In the previous essay I skipped addressing the issue of affect and embodiment through the works of Baruch Spinoza, not because I thought it didn’t make any sense, but because it totally made sense to do that. I just think that his thought requires its own essay, instead of being mentioned somewhere in the mix.
I’ve covered the third part of his ‘Ethics’ in the past, but opted to skip the final few pages where he provides more concise definitions. I did that because, well, he is indeed explaining things again. It’s not pointless to read those final pages of that part, but I just didn’t feel like explaining the same things again, when I had just explained it all in more detail.
Now, I don’t like rehashing things, going over things again, but I thought that I’d try my best to turn them into something easily digestible, in the form of tables.
I’ll start with noting that there are many translations of his ‘Ethics’, so the terms may differ from translation to translation. I’m using the R. H. M. Elwes translation, which is where the pagination comes from, but I’ll also add the Edwin Curley translations.
It’s also worth mentioning that English language isn’t great when it comes to translating these. There is affect (affectus), which is simply a temporary, transitional state in which one has a certain capacity to affect (affectio) and be affected (affectio). As you can see, it’s not ideal to use the same word like that, over and over again, as a noun and a verb. I can see why one would use the word emotion instead, but that’s not ideal either as this basically nothing to do with what people call emotions or feelings. Another way of dealing with that is to retain affect (affectus) as it is, and then call the rest affections (affectio). Then again, that just doesn’t work in the verb form, hence the concise, yet somewhat confusing formula where you have affect, which is that dual capacity to affect and be affected. We could also retain affect (affectus), but explain it as the capacity to act (affectio) and be acted upon (affectio), as I’ve explained it in the past, because that’s also how it’s expressed in Brian Massumi’s English translation of ‘Capitalisme et schizophrénie: Mille Plateaux’ by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, known as ‘A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism Schizophrenia’. That kind of works and I don’t think it causes a lot of confusion, I like it, it’s more straightforward, but I do realize that it’s not very accurate and could be confusing, because Spinoza also addresses affects as active actions and passive passions. As you can see, it’s not accurate to define affect (affectus) as the capacity to act (affectio) and be acted upon (affectio), because Spinoza calls activity and action those affects (affectio) that one understands, and passivity and passion those affects (affectio) that one does not understands.
If you struggle with this, as I did, and still do, read Deleuze’s seminar session on Spinoza, the one date January 24, 1978. He points out that:
“Some translators, quite strangely, translate both in the same way. This is a disaster. They translate both terms, affectio and affectus, by ‘affection’”
Now, we could say the same thing about translating both as affect. I mean it works okay, but, yeah, it does cause confusion and Spinoza is not to blame for that as he wrote that book in Latin, hence the terms affectus and affectio. Anyway, I’ll let Deleuze continue:
“I call this a disaster because when a philosopher employs two words, it’s because in principle he has reason to, especially when French easily gives us two words which correspond rigorously to affectio and affectus, that is ‘affection’ for affectio and ‘affect’ for affectus.”
Now, obviously, this doesn’t work in English, as I pointed out. He mentions other alternatives:
“Some translators translate affectio as ‘affection’ and affectus as ‘feeling’ [sentiment], which is better than translating both by the same word, but I don’t see the necessity of having recourse to the word ‘feeling’ since French offers the word ‘affect.'”
Again, that’s French, not English. In English, feeling or sentiment aren’t really good either, because it makes you think that this has something to do with mood, like how are you feeling, or someone being sentimental. I don’t actually mind how Elwes opts for emotion, but I think affect is more apt.
I actually don’t mind that affectus is translated as affect and affectio is translated as affect, affects, to affect and be affected. It works out just fine, if you follow Spinoza’s train of thought carefully. It’s a bit confusing, sure, but if you get it, you get it, regardless of the word choice.
Anyway, to get somewhere with this, there are three affects for Spinoza, desire, pleasure and pain. Desire is actually the desire to persist in being. If we differentiate between the two attributes, extension and thought, desire is will if we only deal with thought (mind, mental aspects), appetite if we deal with extension and thought (body/mind, bodily/mental aspects) unconsciously (which I believe would be in terms of passion) and desire if we deal with the same, extension and thought (body/mind, bodily/mental aspects) consciously. Appetite, desire and will define the essence of modes, which are the modifications of substance, bodies being its modifications conceived in terms of extension, and thoughts being its modifications conceived in terms of thought. The attributes are the essence of substance, of which we, bodily and thinking modes, know only those two, whereas appetite, desire and will are the essence of the modes. Pleasure is simply any bodily or mental affect (affectio) that increases one’s capacity to affect (affectio) and/or be affected (affectio) and, conversely, pain is simply any bodily or mental affect (affectio) that decreases one’s capacity to affect (affectio) and/or be affected (affectio). Pleasure results in a transition to greater perfection, more or better capacity, whereas pain results in a transition to less perfect, less or worse capacity.
