It was noted in an earlier blog post concerning texts that discourse is generally understood as pertaining to speech and texts to writing. Moreover, it was specified that this common sense division to speech and writing is also utilized by some, but not all linguists. For others, these terms are interchangeable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I tried my best to avoid focusing on discourse in that blog post. The idea was to acknowledge it, but not to get lost explaining in detail. This is usually not possible in academic contexts, as one is expected to acknowledge similar kinds of research, regardless of the terms that one prefers. Nonetheless, it is simply clearer to address discourse and text separately from one another, if possible, hence the separation of the two in this blog.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I personally prefer discourse over text. To me, it has that dynamic sense to it, whereas text comes across a static. Then again, if you mention that something is a<\/em> discourse, it can be difficult for others to comprehend how that can be the case, whereas a<\/em> text makes sense to them. In my view, this has to do with how discourse is thought of as speech, which is something that happens and then it is gone, unless it is recorded, whereas text is thought of as writing, which is something that is there and likely to remain there for you read, even thought that also depends on the permanence of its medium. One way to fix this is to refer to a<\/em> discourse as a discursive formation<\/em>, it being something that has a certain form, having been formed in a certain way, like a group of soldiers that have been arranged in such and such a formation. This does, however, require others to be familiar with that term and its origin, which is not a given.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This does not, however, mean that others ought to do the same. If you prefer text over discourse, or some other term, no problem. If you ask me, what matters is that that others can follow your train of thought. This is why I prefer to explain the terms. This way people are aware of and hopefully understand the key concepts that I rely on in my work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this blog post, I will attempt to clarify what people, especially academics, mean when they use the word ‘discourse’. I will once again limit the scope of discussion, addressing it only in the context of linguistics, applied linguistics and philosophy of language. Moreover, I will once more simplify certain things, where necessary, and it must be noted not everyone will agree with the definitions and views presented in this blog post.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There are so many definitions that it is impossible to account for all of them. It is therefore impossible to provide just one definition of discourse<\/em> that everyone can agree on. Overall, some of them match how most people tend to use the word, whereas others are highly specific. I will start by addressing the considerable conceptual divergence and disagreement among academics regarding this matter. I will then try to elaborate on these matters. Lastly, I will explain what, in my opinion, is the best way to deal with all this divergence and disagreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is worth emphasizing this lack of agreement, as done by Alec McHoul and Allan Luke in their article ‘Discourse as Language and Politics: An Introduction to the Philology of Political Culture in Australia’. In summary, it is fair so say that there is a major rift between what they (323) refer to as the Anglo-American and the European or continental traditions of conducting discourse analysis<\/em>. In the former tradition, discourse <\/em>is thought of as part of linguistics, i.e., the scientific study of language, or, at least, adjacent to it and discourse analysis<\/em> is therefore the scientific analysis of discourse. In the latter tradition, discourse and discourse analysis are not the prerogative of just one field or discipline. In fact, in this tradition it is thought that it would be detrimental to the analysis to ignore what is often thought of as non-linguistic or extra-linguistic. In my view, this more or less mirrors the rift between what is often referred to as division between analytic philosophy and continental philosophy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Simply put, discourse <\/em>and discourse analysis<\/em> can be understood either narrowly or broadly, depending on which tradition one happens to be part of or agree with.<\/p>\n\n\n\n McHoul and Luke (323) also add that the people involved in the Anglo-American tradition of discourse analysis have sought to unify discourse studies, not only as a broad field of studies, but as a new discipline or, at least, a sub-discipline. This would mean “a common core of theory, object and method”, as specified by them (323).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In stark contrast, those involved in the European tradition of discourse analysis are not concerned with such unity, as noted by them (324). Moreover, the focus is more on the analysis of events, on something that occurs, in all its complexity, and how they may have occurred, as opposed to on the analysis of objects, as they (324) go on to add.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to McHoul and Luke (323-324), both traditions have their strengths:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The traditions also have their weaknesses, which, according to McHoul and Luke (323-324), are each other’s strengths:<\/p>\n\n\n\n To be clear, this is not to say that theory and analysis are mutually exclusive, that the Anglo-American tradition has no theory, nor that the European tradition has no analysis, as recognized by Johannes Angermuller, Dominique Maingueneau and Ruth Wodak (5) in ‘The Discourse Studies Reader: Main currents in theory and analysis’. Nonetheless, there is a clear difference between the two. Furthermore, this is not a minor division. This is a major rift.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To be more specific, the Anglo-American tradition is grounded on linguistics, has a very narrow focus and the work is notably empirical, with emphasis on the analysis, as explained by McHoul and Luke (324). It also based on a certain theory of language. It is, however, rare to find deep discussion regarding this language theory in the articles, book chapters and books written by people involved in this tradition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This lack of discussion regarding theory is not exclusive to this tradition. It is common in many kinds of research, not only in this kind of discourse analysis that aligns itself with linguistics. It is nonetheless problematic, as noted by Mario Bunge (110) in his article ‘Philosophical Problems in Linguistics’:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “[T]he specialist is entitled to concentrate on [a] chosen aspect, but by doing so … automatically precludes the possibility of understanding the whole.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In his (111-112) view, focusing solely on “pure linguistics” results in an inadequate understanding of language and treating language as having a separate existence from people bears “the mark of pseudoscience” as it is impossible to verify such. This is not to say that linguists should therefore focus on everything, as he (164-165) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “There is nothing wrong with such a study as long as it is not forgotten that it concerns a construct[.]”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n The problem is, however, that linguists often forget that they are concerned with a construct, which is what they and\/or other linguists have constructed, as acknowledged by him (165). They also tend to forget how that construct was constructed, that it is typically based on the presuppositions of empiricist and\/or rationalist philosophies, as specified by him (169-170).<\/p>\n\n\n\n To put it bluntly, it is simply convenient to ignore the issue. Thomas ‘Talmy’ Giv\u00f3n specifies this in his book ‘On Understanding Grammar’. In his (2-5) view, many linguists err when they carefully limit the data<\/em>, i.e., what can be studied, and the explanatory parameters<\/em>, i.e., what is considered relevant about the data, and then use them to construct a neatly delimited theory <\/em>of language.