Author: sjhurr

Butšan verilöyly – onko Vladimir Putin vastuussa?

Euroopassa vuosikymmeniä vallinnut rauhan aika päättyi 24. helmikuuta 2022, kun Vladimir Putinin johtama Venäjä toteutti pelätyt aikeensa ja aloitti täysimittaisen hyökkäyksen Ukrainaan. Venäjän sotamenestys rajoittui kuitenkin sodan ensimmäisiin päiviin ja sodan pitkittyessä Ukraina sai vallattua takaisin aiemmin Venäjälle menetettyjä maa-alueita. Tämän seurauksena ukrainalaisia odotti takaisin vallatussa Butšan kaupungissa järkyttävä näky. Human Rights Watchin raportin mukaan Butšassa löydettiin 278 kuollutta ruumista ja selviä todisteita teloituksista sekä kidutuksesta. Venäläisten joukkojen miehityksen aikana Butšassa oli selvästi toimittu sodan oikeussääntöjen vastaisesti. Tapaus herättää kysymyksen siitä, voisiko vastuu tapahtuneesta olla sodan aloittaneella Vladimir Putinilla?

Tätä kysymystä pohtii Vittorio Bufacchi vuonna 2022 julkaistussa artikkelissaan ”War crimes in Ukraine: is Putin responsible?”. Bufacchi on professori Corkin yliopistossa ja hänen erikoisalaansa on poliittinen filosofia. Hän keskittyy tutkimuksissaan erityisesti sosiaaliseen epäoikeudenmukaisuuteen, ihmisoikeuksiin ja poliittiseen väkivaltaan liittyviin kysymyksiin. Bufacchin artikkelin tarkoitus on osoittaa, että Vladimir Putin on henkilökohtaisesti vastuussa Ukrainassa tapahtuneista sotarikoksista ja rikoksista ihmisyyttä vastaan. Bufacchin artikkeli on jaettu kolmeen osaan, joista ensimmäisessä käsitellään rikoksia ihmisyyttä vastaan ja sotarikoksia yleisellä tasolla. Bufacchi nostaa sotarikoksista esille erityisesti siviileihin kohdistuvat sotarikokset, joista on säännelty Rooman perussäännössä. Kyseisessä sääntelyssä kielletään kaikki sotilaalliset toimet, jotka kohdistetaan tarkoituksella siviilikohteisiin. 

Artikkelissa nostetaan esiin kaksi tapaa, jolla valtio voi suhtautua syytöksiin sotarikosten aiheuttamisesta. Ensimmäinen keino on kieltää sotarikosten olemassaolo kokonaan. Toinen vaihtoehto on tiedostaa sotarikosten tapahtuneen, mutta kieltää vastuu sotarikosten aiheutumisesta. Tämä argumentti perustuu ajatukseen siitä, että yksittäinen sotilas on yksin vastuussa lainvastaisesta toiminnastaan. Tähän asti Venäjä on vedonnut ensimmäiseen keinoon ja esittänyt, että todisteet sotarikoksista on lavastettu länsimaista mediaa varten. 

Bufacchi nostaa esille neljä keinoa, joilla määritetään, kuka on vastuussa väkivallasta ja sen seuraamuksista. Henkilö tekee väkivaltateon, kun se aloittaa väkivallan tai ylläpitää sitä tilanteessa, jossa se olisi muutoin loppunut. Näiden lisäksi henkilö antaa väkivallan tapahtua, jos hän mahdollistaa väkivallan poistamalla esteitä väkivallan syntymiselle tai pidättäytyy väkivallan estämisestä, kun hän ei tee toimia, jotka olisivat pysäyttäneet väkivallan. Bufacchi nostaa esiin, että edellä mainitut kriteerit pätevät Putinin vastuuseen riippumatta siitä onko sota Ukrainassa oikeutettu vai ei? Oikeutettu sota ei oikeuta sotarikoksia tai rikoksia ihmisyyttä vastaan.

Artikkelissa nostetaan esiin todennäköisyystahallisuuteen viittaava teoria, jonka mukaan Putin on vastuussa sotarikoksista, mikäli hän tiesi tai hänen olisi pitänyt tietää sotarikosten aiheutumisesta hänen toimiensa takia. Bufacchi toteaa, että Putin on tiennyt hyökkäysjoukoissaan olevan palkkasotilaita ja rikollisia, joita hän ei voi kontrolloida. Tästä vedetään artikkelissa johtopäätös, että Putin on vastuussa sotarikoksista, sillä hän on tiennyt tai hänen olisi tullut tietää, että palkkasotilaat ja rikolliset tulevat tekemään sotarikoksia. Mielestäni johtopäätös on mielenkiitoinen, mutta se jää vaille päteviä perusteita. Se ilmeisesti perustuu ajatukseen siitä, että palkkasotilaat ja rikolliset tulevat todennäköisesti tekemään sotarikoksiksi tulkittavia toimia, mikäli heidät sisällytetään osaksi taistelevaa joukkoa. Palkkasotilaiden käyttäminen on kielletty YK:n sopimuksessa palkkasotilaiden värväystä, käyttöä, rahoitusta ja koulutusta vastaan. Johtaako tämän sopimuksen rikkominen Putinin vastuuseen palkkasotilaiden sotarikoksista? Bufacchi ei tarjoa johtopäätökselleen perusteita.

Lopuksi Bufacchi korostaa kansainvälisen oikeuden uskottavuuden palauttamista. Tässä sodassa ei ole kysymys vain siitä kuinka paljon rajoja siirretään, vaan myös kansainvälisen oikeuden merkityksestä ja uskottavuudesta. Mikäli Putinin hyökkäyssotaan ei puututa ankaralla tavalla, ovat seuraukset kansainväliselle oikeudelle katastrofaalisia. Bufacchin mukaan Putinin tuomitseminen rikoksista ihmisyyttä vastaan ja sotarikoksista yleisesti, voisi muuttaa kansainvälisen oikeuden ja jopa koko ihmiskunnan tulevaisuuden päälaelleen. 

Artikkeli jättää kiinnostavia kysymyksiä lukijalle pohdittavaksi. Onko Putin todella vastuussa joukkojensa toiminnasta, sillä perusteella, että hän tietää joukoissaan olevan tietynlaisia sotilaita? Millaisia näiden sotilaiden tulee olla, että vastuu on aina valtiojohdolla asti? Kestääkö tämä ajattelu päivänvaloa, kun katsotaan muiden sotaa käyneiden maiden joukkojen henkilöstöä? Kuinka tarkkaan sotilaiden taustat tulisi sitten selvittää? Aion tarkastella osaa näistä kysymyksistä tulevaisuudessa, kun työni aiheen parissa jatkuu.

