{"id":281,"date":"2026-02-19T12:03:40","date_gmt":"2026-02-19T12:03:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/virtualandactual\/?p=281"},"modified":"2026-02-19T17:43:46","modified_gmt":"2026-02-19T17:43:46","slug":"theory-the-virtual-and-the-actual-vol-iii","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogit.utu.fi\/virtualandactual\/2026\/02\/19\/theory-the-virtual-and-the-actual-vol-iii\/","title":{"rendered":"Theory: The Virtual and the Actual, Vol. III"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

French philosopher Henri Bergson is also known for his interest in the virtual <\/em>and the actual<\/em>. His definitions are, however, slightly different and more specific than the dictionary definitions discussed by Charles Sanders Peirce and how John Duns Scotus defines them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bergson uses the terms virtual <\/em>and actual <\/em>in ‘Matter and Memory’ in relation to real<\/em>. He also uses them in ‘The Creative Mind’. I will first assess his definitions of them, followed by assessing how they differ from what is thought to be possible<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What I particularly like about Bergson’s definitions of the actual <\/em>and the virtual <\/em>is that he uses them to account for reality<\/em>. In his view, actual reality is what people call simply call reality. It is what it is. What people think of it, no matter how they think of it, is always a virtual reality. On one hand, this is negative as the world as we know it is therefore not the world as it is. Our understanding of it is always limited. On the other hand, this is positive as it makes it allows us to understand the world in endless ways. Therefore, much like Duns Scotus and Peirce, Bergson uses the virtual to make room for creativity and invention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Creativity<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

It is worth noting that Bergson uses virtual <\/em>‘Creative Mind’ in similarly as Peirce. He (11) explains that the way we think of time or, rather, measure it, consists of units of time, such as seconds or, more broadly speaking, moments, which are “virtual halts in time.” In other words, time is not actually <\/em>halted. It is only as if<\/em> it were halted. This makes sense, considering that time never actually stops. It is just the way we think about it that makes it seem to be the case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bergson (28) also states in ‘Matter and Memory’ that if one thinks of reality as the objective reality, i.e., what it is actually<\/em>, and then contrasts it with what we think of it, what it is virtually<\/em>, the latter can never be the former, for the simple reason that then it would cease to be virtual and become actual. In other words, the thing <\/em>is actual, whatever it may be, whereas the image <\/em>of the thing is virtual, whatever it may be in our thought as it functions as if<\/em> it were actual, without ever being actual. That is how thinking works, with all of it being virtual, instead of actual, inasmuch we consider all that is in reality to be actual.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bergson (28) clarifies this by noting that something virtual <\/em>can be converted to something actual<\/em>, but not by specifying the actual more, but by specifying it less, so that the thing matches the image. He (28) does not, however, seek to reduce the complexity of the thing, just so that it matches our simplified image of it. Instead, he (28) asks us to think what matters about the thing, there and then:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“[W]e can conceive that their mere presence is equivalent to the suppression of all those parts of objects in which their functions find no interest.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This does not, however, mean that those other parts or their functions are entirely irrelevant. Instead, it is rather that they are unimportant to you, there and then, but could be important to others, even there and then. That would, nonetheless, function the same way for them. What matters for them may be different from what matters to you, but it works the same way, suppressing what does not matter to them, there and then, as he (28) goes on to specify:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

“They allow to pass through them, so to speak, those external influences which are indifferent to them[.]”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This applies to everything. The actual reality<\/em> is just what is<\/em>, there and then, in all its complexity, and the way we think about that actual reality is always a virtual reality<\/em> that retains only what matters to us, there and then, and, conversely, discards anything that does not matter to us, there and then, because it is of no interest to us, because it does not do anything for us, as noted by him (30). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To be clear, the actual <\/em>and the virtual <\/em>are both equally real<\/em>. What is virtual is by no means false or unreal. Instead, actual reality<\/em> is what most people simply call reality<\/em>, whereas virtual reality<\/em> is something that is as if<\/em> it were actual reality, but without ever being actual reality. If the virtual were not merely as if<\/em> it were the actual, it would simply be the actual, as acknowledged by him (46):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“To perceive all the influences from all the points of all bodies would be to descend to the condition of a material object.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

It is worth emphasizing that this is not just the way virtual reality technology works, nor how art works. It is, in fact, how the way we make sense of reality works, as explained by Bergson (30):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