To be clear, it’s worth noting that, obviously, this should be understood in two ways. Greater perfection should be understood as having the capacity to affect in a way that results an increase in one’s capacity to affect and be affected in positive ways, not in negative ways, even if affecting in negative ways can increase one’s capacity to affect and be affected in positive ways. This for the simple reason that negativity has a tendency of being reciprocated with negativity, which is bound to result in less perfection, by which we mean a decrease in one’s capacity to affect and be affected.
To give you an example, you can treat others badly, for your own gain. This means that you transition into a state of greater perfection. Your capacity to affect and be affected increases. You are, however, doing it at other people’s expense. That means that because of you they transition into a state of lesser perfection. Their capacity to affect and be affected decreases. It is in their interest respond by treating you also badly. If they succeed, this means that you transition into a state of lesser perfection. Your capacity to affect and be affected decreases.
Spinoza is trying to make us avoid passions. He is trying to make us think what would be the best course of action, by which he means doing something that involves us transitioning into a greater state of perfection, increasing our capacity to affect and be affected, but not in a way that involves transitioning others into a lesser state of perfection, decreasing their capacity to affect and be affect.
Now, Spinoza being Spinoza, he doesn’t give us any easy answers. He is well aware that desire to persist in our being happens at the expense of others, not necessarily of other humans, but of others in general, for the simple reason that we need to eat. We cannot persist, unless we make others perish. This should not come to anyone as any surprise. It may annoy you, because he isn’t giving us an easy solution, a free pass, but I’d say that’s the point, that it is up to us to decide how we live our lives and take responsibility for it.
To be absolutely clear, before I start to list anything, it is worth highlighting that he wants us to prioritize actions, as these affects (affectio) can only be kinds of desire or pleasure, over passions, as these affects (affectio) can be kinds of desire, pleasure or pain. While not all passions are affects (affectio) that are kinds of pain, many of them are and they are the ones that you should definitely try to avoid, in relation to yourself and in relation to others, both human and non-human alike. Also, while some passions are affects (affectio) that are kinds of desire or pleasure, and thus good for you and/or good for others, they may also end up being bad for you and/or others, either at the same time, so that it’s good for you, but not good for others, or that what is good for you now ends up being bad for you later.
In addition, there’s wonder and contempt, which only deal with thought and, more specifically, whether we seek to understand something which we don’t understand or ignore it out of ignorance, because we don’t understand it. They are not really a matter of pleasure or pain, albeit I guess you could say that wonder is pleasurable, as figuring out what you don’t understand can be like that, and that contempt is painful, as it pains you that don’t understand something. Then again, I’d say it’s more a matter of action and passion, rather than a matter of pleasure or pain.
To put it very plainly, he is well aware how fun life can be and that it only makes sense to enjoy it, but he recommends that people pay attention to their lives. Understanding the affects (affectio) is highly beneficial, because it allows you to avoid maximize desirable and pleasurable actions, and passions, while minimizing painful passions, and pleasurable passions that are painful to others or may end up being painful to others and/or yourself later on.
He is also well aware that it is inevitable that you encounter painful passions in life and you’ll just have to deal with them, because to just persist is to cause pain to others, even if it inflicted by you only to non-humans, of the least similar kind. But if you understand that, you can mitigate the pain. If everyone understands that, everyone can mitigate the pain.
It’s also worth noting that at no point is he telling you how to live, that you must do this and/or that, or that you mustn’t do this and/or that. He is simply telling you what affects what and in what ways, which should help you to understand that there is a superior way to understand the world than the ones they teach you in educational and religious institutions and therefore a superior way to live in that world. He leaves it totally up to you to decide what makes sense, whether you want to be a lover or a hater.
Anyway, here’s all that in table form, listing all the primary affects (affectio).
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Primary | Will | Will | Mental | Persistence | Either |
| Primary | Appetite | Appetite | Bodily/Mental | Persistence | Passion |
| Primary | Desire | Desire | Bodily/Mental | Persistence | Action |
| Primary | Pleasure | Joy | Bodily/Mental | Transition to greater perfection | Either |
| Primary | Pain | Sorrow | Bodily/Mental | Transition to lesser perfection | Either |
| Primary | Wonder | Wonder | Mental | Understanding | Action |
| Primary | Contempt | Disdain | Mental | Ignorance | Passion |
I indicated these being the primary type, because Spinoza while does list more, way more affects (affectio), which I’ll get to soon enough, he considers them to be kinds of desire, pleasure or pain. He refers mostly to love and hate.
