”The world is a messy place” – Adrian Currie
In this post, I reflect on the nature of philosophy of historiography. I discuss what I think are significant turns in the practice of the field.
Last week, June 2022, we had a workshop “The Future of Philosophy of Historiography” at Oulu, Finland. During and after the workshop, a leading scholar in the philosophy of historiography was worried about two things:
First, philosophy of historiography, as it was presented, does not engage enough with the autonomy of historiography.
Secondly, the current philosophy of historiography does not discuss enough existing literature, as if it has nothing to offer.
I am not worried about these issues, and I attempt to explain below why.
First, I think it is an open philosophical question whether historiography resembles other fields of science (I include humanities and social science in “science” for the sake of simplicity here). I have explained why the relationship between historiography and science is difficult to answer a couple of years ago (HERE). However, I do think that it is a fruitful strategy to begin from the assumption that historiography closely resembles sciences. There are two reasons for this.
First, the assumption would allow us to apply conceptual tools from philosophy of science to philosophy of historiography. The conceptual tools of philosophy of science are mature and sophisticated and, if it was possible to apply them to historiography, philosophy of historiography would make great progress with relatively small effort.
Secondly, the assumption would allow us to understand the distinctive nature of historiography better and thus contribute to the overall philosophical picture of sciences. With respect to some issues in historiography, the conceptual tools developed in other fields of science probably would not be applicable to historiography. In these cases, we would be able to see to what extent historiography is unique. Moreover, we would need to develop tools that enable us to understand historiography, and these tools might be useful in an overall assessment of science. For example, there have been extremely interesting discussions on the nature of causal narrative explanations that (i) have shown how the family of sciences called “historical sciences” proceed to explain in their own manner, and (ii) have contributed to the philosophical picture of how certain types of explanations (mechanistic, interventionist, and so on) need to be modified when applied to particular sciences. I have discussed causal narratives HERE.
Secondly, I do not think that it is credible to think that all historiography comes in one package. There are several different types of historiographical works and several different types of functions that a single historiographical work may have. For example, some historiographies attempt to build a narrative through several years, some historiographies attempt to reconstruct what it was like to live in a particular context. Moreover, a single narrative may attempt to provide a causal account of how events were connected and, at the same time, describe how the actors experienced the events and the process. Furthermore, a historiographical work may be written with the external goal of providing an analogy for some current issue – or it might be written to remind us that the past was nothing like the present. Given this diversity and pluralism in historiography, we need different types of conceptual tools to make sense of historiographical phenomena. Some of the phenomena may turn out to be similar to phenomena in other fields; some of the phenomena may turn out to be unique to historiography. This means that different philosophical questions about historiography carry different views, assumptions, and conclusions about the relationship between historiography of science.
Now, I might be biased due to my background in philosophy of science, but I do not see any obvious reason why we should choose as philosophically significant only those questions that concern issues that are unique to historiography. For example, I think the question of explanatory narratives is one of the main questions in philosophy of historiography, and it has turned out that those explanations have similarities and connections with explanations in other fields. To provide another example, in the workshop, Adam Bricker discussed the mentalizing processes that support our capacity to infer and reason about the mental states of others. The mentalizing processes are not unique to historiography, but Bricker was able to suggest that the processes are compromised by certain facts about the nature of historiography. Bricked made us understand the nature and limits of historiography better by discussing historiography in a more general frame.
Thirdly, some interesting topics concerning the human predicament suggest that it might be counterproductive to discuss historiography as if it was sui generis. One such topic is the future, which I have discussed many times. In the workshop, I was not alone suggesting that (i) we need to seriously focus on the future, and (ii) this requires that we consider historiographical understanding in wider terms than the philosophy of historiography has done when it has focused narrowly on the discipline of historiography. Zoltán Boldizsár Simon argued that the emergence of technoscientific and anthropocenic challenges forces us to think about the future (and the transition from the past to the future). This predicament requires historical understanding that goes beyond disciplinary philosophies of historiography. The world is in rapid change and this change is produced by an intertwined network of actors. To understand the change, it might be counterproductive to separate different fields of science as if the world was neatly structured along with the disciplinary identities. For example, the idea that historiography is centered around meaningful human action may no longer be fruitful, at least if we do not stretch the scope of historiography beyond what was originally meant by the idea.