— Murharyhmä

Lähteet:

Bufacchi, Vittorio, War crimes in Ukraine: is Putin responsible? Journal of political power, 2023, Vol.16 (1), p. 1-6.

Ukraine: Russian Forces Trail of Death in Bucha. Human Rights Watch.

Ecocide laki – mikä ja miksi?

Artikkelissaan ”Protecting the planet: a proposal for a law of ecocide” lakimies Polly Higgins ja tutkijat Damien Short ja Nigel South kertovat ehdotuksesta tunnustaa ”ekomurha” kansainväliseksi rikokseksi. He esittelevät esimerkkejä rikoksista ja vahingoista, sekä valottavat sekä keskustelua koskien oikeuskäytännön kehitystä että luonnonmurha-termin alkuperää tutkijoiden ja kansainvälisten toimijoiden käytössä läpi historian.

Viimeisen vuosikymmenen aikana on vironnut keskustelua koskien vihreää kehitystä, ja sitä miten rikosoikeudessa on suhtauduttu rikoksiin koskien ympäristöä, ihmis- ja muuta elämää sekä planeettaamme kohdistuviin ongelmiin. Kyseisiin haittoihin kuuluvat muun muassa teollisuussaaste, osakeyhtiörikollisuus ja sen vaikutus ympäristöön; terveys ja turvallisuus työpaikoissa, jossa rikkeistä seuraa ympäristöllisiä haittoja; järjestäytyneen rikollisuuden osallisuus vaarallisen jätteen laittomassa hävityksessä ja armeijan toiminnan vaikutus maisemaan, vesivaroihin, ilmanlaatuun ja eliökunnan populaatioon niillä alueilla, joilla se on toiminut. Kuitenkin näistä vaikutuksista huolimatta maapallon luonnonvarojen hyväksikäyttöä ja ympäristön heikentämistä on vasta vastikään alettu pitää toimintana, jonka voidaan katsoa olevan rikollista tai ainakin aiheuttavan vakavaa haittaa tuleville sukupolville ja kansalaisille rajoista riippumatta.

Ero ”rikoksen” ja ”haitan” välillä heijastaa pitkäaikaista haastetta kriminologialle: onko syytä tutkia vain laissa määriteltyjä rikoksia vai myös niitä toimia, jotka kuuluvat laillisen toiminnan piiriin, mutta joilla luultavasti on haitallisia seurauksia ja sietäisivät siten tulla lailla kielletyksi. Kriminologit ovat näin ollen pyrkineet omaksumaan joko oikeudellisproseduraalisen lähestymistavan, jossa huomio pysyy perinteisesti säädetyn ympäristölainsäädännön rikkomuksissa, tai kriittisemmän sosio-oikeudellisen lähestymistavan, jossa ympäristöön kohdistuvia toimia, jotka eivät ole laissa kiellettyjä, mutta kuitenkin vähintään yhtä haitallisia, pidetään lainrikkomuksina. Lähestymistavasta huolimatta, pitääkseen lain ajan tasalla ja oikeudenmukaisena, kriminologia on tehnyt rutiininomaisia tarkastuksia koskien ”itsestään selviä” rikosten määritelmiä ja ehdottaen miten sääntelyä tulisi ohjailla.

Esimerkit ympäristörikoksista ja -haitoista voidaan jakaa ensisijaisiin ja toissijaisiin riippuen siitä aiheutuuko toimesta suoraa haittaa, kuten esimerkiksi luonnonvarojen tuhoutumista, vai syntyvätkö seuraukset ympäristövahinkojen tai kriisien jälkeisistä olosuhteista (laittomat markkinat) tai sääntöjen laiminlyönnistä. Ensisijaiset vahingot voidaan jakaa neljään pääryhmään. Veden saastuminen koskee muun muassa juomavettä ja muita vesistöjä, riuttoja sekä liikakalastuksesta kärsiviä kaloja. Ilmansaasterikokset koskevat ihmisiä yli kansainvälisten rajojen joten kaikki väestöt kärsivät niistä. Maailman terveysjärjestö arvioi yli kahden miljoonan ihmisen kuolevan ennenaikaisesti sairauksiin, jotka ovat suora seuraus huonosta ilmanlaadusta. Metsän hävittäminen ja maaperän pilaaminen puolestaan nopeuttavat ilmaston lämpenemistä, kun hiilinieluja kuten sademetsiä kaadetaan ja vaaralliset kaasut kohoavat ilmakehään. Sen sijaan rikokset ei-ihmislajeja vastaan tuhoavat lajien monimuotoisuutta ja näin ollen ekosysteemiä, joka voi näkyä eläinten elinympäristön katoamisena. 

Luonnonmurhalla on käsitteenä pitkä historia, mutta se ei ole saanut odotettua kannatusta sen aiheellisuuden ja hyödyllisyyden vuoksi. Käsitteen institutionaalinen historia liittyy erottamattomasti sen tunnetumpaan sukulaiskäsitteeseen kansanmurhaan, joka on mainittu ensimmäisen kerran vuonna 1933. Ensimmäisen kerran ”ecocide” on kirjattu vuonna 1970 Washingtonissa, sotaa ja kansallista vastuuta käsittelevässä konferenssissa, jossa professori Arthur W. Galston ehdotti ”uutta kansainvälistä sopimusta luonnonmurhan kieltämiseksi.” Hän käytti termiä kuvaamaan ”vahingon aiheuttamista tai sallimista luonnonympäristölle massiivisessa mittakaavassa”, joka heijastaa ”ihmiskunnan laiminlyötyä yleistä huolehtimisvelvollisuutta.” Vuonna 1973 professori Richard A. Falk laati luonnoksen kansainvälistä luonnonmurharikosta koskevaa yleissopimusta. Luonnos otettiin käyttöön, mutta hylättiin syytä ilmoittamatta myöhemmin. 1980-luvulla keskustelu siitä pitäisikö ”vakavan haitan aiheuttaminen ympäristölle” lisätä rikokseksi rauhaa vastaan, heräsi uudestaan keskittyen tahallisuuden aspektiin, ja vuonna 1991 se mielessä pitäen viimeisteltiin artiklaa 26 YK:n kansainvälisen oikeuden toimikunnalle (ILC). Kuitenkin kodifikaation takia aiemmat luonnokset poistettiin ja artikla 26 supistettiin sisältämään vain ”tahallisen ja vakavan ympäristövahingon.” Lopulta vuosia kestänyt kansainvälinen poliittinen köydenveto riisui artikla 26:n syvällisemmästä sisällöstään ja teki siitä lähinnä korulauseen, jolloin alkuperäinen artikla poistettiin ja Rooman perussopimukseen päätyi valmistelukomitean muokkaama artikla, joka kieltää tahallisesti ”laajan, pitkäaikaisen ja vakavan vahingon aiheuttamisen luonnonympäristölle” sodan yhteydessä. 