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Secondary | Love | Love | Mental | Pleasure | Either |
| Secondary | Hate | Hate | Mental | Pain/Pleasure | Passion |
As already noted, these two are kinds of pleasure and pain, which is I’ve listed them as being secondary type. Note also how we are moving from bodily and mental pleasure and pain to mental pleasure and pain. This is Spinoza’s thing. Affects are mostly mental. Why? Because affect (affectus) is a matter of transitioning from one state of perfection to another state of perfection. That’s it. To make sense of that, you need to conceive those transitions, in your mind, mentally. So, to understand affect (affectus), you need to understand affects (affectio).
At this point, it is worth noting that certain affects (affectio), namely hate and the ones that count as kinds of hate, can be understood as having to do with pleasure, as well as pain. They bring pleasure, sometimes great pleasure, to those who hate, but, of course, can inflict pain, sometimes great pain on those who are the ones hated.
For Spinoza, there’s a simple reason for why hate can bring pleasure to the one who hates. Hate is a response to pain, perhaps brought about by someone else’s hate. Removing the source of one’s pain makes sense, because, firstly, it removes what may be a threat to one’s existence, what puts one’s persistence in doubt, and, secondly, what may prevent one from transitioning into a greater state of perfection in one’s existence, making one less capable of affecting (affectio) and being affected (affectio). Simply put, that makes sense because one’s affect (affectus) is at stake.
That said, Spinoza is also doubtful about this. While it makes perfect sense to seek to remove one’s source of pain, it depends what is the cause of the pain. If the cause of our pain, and our hatred, is something dissimilar to us, let’s say a bacteria or a virus, then its removal brings us only pleasure, or at least, minimal pain. However, if the cause of our pain, and our hatred, is something similar to us, let’s say another human, it is far from being clear cut that it only brings us pleasure, or that it is accompanied by minimal pain. This is because, in his view, we tend to share in the pain of those who or what are alike us, but not in the pain of those who or what are unlike us.
This is maybe easier to grasp if the cause of our pain, and our hatred, is an animal. Let’s say it’s a wild animal. It thinks that we are encroaching on its territory. It thinks that we are a threat to its existence and about transition it to a lesser state of perfection, making it less capable of affecting (affectio) and being affected (affectio). It’s affect (affectus) is at stake. It attacks us. We defend ourselves, hating it for attacking us. We kill it, removing the threat to our existence or, at least to our capacity to affect and be affected, preventing us from transitioning to a lesser state of perfection. That brings us pleasure. That said, we are aware that it is a wild animal, protecting its territory and it pains us that we had to kill it.
Let’s go back a bit, to make that source of our pain, and our hatred, something very unlike us, like a bacteria or a virus. This is a different story. We could not care less. It brings us great pleasure to remove them from our bodies. This is not to say that this is entirely unproblematic though. We tend to take it for granted that bacteria and viruses, the ones that cause us pain, to be more specific, are bad for us, just like parasites. Now, ask a biologist, and they’ll tell you that it’s not that simple. The world would be very different if they were not around.
This is not to say that we should embrace everything that is unlike us and potentially painful to us. No, not at all. That’s not what Spinoza thinks. It’s rather that he is telling us that we are in the habit of liking those that are most like us, primarily other humans or, to be more specific, other humans that are like us, and secondarily animals or, to be more specific, animals that are like us humans, such as primates and mammals, especially the ones that are cute and don’t mind us. Conversely, we are in the habit of not liking those who are most unlike us, primarily bacteria, viruses and parasites and secondarily the fungi, the plants, and the animals that aren’t cute and mind us.
To expand on hate, Spinoza lists affects (affectio) that are kinds of desires, some of which could also be understood as kinds of hate.
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Secondary/Tertiary | Anger | Anger | Mental | Desire | Passion |
| Secondary/Tertiary | Revenge | Vengeance | Mental | Desire | Passion |
| Secondary/Tertiary | Cruelty | Cruelty | Mental | Desire | Passion |
| Secondary | Clemency | Mercy | Mental | Desire | Action |
I believe the point of thinking of these primarily as matters of desire and only secondarily of hate is that they pertain to the way one exhibits hate. Anger is a kind of hate in which we desire to injure someone we hate, whereas revenge is the same except that it is a response to having been injured by someone we hate. Cruelty is kind of what we might expect, but I think he puts it aptly by pointing out that it is a kind of hate where we desire to injure someone we hate, like with anger and revenge, but rather an urge to injure someone we love or pity. At first I was tempted to disagree with that definition, like can’t we be cruel to people we hate, but I ended up agreeing with him. Cruelty is indeed when we do something uncalled for.
