I tend to write on whatever Gilles Deleuze and/or Félix Guattari have written or I somehow end up on some tangent that pertains to their work, typically in connection with either discourse or landscape. That’s partly because those are included in the name of this blog. I haven’t really focused on other topics that they’ve written on, unless it has had some relevance to what I have been dealing with. In other words, when I’ve done that, it’s been more like here’s a couple of comments on this topic by either of them or both of them.
To get to the point, this essay will deal with what Guattari had to say about the world in his last works. It’s, perhaps, easy to miss that he had plenty to say about the issues that concern us now already then, in late 1980s and early 1990s. Why is it easy to miss? Well, because he often gets cast as Deleuze’s sidekick. To be fair, there’s some truth to that. Then again, if we think of him or, rather, his work in that way, we end up focusing on Deleuze, even in their co-authored works. A lot of the good stuff is there, in Guattari’s works. At times I find it a bit annoying how little attention those works get, while everyone appears to have read ‘A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia’. To be clear, that’s an excellent book, as is ‘Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia’. Both are great, in their own right. It’s just that even if people have read one of them, or both, which I often doubt, by the way, there’s way, way more good stuff to read, and not only written by Deleuze, but also by Guattari.
Long story short, let’s assume that the world is going to hell. That’s, perhaps, a bit blunt, but it’s an easy way to put it, without having get into heated discussions about whether it is like this or like that. Let’s just assume that. Even if you don’t agree with that, because I haven’t given any evidence for that, let’s just go with it, you know, for the sake of argument.
Right, Guattari has this book called ‘The Three Ecologies’. But why three? Why indeed! Isn’t ecology about the environment? Well, yes, and Guattari isn’t challenging that, but he wants us to take a step back and broaden our horizons.
These three ecologies are the environmental, the social and the subjective, as mentioned by him (28). To distinguish his own approach from ecology, he (28) calls his approach ecosophy. But what is ecosophy then? He expands on that in another book, ‘Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm’. There’s a chapter called ‘The ecosophic object’. The quick answer is, perhaps, the obvious one: ecology + philosophy. What about the long answer then? Well, I’ll get to that.
Guattari (119) starts the book chapter with whatever I just stated: the world is going to hell. He (119) acknowledges that there’s been all this progress, especially in technology, yet it’s like out of the frying pan into the fire. It’s like you’d think all that technological progress would help us, and, to be fair, in certain ways it does, yet, somehow, there’s, perhaps, even more poor people than there were back then, some thirty years ago, more turmoil, both in the form of armed conflicts and in everyday life, and the degradation of environment.
What’s holding us back then? Well, my answer is that a lot of people simply don’t care about other people, like out of sight, out of mind, none of my concern. That’s, however, not exactly his answer, as he (119) wants us to rather focus on why that’s the case, why people don’t care about anyone else except themselves or the people they know (as that connection makes it about themselves)? To give you his answer, he (119) reckons that we’ve been banalized and infantilized by the very technologies that we’ve come to embrace.
To be more specific, he (119) mentions sensationalist imagery in the media as the main problem. Now, as this is from three decades ago, he’d be referring to television, which is, to be honest, not that relevant today. I mean, okay, it sort of still is, but it’s more in the form of streaming platforms. What I mean is that it’s no longer apt to think in those terms, restricted to living room settings, people gathering around a TV. Then again, that means that it has only gotten worse. Now everyone carries that TV around them and what they are presented has been coded to provide them with the type of sensationalist imagery that they’ve been known to like in the past. That’s exactly what’s banal and infantile about it. You only get what the code gives you and it’s presented as being for your own good, even though it’s exactly what prevents you from looking up other things. That’s the algorithm for you. It’s like your very own feedback loop.
Anyway, the world is still going to hell. The difference is that now we know what the problem is, at least in the western context. So, why don’t we just fix it? Why don’t we solve the problem if it’s as simple as that? Well, the problem with the problem is that it’s not easy to fix. Once you’ve been coded to not to stray from the code, it’s difficult to recode yourself. In other words, that code is self-reinforcing. Again, think of it is as a feedback loop.
To be positive though, I wouldn’t say that you cannot stray from the code, that you cannot recode the code, but rather that it is really, really difficult to do so, especially if you aren’t even aware of how it all works. If you think that you are autonomous, in full control, at all times, as a lot of people think they are, as I’ve come to notice over the years, as based on all kinds of feedback I’ve gotten even from what, by all logic, should be very, very smart people.
If I were to summarize what he (119) thinks is missing, back then and still now, it’s a sense of responsibility. I agree. People are very happy to whatever they are doing, but it’s rare that someone is willing to take the responsibility for their actions and thus be replaced by someone else who, perhaps, could do a better job. To be clear, I’m not saying it has to be that drastic, as it’s not all do or die, but rather that with what we like to call agency, having the privilege to act and to be acted on in certain ways, ought to come corresponding responsibility.