Huhtikuussa 2010 brittiläinen lakimies Polly Higgins jätti ehdotuksen kansainvälisestä Ecocide-laista ILC:lle, ja ehdotti Rooman perussääntöön seuraavaa muutosta: ”Ecocide on ekosysteemi(e)n laajaa tuhoamista tai menetystä tietyltä alueelta, joko ihmisen toimesta tai muusta syystä siinä määrin, missä alueen asukkaiden kyky nauttia alueesta on merkittävästi vähentynyt.” Hän tunnistaa kaksi luonnonmurhan tyyppiä; ihmisen aiheuttaman ja luonnollisesti tapahtuvan, ja tällä jaottelulla luotaisiin oikeuskäytäntöä luonnonmurhan ennaltaehkäisyä varten. Ehdotus ylemmästä vastuusta ei koskisi vain yrityksiä vaan myös valtioita. Luomalla valtioille lainmukainen velvollisuus toimia ennen joukkotuhoa tai ekosysteemin romahdusta velvoittaa kaikkia valtioita auttamaan maita, joita uhkaa esimerkiksi merenpinnan nousu. Luonnollisesti tapahtuvan luonnonmurhan estäminen olisi valtioiden hallitusten vastuulla. Kysymys tällaisen lain täytäntöönpanosta ja käyttöönotosta liittyy rinnakkaisiin ehdotuksiin ympäristötuomioistuinten laajentamisesta ja kansainvälisen ympäristötuomioistuimen perustamisesta.

Ecocide-laki pitäisi tunnustaa ihmisen aiheuttaman ympäristövahingon ankaran vastuun rikokseksi myös rauhan aikana. Tahallisuuden vaatimuksen puuttuminen aiheuttaisi loisi porsaanreiän, jonka myötä ympäristötuhot voitaisiin kuitata vahinkona ja tällä tavoin kiertää vastuu piiloutumalla tietämättömyyden taakse. Lain täytäntöönpano lopettaisi tuhoamisen alkutekijöihinsä ja asettaisi yrityksille velvollisuuden ennaltaehkäistä suurvahinkoja. Tällä olisi ilmastonmuutokseen valtava vaikutus – suurimpien saastuttajien hiilidioksiditasojen laskiessa ilmakehän epävakaus vähenisi, ja Ecocide-laista tulisi tehokas ennaltaehkäisevä toimenpide saattamiseksi vastuuseen joukkotuhoa aiheuttavaa päätöksentekoa johtavat, tukevat tai rahoittavat tahot.

— Murharyhmä

Lähteet:

Polly Higgins & Damien Short & Nigel South: Protecting the planet: a proposal for a law of ecocide. Crime, Law and Social Change 59 (2013) 251-266.

Kohti luonnontuhon kriminalisointia sekä tutkintaa Euroopan unionissa

Euroopan syyttäjävirasto (myöhemmin EPPO) on vuonna 2021 toimintansa aloittanut riippumaton Euroopan unionin virasto. Viraston tämänhetkisiin tehtäviin kuuluu EU:n taloudellisiin etuihin kohdistuvien rikosten tutkiminen sekä näistä asianmukaisten syytteiden nostaminen. Tohtori Costanza Di Francesco Maesa pohti vuoden 2018 artikkelissaan, voisiko EPPO:n toimivallan laajentaminen ympäristörikoksiin tehostaa unionin sisällä ympäristönsuojelun tasoa. Ympäristöoikeuden ja rikosoikeuden keskinäisen suhteen tutkiminen Euroopan unionin oikeuden ja kansainvälisen oikeuden näkökulmasta on yksi Costanza Di Francescon tutkimuksen painopisteistä. Costanza Di Francesco on käsitellyt myös aikaisemmissa kirjoituksissaan EPPO:a. Kirjoituksissaan hän on katsonut, että viraston perustamisen taustalla oli hyviä tavoitteita. Samalla hän on kuitenkin esittänyt kritiikkiä viraston toimintaa ohjaavan asetuksen prosessisääntöjä kohtaan niiden sisältäessä lukuisia viittauksia viraston toimintaan osallistuvien jäsenvaltioiden kansallisiin lakeihin. Hän on katsonut, että nämä viittaukset olisivat omiaan heikentämään viraston perustamisen taustalla olevia tavoitteita. Yksi tällaisista tavoitteista koski viraston kautta syntyviä mahdollisuuksia ratkaista ongelmia, jotka johtuivat lukuisista oikeusjärjestelmistä ja niiden mukaisista normeista, jotka tulivat sovellettavaksi tutkittaessa rajat ylittäviä rikoksia. Kyseiset Costanza Di Francesco esittämät näkemykset EPPO:sta näkyvät myös hänen viraston toimivallan laajentamista koskevassa artikkelissaan. 

Costanza Di Francesco rakentaa artikkelinsa kahteen osaan. Ensimmäisessä osassa hän pohtii, onko EPPO:n toimivallan laajentaminen ympäristörikoksiin oikeudellisesti mahdollista. SEUT 86 artiklan 4 kohdan mukaan viraston toimivaltaa on mahdollista laajentaa koskemaan rikoksia, jotka ovat vakavia ja vaikuttavat useampaan kuin yhteen jäsenvaltioon. Costanza Di Francesco katsoo, että monet vakavat ympäristörikokset voisivat täyttää rikosten vakavuutta koskevan kriteerin. Tätä hän perustelee komission esittämällä näkemyksellä, jonka mukaan rikosta voidaan pitää vakavana, jos se vahingoittaa merkittävissä määrin lain suojaamaa tärkeää intressiä yhdistettynä siihen, että EUT:n mukaan ympäristönsuojelu on yksi EU:n keskeisistä päämääristä. Costanza Di Francesco katsoo myös, että rikosten rajat ylittävän vaikutuksen kriteeri voi täyttyä useiden ympäristörikosten, kuten vesistöjen, ilman ja maaperän saastumisen kohdalla, johtuen näiden rikosten luonteesta. Vaikka Costanza Di Francesco arvioi pääasiassa toimivallan laajentamisen oikeudellisia mahdollisuuksia, hän toteaa, kuinka toimivallan laajentamiselle ei vaikuta olevan poliittista tahtotilaa. Toimivallan laajentaminen vaatisi EPPO:n toimintaan osallistuvien 22 jäsenvaltion yksimielisen päätöksen. 