Before I list more affects (affectio), it’s worth pointing out that, for Spinoza, the way this all works, boiling down to affect (affectus), is also mimetic.
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Secondary | Imitation | Imitation | Mental | Appetite | Passion |
| Secondary | Emulation | Emulation | Mental | Desire | Either |
The point here is that we habitually imitate and emulate others and that this can be unconscious and conscious. Spinoza is not too clear on this, therefore it’s worth noting that it’s my interpretation that imitation has to do with unconscious appetite and passion, while emulation has to do with conscious desire and action. To account for uncertainty, he mentions vacillation.
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Primary | Vacillation | Vacillation | Mental | Pleasure/Pain | Passion |
The point with vacillation is that we can be torn between more than one affect (affectio) that can be pleasurable or painful. This takes as long as it takes, until it is one of them sways more than the others. It is related to doubt, which is more or less the same thing for Spinoza, except that vacillation is the affect (affectio) for him, whereas doubt is more a matter of imagination. In any case, this is his way of saying that we can have love–hate relationships.
To make things even more complex, it must be added that, for Spinoza, affects (affectio) compound. So, whenever we are affected by more than one affect, when end up associating those affects with one another. This can be a good thing if those affects transition us to a greater state of perfection, increasing our capacity to affect and be affected, but they can also be a thing if the affects transition us to a lesser state of perfection, decreasing our capacity to affect and be affected. Why? For two reasons. Firstly, it is, of course, even better to be positively affected by multiple positive affects than just one positive affect and, conversely, worse to be affected by multiple negative affects than just negative affect, assuming that one positive or negative affect is not significantly better or worse than the others. Secondly, if we later on are again affected by just one of the affects, positive or negative, we imagine being affected by the other affects as well, simply because we’ve associated them with one another. That can, of course, also be a mixed bag, so that we end up associating some positive affect with some negative affect, which results in subsequent vacillation, even if that is merely imaginary. In my view, this is his way of saying that our minds and bodies are capable of playing tricks on us. This is also not, in itself, a bad thing. It’s just the way it is.
This also applies to the company that people keep, by which Spinoza means that if we encounter people, we end up associating them with other people and expect those other people to show up when we meet those people, or when we imagine those people. That could, of course, also be about people and what else we associate with them, like let’s say we associate certain people with their dogs, and we expect the dogs to be there when we meet them or when we imagine them. This actually applies to all bodies, just like it does to all thoughts, because this is applies to all modes that we humans can conceive. So, we end up associating all kinds of things, sometimes for good reasons, because certain things do tend to co-occur, sometimes for not so good reasons, because certain things can co-occur just that one time when we encounter them.
To get somewhere, to be more specific, there are main kinds of pleasure and pain for Spinoza and, as you’ll notice, he likes to explain them in pairs, one being the pleasurable one and the other being the painful one.
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Secondary | Hope | Hope | Mental | Pleasure | Passion |
| Secondary | Fear | Fear | Mental | Pain | Passion |
| Secondary | Confidence | Confidence | Mental | Pleasure | Passion |
| Secondary | Despair | Despair | Mental | Pain | Passion |
| Secondary | Joy | Gladness | Mental | Pleasure | Passion |
| Secondary | Disappointment | Remorse | Mental | Pain | Passion |
Note how I’ve listed these as secondary. That’s because these are kinds of pleasure and pain. To distinguish these, hope is akin to love and fear akin to hate, but only in the sense that one remembers past or anticipates future love or hate that give pleasure or pain. They are, however, marked by a degree of doubt, which is not to be found in confidence and despair, nor in joy and disappointment. The difference between the last two pairs is that with confidence and despair, your belief is affirmed, whereas with joy and disappointment your lack of belief is negated.
Spinoza is also careful to account for, no, not mistakes, but rather misunderstandings or misconceptions. In his view, we are therefore inclined to like something we don’t really understand, but nonetheless gives us pleasure and, conversely, we are averse to something that we don’t really understand, but nonetheless pains us.
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Secondary | Inclination | Inclination | Mental | Pleasure | Passion |
| Secondary | Aversion | Aversion | Mental | Pain | Passion |
To further explain that, our love or hate for something is indeed for something, something that is not us. Here the point is to account for accidental reasons. We incline or prefer something, often without being able to explain what it is that we like about it. Similarly, we are averse to or disprefer something, often without being able to explain what it is what we dislike about it. Another way of explaining inclination and aversion would be to call them sympathy and antipathy, albeit he doesn’t really expand on that, beyond acknowledging that, in both cases, we don’t really know why that is.
There are also what I would list as tertiary affects (affectio), because Spinoza indicates them as kinds of love or hate, which themselves are kinds of pleasure or pain.
