Runyon v. McCrary is a case decided by the Burger Court (1975-1981) in 1976. Although Runyon is certainly not the best-known decision by the Burger Court (compared with, e.g., Roe v. Wade or Regents of the University of California v. Bakke), it is still an important landmark case leading to the prohibition of racially discriminatory policies in American schools.
In this text, I will go through the Runyon case, focusing on its facts, legal issues, and argumentation. I will explore both past and future cases that are somehow similar to the Runyon case. In the latter part of the text, I will compare the Runyon case with a recent court case, 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. I will aim to determine whether it is favorable to analogize Runyon and 303 creative.
Although the Civil Rights Movement took place in the 1960s aiming to secure equal access to African-Americans, there were still American private schools in the 1970s that entirely excluded African-American students. Two of these schools were Fairfax Brewster School and Bobbe’s Nursery School. A black child named Colin Gonzales applied to both schools but was rejected due to the fact that these schools only accepted white children. Another black child, Michael McCrary, was denied admission to Bobbe’s Nursery School for the same reason.
As a result, McCrary and Gonzales’s parents filed a case against Russell and Catherine Runyon, the owners of Bobby’s school, suspecting the denials were due to their children’s race. Gonzales sued Fairfax Brewster School on the same basis. Both the Federal District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of McCrary and Gonzales, stating that the schools’ admission policies were racially discriminatory.
The principal legal issue in Runyon, according to the US Supreme Court, was deciding whether a federal law, 42 U.S.C § 1981, prohibits private schools from excluding qualified children solely because of their race. According to the Court, it is well-established in previous cases (Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., and Johnson v. Railway Express Agency) that § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts. In Jones, the Court held that racial discrimination is prohibited in the sale and rental of property. In Tillman, the Court prohibited the discrimination of black people in a private swimming club, while in Johnson, the Court held that discrimination on the basis of race is illegal in private employment.
These previous cases play a fundamental role in determining whether there is making and enforcement of a private contract in Runyon case. The Court states in Runyon that there is an intention to enter into contractual relationships, and educational services are being advertised and offered to members of the general public. For this reason, the Court argues that the racial exclusion practiced by the two schools in Runyon accounts for a classic violation of § 1981.
What is the connection between Runyon and 303 Creative then? The Court gave a 6-3 decision in 303 Creative where it stated that the graphic designer’s right not to offer her designs to same-sex couples is protected by the First Amendment. The opinion of the Court in 303 Creative does not bring up Runyon. However, Justice Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, where she analogizes 303 creative to Runyon. Justice Kagan and Jackson joined this dissenting opinion.
Sotomayor compares these two cases largely on the right of free association. In Runyon, the Court separates admission policies and teachings. In other words, while the parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to schools that promote racial segregation, the exclusion of racial minorities from these schools is, however, considered unlawful. In 303 Creative, Sotomayor states that the graphic designer is “free to advocate the idea that same-sex marriage betrays God’s laws”. However, refusing to offer websites to same-sex couples constitutes an entirely different situation, Sotomayor argues. In my opinion, this analogy is legally logical, and it is problematic that the majority does not recognize this similarity between the two cases.
To conclude, in Runyon, the Court emphasizes governmental interest in preventing racial discrimination even in private institutions that are not directly under state operation. While Runyon reflects a legal shift towards broader interpretations of anti-discrimination principles, 303 Creative reflects something entirely opposite. 303 Creative reflects the current Court’s tendency to place corporate speech rights above the rights of minorities. This is exemplified by Justice Sotomayor’s concern that 303 Creative may have a symbolic effect of marking gays and lesbians for second-class status.
Team L. M. S. L. A (303 Creative, Case Genetics)