Artikkelin toisessa osassa Costanza Di Francesco käsittelee sitä, olisiko EPPO:n toimivallan laajentaminen vakaviin rajat ylittäviin ympäristörikoksiin toivottavaa. Hän päätyy vastaamaan kysymykseen myöntävästi. Hän esittää kantansa tueksi useita argumentteja. Monet niistä pohjautuvat vaatimukseen siitä, että EPPO:n toiminnan kannalta olennaisissa säädöksissä määriteltäisiin riittävän yksityiskohtaisesti sen toimintatapoja. Costanza Di Francescon mukaan näissä säädöksissä tulisi esimerkiksi määritellä tarkasti se millaiset ympäristörikokset kuuluisivat EPPO:n toimivaltaan sekä se millaisia rangaistuksia niistä tulisi jäsenvaltioissa antaa. Kansallisten lakien välillä nimittäin löytyy merkittäviä eroavaisuuksia ympäristörikosten tunnusmerkistöjen sekä niissä käytettyjen rangaistusasteikkojen välillä. Tämä puolestaan johtuu siitä, että unioni on säännellyt näitä kokonaisuuksia ainoastaan minimiharmonisointi-direktiivein. Costanza Di Francesco katsoo, että täsmällisen EPPO:a koskevan sääntelyn ja siitä syntyvän harmonisoinnin avulla voitaisiin varmistaa ympäristösäännösten nykyistä tehokkaampi täytäntöönpano EU:ssa. Tämän lisäksi Costanza Di Francescon katsoo, että ottamalla myös yhtenevät säännökset koskien EPPO:n toimivaltuuksia kerätä todisteita sekä sitä, miten ne tulisi ottaa huomioon voitaisiin ratkaista yksi suurimmista rajat ylittävien ympäristörikosten tutkimiseen liittyvistä ongelmista. Ongelmia aiheuttavat jäsenvaltioiden lakien välillä olevat erot perusteista, joiden mukaan ulkomailla kerättyjä todisteita suostutaan hyväksymään sekä siitä millaista painoarvoa tällaisille todisteille annetaan. Costanza Di Francescon mukaan säännöksiä voitaisiin myös antaa Euroopan syyttäjiltä edellytettävästä asiantuntijuudesta. Hänen mukaansa tällä tavoin voitaisiin osaltaan edistää ympäristörikosten tutkintaa, jotka jäävät kansallisella tasolla helposti alitutkituksi osittain johtuen puutteellisesta asiantuntijuudesta.

Edellä mainittujen seikkojen ohella Costanza Di Francescon katsoo, että EPPO:n toimivaltaa laajentamalla voitaisiin korjata eri jäsenvaltioiden viranomaisten välisten koordinoinnin puutteista aiheutuvia ongelmia. Jäsenvaltioiden on nimittäin vaikea yksinään havaita ja tutkia rajat ylittäviä ympäristörikoksia. Vaikeuksista huolimatta Costanza Di Francescon mukaan jäsenvaltiot ovat olleet haluttomia käyttämään tällaisten rikosten tutkinnassa muiden EU virastojen, kuten Eurojustin tai Europolin, tarjoamaa apua. Virastojen nimenomaisiin tehtäviin kuuluu avustaa jäsenvaltiota vakavien rajat ylittävien rikosten tutkinnoissa, mutta tämä on ainoastaan mahdollista jäsenvaltioiden apua pyytäessä. Virastot eivät täten voi itse aloittaa rikoksista omaa tutkintaansa tai velvoittaa jäsenvaltioita näin tekemään. EPPO:lla olisi puolestaan jäsenvaltioista riippumattomat valtuudet itse tutkia sen toimivallan alle kuuluvia rikoksia sekä nostaa näistä asianmukaiset syytteet. 

Artikkelin mukaan EPPO:n toimivallan laajentaminen koskemaan vakavia rajat ylittäviä vaikutuksia omaaviin ympäristörikoksiin olisi oikeudellisesti mahdollista. Toimivallan laajentamisen katsottaisiin myös edistävän tällaisten rikosten selvittämistä. Nämä näkökulmat antavat tukea European Law Instituten tammikuussa 2023 julkaistussa raportissa esitetylle ehdotukselle laajentaa EPPO:n toimivaltaa siten, että se voisi tutkia ecocide rikoksia, joiden kriminalisoinnista ehdotetaan myös direktiivin säätämistä. Ottaen huomioon, että ecocide ollaan alun perin ehdotettu lisättäväksi rikokseksi kansainvälisen rikostuomioistuimen Rooman perussääntöön mielenkiintoiseksi muodostuu näiden kahden sääntelymalliehdotuksen vertailu. Vertaillussa keskeiseksi muodostuisi eri mallien välisen tehokkuuden arviointi todellisuudessa estää sekä asettaa rikosvastuuseen tahot, joiden toiminta aiheuttaisi luonnontuhoa. Tämä edellyttää eri mallien ecocide määritelmien, EPPO:n ja ICC:n välisten toimivaltuuksien sekä mallien toteutumisen todennäköisyyksien välistä vertailua. Tällaisen vertailun toteuttaminen tulee olemaan seminaaripaperini keskiössä.

— Murharyhmä

Lähteet:

Costanza Di Francesco, Maesa, Repercussions of the Establishment of the EPPO via Enhanced Cooperation, Eurocrim 2017/03, s. 156–60.

Costanza Di Francesco, Maesa, EPPO and environmental crime: May the EPPO ensure a more effective protection of the environment in the EU, New Journal of European Criminal law 2018/09/02, s. 191-215.

European Law Institute, ELI Report on Ecocide, Model Rules for an EU Directive and a Council Decision, 19.1.2023.

Independent Expert Panel for the Legal Definition of Ecocide, 2021.

Strict interpretation of the wording of the law vs. social pressure to change the law

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, No. 19-1392, 597 U.S. Supreme Court case was decisive in terms of the regulation of abortion in the USA. With the case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no constitutional right to abortion, at the same time overturning two precedents that found the opposite, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (505 U.S. 833). The above-mentioned result meant that, in the future, states will be allowed to define their own abortion laws and the condition for banning abortion is no longer the viability of the fetus.

So what were the arguments the petitioners used to justify their opinion regarding abortion legislation to the Supreme Court, and were they questionable? The petitioner’s arguments were based on the following themes; absence of a constitutional basis, women’s health, alternative means such as adoption and invalidity of the condition of viability.

The petitioners based their arguments mainly on the fact that the right to abortion completely lacks a constitutional basis. It is true that nowhere in the constitution is there an explicit mention of the right to abortion, nor in history or tradition. As a result of that, the petitioners claimed that the precedents Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey should be overturned because their conclusions are unconstitutional. According to the petitioner’s opinion, due to precedents, states are deprived of the opportunity to protect the health of unborn children and women.