In the workshop, Adrian Currie repeatedly made the point that the world and science are messy. I think the discussion above summarizes some consequences that this messiness has for philosophy of historiography and the autonomy of historiography. Historiography is diverse and the question we might ask about it are diverse. It follows that there are diverse philosophies of historiography that make different conclusions about different aspects of historiography.
And I think that it is here where we can find the answer to the question “Why do we not discuss the existing philosophy of history, the classics?”. The canonical philosophy of historiography is not subtle enough. There are wide-ranging debates about issues such as realism vs. antirealism, where, at least it seems so, there are attempts to make deep claims about the nature of whole historiography – or at least what counts as the most significant aspect/result of historiography (such as narrative colligation). If one has some more specific question in mind, for example, does a narrative about WW2 differ from a narrative about the finding of the W boson, the existing literature is not helpful. To repeat, historiography is diverse and so are our philosophical questions concerning it. This diversity requires diverse conceptual tools in order to be philosophically analyzed. Those tools are too rarely found in the classics of philosophy of historiography. The new plurality in philosophy of historiography and the lack of tools corresponding the plurality explain why the classical philosophy of historiography is no longer discussed so much. For example, I am interested in how one can justify singular causal claims that constitute a narrative. I have not been lucky enough to find fruitful suggestions in the existing canon. All I have found are claims such as “The causal sequence, in turn, can consist only in this case of seeing facts as ordered and so related in a particular way — no functional distinction exists between describing that sequence and justifying causal link” (Roth, The Philosophical Structure of Historical Explanation, 73-75, emphasis original). These claims stem from the supposedly unique nature of historiography and, by using the uniqueness as a premise, lead to the conclusion that nothing useful can be said about the construction of causal narratives from the epistemic point of view. I might be completely wrong, but for me the epistemology of causal narratives appears to be an important question with regard to historiography. Who should I discuss in order to study the issue? Philosophy of historiography has been silent, and I have turned to other fields for help.
Finally, the canonical philosophy of historiography resembles rather little the current philosophy of science in its style and content. This, of course, is no argument against the philosophy of historiography. However, philosophy of science is a sophisticated field that is not entirely focused on big questions (such as metaphysical realism) and big arguments. For example, as Ardian Currie pointed out in the workshop, the philosophy of science has no problem in accepting both realism and the fact that we can have different representations of the world – representations that cannot be straightforwardly connected. Science involves idealizations and other representational choices, but this does not mean that it is not related to the world as it is. The world is a messy place, and we can represent it in different ways. Nothing here commits us to big philosophical conclusions such as antirealism. This same patience has not been a virtue of the philosophy of history.
We can draw the final conclusion: The world is a messy place. So is historiography. We should not focus too much on which philosophy of historiography is the best philosophy. We need plurality when we discuss historiography in the same way as we need scientific pluralism when we discuss the world.
Many thanks for this interesting post. Being present at the same event, I am not sure the leading scholar in the philosophy of history meant what you take him to mean. I also don’t think he is a leading scholar.
You might very well be right that it is fruitful to start with the assumption that history-writing resembles the sciences. History is on our side here. The question if and how to distinguish between the sciences has, after all, been foundational for the philosophy of history as a field. Issues raised in the workshop such as the relation between politics and history, narrativity, explanation, and understanding other minds in other periods, too have been extensively discussed. Philosophers of history should not be ignorant of these discussions, right? This what the not-leading scholar meant with the comment that the presenters hardly were debating their views in relation to fellow philosophers/theorists of history: as if they were introducing new topics, and as if the extensive body of literature had nothing to offer them.
You are right that the conceptual tools offered by the philosophy of science might be helpful to the philosopher of history. I do not think the non-leading scholar would disagree. Though he would wonder why the conceptual tools of specifically the philosophy of science would be helpful, rather than, say, the tools offered by political philosophy, philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, or the philosophy of action (or any other branch to one’s liking)? Clearly, if you’re discussing politics and history, narrativity, and understanding other minds, one rather turns to these then to the philosophy of science.