That’s what I’d call having integrity. Why? Well, because it’s not about finger wagging. It’s not about disciplining people through punishment or fear of punishment. It’s more like, how to put it, honesty, being true to oneself and one’s actions. It’s like recognizing that you are in a certain position, having certain rights and responsibilities that come with it, and that you need to act accordingly. If you don’t act accordingly, if you mess up, it’s up to you to recognize it and make up for it. Sometimes that’s not enough and it’s just better to quit and let someone else be in that position, because you realize that you didn’t do a good job.
For example, if the authorities or politicians aren’t doing a good job, you should be criticizing them for it, so that they get the point, that they understand that changes are in order. That they end up doing a better job in the future. In fact, they should be the ones to realize that themselves. It shouldn’t be up to you make them do a better job. That’s what I mean by integrity.
It’s the same in academics. If you think someone is being sloppy, doing poor research, more of the same, or so to speak, or half-assing it, you should be criticizing them for it, so that they come to realize that they need to change their ways of doing research. Again, this shouldn’t even be something that others need to point out to them. It should be up to each and every academic to do a better job. That’s what I’d call integrity.
But what does that involve? Doing a better job? Indeed, it’s about the actions, not about the person. For example, if a minister says something that’s incorrect, as in not backed up by the evidence, then the minister should take it back and admit that it was not the case. It can, of course, be that the minister has been misinformed or has simply misinterpreted something, fair enough, but that means that the minister should let people know that it was the case, like my bad, mea culpa. This was the case with the current Prime Minister of Finland, Petteri Orpo, who made some statements about proposed changes in taxation, only to have to backpedal on those statements a day later. To my understanding, he had misunderstood the way that would work. Had it been that way, that would not have concerned him, but, alas, it was not that way and thus it did concern him. Okay, it’s not great that you mess up something like that, as the head of the government (not the state, as the President is the head of the state, at least technically, as the President is not that important these days), but it is what it is. It’s better to acknowledge that you were wrong, no matter what the reason behind it was, and move on. That’s responsibility. That’s integrity.
To give you a contrary example, the previous Prime Minister of Finland, Sanna Marin, got so much shit for things that had nothing to do with her actions in that position. She was criticized for posing for a fashion magazine, wearing a swanky blazer, without a shirt under it. So, to be clear, she was not criticized for doing a bad job, having said something incorrect or the like, but for wearing a certain outfit in a magazine, which most people probably never read. Again, it’s totally fine to criticize her for her actions that are related to her job, but it’s not fine to criticize her for her actions that aren’t related to her job. In the former case, that’s about about responsibility, nor about integrity. In the latter case, it’s about how neither has to do anything with her position.
Again, it’s the same in academics. If you don’t agree with someone or, rather, with their work, that’s totally fine. I often don’t agree with others, or their work, but that doesn’t mean that I don’t like them or that I think that all their work is worthless or something. For example, I’ve mentioned in the past that the discussion of landscape in ‘Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design’ is pretty much shit, because, well, it just isn’t that good, because it glosses over the complexity of the concept, because it gives this impression that landscape is this material entity, with its material features, as it is juxtaposed with what they (35) call semiotic landscape. In other words, the problem is that the way it is presented ignores how landscape is, in fact, a semiotic. It is a way of making sense of the world, as opposed to the world itself, as well established in landscape research by the time the book first came out. However, that doesn’t mean therefore the whole book is shit. No. Absolutely not. In fact, I highly recommend the book if you are into multimodality, or, more broadly speaking, semiotics. Plus, even if the entire book was trash, which it isn’t, that wouldn’t entail that other books, book chapters or articles by them are thus trash. No. Absolutely not.
I’ve also went on and on about how landscape is often ignored in linguistic landscape research, but that doesn’t mean the work is thus worthless. Far from it. There’s plenty to like, especially with the attention being paid to visual manifestations language. So, for example, while I agree with Joshua Nash on this and don’t agree with David Malinowski on this, as discussed in a previous essay, but that doesn’t mean that I don’t value Malinowski’s work, nor that I therefore rave about Nash’ work. No. That’d be silly.
This is actually something I have to remind my students. Just because you disagree with something in some article, book, book chapter, interview, etc., doesn’t mean that you have disagree with everything that’s in it, not to mention with everything ever written by the same author or authors. Heck, you might even disagree with nearly everything in some publication or publications, but still find something in that work or those works that you agree with or even consider highly important, if not crucial to your own work. For example, while it may seem that I don’t agree with Malinowski’s and Stefania Tufi’s take on assemblages, as discussed in a previous essay, my disagreement is only partial and thus it’s more like that I don’t entirely agree with them on that.