“[T]he perception of any unconscious material point whatever, in its instantaneousness, is infinitely greater and more complete than ours, since this point gathers and transmits the influences of all the points of the material universe, whereas our consciousness only attains to certain parts and to certain aspects of those parts.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This has its advantages and disadvantages according to Bergson. To be negative, it is clear that there is actual reality<\/em>, but the way we make sense of it as a virtual reality<\/em> is always partial and therefore impoverished. He (31, 41, 46) calls this discernment<\/em>, in the sense that it means setting something aside, to distinguish this from that. No matter what one does, there will always be an image, but never a complete image, as specified by him (46-47):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

“The diverse perceptions of the same object, given by
my different senses, will not, then, when put together,
reconstruct the complete <\/em>image of the object[.]”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He (41, 206) clarifies this by noting that discernment <\/em>is based on utility and, more problematically, often confined by habit. To use his example (206), herbivores, such as cows, perceive grass in a certain way, as something that nourishes them. What grass is otherwise is of little consequence to them. He (206) specifies this example by noting that it is, however, not grass as such, as something actual<\/em>, that a herbivore is attracted to, nor its qualities that it is attracted to. It is rather something virtual<\/em>, the specific image that it is attracted to, such as “the colour and the smell of grass, felt and experienced as forces”, as noted by him (206). This can be a bit confusing, which is why he (207) offers another example: hydrochloric acid. He notes that it is indifferent to the form of calcium carbonate. The acid does not perceive it as present in chalk or marble.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To add something to Bergson’s (206) herbivore example, it is fair to say that herbivores are in the habit of eating grass. This can be a problem. They may be capable of eating other plants, not only grass, but fail to recognize this, leading to their death in the absence of grass. They can also be led to eat grass, such as Johnsongrass, which is toxic to them. If they perceived the surrounding world through abstraction, in terms of qualities, or genus and species, they would know better and simply not eat it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This lead us to what Bergson considers positive about discernment<\/em>. Humans and, perhaps, some other life forms are capable of abstraction. To summarize Bergson (208-209), this amounts to starting from “a similarity felt and lived”, “a similarity which is automatically acted”, followed by generalizing it. What is particularly positive about this is that it can provide us with “an unlimited number of general notions”, as noted by him (209).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To better understand the advantages and disadvantages of discernment<\/em>, or what is positive and negative about it, it is helpful to cover William James’ (American philosopher and one of the founders of pragmatism) commentary on the matter. He (216) acknowledges Bergson in his book ‘A Pluralistic Universe’, noting that “Bergson has refuted … pretension to decide what reality can and cannot be.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To be more specific, James (217) acknowledges the importance of discernment <\/em>or abstraction<\/em>, as we might call also call it, because it allows us to think in terms of concepts<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

“When we name and class it, we say for the first time what it is, and all these whats are abstract names or concepts. Each concept means a particular kind <\/em>of thing, and as things seem once for all to have been created in kinds, a far more efficient handling of a given bit of experience begins as soon as we have classed the various parts of it.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, much like Bergson, he is over the moon about this. In his (217) view, this capacity to create concepts <\/em>and entirely conceptual orders is exactly what makes us humans superior to other life forms:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

“[It] gives us our chief superiority to the brutes, our power, namely, of translating the crude flux of our merely feeling-experience into a conceptual order.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

What makes this so special for Bergson and James is the way in which language makes it possible for us to conceive the world in endless ways. James (217) is very clear on this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

“Once classed, a thing can be treated by the law of its class, and the advantages are endless. Both theoretically and practically this power of framing abstract concepts is one of the sublimest of our human prerogatives.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

People have, however, ended up mistaking the human created concepts and conceptual orders as something pre-existing, as explained by James (217-218). They insist that there is one and only one conceptual order that is unchanging and it is through its concepts that we must make sense of the world, as further elaborated by James (220). This is a problem because it strips people of this power and thus creativity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The possible and the impossible<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