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Secondary/Tertiary | Veneration | Veneration | Mental | Pleasure | Passion |
| Secondary/Tertiary | Devotion | Devotion | Mental | Pleasure | Action |
| Tertiary | Derision | Mockery | Mental | Pleasure/Pain | Passion |
| Tertiary | Scorn | Contempt | Mental | Pleasure/Pain | Passion |
Now, to be clear, Spinoza (176) presents these one after another, which may give the reader the impression that they are a pair, one being pleasurable, the other being painful, but that’s not exactly the case. Devotion is a love or wonder for the unknown, something that one devotes one’s time to understand and it becomes mere love once one understands it, because then it’s no longer something to wonder. I’d say it would be more apt to call it amazement, but devotion does make sense, given that it has that devotion or dedication to it. Derision is not presented the same way. It’s about hate, yes, but it’s not specified as being about contempt for the unknown. It could be that, of course, and I’d day it is often the case that people deride what they don’t understand.
I have also listed veneration and scorn. The former is a kind of wonder or awe of someone or something being better than us. The latter is a kind of contempt, that of foolishness.
There are more of these tertiary affects, such as approval and indignation. As you’d expect, they come in pairs.
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Tertiary | Approval | Favor | Mental | Pleasure | Either |
| Tertiary | Indignation | Indignation | Mental | Pain | Passion |
These are relatively straightforward. Simply put, people love people who do good deeds and hate people who do bad deeds. Related to these, the problem with these is that we may end up approving people simply because we love them or to disapproving them simply because we hate them.
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Tertiary | Partiality | Overestimation | Mental | Pleasure | Passion |
| Tertiary | Disparagement | Scorn | Mental | Pain | Passion |
Notice how nuanced this can get. While Spinoza is generally in favor of all the good, all the positive, that is to say all the pleasure, and against all the bad, all the negative, that is to say all the pain, we may end up being enamored by all that’s good, positive and pleasurable.
There are situations where this is a real problem. At times good people do bad things or bad people do good things, but we gloss over that, simply because we are partial, simply because we already love them or because we already hate them. This is not to say that one bad deed or one good deed should somehow negate all the other good deeds or make up for all the bad deeds, but rather that this happens.
It is also possible to direct these kinds of love and hate at oneself. In that case we are, however, dealing with self-approval, humility and repentance.
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Secondary | Self-approval | Self-esteem | Mental | Pleasure | Either |
| Secondary | Humility | Humility | Mental | Pain | Passion |
| Secondary | Repentance | Repentance | Mental | Pain | Passion |
Here we have a double pairing. Self-approval is positive, a kind of pleasure, and it can be either based on action or passion. It is paired with either humility or repentance. The different between these two is that humility is a response to a past failure, whereas repentance is a response to a past failure, something that we have done out of free will, voluntarily, but failed at it.
As you might already guess, Spinoza also accounts for overdoing these two. In that case we are dealing with pride and self-abasement:
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Tertiary | Pride | Pride | Mental | Pleasure | Passion |
| Tertiary | Self-abasement | Despondency | Mental | Pain | Passion |
With these two, approval or disapproval of oneself goes too far. Spinoza specifies that these are a pair, but qualifies self-abasement as having to do with affirming others’ hate or their imagined hate directed at oneself and not about hating oneself as that’s something he considers absurd.
Spinoza notes that are used to pairing pride with humility and acknowledges that there is something to it. He reckons that this is because we are looking them as mere effects, like how someone felt pride or humility, in response to something, whereas he is thinking pride as habitual, a behavior that is the opposite of self-abasement.
He also notes that humility and self-abasement are rare, and I’d say far rarer than self-approval and pride, because it is our essence to desire and persist, or strive, as he calls it in this context. He is actually skeptical of people who are humble or abase themselves, not because approves of pride, but because believes that the people who act all humble and self-abasing are often not at all humble, nor self-abasing, but rather ambitious and envious in disguise.
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Secondary/Tertiary | Courtesy | Kindness | Mental | Pleasure | Either |
| Secondary | Ambition | Ambition | Mental | Desire | Passion |
To clarify ambition, it is not exactly what most people these days would think it is. I don’t think ambition is a great contemporary translation, largely because I am indeed working on an old translation and a somewhat dated translation that may still acknowledge the negative aspects in addition the positive aspects. We might refer to such person as vain and ostentatious these days.
To be clear, Spinoza acknowledges the beneficial aspects of ambition, the way it is understood these days. It is not that he is opposed to affect (affectus) itself, striving to better oneself, to transitioning to a greater state of perfection, increasing one’s capacity to affect (affectio) and be affected (affectio).