I could say the same about Critical Discourse Analysis, which is these days known as Critical Discourse Studies. Just because I don’t agree with some authors, on some matters, doesn’t mean that I don’t agree with them at all. It all depends.
Then there’s the time aspect. While people tend to be rather consistent with their views, people do change. This means that while you may disagree with some authors’ early work, but then agree with their later work, or vice versa. Some people might also have a number of interests, some of which are also of interest to you, but then the rest aren’t. This then means that you are bound to agree with only some of the work. Again, this is totally fine.
That may also change. You might not find something to be of great value to you right now, but then come to appreciate it later. For example, I wasn’t too keen on Jan Blommaert’s work like a decade ago, but then came to appreciate it. To be honest, I don’t know how that happened. It’s just like some things didn’t click initially and then they did. My guess is that whatever it is that I read in between made it work for me and, so, I was the one to blame there, not him. This happens all the time and at least I don’t mind admitting that I might be just too stupid to understand something. That’s why you want to keep an open mind and swing back to it later, just in case what you’ve encountered in between has made it work for you.
To make sure you get the idea, let’s take a big name like Karl Marx. I don’t really agree with his views, as presented in his works, and in the works of others, but that doesn’t mean that I wholeheartedly disagree with him either. Plus, like with Plato, with whom I tend to disagree even more, I still acknowledge the importance of his views, just as I acknowledge the importance of Plato’s views.
To be fair, this also applies to my favorites. For example, Deleuze and Guattari are difficult to comprehend. You can give them shit for that. That’s totally warranted. It takes a lot of effort to get used to their style. But does that mean that their work is poor? Well, no. Obviously not. Just because something is expressed in a certain way doesn’t mean it’s poor. Then again, fair is fair, and I think you can give them shit for that.
If this is too academic for your taste, it’s also like how it is with music. It might be that you absolutely love someone’s first four albums, but then think it just isn’t that good by the fifth album and by the ninth album it’s pretty much shit. Or, alternatively, you love certain songs on each of the albums, but wonder what the deal with the other songs on those albums are, like didn’t they know that they just aren’t that good and, perhaps, come across as shit, especially when paired with those songs that you just adore, as then there’s that added contrast.
Then there’s the personal aspect. To summarize all these, I don’t know any of the people that I’ve mentioned so far. It’s hard for me to even comment on them. Like what’s there to say? I’ve never been in the same room with the Prime Ministers. It would have been impossible for me to meet Marx and Plato. I’ve never met Kress, nor van Leeuwen. What’s in common with all of them is that I can’t say anything about them, really, because I don’t know them personally. I’ve met Malinowski and Tufi in a conference, years ago, but I don’t know them personally, so, again, I can’t say anything about them. Okay, I guess I can say that they are alright people, but that impression doesn’t tell you anything, really. That’s like most people I’ve met briefly.
Not having anything to say about someone may, of course, come across as not wanting to say anything about someone, but that’s not the case. Even if the people I listed were people that I actually know, or have known, for better or for worse, it wouldn’t matter, I’d keep it to myself. I like to operate that way, on a need-to-know basis. If the life of someone else doesn’t concern you, but I happen to know about it, you won’t hear it from me. I think it’s just better that way, as I’ve mentioned in a past essay. I leave it up to the people in question to deal with their personal lives.
I also think it’s cheap to resort to personal remarks. If you don’t like the actions of people whose actions concern you, let’s say authorities or politicians, criticize them for those actions and be ready to back it all up with some evidence. Demand that responsibility, that integrity, but don’t comment on their haircuts or the like as that doesn’t really get us anywhere. It’s the same with commenting on the company that they keep. At least I couldn’t care less who is in a relationship with who, inasmuch it doesn’t result in some conflict of interest and, even then, the problem is that conflict of interest, not the relationship itself. No matter what happens, all that matters is that the conflict of interest gets addressed.
Anyway, moving on from responsibility and integrity, as well as agreement and disagreement, to technology. Will it save us? Will it doom us? I’d say no to both. It can provide some solutions, to some problems, but it can also create new ones. That’s my take.
But what’s Guattari’s take then? Well, in his book chapter, he (120) seems to be well aware of what actually happened in the decades following his death, by which I mean the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, how we went from gathering in the living room to streaming content on the go, like wherever, whenever. As he (120) points out, new technologies have certain revolutionary potential, but it’s how we use them that really matters. For example, I think he would have liked the idea of people communicating with one another, like it is these days, like having a casual conversation, but I also think that he’d abhor how that panned out, how banalizing and infantilizing it has become, because of the way it has come to rely on sensationalist imagery and how subservient it is to marketing. That said, I think he’d appreciate something like Open Source and collaborative efforts, such as Wikipedia, much more, because they involve people, like just about anyone, really, and because they don’t rely on sensationalist imagery, nor seek to engage with you just to sell you something.