In their argumentation, the petitioners went through various problems caused by the fact that the right to abortion has no basis in the constitution. One of the problematic situations that arise is that the court does not have the opportunity to objectively weigh the right to abortion, which is also supported by Id. at 2136 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment). The petitioners also brought up a case from 2021 when the five justices who upheld the court’s June ruling could not agree on what the case Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey meant, and the five justices who agreed on what Casey meant did not reach a consensus on the verdict. The petitioners wanted to highlight how it is impossible for the court to interpret two precedents that contain a far-reaching interpretation of, for example, the protection of privacy, and what it means in practice when it comes to abortion.

The petitioners appealed to the 10th Amendment to the Constitution, which states that powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution or denied to the states by it are reserved to the states or the people respectively. In addition, the 14th Amendment to the Constitution was brought up, according to which no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Thus, in light of the arguments referring to the wording of the Constitution, abortion legislation should be left to the states. I partly understand the opinion of the petitioners, that the precedents Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey are problematic because they state that abortion is a constitutional right and cannot be denied before viability. However, the petitioners appeal to a strict literal interpretation, completely detaching the precedents from the social context. In the precedent case Roe v. Wade, the court has based its decision on the protection of privacy and in accordance with the Due Process clause, the freedom that the court has granted to certain “personal decisions” in which, in my opinion, having an abortion is strongly included. However, the petitioners argued that The Constitution does not protect a general “right of privacy.” It protects aspects of privacy through specific textual prohibitions on government action (e.g., U.S. Const. amend. I, IV) or structural features that limit government power. No textual prohibition or structural feature guarantees a right to abortion. Petitioners also pointed out that none of the Court’s prior cases involving liberties or privacy interests includes, like abortion, “the intentional termination of potential life” (Harris v. Mcrae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980).

The respondents counter-argued that it doesn’t really matter that the word abortion is not found in the Constitution, history or tradition. They appealed to the fact that a woman’s right to freedom of choice and bodily integrity can still be derived from the Constitution. However, is it problematic if the possibility to deviate from the wording of the constitution is given? Does the court’s changing interpretations of the Constitution, which do not fully follow the wording, possibly endanger legal certainty? Or is the pressure to change the legislation to better reflect the rights of today’s women more important than the legal certainty that could be jeopardized with the development of society? I also think that if legal certainty were always prioritized above the urgent need to change the law, our society and for example, women’s rights would not have the opportunity to develop for the better at all.

As a result of the Roe v. Wade, regarding the unborn child, the court considered that it means “the ability to have a significant life outside the mother’s womb”, the so-called viability condition, according to which abortion cannot be prohibited until viability is achieved. According to Roe v. Wade the ability to live outside the womb usually happens between 24 and 28 weeks after conception. The fact that abortion lacks a constitutional basis in the opinion of the petitioners, also supports their demand that the court should remove restrictions on abortion before viability. Viability starts at 15 weeks of pregnancy in the petitioners’ opinion. According to the petitioners, the viability condition also lacks constitutionality and thus it must be rejected as a condition for banning abortion. However, it is problematic to remove the previous viability condition, as it increases the number of cases where a woman does not get a real opportunity to choose whether she wants to continue the pregnancy or not. Many women may not even know they are pregnant at the 15th week of pregnancy.

The brief of petitioners argues against abortion, one of its arguments being the possible harm it causes to the woman. The legislator stated that the state has a legitimate desire to protect women’s health throughout pregnancy. According to them, in the worst case, abortion risks a woman’s physical and mental health, for example by exposing her to various tears, blood clots and depression. When reading the above-mentioned arguments regarding the possible health harms caused by abortion, I can’t help but wonder if the petitioners have at all taken into account the harms to a woman’s health that follow from unwanted pregnancy and from carrying the child until birth? However, if we take into account what the Center for Health Statistics tells us about the 2022 US statistics regarding maternal mortality, 23.8 women died in childbirth per 100,000 live births. For example, in Canada the figure is 7.5 and in Finland 4. While deaths caused by abortion are 0.43 per 100,000 abortions.

The respondents defended the right to abortion and the precedent Roe v. Wade in that an unwanted pregnancy would have harmful effects on the woman’s planned future, for example in terms of career. However, the petitioners objected that today there are numerous women with families who, despite the situation, have reached a high level educationally and financially. From the arguments of the petitioners, a conclusion can be drawn from the so-called “everyone is the smith of his own luck” thinking model. Unwanted pregnancy and having a child, according to the petitioners, does not mean that the fate of the woman for the rest of her life is predetermined. It is true that women with a durable support network and a wealthy starting point may be able to organize their everyday life in such a way that their career or education does not suffer. However, the argument does not take into account all the possible starting points that an unwanted pregnancy scenario can have. For example, single parents or women who lack a support network of loved ones or who are in a lower socio-economic status are left in a different position when the child comes into the world.

In addition to women’s health, the petitioners offered alternative options for abortion if the unwanted pregnancy does occur. The arguments were, for example, how today’s contraceptive methods and their wide availability would prevent unwanted pregnancy. The argument is valid if we think in black and white that all unwanted pregnancies are caused by irresponsible unprotected intercourse. In the argument, it is also assumed that you are aware of the risks of sexual intercourse and that no hormonal contraceptive method prevents pregnancy with 100 percent certainty. In my opinion, it should also be stated that even if both parties knowingly engage in unprotected sex, ultimately the woman bears the consequences of unintended pregnancy. 

I think the above-mentioned arguments only work if we ignore exceptional situations. The argument does not take into account, for example, the fate of women who became pregnant as a result of rape. In addition, the assumption that pregnancy is preventable in all situations by using contraception ignores the variable level of sex education in the US school system and the status of the poor in obtaining paid contraceptive methods and the health care they require.

In addition to advanced birth control methods, adoption was brought up as one option for women who do not wish to have a child themselves. It is true that it is possible to find a child through the adoption system with parents who themselves suffer from, for example, involuntary infertility. However, I think that proposing adoption to a woman who has become pregnant against her will is narrow-minded. It does not remove the mental and physical pain that pregnancy and childbirth cause to the mother. A child’s entry into the adoption system does not protect the child’s rights.

I found it really interesting to get to know the brief of petitioners because I feel that after the Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization case, the mainstream media mostly covered only one side of the case. In the media, the arguments that the petitioners had presented as their justification were not so much brought up. However, in order to understand the legal case in question, it is necessary to know the positions of both sides.

Inevitably, however, when reading the arguments of the petitioners, I got the feeling that they have a rather black-and-white approach to abortion and its conditions, without taking into account the many situations a woman can be in when she gets an unwanted pregnancy. I feel that the arguments of the petitioners would be valid and functional if we lived in an ideal world where women would have access to the necessary financial and emotional support from their close circle. Their arguments shine through with the belief that everyone is in exactly the same position and has the same starting points for bringing a child into the world, ignoring the low-income class and women who have been victims of crime. However, in my opinion, even if a woman has a good starting point for having a child, it does not mean in any situation that her bodily autonomy should be violated by the state by banning abortion.

