In this post, I discuss the mechanistic approach to historical (causal) explanation. I argue that while the approach has many virtues, it does not capture some important aspects of historiographical explanatory practices. — In the paper “Ephemeral Mechanisms and Historical Explanation” (2010), Stuart Glennan argues that historical events are often products of processes that can […]
All Along the Watchtower. On the Relationship between Philosophy and Futures Studies
In this post, I analyze the relationship between philosophy and futures studies. I do not intend to capture the whole picture. Rather, I reflect on the commitments that my own study of the estimating of possible futures of science makes to the nature of philosophy. In my view, the main distinction is to be made […]
Die with Your Boots on. Theories, Corroboration, and Rational Prediction
”It may be possible to excise all inductive ingredients from science, but if the operation were successful, the patient (science), deprived of all predictive import, would die” (Salmon 1981, 125). In previous posts, I have suggested that we should approach the estimating of possible futures (of science) in a theory-driven way: We need to use […]