The Latin original for ambition (ambitio) makes perfect sense because it is used in reference to someone who seeks the approval of others or, as he explains it, someone who seeks the approval of others, with little actual care for oneself and others. It is excessive. Plus, he points out that it amps up all the affects (affectio), making it very difficult to overcome ambition.
To be clear, an ambitious person, what we might these days call an ostentatious person, is the worst kind of person for Spinoza because, in his view, that kind of person stops at nothing, hence his other remark about ambition being something that happens at one’s own expense and/or the expense of others, having little care for anyone but oneself.
Spinoza contrasts ambition with courtesy, which is a deference, kindness, if not charity towards others, seeking to do what pleases them and refraining from doing what displeases them. He does, however, also point out that he considers this a kind of ambition. I might be wrong about this, but this seems to be connected to his point about how humility and self-abasement can also be about ambition and envy.
Self-approval, pride, humility and self-abasement are largely about how we view ourselves, while approval, partiality, indignation and disparagement are largely about how we view others. For Spinoza, honor and shame explain how we come to view ourselves in response to how others view us.
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Secondary | Honor | Love of esteem | Mental | Pleasure | Either |
| Secondary | Shame | Shame | Mental | Pain | Passion |
This is a tough pair that requires plenty of unpacking, as done by Spinoza. Firstly, he explains these in reference to praise and blame, which are almost, if not the same affects (affectio) as approval and indignation. Secondly, he distinguishes shame from modesty, which is a kind of fear of shame, rather than shame itself. Lack of shame or shamelessness is, however, not the opposite of modesty, nor an affect (affectio) in his view, as, I guess, it’s either about being unaware of shame or not giving it any thought because one thinks that there’s nothing to be ashamed of.
To add more nuance to the affects (affectio), it is worth going back a bit. Much like with imitation and emulation, other affects (affectio) can also be about others, yet affect us.
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Secondary | Pity | Pity | Mental | Pain | Passion |
| Tertiary | Sympathy | Compassion | Mental | Pleasure/Pain | Passion |
| Tertiary | Envy | Envy | Mental | Pain/Pleasure | Passion |
| Tertiary | Jealousy | Jealousy | Mental | Pain | Passion |
For Spinoza, pity and sympathy are similar, but they are nonetheless distinct. Pity is about a singular instance of pain, when we pity someone else, whereas sympathy is more habitual and rather a kind of love. Sympathy can also involve getting pleasure from someone else’s success and not only sharing in their pain, whereas that is not the case with pity.
Envy is the proper pairing here, albeit Spinoza indicates that it is a kind of hate. It is defined as the exact opposite of sympathy. When we envy someone, we are pained by their fortune, but gain pleasure from their misfortune.
Jealousy is a kind of envy that is linked with shame in Spinoza’s view. It’s always painful, because we imagine what or, rather, who we love to rather love something or someone, again, typically a person, else instead of us. It’s also extra painful because jealousy has a tendency of making the one we love us less.
It is also worth reiterating here that, in Spinoza’s view, people affect (affectio) and are affected (affectio) by others, humans and non-humans alike, on the basis of their similarity to us or lack thereof. We privilege ourselves, out of necessity, to persist and to transition to and maintain a greater state of perfection. When we encounter someone like us, we end up privileging that person. Conversely, when we encounter someone unlike us, we end up deprivileging that person.
That is his way of saying that people are habitually classist, racist, sexist etc. He is not saying that they should be, especially because people are remarkably alike, way more alike than they are different, just ask a biologist, or a doctor, but rather that they nonetheless are like that, habitually, and that it shouldn’t come to us as a surprise.
To get back to the affects (affectio), pity and compassion only occur, causing us pain, when people like us, people we like, if not love, are in pain. We don’t pity, nor have compassion for people who are unlike us, nor for people we dislike, not to mention hate.
Spinoza also covers more affects (affectio) that pertain to our relations with others, but he indicates that they are kinds of desire, and not kinds of pleasure or pain, or love or hate.
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Secondary | Regret | Longing | Mental | Desire | Either |
| Secondary/Tertiary | Thankfulness | Thankfulness | Mental | Desire/Pleasure | Either |
| Secondary | Benevolence | Benevolence | Mental | Desire | Passion |
Regret is, perhaps, the most straightforward of these three, as it is, for him, something which we have had, but no longer have, because something else prevented or prevents us from having it. Thankfulness is a desire to reciprocate love or the love of being loved, whereas benevolence is the desire to do good for someone we pity.
Then there are affects (affectio) that are kinds of desire and kinds of pain that are related to others and, more generally, what we encounter in life.