I think the non-leading scholar had a rather simple idea in mind with the autonomy of history, if I remember his words correctly. The discipline of history is concerned with actions and event in socio-political reality. This idea is as old as history-writing itself and it explains why history is an autonomous discipline in the first place. It also explains why history-writing by historians working in history-departments can be distinguished from the way history is professed at other departments, which includes the history of science, the history of philosophy, the history of art, the history of the species, the history of the planet, the history of art, and so on. (Of these other types of history-writing, many too actually belong to history proper in that they are concerned with actions and event in socio-political reality: we all know that good examples of say a history of Galilei or the discovery of hygiene, or ballets at courts, are concerned with their sociopolitical context and implications).
The autonomy of history also explains why self-knowledge is a classical moral value of history-writing: we have history to reflect on ourselves as members of some community. In the course of time, we achieve a better understanding of such issues as (in)justices, (in)equality, freedom, than agents in the past had, precisely because of the reflections on them in the course of time, and the relations between those actions and events we retrospectively trace.
You are right: there are many different motives for writing history. But this leaves untouched that history as a discipline is concerned with actions and events in a sociopolitical order. And these actions and events are approached from a cultural, social, institutional, ecological, post-colonial point of view. You are also right that there are many different philosophical questions to ask, also in connection to the relation between history-writing and other disciplines. I do not think the non-leading scholar would disagree. He certainly would agree that history-writing is diverse and so are the question we might ask as philosophers of history.
You are right: we should not choose as philosophically significant only those questions that concern issues that are unique to history-writing. I do not think the non-leading scholar would disagree. He did conclude to connect to issues on moral philosophy, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. And indeed, that does seem rather obvious given the basic assumption that history as a discipline is concerned with actions and events in a sociopolitical order.
Another basic assumption is that the highest thing an historian can achieve is to write (or tell) a monograph. His/her/their highest goal is not to explain this or that; nor to provide information on this or that; nor to write a textbook account on this or that; and certainly not to tell an anecdote on this or that. In a monograph, the historian tells us how some part of the past is to viewed upon, what it’s historical significance is, and what it tells us about what we are to ourselves as human beings. These are the sort of things that define a monograph as a monograph. Such monograph may include an explanation of this or that, or recounting how some agents experienced this or that, but these sort of things do not define a monograph as a monograph. If you want to know what history-writing is like: read mainstream historical monographs.
The philosophy of history in connection to history as a discipline cannot get rid of these two basic assumption. This is not to say that other questions can be put on the agenda of the philosopher of history. It simply means that talking about history-writing requires acknowledging that history-writing is monographic and basically concerned with actions and events in socio-political reality.
The comment that challenges such as climate change requires us to look beyond disciplinary boundaries is uncontested. I might add that historians have always been very good in appropriating concepts and concerns from other disciplines. But it does not mean that we should give up on the basic assumptions that make up our disciplines. The emphasis on the autonomy of history as a discipline also makes clear that historians look at environment and climate as part of sociopolitical order, and the threat to it. History-writing is always motivated by present concerns. And that is how it should be.
The idea that philosophy of history is not subtle enough is absurd. When the two basic assumptions are taken into account, one no longer can wonder how a narrative about WW2 differs from one on finding the W boson. Narrative as theorized by philosophers of history have always taken the two basic assumptions into account. They are not talking about anecdotes or other small story-like account such as finding the W boson or some mammal that Churchill likes. For an explicit account on the two basic assumptions, consult Hayden White’s “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality”. For singular causal claims and narrative, consult for instance Ricoeur, Time and Narrative. Vol.1 , pp. 182-192. There are many others discussing explanation, including causal explanation. One relevant question is why the question of historical explanation disappeared from the agenda of philosophers of history at the end of the 1970s, after having been extensively discussed for two decades.
Philosophy of history is served by debate.
Chiel van den Akker