It is interesting to compare the brief of petitioners to the brief of respondents. I think they reflect really different approaches to the whole abortion issue. The brief of respondents primarily emphasizes the rights and freedom of choice of the woman, the mother, as well as the autonomy of the body. While the brief of petitioners highlights the rights of the unborn child. A good example of a different attitude is how the respondents defend the precedents Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey was guaranteeing equality between men and women by giving women the right to choose. The petitioners, on the other hand, said as a counter-argument to this that banning elective abortions is supported by both women and men, and it protects unborn girls and boys equally, thereby guaranteeing equality between the genders.

The respondent’s point of view takes more into account the social situation and the rights achieved by women in it, while the petitioners would like to stick to the exact wording of the Constitution and deal with it in a vacuum, so to speak, without taking into account the changed society around and the change it requires from the legislation.

E.P.M.J.

Fact based argumentation was not enough in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization

In Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the Supreme Court decided on overruling the Court’s previous cases Casey and Roe. In Roe and Casey it was ruled that a women’s right to abortion is a constitutional right falling under the “liberty” named in the 14th amendment. The petitioners, Mississippi, are asking the Court to overrule Casey and Roe or at least discard the viability line. The respondents, Jackson Women’s Health Organization, firstly argued that the case should be dismissed due to the lack of constitutional foundation. Secondly, the respondents argued that Roe and Casey should not be overruled. The respondents’ argumentation was built mainly on points regarding the fundamental and constitutional right for abortion, arguments on behalf of the viability line and arguments about fundamental need for abortions as well as facts and arguments about women’s health. The case was not dismissed and therefore the respondents’ other main arguments are discussed in this blogtext.

The respondents argued that it is of no meaning that the specific words “abortion” or “pregnancy” do not appear in the text of the Constitution. It was argued that the actual question of the case is whether the general principles grounded in the Constitution apply to the specific case of abortion, and according to the respondents they do. The respondents argued that in Casey the Court explained that ending a pregnancy is a fundamental liberty interest. The constitutional right to abortion was also argumented in the light of history and tradition. History and tradition provide support for the conclusion that Constitutional “liberty” from the 14th amendment includes a person’s right to end a pre-viability pregnancy. 

With all this in mind the respondents argued that the key insight of Casey and Roe is that the decision of having an abortion has deep constitutional roots. This constitutional sense of “liberty” includes a person’s right to bodily integrity and personal autonomy in matters such as family, medical care and faith. The respondents underlined that the right to “physical autonomy” as well as “bodily integrity” has been reinforced as an important component of liberty in numerous other cases as well (Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178–79, 183 (2003); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 & 78 n.14 (2001) (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977)); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).

What was particularly interesting in the case were the arguments raised about the viability line. The viability line means that ending a pregnancy has been a right for women before viability of the fetus. Viability is defined by the Court to be “the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb” (Casey 505 U.S. at 846, 870–71). The respondents firstly argued that the viability line is an essential doctrine in Casey and Roe. The respondents also claimed quite boldly that none of the petitioners’ arguments offer ground for dismissing the viability line. From the respondents’ point of view the State’s argument that viability may move earlier was already properly discussed and rejected in Casey. The respondents claimed that no factual circumstances prove that viability may occur earlier than 23-24 weeks into pregnancy. This fact was also properly identified in Casey.

The respondents stated that Mississippi did not offer an alternative for the viability line. Therefore, if and when Casey and Roe are overturned, there will be no remaining legal framework for the possibility of having an abortion. This might result in a situation where abortions could be prohibited all in all. 

The respondents also raised a point on how well the viability line has been implemented by the courts. Contrary to the opinion of petitioners where it was claimed “hopelessly unworkable”. The respondents argued that the viability line is clear and has in no sense proven to be “unworkable”. Federal courts have applied the viability line with great success, remarkable predictability and uniformity for over five decades. 

An interesting aspect was also the petitioners’ arguments about women’s health. The respondents underlined that the State’s arguments regarding the safety of abortion were false. The respondents were also quick to point out that Mississippi raises no new arguments regarding women’s health that the Court has not seen and addressed previously. Also in Casey the Court declared that it is up to the woman to weigh the risks of a pre-viability abortion and compare such risks with the risks of continuing pregnancy and the risks of childbirth (Casey, 505 U.S, 878). The respondents argue that even though abortion has been proven to be more of a risk to women’s health later the abortion is done, that the State’s own argumentation alone proves that abortions as a whole have become safer for women specifically in the past 25 years. The risk of death from legal abortion during the span of 25 years has declined a total of 85 %. 

The respondents also raise that the only alternative to a safe abortion is to continue pregnancy, which itself presents substantial risks to one’s health. At this moment pregnancy and childbirth is 14 times more likely than abortion to result in the death of a woman. The respondents also underline that childbirth has become more dangerous in the United States during the recent years while legal abortion continues to be safer for women over time. From these statistical facts it is clear in my opinion that pregnancy poses more of a threat to women’s safety, health and life than legal abortion. 

The respondents argued that the State’s arguments regarding that modern contraception and policy changes render abortion unnecessary are not only false but also paternalistic. The respondents note that firstly the State misunderstands the nature of the question on hand. The respondents underline that the issue at hand is whether women are granted the right and ability to decide if and when and how many children to have, and there are no policy changes possible to take that liberty and fundamental right from a person. 

The state claimed that due to modern contraception, abortion is not necessary. Respondents were quick to point out that statistically one in four women has made the decision to end a pregnancy during their lifetime. Therefore, it is not coherent to argue abortion to be unnecessary by any means. The respondents point out that contraception is not universally accessible or affordable in the United States, contrary to what the petitioners claim. Contraception is not universally accessible particularly to young people or people in poverty, and these groups are generally also in need to end a pregnancy for the most pressing reasons. 

Despite the respondents’ extensive and fact-based argumentation on behalf of the constitutional right to abortion Roe and Caseywere overruled by the Supreme Court. The Court justified the majority opinion by claiming the constitution to be neutral in the case and therefore the jurisdiction should belong to States’ in the matter. For these reasons the Court sees that it has no jurisdiction on deciding in abortion.

E.P.M.J.

The issue of abortion for the hands of the people’s elected representatives — majority opinion of the Supreme Court

The Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization concerns a crucial ruling that discusses the constitutionality of the women’s right to abortion. The dispute in this case concerns the legality of the state law of Mississippi that prohibited abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy. When considering the outcome of this case, it is vital to review the majority opinion of the Supreme Court. In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the Court stated that they do not possess the jurisdiction to declare the constitutional right to abortion nor declare the constitutional ban on abortion. Moreover, the Court highlights the importance of not considering the Constitution neither pro-life nor pro-choice. The Constitution should be considered neutral and therefore the issue of abortion should be addressed to the people and their elected representatives. Furthermore, the Court implies that the people should resolve the issue of abortion, just like the other questions of American social and economic policies, which the Constitution does not have authority to address.