His (121) comments on contemporary politics being, basically, a one-party system in which the former hardcore leftists, aka communists, are no longer there and the light leftists, aka social democrats, are no longer there either as they’ve been converted to liberals, are also interesting. As he (121) points out, when it’s election time, it’s all, supposedly, high stakes, but once the elections are done, not a lot gets done, regardless of who people vote. I think he (121) is also correct about how that’s, at least, partially attributable to how the politicians and the parties are tied to state bureaucracy, by which I believe he means that it’s unlikely that voting this or that person, this or that party, makes a whole lot of difference when the people in the state institutions are largely the same people, regardless of the election year.
It’s not entirely clear to me what he (121) means by some of his suggestions, but it seems like he’d like to see something like more global politics, as well as more local politics, and not this, usual, state politics that operates somewhere in between the two. While that’s a bit wobbly, as I’m not exactly sure of that, he (121-122) doesn’t want the sort of ethnic particularism that you find in a lot of nation states, because, well, they’ve been constituted that way. It’s exactly what we got in the decades following his take on the situation. So, in short, he (123) wants federalism, but one that is not as some lofty internationalism in which nation states come together to cooperate, you know, whenever they feel like being responsible.
He (29) also brings up this issue in his earlier work, in ‘The Three Ecologies’, while noting two things. Firstly, capitalism has reduced different ways of valuing into one way of valuing it all. Secondly, the role of the states has been reduced to serve the capitalist system.
It’s not enough to oppose the system, aka capitalism, by means of seizing the means of production and the state institutions, as he (122) points out in the book chapter in ‘Chaosmosis’. Why? Well, my answer is that you end up replicating the system that you oppose as you haven’t changed the system. You’ve only put new people in charge of the old system and, perhaps, called them something else, that being the only novelty there is to it. This is why he (122) is so adamant to point out that you need a clean break, one in which the state and its institutions are redefined, completely, and the role of the market is decoupled from the production of subjectivities, so that you don’t end up with banalized and infantilized people.
He (123) wants to emphasize that the market or, rather, world market doesn’t exist. We keep being telling ourselves that there’s this global economy and what not, but, as he (123) points out, you have all these markets that don’t run themselves, but are run by power formations, by which I believe he means, largely, states and corporations. The gist of this is that you don’t have a free market, but a number of more or less regulated markets, which serve certain state and corporate interests.
It is at this point that things start to get jargony. So, to summarize his (124) ecosophic object, as opposed to the banalized and infantilized subject of capitalism, we have four dimensions: Fluxes, Phylums, Universes, and Territories. The fluxes, are “material, energetic and semiotic”, the Phylums are “concrete and abstract machinic”, the Universes are “virtual Universes of value” and the Territories are “finite” and “existential”, to use the terms he (124) uses.
To connect this to a previous essay, this is what he (26-28, 56-57) also presents in ‘Schizoanalytic Cartographies’ as the four functors that operate in four domains, the Fluxes being the F, the Plylums or Phyla being the Φ, the Territories being the T, and the Universes being the U. In summary, his four functors and domains can be summarized like this:
- F = material/energetic and signaletic Flows (Actual, Real) = entities arranged in Complexions
- Φ = abstract machinic Phyla (Actual, Possible) = entities arranged in Rhizomes
- T = existential Territories (Virtual, Real) = entities arranged in Cutouts
- U = incorporeal Universes (Virtual, Possible) = entities arranged in Constellations
To connect these to how these are discussed in some other works, namely in ‘A Thousand Plateaus’, using terms borrowed from Louis Hjelmslev’s work, we get something like this:
- F = Fluxes = Substance of Content
- Φ = Phyla = Form of Content
- T = Territories = Substance of Expression
- U = Universes = Form of Expression
In ‘Chaosmosis’, he (124-125) gives a couple of examples of these as he indicates that:
“Here one is thinking of the visibilised and actualised strata of material and energetic Fluxes, of the strata of organic life, of those of the Socius, of the mecanosphere, but also of the incorporeal Universes of music, of mathematical idealities, of Becomings of desire[.]”
As you can see, he is indeed talking about the F as both material and signaletic (a-signifying) flows, organized as inorganic, organic and social strata, which would then, by all logic, necessitate the involvement of Φ, and about the U as the incorporeal (signifying) codings , which would then also necessitate the involvement of T, as, to my understanding, you cannot separate the substances from the forms.
There’s a lot going on in only a couple of pages and if you aren’t familiar with what I just listed (which, to be honest, probably isn’t enough), you are bound to be lost, so I’ll skip a head to point which probably makes more sense on its own terms. Right, so, he (127-128) compares the ecosophic approach to the psychoanalytic approach. In summary, the latter is obsessed with language, whereas the former acknowledges the importance of language, but doesn’t seek to translate everything into language. In his (127-128) words:
“[T]he ecosophic (or schizoanalytic) approach is not confined to the level of verbal expression alone. Of course [s]peech remains an essential medium, but it’s not the only one; everything which short-circuits significational chains, postures, facial traits, spatial dispositions, rhythms, a-signifying semiotic productions (relating, for example, to monetary exchange), machinic sign productions, can be implicated in this type of analytical assemblage. Speech itself—and I could never overemphasise this—only intervenes here inasmuch as it acts as a support for existential refrains.”