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I am fairly certain that many academics, linguists included, have no idea that they are basing their work on some construct. To be fair, it is not that they lack what it takes when it comes to dealing with theory and, to be more accurate, with philosophy. It is rather that understanding and being able to explain such is not expected of them and likely has never been expected of them by their peers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This lack of attention to theory and philosophy means that people, including linguists, are often unwittingly, but not necessarily unwillingly empiricist and\/or rationalists. To be more accurate, they are or at least think like positivists, in the sense that they believe “that questions of fact can only be decided by empirical methods of science”, or logical positivists, in the sense that they also believe that “questions that can be decided without appeal to experience are either mathematical or linguistic”, to use Bertrand Russell’s (3) definition of logical positivism in his article ‘Logical positivism’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The reason for this has to do with the history of linguistics. It sought to establish itself as not only as the discipline concerned with language or the study of language, i.e., as one of the humanities, but the scientific study of language, i.e., as one of the sciences, as noted by Randy Allen Harris (11) is ‘The Linguistic Wars’. Therefore, the proponents of this view sought to ally themselves with empiricism, rationalism and, more contemporarily, with positivism and logical positivism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To be clear, none of these ways of thinking are no longer in vogue. It is rare to see anyone claim that they are an empiricist, a rationalist, a positivist or a logical positivist. It is not far fetched to say that most people do not even know that empiricism and rationalism were known for their opposing viewpoints, the former being inductive, based on sensory experience, and the latter being deductive, based on innate faculty to reason, as explained by Birger Hj\u00f8rland (134-135) in his article ‘Empiricism, rationalism and positivism in library and information science’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is also worth noting that the inductive approach of empirical research, i.e., taking data seriously, is not exclusive to empiricism. Similarly, the deductive approach, being rational and relying on one’s intuition, is not exclusive to rationalism. This is perhaps self-evident, but it is nonetheless important to avoid conflating certain terms, as Hj\u00f8rland (139-141) reminds his readers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In popular thought, these ways of thinking have largely merged with one another and the terms are often used interchangeably. This popular way of thinking can be therefore summarized by people’s shared “faith in neutral observations and deductions”, as indicated by Hj\u00f8rland (133).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In contemporary academic parlance, positivism means what Russell (3) means by logical positivism, in the sense that it consists of both empiricism and rationalism. It might not be in vogue, but it is something that lingers, as noted by Hj\u00f8rland (133):<\/p>\n\n\n\n “[P]ositivism has been termed the ‘invisible philosophy of science'[.]”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n To summarize Hj\u00f8rland (133), positivism is, in fact, alive and well because it is “a kind of na\u00efve or silent philosophy”. It has become indistinguishable from common sense. It is therefore something that people take for granted. It is the philosophy that people have been taught to subscribe to, without ever explaining it to them that it is indeed a philosophy, among other philosophies. It is therefore a way of thinking, among other ways of thinking, but people tend to conflate it with thinking itself. Only a handful of people, mostly academics, are ever taught other ways of thinking. To use Hj\u00f8rland’s (133) listing, most people have no idea about hermeneutics, phenomenology, pragmatism or social constructivism, for the simple reason that these are not part of the curricula. They would therefore be puzzled if you, in all seriousness, explain something in reference to, for example Wilhelm Dilthey, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ric\u0153ur, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, C. S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, Lev Vygotsky, Peter Berger or Thomas Luckmann.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In other words, positivism is a position, among other positions, but it is the one that people default to. It is also what people expect others to subscribe to. It is thought of as synonymous with science and therefore guides the research processes, as noted by Hj\u00f8rland (133).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In stark contrast, the European tradition has a very wide focus and marked by wide ranging theoretical discussion. Moreover, it is acknowledged that theory forms the base for the analysis. However, while this tradition revels in theory, it also tends to shy away from actual analysis, as summarized by McHoul and Luke (324).<\/p>\n\n\n\n To clarify the absence of theoretical discussion in the Anglo-American tradition, the idea is that linguistics needs no other theory than a theory of language. Discourse analysis<\/em> is therefore understood as linguistic analysis of discourse, which is understood as suprasentential language use, and anything outside linguistics, is simply added to it, as summarized by McHoul and Luke (324). Judith Stalpers (88) exemplifies this stance in her review article ‘The maturity of discourse analysis’:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Linguists are first and foremost interested in how language works: in its functions and structures and in the interrelationships between the two. The object of study is language and the result must be a theory of language, of which discourse phenomena form a part.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Therefore, it is not that the Anglo-American tradition has no theory. It does have a theory, but it is a theory of language, and nothing else, as stated by Stalpers (88). For many linguists, their object of study is simply language and not what is outside language, as further elaborated by her (89):<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Linguistics aims at a model of how language phenomena are used in the production and understanding of discourse. … Through introspection, observation, and experiments, linguists develop models of discourse which should eventually furnish a theoretically valid method of analysis.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n This is a good example of positivism that is nowadays understood as a kind of empiricism, “a point of view that neglects the theoretical work of researchers”, as expressed by Hj\u00f8rland (136). It is also a good example of a certain reluctance to engage with theory, “to consider how both their own views and those of their objects are influenced by theoretical and cultural issues”, as noted by Hj\u00f8rland (136). In my experience, some academics are reluctant to engage with theory either because it is highly inconvenient to do so, as going through the relevant literature is challenging and highly time consuming, and\/or because it is not expected of them by their peers, as also acknowledged by Hj\u00f8rland (141).<\/p>\n\n\n\n To be fair, I think there is also another reason for this. I would say that linguists also shy away from anything that is considered non-linguistic or extra-linguistic because they genuinely believe that “good science must be value free” and therefore they must stay true to “an a priori logic of science”, which is the guiding principle of logical positivism, as explained by Hj\u00f8rland (137). <\/p>\n\n\n\n The continental or European approach or approaches do not hold on to a theory of language. Instead, the theories go beyond language and the idea is to incorporate them into the analysis. The theories can, in fact, be understood as the methods of analysis, as something concrete and practical, instead of being some more or less relevant background information. The theories and the various considerations pertaining to, for example “political-institutional sites, questions of the production of the human subject and relations between” as well as “power and signification”, are not something that one adds to one’s research, but rather “its very raison d’\u00eatre”, as explained by McHoul and Luke (324).<\/p>\n\n\n\n For many linguists, the European tradition makes little sense, considering that, as linguists, they study language and not anything beyond language, as already noted. In their view, discourse analysis<\/em> is simply the study of discourse<\/em>, which is suprasentential language use, and not something in addition to that. Others are free to analyze something else as well, but then discourse analysis is rather a way of doing non-linguistic research, as explained by Stalpers (88-89):<\/p>\n\n\n\n “For all the other disciplines, the study of discourse is a tool, that is, a means to an end other than theory of language.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, others also go beyond language in terms of what it is that they seek to understand, as she (89) goes on to add:<\/p>\n\n\n\n [T]he goal is to arrive at conclusions about various nonlinguistic aspects of human behavior.