The case of Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo from year 1974 has an important role in establishing the legal precedent of ‘editorial freedom’, also referred to in the recent case of Moody v. NetChoice. So, based on this case, what does the editorial freedom mean, how was it constructed and more importantly – how does it relate to the present-day?
In the case of Tornillo Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the court, stating: “The issue in this case is whether a state statute granting a political candidate a right to equal space to reply to criticism — by a newspaper violates the guarantees of a free press”, Tornillo (Burger, J.) p.241. At the time Florida Statute § 104.38 (1973) or also known as “right of reply” statute, provided that when a candidate for nomination was criticized by a newspaper, the criticized party had a right to demand that the newspaper print, free of cost, a reply written by them. Rejecting to print this reply meant committing a first-degree misdemeanor.
So, the case to its core was about the role and rights of the press as using their freedom of speech established by the First Amendment. In the majority opinion of the court Burger describes the historical view in which the First Amendment was created, and the fact that the function of the press is to represent broadly the views of the people – the same role addressed to it already at the time of the enactment of the Amendment. So, the role of the media, on the other hand, is to act as a free marketplace of ideas, and on the other, to act as the harsher critic of the government, which is not to restrict it, the rule which is also in this case affirmed by the court.
However, at the time the court acknowledged also the fact that the media can be a double-edged sword. Media is a powerful tool if the information it spreads is false or biased. This view is especially brought up by J. White in his concurring opinion. He expresses concerns about liability issues – the media releasing false information and people not having the right to defend themselves – or as he puts it, a fair chance to vindicating oneself.
From justice Whites opinion, it is a little unclear why he is in general so concerned with the right of reply. As he himself mentions, quoting another case: “In plain English, freedom carries with it responsibility even for the press; freedom of the press is not a freedom from responsibility for its exercise,” as stated in Pennekamp v. Florida (Frankfurter, J., concurring) p.356. So, the press has freedom, but also a certain obligation to stick to the truth, the precedent seems to imply.
But how is this linked to the more recent case of Moody? In Moody, in the opinion of the court, delivered by justice Kagan, the Tornillo case and the freedom of press it establishes, are highlighted many times. Even when in Moody the question is not about the press but rather about the social media platforms, the holding of Tornillo: exercise of editorial control and judgement, still holds value. Justice Kagan highlights the judgement of Tornillo as it supports the viewpoint she promotes: the editorial freedom of social media platforms. Tornillo, as Kagan also mentioned, promoted greater diversity of expression of speech (p. 19) in addition to ruling that the owners of an expressive platform have a right to decide what is and is not said on their platform. This way the holding of Tornillo and the exercise of editorial control and judgement declared by the court can be seen as important – also from the viewpoint of the present-day.
However, noteworthy is that not only justice Kagan, but also justice Alito mentions this case in his concurring opinion. He, on the other hand, has a totally different standpoint; he states that the differences between Tornillo and another case, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, creates the question of how the media is managed: if it is simply meant as a platform for others speech or if it can be seen as providing also its own speech. In Alito’s view this difference between these two cases is important and, in his opinion, backs up his view. He also mentions the possibility of media platforms using AI, not human workforce as editors. His point thus seems to be that, considering the First Amendment rights, it makes a difference by who and how the editorial task is done.
Also, the construction: “A true marketplace of ideas”, mentioned by Alito has been already brought up, but in a totally different context, in the Tornillo case. Even at the time of the Tornillo judgement, a concern about the monopolization of the media was mentioned. The court stated that “The First Amendment interest of the public in being informed” was seen to be in peril because the “marketplace of ideas” was, already, a monopoly controlled by only the owners of the market, Tornillo (J. Burger) p. 251. So, the recognition of the problem of concentrated power and restriction of free speech was already there, in the context of the press, a question very similar to the one Alito seems to be asking.
Even when justice Alito rises many interesting and noteworthy issues in relation of the context of social media platforms – as Kagan well states: “However imperfect the private marketplace of ideas, here was a worse proposal – the government itself deciding when speech was imbalanced, and then coercing speakers to provide more of some views or less of others”, Moody, (Kagan, J.) p. 19. Even when times have changed, the questions about freedom of speech remain much the same.
Team Moody