To use the terms used in ‘A Thousand Plateaus’, this is also what’s known as micropolitics, pragmatics, rhizomatics, schizoanalysis and stratoanalysis, as listed by the two (22). If you understand that book or, well, at least most of it, then, well, you are probably already doing this. You are then already focusing on forms of content and forms of expression, as manifested in substances of content and substances of expression, as well as assemblages and abstract machines. To use terms Michel Foucault might prefer, you are already doing dispositive analysis, focusing not only on the discourses, i.e., the discursive formations, but also on the non-discourses, i.e., the non-discursive formations and their diagrams.
To me, it doesn’t really matter which terms you use, as long as you understand what how this type of analysis, whatever you want to call it, differs from the psychoanalytic approach Guattari criticizes in ‘Chaosmosis’ for attempting to reduce everything into a matter of language, as if language was, somehow, transparent to us and trough it we’d understand the world, and ourselves. While appreciate the effort that results in a fine-tuned conceptual framework, as opposed to half-assing analysis by attributing whatever you cannot account for to random concepts that often used in some field or discipline, I’m not too fussy about details, such as what label is most apt for this and/or that concept. At that point I’m like whatever, because what matters is that you get it, that it makes sense to you.
What is the goal then? Well, luckily, he (128) does give us an answer:
“The primary purpose of ecosophic cartography is thus not to signify and communicate but to produce assemblages of enunciation capable of capturing the points of singularity of a situation.”
Okay, okay, I know, I know. So, what does he mean by that? To address the first part, the analysis should not only explain what something is, but also account for how it comes to be that way or, rather, how it might come to be that way, as well as for how it works. This type of analysis is all about the function. Sure, you have to explain what’s what, there and then, in order to address how it all works, that function or those functions, but that’s not what you are focusing on.
What’s also particularly important in this type of approach is how fuzzy and muddled everything is. While you can separate this, whatever it is, from something else, whatever that may be, it’s ultimately unsatisfactory and gets us nowhere, because it’s all connected, one way or another, directly or indirectly (as in through something else, which then connected to something else, and so on and so forth). He (128) exemplifies this with how ecologists want to save the planet, as he also wanted, but they aren’t willing to engage with questions that are tied to saving the planet, such as poverty and dogmatism. In other words, an environmental account is not enough, because to make a difference, you also need a sociological and psychological account, as he (128-129) goes on to point out.
To expand on his example, people have other things on their mind than saving the planet. That’s what prevents us from fixing the problem. If people are not alive tomorrow because they don’t have food, water and/or shelter, saving the planet doesn’t really matter to them and I’d say that it’s hard to blame them for not doing more for the planet. It’s the same with people who aren’t poor or, more broadly speaking, disenfranchised. They might not be struggling like the poor, true, but they also have their struggles. It’s just that the struggles are mental. They’ve been banalized and infantilized to the point that no matter how much money they have, they’ll never be happy. It’s always that lack that they have or, rather, think that they have. They try to fill that lack, but once it is filled, there’s always that next lack. That’s how they sell products to you, which you then consume. It’s like you get your fix, yes, but once that wears off, you need another fix, and so on and so forth, just like it is with drugs, but just without the drugs.
To give you another example, think of terrorism. There’s often a call for more law enforcement to deal with it. That’s one way to go about it, sure, but the problem with such approach is that you aren’t dealing with why you have such problem in the first place. It is, of course, much more difficult and much more expensive to approach the issue differently. For example, if people from developing countries end up picking arms and then run some operations, it might have something to do with their living conditions. Often, it’s simply poverty, which is a social issue, but it can also be an environmental issue, in the sense that environmental degradation may result in poverty. It can also be that a certain threshold ends up being crossed, by which I mean that people can handle the poverty, but only insofar as they can make ends meet. They might rely on subsistence agriculture, but end up taking up arms if that is no longer possible for them due to environmental changes. They may also hold certain beliefs about one’s status in the society and once they are unable to make ends meet, they may take action, especially if others promise them that it will result in a better life.
If that’s too extreme, then think of the youth. Adults are bothered by them, just by their presence in the public, because just by doing nothing, they appear to be loitering. The thing is, however, that you aren’t really allowed to do much in the public, except move in traffic or sit on some benches. Plus, even if they are up to no good, it’s not like they are spoiled with options. What’s there to do if you are a teenager? Okay, there are all kinds of hobby groups, sports clubs etc., but access to those is largely based on how much money one’s parents or other guardians have. It shouldn’t be that surprising if that results in delinquency.