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n I am tempted to agree with Stalpers. It is up to each researcher to delimit their research as they see fit. It is their work, after all. Plus, it makes sense that linguists focus solely on linguistic aspects and then others focus on non-linguistic aspects. I would, however, also add that she fails to explain how others in other fields or disciplines are doing something that is non-linguistic. It is difficult for me to understand how is it possible to separate the linguistic aspects from the non-linguistic aspects of human behavior. Anything that we say or write is certainly linguistic, as is our thinking. Furthermore, anything that we see, hear, feel, smell, taste or, more broadly speaking, sense is also evaluated and interpreted through language. This is not to say that one cannot experience something in the absence of language, but that experience is then nonsensical to humans, as explained by Valentin Volo\u0161inov in \u2018Freudianism: A Marxist Critique\u2019 (21) and ‘Marxism and the Philosophy of Language’ (26, 29, 34, 88).<\/p>\n\n\n\n To be clear, this is a difficult issue is to comprehend, not to mention solve, as this is not a minor theoretical issue, nor an issue concerning academic disciplines and fields of study. This is such a major theoretical issue. It is a properly foundational, philosophical issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Those who adhere to the Anglo-American tradition rely on linguistics and consider it or, to be more specific, what is known as the ‘linguistics proper’ to be an exact and rigorous science, much like biology, chemistry and physics, and the analysis to consists of empirical study of language, as discussed in the previous blog post on texts. The problem here is that they fail to acknowledge their own philosophical position, the various “umproblematicised assumptions about discourse and its analysis”, which can be summarized as presupposing “an uncompromisingly empiricist conception of ‘discourse’ from the start”, as noted by McHoul and Luke (323, 325). In stark contrast, those who adhere to the European tradition recognize their own position, in relation to a philosophical position or positions, and seek to examine their presuppositions, as acknowledged by the two (326), hence the substantial emphasis on theory before any analysis is conducted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I often use the term discourse<\/em>. I use it for nearly everything, not because I am glib or because that is all there is to life, but because, in my view, the underlying concept can be used to explain the way we make sense of the world. The way I define it and therefore also comprehend it is largely similar to the way Mikhail Bakhtin and Volo\u0161inov define language not as objective<\/em>, nor subjective<\/em>, but as collective<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I do not, however, use the word in everyday life, for the simple reason that people would be confused by the way I use it. I must also be very careful when I use the word in academic contexts. This has to with what Alastair Pennycook calls incommensurability in his article ‘Incommensurable Discourses?’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Pennycook (115) acknowledges that there is “a key conceptual divergence” when it comes to how academics use the term, even in a relatively small and thus specific field like applied linguistics. He (115) notes that for some discourse is hardly a concept. It is therefore rather an instance of language in use, like a conversation, or a discussion. He (115-116) then adds that for others discourse <\/em>is a concept that accounts for how language is used and, more specifically, how meanings are socially and culturally produced. He (116) acknowledges how confusing this can be:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “From one point of view, we were participants in the same discourse<\/em> (the same conversation), while from the other we were each taking up positions in different discourses<\/em> (different ways of understanding).”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n The first point of view is the common sense view of discourse. It is merely an instance of language use. He (116) notes that this is also how most linguists, including applied linguists, view the matter. I agree. In my own experience, linguists tend to use the word in this sense. It is something unspecific, something that addresses language beyond the sentence level, as noted by him (116). In stark contrast, the second view presents language as turning on itself, so that discourse <\/em>pertains to how meaning is made, how something makes sense in a certain time and place specific situation, and how something does not make sense in that situation, as elaborated by him (116). Luke, McHoul and Jacob Mey’s book chapter, ‘On the Limits of Language Planning: Class, State and Power’, is brought up by Pennycook in this context as they state (40) that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Discourse is not a mere function of language. Rather discourse is, to put it crudely, the condition by which language as a structure or a system exists[.]”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In this sense, discourse <\/em>is not an object, but rather a process of producing objects. This also means that, for them (40), language is never neutral or apolitical:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “[D]iscourse … is not identical with ‘talk’ or ‘conversation’ or even ‘text’. It is not the utilitarian end of language (with language construed linguistically). Rather discourse is that central, yet also diverse, analytic field in which language, power and discipline(s) come together.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n To reiterate the earlier points, discourse <\/em>is indeed often thought of as speech, just as text is often thought as writing. Discourse analysis<\/em> is then the analysis of speech and\/or text that goes beyond the sentence level. This is the way it was and to some extent still is dealt with in linguistics. However, not everyone agrees with this definition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Many linguists, including many applied linguists, want to focus solely on accounting for what <\/em>someone said and how <\/em>they said it, as summarized by Pennycook (116), <\/p>\n\n\n\n Who <\/em>said or wrote something and why <\/em>they said or wrote it are not thought of as ‘properly linguistic’ questions. This means that many linguists consider language to be asocial and apolitical, as noted by Norman Fairclough (7) in his seminal book ‘Language and Power’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is also worth noting that many linguists operate at the sentence level and not at the level of discourse. There is a historical reason for this. In linguistics, the terms discourse <\/em>and discourse analysis<\/em> were introduced relatively late, in the 1950s. Zellig Harris (1) defines them in his article ‘Discourse Analysis’:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “[Discourse analysis is] a method for the analysis of connected speech (or writing).”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n For a linguist like Harris, discourse <\/em>is therefore to be understood stretches of language, speech or writing. This makes it equivalent to text<\/em>, which is also clear from how Harris also keeps mentioning texts in his article. Discourse analysis<\/em> involves going beyond the sentence level, as specified by him (1). It therefore matches how many linguists, including applied linguists, define it as pertaining to suprasentential language use, as indicated by Pennycook (116-117).<\/p>\n\n\n\n What is notable about Harris’ (3) definition of discourse <\/em>is that he recognizes, similarly to Volo\u0161inov and Bakhtin, that instances of language use can be extremely short or extremely long:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “[A]ll language occurrences are internally connected. Language does not occur in stray words or sentences, but in connected discourse\u2014from one word utterance to a ten-volume work[.]”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Overall, the idea is that even if one says or writes just one word, there are other words that the word is connected to. They occur before and after each other, like in a dialogue<\/em>. Discourse <\/em>can therefore be understood as amounting to a handful of short utterances<\/em>, such as simple rejoinders like “‘Ah!'”, as Bakhtin (71) point out in ‘Problems of Speech Genres’, but it can and often does amount to series of much longer utterances. What matters is that it is a mistake to examine words in isolation from other words as no word exists in isolation from other words. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Harris (2-3) also recognizes that ignoring the social situation, what we might also refer to as the context<\/em>, is impossible if one wants to do discourse analysis<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “The reason is that each connected discourse occurs within a particular situation\u2014whether of a person speaking, or of a conversation, or of someone sitting down occasionally over a period of month to write a particular kind of book[.]