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Secondary | Daring | Daring | Mental | Desire | Passion |
| Secondary | Cowardice | Cowardice | Mental | Pain | Passion |
| Secondary | Timidity | Timidity | Mental | Desire | Passion |
| Secondary | Consternation | Consternation | Mental | Desire | Passion |
Here the obvious pair is daring and cowardice. The former involves a daring person who desires to do something that involves danger or, I’d say, a fear. I was tempted to also list is as a kind of pleasure, but that’s not exactly accurate. Doing something dangerous can be exciting, sure, and a learning opportunity, but it can also be foolhardy. The latter involves having that desire to do something dangerous being checked by fear. Timidity differs from cowardice in the sense that instead of being paralyzed by fear one avoids the danger by opting for other, lesser danger. Consternation is an interesting one, because it is dissimilar to cowardice, being about being amazed or even appreciating some danger, in awe or wonder, I guess, but it is similar to it as well, because the danger remains. It is also similar to timidity, in the sense that it may involve multiple dangers, but dissimilar to it, in the sense that one does not risk any danger.
The last list involves kinds of desire, or pleasure, that, for Spinoza, involve eating, drinking and sex, as well as money.
| Type | Affect (Elwes) | Affect (Curley) | Attribute | Kind | Understanding |
| Secondary/Tertiary | Luxury | Gluttony | Mental | Desire/Pleasure | Passion |
| Secondary/Tertiary | Temperance | Moderation | Mental | Desire/Pleasure | Action |
| Secondary/Tertiary | Intemperance | Drunkenness | Mental | Desire/Pleasure | Passion |
| Secondary/Tertiary | Sobriety | Sobriety | Mental | Desire/Pleasure | Action |
| Secondary/Tertiary | Lust | Lust | Mental | Desire/Pleasure | Passion |
| Secondary/Tertiary | Chastity | Chastity | Mental | Desire/Pleasure | Action |
| Secondary/Tertiary | Avarice | Greed | Mental | Desire/Pleasure | Passion |
The first pair here is luxury and temperance, which we might opt to translate in a different manner as there are about eating. It’s the same with intemperance and sobriety, which are about drinking. Lust and chastity make more sense, being about sex. He does not provide anything to pair with avarice though.
He also wants to emphasize that isn’t against eating, drinking, sex, nor being attached to possessions. What he is against is being obsessed or enamored by them. So, the point with temperance is not that you shouldn’t eat, drink, have sex or own anything, but that you should come to realize that too much is too much.
It’s also worth noting that he acknowledges that there are other affects, such as timidity and, I would add, cowardice that result in not daring to eat, drink, have sex or buy something. But that’s not good for people, because one abstains from something which is, in itself just fine, out of fear or, I might add, from shame.
Spinoza does mention certain other affects (affectio), such as merriment, stimulation, melancholy and grief, but he doesn’t want to get tangled up on them. While he (138) first mentions them as pertaining to both thee body and the mind, he (174) later on points out that are rather passions of the body that involve pleasure or pain. I think he is actually correct in both cases. They concern both the body and the mind, but he doesn’t want to expand on them because they also concern the body, not just the mind. He also mentions annoyance and vanity, but doesn’t expand on them.
To be honest, not explaining the affects (affectio) concerning our bodies isn’t great. That said, I get why he doesn’t attempt to explain them. So, in his defense, I have to point out that when we are affected by something negative, like physically injured, our minds do affirm that, acknowledging the pain as a passion. That may seem bad, because it certainly is, for the body but also for the mind, because your mind affirms it, otherwise you wouldn’t even recognize it as a pain. Anyway, my take is that he doesn’t want to comment on such, because there isn’t anything that you can do about it. Thinking about the physical pain does little to help in that moment. That painful passion won’t turn into a pleasurable action. That is also the same if you happen to physically elated, perhaps because you are intoxicated. That is a pleasurable passion of the body, which you simply cannot turn into a pleasurable action. I guess some could argue that you could turn that into an action, but I think he’d object to that, pointing out that it’s then intemperance, indulging excessively in whatever it is gives you that pleasure. Your mind would tell you that, ah, but see, this can also be bad for the body and the mind. It can’t turned into an action, because he (171) is very adamant about how there can be no action that is painful.
At the very end of part three of his ‘Ethics’, Spinoza does a proper 180. He’s gone through all the affects (affectio) that one can think of, all these emotions as the primary translation that I’ve used here refers to them, only to point out that what we call them and how we specify them isn’t that important. What matters is that affects (affectio) are either desire (which, for him, is conscious appetite, or a will that also accounts for the body, not just the mind), pleasure and pain, and that they are either actions or passions. He reckons these are relational and thus you also need to take into account the relata, for example the objects of our love and hate, and how they are reciprocally related to us, whether they love or hate us, or are indifferent to us, not necessarily even aware of our existence.