Then there’s work. It used to be so that everyone who wanted a job could get a job, or so the older generations keep telling us. Apparently, all you needed to do was the walk into workplace or call the manager and you’d start the next day. I highly doubt that, but it doesn’t really matter whether that was case or not. What matters is that work has changed. Many kinds of work simply don’t exist anymore, because they’ve been shifted elsewhere, largely to developing countries where the employers have to pay less to their employees and operate in ways that otherwise may their enterprise more profitable than it would in developed countries. Alternatively, the work has been automated, which means that machines and computers have made people redundant. He (28) makes note of the unemployed in ‘The Three Ecologies’:
“But to what end? Unemployment, oppressive marginalization, loneliness, boredom, anxiety and neurosis?”
He doesn’t answer his own questions, but I’d say yeah, that’s an apt way to characterize being unemployed. As I’ve mentioned in a previous essay, being unemployed is awful. While it may seem like a sweet gig to have all the time in the world, much of what you’d like to with that time either requires money, which you don’t have anyway, or the status of being employed. Like I’ve never told anyone when I’ve been unemployed, even though that’s known to come with the territory, as you are lucky to land a steady job in the academics. Why? Well, because it’s not an attractive look. Inasmuch as people don’t know that, you come across as far more attractive. That’s why.
Anyway, what he (28) lists there is pretty accurate. Firstly, there’s that marginalization. You’re fine if you don’t tell anyone, but, again, if you do tell that to others or they figure out, you are instantly labeled as a loser in life. Secondly, that makes you pretty lonely alright, because you can’t really tell anyone, or you have to be coy about it. Thirdly, it is pretty boring. That of course depends a lot on you. If you aren’t a big spender, you’ll find a lot to do on your own. Fourthly, anxiety and neurosis are, perhaps, the worst thing about it, because they make everything uncertain.
To be clear, the problem here isn’t that machines and computers have taken people’s jobs. It’s rather that people’s lives are defined by their relation to work. When that’s then taken away from them, you end up with plenty of social and mental problems. So, to be productive, you either have to come up with new jobs for them or redefine the value system that reduced everything to capital, without which you are nothing. My guess is that the first option is not doable, because, you know, it’s their problem that they are unemployed, or so we are told by people who have jobs. The second is not doable either, because that would indeed change the system and the people who benefit from it don’t really want to see it changed. In short, it’s just way easier to blame the unemployed for their lack of employment than it is to do anything about it.
To connect the issue of work with Guattari’s three ecologies, which are the environmental, the social and the subjective, as mentioned by him (28), people also lose their jobs not because of environmental degradation, but because of environmental protection. For example, if you cut on coal power, you’ll inevitably cut on coal mining, which means that the power plant workers and the coal miners need to find new jobs. So, while the world is going to hell, as we’ve already agreed, to get them on board requires that we take their situation seriously. That would, of course, be an inconvenience for others, so it’s just easier for people to blame them for things going to hell.
As he (30-31) points out, technology is one solution to this issue, but somehow, no matter what we do, the system remains the same. You have the developed countries, what used to be called the First World Countries, and the developing countries, what used to be called the Third World Countries (The Communist/Socialist countries being the Second World Countries, in case you’ve ever wondered about that). There’s certain been plenty of development ever since he wrote this book in the later 1980s, but in relation to one another, the developed world is still developed and the developing world is still developing. What was new already then was what takes place within the developed countries, as he (32) goes on to point out:
“[T]his phenomenon is accompanied by a sort of Third-Worldization within developed countries[.]”
To give you a bit of context, he (32) first acknowledges that the gap between the developed and the developing countries is no longer that wide. Okay, it’s still there, but what’s notable is how in the rich countries some are getting richer and richer, whereas others are getting poorer and poorer. So, in practice, you can have very, very nice, affluent neighborhoods and then not far from them really, really poor and deprived neighborhoods. You can’t really explain that with the current terms, the developed and the developing, but you can explain it with the old terms, so that it’s like the same country is a First World Country and a Third World Country at the same time.
I think I’ve mentioned this in the past as well, at least in passing, but I’m going to repeat it anyway. Right, I don’t’ believe he is clairvoyant, but he does seem to have a knack at foreseeing what’s going to happen in the following decades. In this context, he (32) points out that:
“[This] is coupled with an exacerbation of questions relative to immigration and racism.”
Okay, something tells me that others, likely sociologists, have said the same thing, but you do have to give him credit here. That’s a pretty accurate depiction of contemporary western politics. This shouldn’t, of course, surprise us. Even though we are told time and time again that we love immigrants, because they enrich the society, most of the immigrants end up in a situation where they are unemployed, because they lack skills and/or the formal qualifications needed in the western societies. That means that they end up being seen as impoverishing the society, because they are, indeed, unemployed and we already know what people think of the unemployed. On top of that, they get blamed by the unemployed who are not immigrants, because the more you have unemployed, the more difficult it is for the unemployed to get employed.