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n To avoid being deterministic, he (3) nonetheless adds that this does not mean that people speak or write the same way in certain kinds of social situations. Instead, it is rather that is likely to be the case that they exhibit similar behavior, as he (3) goes on to acknowledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is also what distinguishes Harris’ definition of discourse analysis<\/em> from text analysis<\/em>. His version of discourse analysis acknowledges the social situation, whereas the latter does not, as explained by David Crystal (148) in ‘A Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics’. It is, nonetheless, similar to text analysis in the sense that the social situation does not play a major role for Harris.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is worth noting that what amounts to discourse <\/em>and discourse analysis<\/em> is not something that is solely attributable to Harris. It is rather that he is considered the person who introduced the terms in linguistics. There is not shortage of prior research of all kinds that amounts to discourse analysis, but it is simply not thought of as such, as noted by Stalpers (87-88).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In summary, for many linguists discourse <\/em>simply amounts to suprasentential language use and it is typically understood narrowly as pertaining to speech. Discourse analysis<\/em> is therefore typically understood among linguists as the analysis of speech in a specific context.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Such narrow view is untenable to Luke, McHoul and Mey. They (36) see the linguistics as being born from Ferdinand de Saussure’s work and matured through the work of Noam Chomsky, only to be brutally stabbed, not necessarily to its death, but to being maimed through the works of Dell Hymes, casting a serious doubt on whether linguistics is the scientific study of language. To survive, linguistics had to adapt, to expand and accept what was previously considered non-linguistic or extra-linguistics, namely anything that addressed language users, as explained by Luke, McHoul and Mey (36). This expansion included:<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is worth emphasizing how and why these approaches to language listed by Luke, McHoul and Mey (36) were not initially considered appropriate in linguistics. For Harris (2), this has to do with what many linguists object to:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “[T]he connection between behavior (or social situation) and language, has always been considered beyond the scope of linguistics proper.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n For some, language is to be understood as separate from language use, as explained by Fairclough (6):<\/p>\n\n\n\n “I am referring here to ‘linguistics proper’, which is the study of ‘grammar’ in a broad sense: the sound system of language (‘phonology’), the grammatical structure of words (‘morphology’) and of sentences (‘syntax’), and more formal aspects of meaning (‘semantics’).”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n For them, going beyond the limits of ‘linguistics proper’ is simply unacceptable, out of scope, as also noted by Kate Scott (2-3) in ‘Pragmatics in English: An Introduction’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The definitions of discourse <\/em>and discourse analysis<\/em> do, however, vary among linguists. This also applies to those who are known for conversation analysis, ethnography of communication, text linguistics or a mixture of them, but what matters to them is “the analysis of extended chunks of language use”, as explained by Pennycook (117).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The problem with how many linguists define discourse <\/em>and discourse analysis<\/em> is that while they may acknowledge the social situation, what amounts to the non-linguistic<\/em> or situational context<\/em>, and even focus on certain social situations, such as classroom interaction, the social situation does not play a major role. The context <\/em>ends up being decontextualized<\/em> and therefore ignores why <\/em>people say or write something, as specified by Pennycook (117, 119).<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is not that the context <\/em>or the social situation is not properly acknowledged or accounted for by linguists. Instead, context ends up being decontextualized <\/em>because interaction is thought of as involving autonomous, intentional and rational people, who choose to say or write something to someone else, who then chooses to say or write something in response, as explained by Pennycook (117). The problem here is that this ignores the ways in which people’s behavior is constrained and therefore defined not only by the immediate social situation that they find themselves in, but also by their position in society, such as being part of certain social groups, as noted by him (121).<\/p>\n\n\n\n This lack of attention to social concerns among linguists was addressed first by critical linguistics in the 1970s and early 1980s and then after that by critical discourse analysis (CDA), which is nowadays known as critical discourse studies (CDS). John Flowerdew and John Richardson (2) explain the reasons behind the name change in their introduction chapter to ‘The Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Studies’:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “[T]he rationale for this change of designation resides in the fact that CDA was increasing not restricted to applied analysis, but also included philosophical, theoretical, methodological and practical developments.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n The former is more of a precursor to the latter, as acknowledged by Flowerdew and Richardson (1). The people involved in the former shifted their focus on to other related matters, what became known as social semiotics, and therefore the people involved in the latter were not the same people. There is, of course, some overlap between the two groups and considerable overlap between the views held by members of these two groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fairclough is not known as one of the critical linguists, albeit it is fair to say he was critical of linguistics, but as one of critical discourse analysts. He is, in fact, considered one of the founders of critical discourse analysis and critical discourse studies. He was, nonetheless, around at that time and very much aligned with critical linguistics. He (110) summarizes the stance of critical linguists aptly in his review of Dwight Bolinger’s book ‘Language \u2013 The Loaded weapon: The Use and Abuse of Language Today’:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “The development of critical linguistics will be seen by some to compromise the established commitment in linguistics to description which shuns the questions of value, but it will be welcomed by others who have doubts about the social role of linguistics, and its relationship to diverse interests.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n To be clear, the critique here is not new, nor was it new in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Critical linguists and critical discourse analysts were not the first to criticize other linguists for failing to account for social aspects of language. To their credit though, they did revitalize and subsequently popularize this critique.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This critique was expressed already in the 1920s. For example, Volo\u0161inov criticized Saussure’s highly influential conception of language that is elaborated ‘Course in General Linguistics’ that privileges language <\/em>(langue<\/em>) as a signifying system and separates it from language use (parole<\/em>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Volo\u0161inov (57-58) states in in ‘Marxism and the Philosophy of Language’ that Saussure’s understanding of language is a mathematically minded rationalist project that models language after mathematics. While he (58) recognizes Saussure’s role in all this, he traces this all the way back to Ren\u00e9 Descartes and notes that it is best exemplified by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s conception of a universal language that has a universal form or character that is then the basis of all thought.