After this segment of part three, where Spinoza goes (173-185) through the definitions of affects (affectio), he (185-186) summarizes them. For passion, he states (185):
“Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis) greater or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another.”
To unpack that neatly packed definition of passion, there’s a lack of understanding, aka a confused idea or inadequate idea. In that case, our mind lacks comprehension of what’s going on, which results our minds affirming something positive or negative that concerns our body or any part of it. That’s then a concern for the affect (affectus). A transition occurs. If the mind is set to affirm something positive in the body, or part of it, it increases the body’s or its part’s capacity to affect (affectio) and be affected (affectio), transitioning the body or its part to a greater state of perfection. Conversely, if the mind is set to affirm something negative in the body, or part of it, it decreases the body’s or its part’s capacity to to affect (affectio) and be affected (affectio), transitioning the body or its part to a lesser state of perfection. It is also worth specifying, as he (185) does, that this transition that concerns the body and the mind is real, not merely a matter of thinking and comparing our present state with some past states. So, as one is affected (affectio), or affects (affectio) others that are then affected (affectio), the mind affirms these affects (affectio) that concern the state of one’s perfection, i.e., affect (affectus), as emphasized by him (185).
For whatever reason, he doesn’t cover action, in his summary. It should, however, already be clear that it is about understanding, what Spinoza calls having adequate ideas of the affects.
Spinoza’s guide to life is basically this: acknowledge yourself as a mode of substance that conceives itself through two of the attributes, extension and thought, that constitute the essence of that substance. Your essence is that you are a modification of that substance. Affect (affectus) explains how that modification of substance functions, like how it is modified. You are a composite body, just as your mind is a composite of thoughts. You transition, shifting between lesser and greater states of perfection, by which he means your capacity to affect (affectio) and be affected (affectio). That’s how the body and the mind are modified. That’s why you, just like everyone else, and just like everything else, are a mode or a modification of substance. To understand how that transitioning and modification works, you need to understand affects (affectio) that concern your body and mind, as well as the bodies and/or minds of others, both human and non-human, both animate and inanimate. That’s understanding and once you understand that, you become active, instead of being passive.
What kind of action? He recommends strength of character, or fortitude, that can be understood in two ways. Firstly, fortitude is a matter of courage, which is persistence and striving for a greater state of perfection. It’s kind of what we would contemporarily refer to as ambition, but, you know, without the negative aspects that were once typically associated with ambition. Secondly, fortitude is also a matter of high mindedness, which is how that courage is kept in check. Instead of looking after one for yourself, making sure that you persist, and that you strive for a greater state of perfection, you need to look after others as well, making sure that they also persist and strive for greater state of perfection. Now, he doesn’t explain high mindedness as a check on courage, but I think it is. If you only have regard for yourself, you end up disregarding others. In my view, this also neatly explains why he uses unspecific language like lesser or greater state of perfection, instead of just imperfection or perfection. It is a matter of action that is good for you, as well as for others, but it can never be imperfect, nor perfect in itself.
To be clear, what he (185) means by our perfection is “the very essence of a thing”. Given that our essence, or the essence of any mode is its persistence, which is to be understood in terms of affect (affectus) and the dual capacity to affect (affectio) and be affected (affectio). The affects (affectio) are also to be understood as either pertaining to desire (appetite if we are dealing with unconscious desire, will if we are dealing with mind only), pleasure and pain. The world is, in itself, perfect, so don’t go thinking he thinks we can be perfect or imperfect. That’s now what he is talking about when he refers to a lesser or greater state of perfection.
Now, as a final note, I acknowledge that I may have erred somewhere, with the classification of these affects (affectio), and/or failed to include and/or explain all of them. This is because, no, not because I was hasty, but rather because Spinoza isn’t always super clear what he considers an affect or whether what he calls … is the same as what he calls … and what not. I am happy to modify the essay, and my other essays, if I feel like it, because, come on, it’s only fitting, given that, for Spinoza, it’s just all just modification of substance anyway. Haha!
References
- Deleuze, G. ([1978] 2019). Seminar on Spinoza, Continuous Variation (T. S. Murphy and C. J. Stivale, Trans.). https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/seminars/spinoza-velocities-thought/lecture-00
- Spinoza, B. ([1677] 1884). The Ethics. In R. H. M. Elwes (Ed.), The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza: Vol. II (R. H. M. Elwes, Trans.) (pp. 43–271). London, United Kingdom: George Bell and Sons.
- Spinoza. B. ([1677] 1985). Ethics. In E. Curley (Ed.), The Collected Works of Spinoza: Vol I. (E. Curley, Trans.) (pp. 408–617). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.