For the rich, such an arrangement is a win-win. Firstly, the poor end up blaming one another. That keeps them occupied, pointing fingers at one another and not the rich. That’s divide et impera for you. Secondly, the more you have unemployed, the more they have to compete with another, which, again keeps them occupied with pointing fingers at one another and not the rich.
We can also see this in education. I’d say the system here is pretty good, overall, but if it fails people, it’s because it’s run a shoestring budget. Having more teachers would, of course, be the best course of action, at least in the short run, but there appears to be no money for such. While I doubt that, as where there’s a will, there’s a way, let’s assume that it is the case, you know, for the sake of argument.
So, are teachers even necessary? Do we even need schools? Well, no and no, but we’ve become so accustomed to both that they are needed. You can’t expect people to suddenly become more active and take more responsibility of themselves, if they’ve spent years sitting behind desks memorizing the ‘correct’ answers provided to them by their teachers. To explain that in Guattari’s parlance, you can’t expect people to be veritable autodidacts, all the sudden, when they’ve been infantilized and banalized for years, if not decades by that point. If they act all servile, it’s because that’s what’s expected of them instead of having integrity and taking responsibility of themselves.
But are the teachers then to blame for that? Well, yes and no. Yes, in the sense that they are the people responsible for the students’ learning. No, in the sense that they are most likely keenly aware of how demanding it is to take responsibility of your own learning when that’s not something that’s really appreciated. It’s difficult to encourage people to do their own thing if that’s then not appreciated (like who do you think you are? who gave you this idea?). I think they’d be delighted if the students did more, on their own, but as they are, indeed, responsible for the students’ learning, they can’t really encourage the students to do their own thing. I get that, so it’s difficult to blame the teachers. I bet they rolled their eyes when it was made public that the current core curricula emphasized that aspect and I reckon they thought it was just a way to justify why more teachers aren’t needed.
I encounter this at the university level, and it is sort of … how to put it nicely and fairly … frustrating to see that the students are clearly smart, but they are often also rather timid. It’s like prior to that point, prior to my engagement with them, no one told them that they could do it, that they don’t need their teachers. I don’t see myself as being in the position to tell anyone what they should be doing, like what they should focus on when they do research. It’s their work, so they get to make it work. Sure, you can bounce some ideas off of me, that’s fine, I’m glad to be of assistance in that regard, but I’m not there to tell you what to do and how you should be doing it. I’m very hands off when I supervise people, because that way they get to do their own thing.
This is also what Guattari (132-133) observes in ‘Chaosmosis’. There’s a profound lack of creativity, even, and, perhaps, especially in the academics, yet we are told that we need to innovate. The way he (132-133) expresses that has to do with the way we’ve ended up championing science and objectivity, while happily ignoring that is the subject that defines science and objectivity. That doesn’t mean a retreat to subjectivity is in order though, to privilege it in any way, but rather that we should be focusing our attention on the production of subjectivity, as mentioned by him (122, 133) here and already earlier on. He (135) also wants to end on that after noting that just something as mundane as air or water, it’s not a given in the universe:
“How do we produce it, capture it, enrich it, and permanently reinvent it in a way that renders it compatible with Universes of mutant value?”
His (134-135) answer to all of these questions is that we need to let go of any givens, even existing art. This is not to say that you must discard everything, like for the sake of it, no, but that you must be able to let go before you can expect the system to change. Of course, it’s not enough that you are able to do that, to let go, like I sure am, as I’ve pointed out a number of times in my past essays, probably to the point that it irritates people that I keep mentioning it, as if I was something special, some chosen one. It simply isn’t enough. You do need a lot of people, not just me, or you, or a handful of people like me or you, assuming we are alike (maybe, maybe not), as he (135) points out.
But how to convince a lot of people, like the vast majority? Well, thinking in terms of the three ecologies, the environmental, the social and the psychological, to prevent the world from going to hell requires us to not only take care of our environment, but also of ourselves and one another. This means that we need to address all of the three ecologies at the same time.
To be clear, addressing all of the three ecologies at the same time is difficult, because it takes so much more resources than just focusing on one of them. There’s no denying that. Then again, it’s kind of pointless to try to address just one of them, because if you don’t address the other two, it’s very, very difficult to make any change to the one that you are addressing.
What’s the most difficult to change? Well, my answer is that the environmental is the most difficult to comprehend and thus to manage. There’s just so, so many things to take into account at all times. Then again, while we occasionally fail at that, it’s something were are, at least, pretty good at. I think the social is, perhaps, the easiest to change as much of it pertains to poverty. The most difficult to change is the psychological. I’d say that it is also the most important thing to change, because if you don’t change the way people think, especially in the west, it’s going to be very, very difficult to change the environment and the social.