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To summarize his ‘Course in General Linguistics’, Saussure was interested in language, but only in a very specific and narrow sense. He (1) objected to philology as mere commentary and comparison of various writings dating to different periods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The issue he (81) took with philology was that it focused on the evolution of language and therefore it was diachronic<\/em>. In his (81) view, the goal of linguistics was to focus on language itself, here and now, and treat it as something fixed or static, for the sole reason that language appears to people that way, here and now, without them needing to think about how language has evolved. <\/p>\n\n\n\n To Saussure’s credit, there is a logic to this, how he (81) insist on the synchronic <\/em>study of language and how he (81) considers it and only it to amount to scientific study of language. You can only focus on something here and now. Even if you study some documents from the past, you are indeed focusing on them here and now. What he is missing, however, is that he seeks to generalize from the here and now, ignoring how he is, in fact, privileging one point in time over other points in time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Saussure also used the term ‘linguistics proper’ (French: ‘la linguistique proprement’), by which he meant the study of language, on its own, as a signifying system (langue<\/em>), on its on terms, and, most importantly, a science, and not to be confused with language (langage<\/em>) as a whole, nor with individual languages, as explained (1, 1a-4a) in a more comprehensive edition and translation of his work, ‘Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistics (1910-1911): From the notebooks of Emile Constantin’. He (4a-5a) was also very adamant that linguists should clearly define linguistics, delimit it, and, ultimately, rationally focus on universal laws that are common to all languages.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Giv\u00f3n addresses this approach to language in the revised edition of ‘On Understanding Grammar’. He (2) calls this exclusion of what is, supposedly, outside the purview of linguistics “Saussure’s firewall” and states that it only makes sense if one subscribes to structuralism and, more generally, to logical positivism. Those who approach to language in this way, nowadays known as structuralists, are solely interested in the linguistic signs and how they relate to one another in a system. That means that “they are interested only in the inner logic of the system of signs itself<\/em>” and in isolation from people, as elaborated by Volo\u0161inov (58). This does not make sense and therefore it all falls apart if one does not subscribe to structuralism or logical positivism. This becomes clear if one takes a closer look at the various phenomena that are situated outside this firewall, as stated by Giv\u00f3n (3-5).<\/p>\n\n\n\n What is curious about this conception of language is that it is the viewpoint of linguist, the person who listens to or reads something said or written by someone else, but the viewpoint of the person who said or wrote something is typically absent, as indicated by Volo\u0161inov (58). This is attributable to how mathematicians are inclined to consider mathematical signs as the model for all signs and strive to eliminate interpretation, so that all signs have a fixed meaning, as specified by him (58). The core idea is that there is no need to consult the person who said or wrote something, nor anyone else, when meaning is thought to be fixed, when it is “already accepted and authorized”, as he (58) points out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This critique applies to linguistics or, to be more specific, to ‘linguistics proper’ and it remains relevant to this day. While structuralism and logical positivism have not been in vogue for decades, there are linguists who still hold on to the idea that it is possible to focus purely on language, as exemplified by Gilbert Lazard in his article ‘The case for pure linguistics’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Volo\u0161inov’s (59) view, Saussure recognized the difficulty involved with studying language. Saussure opted to study language (langue<\/em>) as a signifying system, having realized that language use (parole<\/em>) among people is heterogeneous and, simply put, messy, as explained by him (9) in the standard edition of ‘Course in General Linguistics’. He (9) is particularly explicit about this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “[T]here is only one solution to … the … difficulties: from the very outset we must put both feet on the ground of language and use language as the norm of all other manifestations of speech<\/em>.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n It is language (langue<\/em>) as a signifying system that is what matters. It is something pre-existing, whereas language use (parole<\/em>), what someone says or writes, is merely thought of as a manifestation of how certain signs that are part of a sign system. This is attributable to how he (9) considers language (langage<\/em>) as a whole to be a human faculty, while language (langue<\/em>) as a signifying system is the product of this faculty. The differences in language use (parole<\/em>) between people and the languages they speak and write are then thought of as mere manifestations of the system, how each individual puts it to use, that vary to a certain degree from one another, as specified by him (13-14).<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is also worth emphasizing that Saussure was not interested in the specifics. Firstly, he did not care about what people said, nor about what they wrote. Secondly, he did not care about this and\/or that language. He (23) certainly recognized that linguists must work with what they have, but he saw this as a chore, because he was only ever interested in working this way, through “observing and comparing” languages spoken and written by people, to figure out “what is universal in them”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Saussure thought that this way of thinking about language is unproblematic. He claimed to be solely interested in language (langue<\/em>) as a system and therefore the way people use language (parole<\/em>) was simply inconsequential to him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For Volo\u0161inov (67), this amounts to a two-fold problem. Firstly people do not simply use language, not to mention willfully choose to use language, as claimed by Saussure (14). Secondly, there is no language as a signifying system that people simply tap into when they speak or write something. The way in which Saussure conceives language is just that, a way in which he conceives language, as indicated by Volo\u0161inov (67):<\/p>\n\n\n\n “That system is merely an abstraction arrived with a good deal of trouble and with a definite cognitive and practical focus of attention. The system of language is the product of deliberation on language, and deliberation of a kind by no means carried out by the consciousness of the … speaker … and by no means carried out for the immediate purposes of speaking.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n What is problematic about this is that the system is thought of as a given. It is thought to exist and be the norm<\/em>, as explicitly stated by Saussure (9). It is the rule. It is what is considered to be correct or right, what language is<\/em>. This lends itself to judging the application of this system according to this norm, as conforming with it or as deviating from with it. Something is either <\/em>correct or <\/em>incorrect, which can only be judged according to linguistic criteria that are reducible to whether there is “correspondence of a given form to the normative system of language<\/em>“, as explained by Volo\u0161inov (54). People must therefore use the ‘correct’ words, ‘correctly’, as defined by linguists. This means that language becomes a matter of compliance, as criticized by him (53).<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is also worth noting how similar Saussure’s conception of language is to Plato’s dualistic conception of reality that consists of transcendent, unchanging perfect forms <\/em>(ideas) that are imperfectly represented <\/em>by the various changing objects that we encounter. To summarize Giv\u00f3n (8-10), Saussure considers language to be an the abstract system (langue<\/em>) and speech (parole<\/em>) to be a mere manifestation of this abstract system in action. Moreover, Saussure approaches it synchronically<\/em>, as fixed in time, while disregarding how the system is subject to diachronic <\/em>change, as stated by Giv\u00f3n (8-10).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In critical linguistics and critical discourse studies, language is no longer to be though of as merely communicating information from one person to another. Instead, the point is to acknowledge and, in certain sense, expose the major role that language plays in society, how language is a social practice<\/em> through which people are classified as belonging to such and such a group of people and how that benefits certain groups of people, at the expense of other groups of people. In Pennycook’s (121) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Of significance here is these researchers’ concern with, on the one hand, the analysis of various forms of discourse as instances of language use, and, on the other hand, with locating these discourses within wider questions of social Simply put, language is social, through and through. It is social practice<\/em> and not separable from other social practices. It is not something just is <\/em>and one taps into in order to communicate, to provide someone else with some information. Instead, it is something that one does<\/em>, to make something happen. It is also this doing, what others have done through language, that determines what one can do through language, which sets constraints on what one can say, write or otherwise express in some other semiotic modes, at any given time. Roger Fowler and Gunther Kress (190) summarize this in their book chapter on ‘Critical linguistics’:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “[I]n a very basic way language is a part of, as well as a result of, social process.