It is important for Bergson to distinguish the actual <\/em>and the virtual <\/em>from what is possible<\/em>. However, it is equally important to realize that he takes no issue with the way the word is used in everyday parlance. He (120-121) acknowledges in ‘Creative Mind’ that we habitually say that something is possible or impossible, that something can or cannot be done. We realize that there is some obstacle and we assess whether or not we can overcome it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bergson’s issue with possible <\/em>is much more specific. He (18-19) notes that it is thought of as something that can happen, but needs to be brought about, i.e., realized<\/em>. In other words, the issue he takes with this has to do with how everything is therefore thought of as already there, either happening, or waiting to happen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This issue persists no matter how many possibles <\/em>there are, because they are all given. This is problematic in his (19) view because this leaves no room for anything new. Everything is to be thought of as having been realized or as yet to be realized, like in a closed system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For example, a board game has the board, certain pieces and rules how to play it. The board remains the same, as do all of the pieces and the rules. It is all given, either there or waiting to happen as people play the game. This can all be changed, but people generally play the game as it has been designed to be played. Furthermore, even if they alter something about the game, the game itself does not change. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bergson (19) wants to account for how something new or unpredictable can happen, but this is not possible in that board game. You may be tempted think that something new happened or something was unpredictable, but that is only because you have not played the game long enough for all those possibles <\/em>to be realized<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He (119) specifies the possible <\/em>as something that we already know, right now, but thrown back in time:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

“[T]he possible is only the real with the addition of an act of mind which throws its image back into the past, once it has
been enacted.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Here the problem for him is that what he calls real<\/em>, what we might also call reality<\/em>, appears to be missing something if we think in terms of something being possible<\/em>. He (117) is keen to address this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201c[T]here is especially the idea that the possible is less <\/em>than the real, and that, for this reason, the possibility of things precedes their existence.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The problem with something being possible <\/em>is always tied to that something, just as Peirce points out that potential <\/em>is always tied to that something, which is already there or, rather, thought to be already there. I think Bergson explains the issue here particularly well when he (117) adds that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cThey would thus be capable of representation beforehand; they could be thought of before being realised. But it is the reverse that is true.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Simply put, the problem is that anything that is considered possible <\/em>is doubled. I would say that this also applies to potential<\/em>, as discussed by Peirce. There is always this image that precedes it, whatever that something may be. That\u2019s how you end up saying that something represents <\/em>something else. This why Bergson (119) states that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201cThe possible is therefore the mirage of the present in the past[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

He (118) exemplifies this with how a journalist wanted to know what he thinks of future literature. He responded that he has no idea what the future had in store for them and that had he known, he would have already been on it, instead of answering such questions. People do, however, tend to think this way, as he (119) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201c[W]e are convinced that the image of tomorrow is already contained in our actual present[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In summary, what is at stake here is that, for something to be possible<\/em>, it is something that we must already know as being possible, there and then. All that ever happens is therefore only what can ever happen, like in that board game example.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In my view, this way of thinking about something possible <\/em>or potential <\/em>is inferior to thinking about something virtual<\/em>. The problem with them is that they lock us to thinking in terms of what already exists. Virtual allows us to think of something without having to specify what it is as what matters that it is as if<\/em> it were something else, but without being that something else, as summarized by Peirce. This way representation <\/em>can be eliminated and everything still works. Bergson (122) provides an apt example of what this entails:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

\u201c[O]ne blade of grass does not resemble another blade of grass any more than a Raphael resembles
a Rembrandt[.]\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The obvious objection to this is that, of course, blades of grass resemble one another, just as people resemble one another, to this or that degree. This is, however, beside the point, which is that no blade of grass can be judged as the original and the rest as copies of that blade of grass, just as we cannot give priority to Raphael, nor to Rembrant in that way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
    \n
  • Bergson, H. ([1934] 1946). The Creative Mind<\/em> (M. L. Andison, Trans.). New York, NY: Philosophical Library.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Bergson, H. ([1896] 1911). Matter and Memory<\/em> (N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer, Trans.). London, United Kingdom: George Allen & Unwin.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Duns Scotus, J. ([1639] 2022). The Ordination of Blessed John Duns Scotus<\/em>: Book One, Third Distinction (P. L. P. Simpson, Trans.). https:\/\/aristotelophile.com\/Books\/Translations\/Scotus%20Ordinatio%20I%20d.3.pdf<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • James, W. (1909). A Pluralistic Universe<\/em>. New York, NY: Longmans, Green, and Co.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Peirce, C. S. (1902). Virtual. In J. M. Baldwin (Ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. II<\/em> (pp. 763\u2013764). New York, NY: The Macmillan Company.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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