I think it’s fair to say that focusing on the psychological, what Guattari refers to as the subjective, is what he and Deleuze focused on in their work. Okay, they do also take into account the other two ecologies in their work, I don’t doubt that, but I’d say that they tend to focus on the subjective. I’d say that it’s actually more fitting to characterize them as mainly interested in the production of subjectivity, rather than on subjectivity, because that accounts for the other two ecologies as well.
The production of subjecitivity is also what interests me. I’m not really interested in subjectivity, nor care for addressing it. I just don’t know what to do with people’s accounts of this and/or that, because as interesting as they may be, namely for the people themselves, I’m only interested in such inasmuch as it informs me how their subjectivity is produced.
This happens all the time in everyday life. I listen to people and read what they have they’ve written. I look at their facial expressions, their hand gestures and their posture. It’s not simply what they express, nor through which mode it is expressed, but rather how they express it. I don’t do any of this in hopes of understanding who they are, nor who they think they are. I do this to understand how they become who they are or who they think they are at any given moment.
I guess you could say that all I’m doing is reading signs, which people emit constantly. I don’t like bragging, because I’m not fan of pride, because it leads to complacency, but I do want to point out that, somehow, over the years, I’ve gotten pretty good at that. It’s not clairvoyance, no, as I can’t read people’s minds, but I can often figure out people’s desires, in the sense that I can understand what drives them to act in a certain way. Some people are, of course, good at hiding such, but, I’d say, most people aren’t, which makes it easy for me to read the signs.
What I’ve noticed is that people’s subjectivity is typically produced in terms of a lack, as already discussed. I might not know what it is that they desire, that they think that they need in order to feel complete, if only for a moment, but it’s there. People have this … how to put it … restlessness to them. It’s like something just ain’t right. It’s like the person isn’t entirely present.
Now, I don’t think I have some super power. Haha, no. It’s rather that Deleuze and Guattari have provided me the conceptual tools that allow me do that. It’s actually rather easy when you come to terms with how the contemporary sign system relies on signification and subjectification. The former accounts for people’s neurotic tendencies, which I often see as this subtle restlessness. It’s like they worry that something bad is about to happen if they don’t know what’s happening around them. So, instead of being poised, they are jittery, like constantly looking over their shoulder, even though they look forward. The latter accounts for their passional tendencies, which I see or hear as this contradictory conviction that has them express themselves as being focused and thus in control of the situation, even though they are not, as I can see from that subtle restlessness. It also manifests itself as reactionary behavior, which I can see and/or hear when someone else challenges their sense of self.
To connect this to what Guattari discusses in both books covered in this essay, most people act that way, in highly contradictory fashion, self-assured, yet in constant fear of not being able account for what goes around them, because they’ve been infantilized and banalized. They are unsure of themselves, lacking that poise, because they’ve been taught that they constantly need to hold someone’s hand. To be clear, they are not infants, nor children. Instead, they are adults who’ve been taught to act in a servile manner, like infants, like children, in the sense that they are expected derive their sense of self from the adults. That’s infantalization for you. To feel good about themselves, they then say and do the most banal things you can think of. Instead of doing their own thing, they do what everyone else around them does. The typical manifestation of that is buying something that they think that they need, that they think defines them, only to have to do that, over and over again.
Finally, to connect this to my own work, it is difficult to act in any other way, because that’s how the entire world around people appears to them. That’s landscape for you. The more people subscribe to what’s around them, which is usually pretty banal, the more they feel like they are in control of their surroundings, which is pretty infantile or servile behavior. This is not to say that everything needs to change for the sake of it, no, but rather that landscape makes people very, very conservative, to the point that people insist that the world should stay the same, regardless of how inevitable it is that doesn’t stay the same. In short, landscape reinforces signification and subjectification and vice versa, which is what Deleuze and Guattari explain in ‘A Thousand Plateaus’, hence my interest in landscapes, but not in people.
References
- Deleuze, G., and F. Guattari ([1972] 1983). Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (R. Hurley, M. Seem and H. R. Lane, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Deleuze, G., and F. Guattari ([1980] 1987). A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Guattari, F. ([1992] 1995). Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm (P. Bains and J. Pefanis, Trans.). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Guattari, F. ([1989] 2000). The Three Ecologies (I. Pindar and P. Sutton, Trans.). London, United Kingdom: The Athlone Press.
- Guattari, F. ([1989] 2013). Schizoanalytic Cartographies (A. Goffey, Trans.). London, United Kingdom: Bloomsbury.
- Kress, G., and T. van Leeuwen ([1996] 2006). Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design (2nd ed.). London, United Kingdom: Routledge.