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n This is mirrors how Volo\u0161inov (26, 28, 34) states that psyche is both linguistic and social. Fowler and Kress (190) further specify their view:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Language serves to confirm and consolidate the organizations which shape it, being used to manipulate people, to establish and maintain them in economically convenient roles and statuses, to maintain the power of stage agencies, corporations and other institutions.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n These two traditions, critical linguistics and critical discourse studies, are also distinct from linguistics and sociolinguistics. In fact, the people involved in the former traditions like to maintain a certain distance to the latter traditions, as noted by Pennycook (122), and consider this distinction between linguistics and sociolinguistics to be harmful in the first place. Fowler and Kress (187) note that for many linguists language is its own thing, something separate from people, yet somehow they acquire it from other people:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “[T]he specific language \u2013 English or French or whichever \u2013 is basically a set of structures, or a system of rules for generating structures, which have been acquired or facilitated or elicited through primary socialization[.]”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n To account for how this can be, it is argued, namely by linguists like Noam Chomsky, that humans have innate capacity for language, as Fowler and Kress (187) further specify this matter:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “[They] are ‘not’ social in character \u2013 they are formal constructs, a selection of possibilities afforded by biological character of human beings.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n There is a clear contradiction. People learn language from other people, namely from their parents, siblings and teachers, yet language is thought of as separate from them, a biological fact, if you will. Fowler and Kress (187) explain the consequences:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “[Languages] may therefore be described \u2013 a grammar may be written \u2013 without any reference to social function, to the needs of use in communicative context.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Speaking and writing is therefore seen as mere use of language, which is thought of as an innate capacity or a faculty that everyone has. People are thought of as being competent<\/em>, having access to structures of language and knowing when the use language, and simply performing <\/em>language by selecting certain structures, as Fowler and Kress (187) summarize this Chomskyan view.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Those who accept sociolinguistics as part of linguistics delegate it with dealing with all the issues pertaining language and society. It is primarily concerned with variation<\/em>. It therefore accounts for how language varies, not only geographically, but also socially, as explained by Crystal (143, 509). Moreover, it typically involves the study of dialects<\/em>, which are varieties <\/em>of language, and how one dialect is often considered standard <\/em>and promoted the status of a language<\/em>, while the rest are considered non-standard<\/em> or substandard<\/em>, as further elaborated by Crystal (142-143, 145, 440-441, 450, 509).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Accounting for linguistic variation <\/em>is certainly an improvement, but, according to Fowler and Kress (189), sociolinguistics does not, however, fare much better in this regard than Chomskyan linguistics:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Sociolinguists seem to assume that there is for each language-community a given grammar which pre-exists social processes.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Once again, language is seen as something that one simply taps into and then uses. It is thought of as a one-way street. They (189) specify this by noting that sociolinguistics attributes the limits of language use to society, so that the notions of ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ or ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ ways of speaking and writing are deemed to accidental or arbitrary and not part of language itself. To put this more bluntly, as done by them together with Bob Hodge and Tony Trew (2) in preface to the same book:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Sociolinguists are, therefore, at best na\u00efve in accepting the social structures they describe as neutral, while at worst they collude in a view of existing social structures as unchangeable.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In addition to critical linguists, like Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew, Pennycook (122) also mentions Cathy Urwin’s commentary of sociolinguistics. She (267) addresses the issue in her book chapter ‘Power relations and the emergence of language’, chastising the research tradition for largely the same reasons as critical linguists:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “[T]his sociolinguistic tradition is … constrained by the fact that … it retains de Saussure’s … distinction between langue<\/em> and parole<\/em>; or a universal and fundamental ‘competence’ plus … ‘performance’ in Chomsky’s theory.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In other words, she (267) takes issue with sociolinguistics, because even though, to its credit, it acknowledges social issues, such as class and racism, it amounts to more of the same. Language is seen as primary, while the instances in which language appears in everyday life are seen as secondary, as mere use of language. The subject <\/em>is thought of as autonomous, intentional and rational, i.e., ‘competent’ in language, and what is left is addressing language use, which means that variation<\/em> ends up being reduced to accounting for superficial glosses in language, i.e., for the differences in the ‘performance’, as she (267) points out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In summary, while sociolinguistics may seem rather innocuous, notions such as standard<\/em>, non-standard<\/em> and substandard<\/em> indicate that language is not a neutral or apolitical matter. Some ways of speaking and writing are deemed proper and this was, for a long time, what interested linguists. The grammar of a language<\/em>, such as English, was, in fact, the grammar of specific dialect <\/em>that had simply been given an official stamp of approval. The other dialects, how people spoke and wrote, were deemed non-standard, if not substandard. They not only lacked in status, but this also meant that anyone speaking and writing in a non-standard or substandard way was deemed to be non-standard or substandard. This is not to say that linguists themselves have sought to value one dialect more than others, or to rank them, but rather that the state institutions, namely schools, keen to do this, as noted by Crystal (450). It is therefore rather that linguists have ended up complicit in standardization<\/em>. They do object to it and distance themselves from it, but their work, such as dictionaries and grammar books, inevitably form the basis for what is considered ‘correct’, ‘proper’ or ‘standard’ by educated people and state institutions, as Miriam Locher and J\u00fcrg Str\u00e4ssler (4-7) explain this issue in their introduction chapter of ‘Standards and Norms in the English Language’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The people involved in critical discourse studies agree with the views held and concerns expressed by critical linguists. Fairclough expresses many of the same views and concerns as critical linguists, which he summarizes in his response to another linguist, Geoffrey Sampson, ‘The Politics of Meaning: A Reply to Sampson’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To summarize Fairclough’s view on language <\/em>and discourse<\/em>, as explained in response, he does not believe it is possible to differentiate between the individual and the collective. His views are therefore very similar to the views held by Bakhtin and Volo\u0161inov. There is no autonomous individual who is intrinsically free, but bound by some collective. The collective is not merely a collection of individuals who come together to negotiate with one another, to agree and to disagree, and then opt to engage in certain social practices that bound all of them. People do not negotiate what something means, in coordination with one another. This is not to say that there is no negotiation, but rather that meanings are taught to people, first by their parents and other family members, then by their teachers and their bosses, while they also learn them through media. Negotiation may be relevant, here and there, but whether you agree or disagree with something is almost irrelevant for the first twenty years of your life and even after that agreeing and disagreeing over the meaning of this and\/or that remains fairly irrelevant. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The gist of Fairclough’s position is that there is never this individual who is free to think, say or do just about anything, but chooses to set limits to this, in coordination with others, for the common good. In his (45) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “The image here is of a ‘pre-social’ individual with certain capacities which are necessarily curtailed in the social individual.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In other words, the individual is not something that exists before the collective. Instead, the individual is always a product of the collective. Even if one limits this to the context of one’s family, one is always like one’s parents, not only in terms of one’s behavior, but also in terms of one’s physical features. The reason why people say or write something is not attributable to those people as individuals but as a collective. People produce certain meanings and expect them to be reproduced, having learned that reproducing them is rewarded by others, as explained by Fairclough (48, 53).<\/p>\n\n\n\n This issue is also related to how many linguists think that people communicate with one another on an equal footing, as noted by Fairclough (117) in his review of Bolinger’s book. There are, however, countless situations in which one person has authority over the other person, as also addressed by Volo\u0161inov (85). Even when people are peers or near peers in terms of their social and\/or economic status, this does not necessarily mean that they are equal. One may, for example, owe money or favors to others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fairclough (48) exemplifies the (re)production of meaning in his reply to Sampson with how students are taught by their teachers to use certain words or expressions that bear their teachers’ stamp of approval, such as ‘pompous’, instead of other words or expressions that do not bear their stamp of approval, such as ‘stuck up’. Such differences may seem subtle and inconsequential, but they are, in fact, considerable. If you call someone ‘pompous’, you mean that the person in question is self-important and\/or expresses this to others. This person is therefore likely a ‘fool’. If you call someone ‘stuck up’, you mean that the person in question is snobby and unwilling to deal with other people. This is person is not a ‘fool’, but rather someone who holds others in contempt, treating them as inferior people. The irony here is, of course, that teachers who tell their students to say ‘pompous’ instead of ‘stuck up’ are, in fact, ‘stuck up’ themselves. They are not merely telling their students to use a word or an expression that is more apt, which would be the case with someone who acts like a fool, with unnecessary splendor or pomp, but rather steering them to use a word or an expression that does not question the existing social order, which is the case with ‘stuck up’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This issue does not only concern those who teach language, but also those who study language. In fact, the teachers are not to blame for this, as Fairclough (3) points out in ‘Language and Power’:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “This cannot be blamed on the teachers, because the same is true of most of the academic work on language which the teachers have been offered as models.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Fairclough (116) addresses this issue in greater detail in his review of Bolinger’s book, noting that people, linguist like Bolinger included, tend to think that there is neutral language and neutrality is therefore not only possible but also to strive for and then there is biased language, which is reprehensible and to be avoided at all cost. To be clear, Fairclough (116) does not criticize Bolinger for pointing out that people are biased, nor that this is manifested in what they say or write, but rather for claiming that it is possible to be unbiased and to say or write something in an unbiased way. This has to do with what Volo\u0161inov (57-58) calls “mathematically minded rationalists” and how they like to model language after mathematics. This also applies to Bolinger (69) who explicitly states that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “One small corner is purely neutral: the language of mathematics.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n He (69) also adds to this that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Mathematics gives us a neutral footing, and logic builds a neutral usage around it, with its techniques for winnowing out the biases: the definition of terms, the detection of fallacies, and the analysis of propositions to get at truth and falsity.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n This is a textbook example of how someone starts from mathematics and, more specifically, algebra, as specified by Volo\u0161inov (58), then applies it as a model for language. This not only ignores that mathematics is not reducible to algebra, but also that it is a social practice<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The problem with that Bolinger’s (69) passage is, however, that it asserts that there is truth and falsity or, as Volo\u0161inov (54) puts it, what is correct and what is incorrect. This assumes that there is a denotative <\/em>or a referential meaning<\/em>, which is then contrasted with various connotative <\/em>or evaluative meanings<\/em>, as explained by Fairclough (116), in reference to Volo\u0161inov (105) who rejects such distinctions:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “This sort of disjuncture between referential meaning and evaluation is totally inadmissible. It stems from failure to note the more profound functions of evaluation in speech.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In other words, the problem is that there is no referential meaning <\/em>that we can discern, figure out or uncover and then refer to. There are only evaluative meanings<\/em> as all meanings are evaluative, as specified by Volo\u0161inov (105):<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Referential meaning is molded by evaluation; it is evaluation, after all, which determines that a particular referential meaning may enter the purview of speakers\u2014both the immediate purview and the broader social purview of the particular social group.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n This also accounts for changes in meaning. Meanings are constantly evaluated <\/em>or, he (105) expresses it, reevaluated<\/em>. This does, however, make language whimsical and meaning of a word whatever we wish it to be. In his view (101-102), one always operates somewhere in between the upper and lower limits of understanding, striving for the upper limit, for a meaning that is apt in a specific context<\/em>, while also recognizing the lower limit and the difficulty involved with taking language to its upper limit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fairclough (117) exemplifies the problem with thinking that language can be denotative <\/em>or referential <\/em>and therefore unbiased with how employers, namely large corporations, prefer to refer to employees losing their jobs as a matter of ‘redundancy’, whereas the employees refer to them as getting ‘fired’. To add something to this, these days people often have a short, fixed term contracts. This means that one is never even made ‘redundant’, nor ‘fired’. Instead, the contract has simply ‘expired’, after which it may or may not be ‘renewed’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is for this reason that Fairclough (116-117) points out that it is not that some words and expressions are marked by bias, while others are not, nor that their use indicates biased and unbiased people. Instead, all words and expressions are marked by interests and values that are attributable to the people who use those words and expressions, as specified by him (117). This is exactly why, for Volo\u0161inov (105), all meanings are evaluative<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is also not just about the words that are used. This also applies to grammar, as Fairclough (111, 117) points out. For example, these include negations that prompt agreement, such as “Isn’t it a nice day?”, tag questions that also prompt agreement by reducing the number of answer to a binary yes or no, such as “It will be all right, won’t it?”, and passive voice, namely in the form of omitting the agent, as elaborated by Bolinger (84-85).