal status. In other words, it\u2019s hard to describe the town <\/em>or the republic <\/em>in the terms of the state <\/em>because it works very differently from the state<\/em>. Again, if you\u2019ve played Crusader Kings II, you\u2019ll be quite familiar with this. Now, it\u2019s worth noting here that as they (432-433) juxtapose the town <\/em>with the palace<\/em>, they inevitably cast the town <\/em>in a positive light. However, they (432-433) do address this, noting that the town \u201chas egalitarian pretensions\u201d, yet they wonder, in contrast to the state<\/em>, \u201cwhere the greatest civil violence resides?\u201d In other words, while the town <\/em>may have plenty of potential, it may take all kinds of forms, \u201ctyrannical, democratic, oligarchic, aristocratic\u201d, as noted by the two (432). Once again, if you\u2019ve played CK II, you\u2019ll know that the republics <\/em>are not exactly the embodiment of peace, love and understanding. Of course, if you juxtapose them with the feudal entities<\/em>, then, well, yes, they do appear far more fair than, for example, a kingdom. You have to be at least a bit naive to think that any kind of monarchy is good for you, unless you happen to be an essential part of that monarchy that is, of course. In this sense a republic <\/em>is way better to begin with, albeit that\u2019s with emphasis on the to begin with part as there\u2019s no telling how it\u2019ll end up operating. In summary, this system is one of transconsistency<\/em>, of the network<\/em>, as explained by the two (432).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The system<\/em>, or, well, rather the lack thereof, is what Deleuze and Guattari (428) call primitive <\/em>hunter-gatherer societies<\/em>. In the game this is tribalism, albeit this already includes agriculture, which Deleuze and Guattari (428) associate with the state<\/em>. To be more specific, explaining this, unlike Marx, Deleuze and Guattari (428) argue that \u201c[i]t is no longer the State that presupposes advanced agricultural communities and developed forces of production.\u201d Instead, they (428-429) argue that \u201cthe State is established directly in a milieu of hunter-gatherers having no prior agriculture or metallurgy, and it is the State that creates agriculture, animal raising, and metallurgy[.]\u201d They (429) then add that \u201cit does so first on its own soil, then imposes them upon the surrounding world.\u201d Similarly, on the other pole<\/em>, they (429) state that country <\/em>is progressively created by the town<\/em>, not the other way around. In short, in both cases it\u2019s exactly the other way around than what is typically understood as having occurred. Returning to address the primitive societies<\/em>, they (429-430) state that state<\/em>, as well as the town<\/em>, exist simultaneously, and therefore stating that primitive societies<\/em> existed prior to the two other \u201cis an ethnological dream.\u201d The two (430) elaborate what results from this is an impossibility of economic evolutionism<\/em>, in which there\u2019s a movement from hunter-gatherers to animal breeders, then to farmers-industrialists. Instead, they (431) argue that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cThese societies simultaneously have vectors moving in the direction of the State, mechanisms warding it off, and a point of convergence that is repelled, set outside, as fast it is approached. To ward off is also anticipate.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
That\u2019s the gist of it, same with regards to the town<\/em>, but we\u2019ll get to that later. Anyway, they (431) continue:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cOf course, it is not at all in the same way that the State appears in existence, and that it preexists in the capacity of a warded-off limit; hence its irreducible contingency.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
I think it\u2019s worth emphasizing that they are not stating that there is an actual state <\/em>that the primitive societies<\/em> are warding off<\/em>, hence the anticipation <\/em>of it. I guess you could say that the state <\/em>is merely virtual<\/em>, there, yet not actually <\/em>there. In order to make sense of this, they (431) add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201c[I]t is necessary to demonstrate that what does not yet exist is already in action, in a different form than that of its existence.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
That said, they (431) then add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cOnce it has appeared, the State reacts back on the hunter-gatherers, imposing upon them agriculture, animal raising, an extensive division of labor, etc.; it acts, therefore, in the form of a centrifugal or divergent wave.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
The issue is, however, as they pointed out, that it has yet to appear in this scenario. Therefore they (431) add that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cBut before appearing, the State already acts in the form of the convergent or centripetal wave of the hunter-gatherers, a wave that cancels itself out precisely at the point of convergence marking the inversion of signs or the appearance of the State<\/em>[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
They (431) then explain that it is precisely this that makes the primitive societies<\/em> functionally and intrinsically unstable. What\u2019s important here is to consider how this works, how the primitive societies<\/em> become a state <\/em>and how they ward off <\/em>becoming a state<\/em>. They (432) explain that there\u2019s a threshold or degree for this, dictating whether there\u2019s enough consistency <\/em>for what is anticipated <\/em>to take hold or not. Now, as I pointed out already, and the two (433) come to point out, this must be extended to the other pole<\/em>, to the town<\/em>. They (433) are clear on this, stating that primitive societie<\/em>s both anticipate <\/em>and ward off<\/em> \u201ctwo presentations, one segmentary and egalitarian, the other encompassing and hierarchisized.\u201d At this stage it shouldn\u2019t take much to figure out which one is which. Simply put, as they (433) insist, primitive societies<\/em> are nothing more than decentralized systems<\/em> which have certain formations of power<\/em> that are not consistent <\/em>or, to be more specific, consistent <\/em>enough for them to cross the threshold <\/em>which would result in becoming either segmentary <\/em>and egalitarian<\/em>, the town<\/em>, or encompassing <\/em>and hierarchized<\/em>, the state<\/em>. So, simply put, in their (434) formulation, there is only simultaneity, one not being before the others. To explain it, they (434), once again, refer to how it is possible as necessitating reciprocal presupposition. You can\u2019t have one without the other(s).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To make more sense of the process, how one crosses over, they (438) clarify this by differentiating limit <\/em>and threshold<\/em>, classifying the former as \u201cdesignat[ing] the penultimate marking a necessary rebeginning\u201d and the latter as designating \u201cthe ultimate marking an inevitable change.\u201d Simply put, limit <\/em>has to do with staying within one\u2019s limits <\/em>in order to keep going, hence the rebeginning<\/em>, while the threshold <\/em>is when one crosses one\u2019s limits<\/em>, hence changing into something else. They (438) go on to provide an everyday example, one that, I believe, Deleuze brings up in his televised interviews with Claire Parnet, originally known as ‘L\u2019Ab\u00e9c\u00e9daire de Gilles Deleuze’. The example they (438) provide has to do with \u201cwhat does an alcoholic call the last glass?\u201d They (438) elaborate:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\u201cThe alcoholic makes a subjective evaluation of how much he or she can tolerate. What can be tolerated is precisely the limit at which, as the alcoholic sees it, he or she will be able to start over again (after a rest, a pause \u2026).\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n
There, to be clear here, an alcoholic is not someone who obtains this and that much alcohol, only to drink it all down, at least not without having access to more thereafter. If access is essentially unrestricted, that is to say that you can buy it whenever, the alcoholic, of course, doesn\u2019t have to stockpile alcohol. If you can buy it whenever, wherever, then you don\u2019t need to do that. There\u2019s always more around. That said, it makes little difference if that\u2019s not the case. The alcoholic only buys more at one go and stashes enough of it to keep going. Now, unsurprisingly, one may run out, but that, one again, makes little difference. The alcoholic is bound to know someone who has a stockpile, thus effectively circumventing any sales restrictions. The access to alcohol is a non-issue.When you think of it, this explains why at times alcoholics are reported as having attacked one another, even killed one another over alcohol, as there must the penultimate drink to have and it\u2019s a catastrophe if the one you just had ends up being the ultimate drink. Anyway, to make more sense of this, Deleuze and Guattari (438) continue:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n