The Court takes a view on the previous cases in its decision – overruling Roe v. Wade and Casey v. Planned Parenthood. The Court claims that the Court in Roe did err by taking sides on the issue of the abortion. The Constitution does not grant power to decide on these important moral issues. They base its decision on the particular fact that there is no mention of abortion in the Constitution nor in the Nations’ history, and therefore, Roe and Casey should be overruled.  Moreover, Roe has caused major negative jurisprudential and real-world consequences, and it is necessary to overrule Roe and Casey.

The Court in Roe and Casey stated that women’s right to abortion is considered as a constitutional right as it falls under the liberty in the 14th Amendment. However, the Court argues that abortion cannot be considered under the branch of liberty. As mentioned previously, the Constitution does not recognize abortion, and no constitutional provision, including the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, provides implicit protection for it. This clause has been used to recognize the rights that are not explicitly written in the Constitution, but these rights must have a strong historical tradition or be crucial for the ordered liberty. Until the late 20th century, American law did not acknowledge abortion as a right. At the time when the 14th Amendment was enacted, abortion was illegal in three-quarters of the states at all stages of pregnancy. The right to abortion differs from the other rights recognized as part of the 14th Amendment’s protection of liberty, such as intimate relationships, contraception and marriage. This certainly raises a question – when can the Supreme Court overturn its misguided decision? Or in particular, what sort of erroneous decision can be overturned by the Supreme Court? According to the Court itself, the incorrectness of a precedent does not necessarily mean it should be overruled, but as the Court further explains, Roe has caused negative effects both in legal practice and in theory, including the legal disputes which were addressed in Casey. By taking a stance on a controversial issue that is not specified in the Constitution, the Court in Roe went beyond its constitutional authority, distorted the perception of the court’s role and caused harm to the state’s interest in protecting fetal life.

The opinion raises another question of whether this leads to the weakening of the protection of other rights. Nevertheless, the Court underlines that this ruling concerns the constitutional right to abortion and not any other right. Moreover, the opinion mentioned above does not challenge precedents unrelated to abortion. However, at this present time it is extremely relevant to consider what the outcome of this case will lead to for the rights of women and other minorities. In order to understand the problematic nature of this case, one must compare and examine the arguments between the majority and minority as well as consider the general impact on equality between the states.

E.P.M.J.

The curtailment of women’s rights – minority opinion of the Supreme Court

On June 24, 2022, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization stating that there is no constitutional right to abortion, reasoning that “abortion is not specifically mentioned in the U.S. Constitution”, and “abortion is not rooted in the nation’s history and tradition,” nor is it an “essential component of ordered liberty.” Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan filed a powerful jointly drafted dissenting opinion where they argued that Dobbs’ ruling sees women as “second-class citizens”. They also contested the majority’s originalist interpretation of the Constitution and gave us a glimpse to the future and to the possible consequences of the decision.

To start with, the dissent attacks the majority’s “core legal postulate”, that today in the 21st century we should read the Fourteenth Amendment just as its ratifiers did. Therefore, because the ratifiers didn’t see reproductive rights as part of the Fourteenth Amendments guarantee of liberty, neither should we. Unfortunately, those (men) in the 19th century did not recognize women as equals nor recognized women’s rights at all. The dissenting justices point out that the Constitution is not meant to be interpreted according to “the sentiments of one long-ago generation of men”. The terms “liberty” and “equality”, were written in a universal form, to allow room for evolution in their “scope and meaning.” The dissent states that applications of those open-ended terms can develop whilst remaining “grounded in constitutional principles, constitutional history, and constitutional precedents.” The dreadful outcome of the majority’s originalist interpretation of the Constitution is that it “consigns women to second-class citizenship.”

The dissent also pays attention to the Court’s determination to stay “neutral”. By leaving the decision-making about abortion to the States, the Court does not act “neutrally”. The decision taking away a right to abortion, which women have held for 50 years in the United States, does not make the Court “scrupulously neutral”. The fact is that by removing a woman’s right to choose whether to have a child “does not mean that no choice was being made”. As Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan demonstrate, the right to choose is taken away from women and given to the States. 

How does this all affect women? For half a century Roe and later Casey have protected the liberty and equality of women. For women to be able to participate “fully and equally in the Nation’s political, social, and economic life”, they must have control over their reproductive decisions, as Casey recognized. The majority, however, does not think that forced childbirth has anything to do with a woman’s right to equality and freedom or that a woman’s control of her body has any constitutional significance incorporated to it, as Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan disclosed. The outcome of Dobbs is that the constitutional regime now acknowledges only the State’s interest in protecting prenatal life and erases the woman’s interest. A striking fact the dissenting justices point out in the Court’s ruling is the lack of discussion about possible effects on women and especially on women living in poverty. In States where abortions are illegal, women who cannot afford to travel to another state to obtain an abortion, have a possibility to lose their lives due to unsafe abortions. So, when does the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of life “kick in?” As shown in the Brief for the Howard University School of Law Human and Civil Rights Clinic as Amicus Curiae, a ban on abortions increases maternal mortality by 21 percent, with white women facing a 13 percent increase in maternal mortality while black women face a 33 percent increase. The majority’s answer to this is that “reproductive planning could take virtually immediate account of any sudden restoration of state authority to ban abortions.” However, as the minority’s opinion tells us, sometimes contraceptives fail, not all sexual activity is consensual and sometimes the party at risk of pregnancy can not make the decision about contraceptives. To conclude this, at least one result of the Court’s ruling is certain: “the curtailment of women’s rights, and of their status as free and equal citizens.”

Finally, the dissenting opinion paints a worrying picture about the future. Although the majority states that “nothing it does casts doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion”, the dissenting justices argue that all rights with no history stretching to the mid 19th century are at stake. Settled freedoms involving bodily integrity, familial relationships, and procreation, are all part of the same constitutional structure which protects autonomous decision-making over the most personal decisions. For example, the right to terminate a pregnancy arose straight out of the right to purchase and use contraception. As demonstrated earlier, the dissent tells us that “the majority’s departure from Roe and Casey rests only on whether a woman’s decision to end a pregnancy involves any Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests”. The conclusion was that no liberty interests are present, because woman’s choice wasn’t protected in the 19th century. An interesting point was then brought up; the law also didn’t protect same sex intimacy and marriage, marriage across racial lines or right to use contraceptives nor right not to be sterilized without consent. Following the majority’s legal analysis all decisions protecting those rights were wrong as well. The possibility is that any issues with a moral dimension can be taken out of the Fourteenth Amendment and into state legislatures. Another worrying glimpse of the future comes from Justice Thomas’s concurrence. “In future cases, we should reconsider all of this Court’s substantive due process precedents, including Griswold, Lawrence and Obergefell.” All in all, the significance of the Court’s opinion and which rights it will affect, will rest in the future.