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Many linguists, including many sociolinguists, distance themselves from normativity<\/em>, claiming to be interested only in language, only to be the ones who create linguistic norms<\/em>, not only wittingly, but also unwittingly. For example, Fairclough has much good to say about Bolinger’s book, but he (113) also faults it for this exact reason:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “[I]n addition to roles we can group under ‘efficiency of communication,’ the standard has a symbolic role: its status symbolizes the status of ‘its’ class[.]”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n The problem is that despite his contribution to critical linguistics, namely by addressing the stigma associated with certain varieties <\/em>of language, acknowledging how standard <\/em>language is merely a variety that has been privileged over others and recognizing how that burdens those familiar only with other dialects, Bolinger (47, 52, 55) lapses into promoting standard language, seeing it as necessary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To be clear, none of this is inherently negative. One is not only constrained by others, but also enabled by them, as acknowledged by Fairclough (45) in his reply to Sampson. It works both ways. This also means that we cannot understand language, what it is, nor what it does, if we separate it from people, and, conversely, that we cannot understand people, who they are and what they do, if we separate them from language, as also acknowledged by him (46).<\/p>\n\n\n\n What is also notable about Fairclough’s (46) position in his reply to Sampson is that politics is not something that happens at the state level, but at all levels. People do, however, often think this way, that it only takes place internationally, between state leaders, or nationally, regionally or locally, between politicians, and, by extension, between bureaucrats in ministries and various other state institutions, but, for Fairclough (46), everything is political, even everyday conversations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sociolinguistics is, however, not the only one to blame for ignoring the politics of language. Fairclough (9) extends his criticism also to conversation analysis and pragmatics in his book ‘Language and Power’. It is worth clarifying, however, that the issue he (9) takes with pragmatics concerns only a certain conception of pragmatics known as Anglo-American pragmatics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What Fairclough (9) objects to has to do with how Anglo-American pragmatics relies on an autonomous, intentional and rational subject. There is always this self, someone who chooses to say something to someone else, another self, and then that someone else chooses to say something in response. In his (9) words:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “The main weakness of [Anglo-American] pragmatics from a critical point of view is its individualism: ‘action’ is thought of atomistically as emanating wholly from the individual, and is often conceptualized in terms of the ‘strategies’ adopted by the individual speaker to achieve [that individual’s] ‘goals or ‘intentions’.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n What is remarkable about Anglo-Pragmatics and, more specifically about speech acts<\/em>, as championed by J. L. Austin and John Searle, is that it changes the way one thinks about language. Fairclough (156) explains this particularly well:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Speech act values cannot be assigned simply on the basis of formal features of an utterance[.]”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In simpler terms, one can say one thing, like ‘oh, how interesting’, and mean another thing, even the exact opposite, like how something is boring, or even multiple things at once, so that some people are led to think that one finds something interesting, while other people will realize that one finds that something boring, as also recognized by Fairclough (156). It is also often the case that one is not simply describing something, like when one says something like ‘it’s warm here’, but rather asking or even commanding someone to do something, such as turning on the air conditioning. This way one can avoid appearing as imposing on others, even though that is exactly what one is doing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This has major consequences for linguistics, as discussed by Austin in ‘How to Do Things with Words’. The act of saying, writing or, more generally, expressing something, i.e., locution<\/em>, is not, no longer that important. Instead, what matters is how what is said, written or expressed is used, i.e., illocution<\/em>, and how it is then understood, i.e., perlocution<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To make sense of how this works, it is worth noting that it is often not what <\/em>is said, but how <\/em>it is said that matters. Something as simple as a change in intonation can change what one means by what one is saying, while others may or may not recognize what one meant, as recognized by Volo\u0161inov (103-105).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The problem with Anglo-Pragmatics is that it separates people from the social context. It therefore fails to account for people’s everyday limits, as explained by Fairclough (9):<\/p>\n\n\n\n “This understates the extent to which people are caught up in, constrained by, and indeed derive their individual identities from social conventions, and gives the implausible impression that conventionalized ways of speaking or writing are ‘reinvented’ on each occasion of their use by the speaker generating a suitable strategy for … particular goals.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n People are therefore thought of as simple expressing themselves with no constraints. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, this also makes people appear more manipulative than they are, as acknowledged by him (9):<\/p>\n\n\n\n “[I]t correspondingly overstates the extent to which people manipulate language for strategic purposes.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n In other words, while it is naive to think that people will say just about anything to anyone, it is also conspiratorial to think that they are constantly calculating how to benefit from other people through language. Simply put, Anglo-American pragmatics puts way too much emphasis on the individual.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It also worth noting that Fairclough (10) faults Anglo-American pragmatics for simply assuming that people strive to get along with one another. He does not name anyone, but, being familiar with this tradition, it is fair to say that this is a clear, albeit warranted attack on H. P. Grice’s Cooperative Principle<\/em>. For Fairclough (10), the problem is not that people do not cooperate with one another, as they do, quite frequently, but rather that it ignores why people might not cooperate with one another and why, in some cases, agreement is not a matter of cooperation between equals, like ‘one man to another’, but a matter of doing as you are told.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Fairclough’s (11-12) view, conversation analysis suffers from the same issues as sociolinguistics and Anglo-American pragmatics. In summary, people are thought of as simply talking to one another, as autonomous, rational individuals who are equals with clear intents, as if the social situation and the social relations did not determine what they are expected to say to one another and what they may therefore likely say to another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To be fair, this does not mean that there is nothing to like about Anglo-American pragmatics, conversation analysis or sociolinguistics. In fact, there is much to like about them. Firstly, I would go as far as to say that Austin’s posthumously published lecture series, ‘How to Do Things with Words’, is revolutionary when it comes not only to philosophy of language, but also to linguistics. I cannot say that about John Searle’s work, considering he did not come up with the idea, but it is fair to say that he did popularize the notion of Disagreement<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Divergence<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Language use<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Expanding the scope<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Critique<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Early critique<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Later critique<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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power.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n\n
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Further critique<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Critique of the self<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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