“As of today, young women will come of age with fewer rights than their mothers and grandmothers had.” Those are the words of the dissenting opinion, and they demonstrate a distressing future for the many millions of American women who lost a fundamental constitutional protection due to the majority’s decision. Just to say, according to The New York Times, in January 2023 most abortions are now banned in at least 13 states and in many states the fight over abortion still continues in courtrooms. 

E.P.M.J.

Roe v. Wade

In 1973 one of the landmark cases regarding abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was established. In Roe v. Wade, a pregnant woman brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion laws. A majority of the Court decided that the Texas abortion laws indeed were unconstitutional. The outcome was that a state couldn’t regulate abortion during the first trimester. During the second trimester regulating was possible if regulations were related to the health of the pregnant person and during the third trimester a state could prohibit abortion unless it was necessary to save the life of the pregnant person. In this case, the Court stated that abortion was a part of the constitutional rights of privacy and decision to dividing pregnancy into three trimesters were to balance state’s interest, protecting the potential human life, with privacy rights. 

The legal system in the U.S. builds on a case law system; norms and principles are established in previous cases, precedents. Stare decisis is a doctrine which means that lower courts are bound to follow the Supreme Court precedents but also that the Supreme Court should follow its own precedents. It is however possible to overrule previous precedents if there is a special reason for overruling and the precedent was wrongly decided. The Supreme Court has developed four criteria to consider when overruling a precedent: workability of the standard established, the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interest at stake and how well the precedent was reasoned. 

As you might already know, Roe v. Wade was overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. Opinion of the Court on the Dobbs focuses broadly on why Roe v. Wade should be overruled and considers the criteria mentioned above. In Dobbs case Court’s majority decided that “the Constitution does not confer a right to an abortion” and “the authority to regulate abortion is returned to the people and their elected representatives”. They argue that firstly, Roe v. Wade was “egregiously wrong and on a collision course with the Constitution from the day it was decided”. They also argue that the reasonings were faulty, the rule it imposes is unworkable (focusing more on Planned Parenthood v. Casey), Roe v. Wade has led to the distortion of many important but unrelated legal doctrines and overruling will not upend concrete reliance interest. One of the main arguments on overruling are that the Constitution makes no reference to abortion and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, does not apply because the right to abortion is not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”.

Before Dobbs, Roe v. Wade was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Casey, and it maintained its stare decisis position. Also, in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and June Medical Services, LLC v. Russo the Court didn’t overrule Roe v. Wade and Chief Justice Roberts even emphasized in concurring opinion that stare decisis must be followed. 

I find it intriguing that in Payne v. Tennessee Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion he states that “the majority sends a clear signal that essentially all decisions implementing the personal liberties protected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment are open to reexamination”. He then suggests that there are some “endangered precedents” under a weak stare decisis framework. Roe v. Wade is one of these cases Justice Marshall thinks is a liberal constitutional decision potentially threatened by the new conservative majority. By the time this Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion was written, Roe v. Wade had survived overruling challenges, but this opinion shows that there was a political change in the Court even in that time. 

In Dobbs’s reasonings the Court discussed the criteria for overruling a precedent and in that way ostensibly followed the rules of procedure. Still, was there the ground to overrule a fifty-year-old precedent or should the Court have followed stare decisis? It has been presented that some precedents regarding personal liberties might be endangered if there is a conservative majority in the Court. It seems interesting to me that change in political environment can affect in the Supreme Courts line of decisions in this quantity. Is this kind of jurisdiction just?

Mississippi Too

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey

Introduction

In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the right to have an abortion. The case arose from the provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, in which some of the requirements for abortion included a waiting period, spousal notice and parental consent in case of minors. Casey was a divided judgment, and in the end the plurality opinion that was recognised as the principal opinion was jointly written by three justices.

Stare Decisis

At its core, stare decisis means “to stand by things decided”, so in essence the court is bound by its previous decisions. The respect of precedent was acknowledged by the plurality opinion in Casey as well, as the justices engaged in some discussion regarding Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and how the precedent set in Roe should be followed in Casey.

In their analysis, the authors of the plurality opinion stated that even unpopular and disapproved decisions should be upheld unless the rule of the decision had become unworkable. They found no evidence of that having happened to Roe’s essential holding, instead stating that it had changed women’s lives and had been assimilated into the concept of liberty and personal autonomy in the society. As the rule established in Roe was relied upon by many, there had not been any developments of the law that would have made the rule a remnant of abandoned doctrine, and the facts remained the same, the authors of the plurality opinion saw no reason why stare decisis would not apply in Casey.

They also went on to emphasise that the reason why the stare decisis doctrine was so essential to their legal system as a whole had to do with the predictability and consistency of judicial decision-making. The decisions of the court should not be changed purely because the members of the court had changed. Legitimacy of the court came from the fact that the decisions were grounded in legal principles, not on the personal views of the justices, and as such the decisions could survive the test of time.

Changing and replacing

While the court found that there was no reason to overrule Roe, the plurality opinion still ended up changing and replacing some of the criteria for the right to abortion that was established in Roe. The trimester framework used in Roewas overturned and replaced by a viability analysis, which allowed the states to restrict access to abortion after the fetus could be considered viable but at the same time prohibited the states from placing an undue burden on the women’s access to abortion prior to fetus viability.

Similarly, the plurality opinion overturned Roe’s strict scrutiny test in favour of the undue burden standard. With strict scrutiny, the state must demonstrate that a law infringing on a constitutional right is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, is as narrow as possible and uses the least restrictive means to achieve its purpose. Undue burden standard, as it was applied in Casey, meant that the court had to consider the obstacles to abortion access placed by the law together with the benefits that could come from the burdensome law. As such, the plurality opinion held that the states were not allowed to make laws that would place substantial obstacles to women’s access to abortion prior to fetus viability.

Conclusion

Despite the plurality opinion’s lengthy discussion about the stare decisis doctrine, the court still overturned some parts of Roe. For this reason, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the entire section where the plurality considered the stare decisis doctrine was obiter dicta, “said in passing”, and thus was not part of the binding judgment. No matter whether one considers the plurality opinion’s stare decisis analysis obiter dicta or ratio decidendi, the curious nature of stare decisis in Casey is still clearly visible — while the court claims to be bound by the precedent, the court still does change parts of it.

Mississippi Too