I received an insightful response to my previous post from Chiel van den Akker who disagrees on several issues and nicely discusses the shotcomings of my thinking.

Below, I publish the comment (it is already publish in the previous post with a permission) and provide some quick though on it.

“C” refers to Chiel van den Akker, “V” refers to my comment.

C: Many thanks for this interesting post. Being present at the same event, I am not sure the leading scholar in the philosophy of history meant what you take him to mean. I also don’t think he is a leading scholar.

You might very well be right that it is fruitful to start with the assumption that history-writing resembles the sciences. History is on our side here. The question if and how to distinguish between the sciences has, after all, been foundational for the philosophy of history as a field. Issues raised in the workshop such as the relation between politics and history, narrativity, explanation, and understanding other minds in other periods, too have been extensively discussed. Philosophers of history should not be ignorant of these discussions, right? This what the not-leading scholar meant with the comment that the presenters hardly were debating their views in relation to fellow philosophers/theorists of history: as if they were introducing new topics, and as if the extensive body of literature had nothing to offer them.

• V: Surely they have been discussed. However, it does not follow that those discussions are relevant to all questions that are asked (or were asked in the workshop). The value of the existing body of literature can only be decided case-by-case. For example, as I attempt to understand causal explanation in historiography (I currently write Cambridge Element on the issue), the existing body of literature does not answer many questions that are central to causal explanation (mechanisms, contingency, explanatory depth, the choice of questions, the question of law-like regularities, and so on). The body of literature simply has not discussed these issues in sufficient detail, and I have turned to the related fields like philosophy of social sciences and philosophy of historical sciences.
• Moreover, there are debates that are discussed in great detail in philosophy of history but the style of these debates is different than it is in other fields that discuss similar issues. One example is the discussion about realism/antirealism. As I wrote the debate in philosophy of historiography does not resemble the debate in e.g. philosophy of science. This makes the question, should I build on literature in philosophy of history, awkward. Should the existing debate be guided in new directions or should there be a completely new debate? I do not know but I certainly understand why e.g. Currie wished to discuss the issue from another starting point. This is also related to the issue of whom we are writing for (as I mentioned in the roundtable). What is the audience in philosophy of history? My strategical choice has been to write people in other fields. This choice means I need to frame the issues in terms other than the disciplinary philosophy of history. There is justification for the strategy:  I think the philosophy of historiography has a lot to offer, but in order to make contributions to other philosophical fields, it needs to attract scholars from those fields. I think we should reverse the wittgensteinian picture: First abandon the ladder and then climb down with it.

C: You are right that the conceptual tools offered by the philosophy of science might be helpful to the philosopher of history. I do not think the non-leading scholar would disagree. Though he would wonder why the conceptual tools of specifically the philosophy of science would be helpful, rather than, say, the tools offered by political philosophy, philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, or the philosophy of action (or any other branch to one’s liking)? Clearly, if you’re discussing politics and history, narrativity, and understanding other minds, one rather turns to these then to the philosophy of science.

• V: You are completely right here. I must say that my implicit assumption is that “philosophy of historiography” is analogous to “philosophy of biology”, i.e. a philosophical field that studies the practice of historical research. Therefore, I do conjecture that philosophy of science is central inspiration, as it has resources to analyze research practices. Moreover, I do think – with certain reservations – that philosophy of science has already been a field where metaphysics, philosophy of language, political philosophy, and so on have been melted together. Therefore, philosophy of science provides resources to deal with issues relevant to those fields.

C: I think the non-leading scholar had a rather simple idea in mind with the autonomy of history, if I remember his words correctly. The discipline of history is concerned with actions and event in socio-political reality. This idea is as old as history-writing itself and it explains why history is an autonomous discipline in the first place. It also explains why history-writing by historians working in history-departments can be distinguished from the way history is professed at other departments, which includes the history of science, the history of philosophy, the history of art, the history of the species, the history of the planet, the history of art, and so on. (Of these other types of history-writing, many too actually belong to history proper in that they are concerned with actions and event in socio-political reality: we all know that good examples of say a history of Galilei or the discovery of hygiene, or ballets at courts, are concerned with their sociopolitical context and implications).

• V: I honestly do not understand the distinctions. The historians of science that I know (and with whom I have been working for over a decade) due not consider themselves to belong outside historiography proper. Why is not a historiographical work on some scientific instrument “history proper”? Surely, one can define historiography in the way you suggest but there are possible problems: Some people who wish to achieve insights into the nature of historiography through philosophy of historiography may have a wider conception of “historiography”. In that case, philosophy of historiography that focuses on historiography that satisfies the definition does not provide that person with the wanted insights. Moreover, how do we identify works that are “concerned with actions and events in socio-political reality”? Many works outside historiography do this and many historical works – due to their many layers – do other things besides. The latter is the more serious worry. If historical works have many layers and aim to establish many things, we need to have philosophical tools to study the different layers. Tools that enable us to understand the aspect which is focused on “actions and events in socio-political reality” are not sufficient.
• I do not think we can define historiography and what kinds of things historiography can achieve is an open question (although I agree that understanding actions and events in context is the main function of historiography). One of the main issues with older historiography of science that I struggle with is the tendency to define historiography and produce philosophical analyses that capture historiography qua the way in which it was defined.

C: The autonomy of history also explains why self-knowledge is a classical moral value of history-writing: we have history to reflect on ourselves as members of some community. In the course of time, we achieve a better understanding of such issues as (in)justices, (in)equality, freedom, than agents in the past had, precisely because of the reflections on them in the course of time, and the relations between those actions and events we retrospectively trace.

• V: I agree. I have even defended an idea resembling this.

C: You are right: there are many different motives for writing history. But this leaves untouched that history as a discipline is concerned with actions and events in a sociopolitical order. And these actions and events are approached from a cultural, social, institutional, ecological, post-colonial point of view. You are also right that there are many different philosophical questions to ask, also in connection to the relation between history-writing and other disciplines. I do not think the non-leading scholar would disagree. He certainly would agree that history-writing is diverse and so are the question we might ask as philosophers of history.

• V: See above about the definition.

C: You are right: we should not choose as philosophically significant only those questions that concern issues that are unique to history-writing. I do not think the non-leading scholar would disagree. He did conclude to connect to issues on moral philosophy, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. And indeed, that does seem rather obvious given the basic assumption that history as a discipline is concerned with actions and events in a sociopolitical order.

Another basic assumption is that the highest thing an historian can achieve is to write (or tell) a monograph. His/her/their highest goal is not to explain this or that; nor to provide information on this or that; nor to write a textbook account on this or that; and certainly not to tell an anecdote on this or that. In a monograph, the historian tells us how some part of the past is to viewed upon, what it’s historical significance is, and what it tells us about what we are to ourselves as human beings. These are the sort of things that define a monograph as a monograph. Such monograph may include an explanation of this or that, or recounting how some agents experienced this or that, but these sort of things do not define a monograph as a monograph. If you want to know what history-writing is like: read mainstream historical monographs.

• V: I do not find it convincing that there is “an ultimate goal” of historiography. When I did my PhD, I went through countless articles in history of science journals [notice my bias towards historiography of science!] and found them self-sufficient works in historiography. I have read historiographical monographs and monitored historians’ work when writing one. This has strengthened my belief that a historiographical work consists of and is constituted by many levels of work and insight. Kuukkanen’s book in 2015 argued that, in addition to a narrative, a historical work contains an argumentative structure. I would expand this insight to claim that there are layers of narrative, justification, explanation, what-it-felt-like, speculation, rhetoric, translation of the past context meanings to meanings of today’s reader, and so on. A monograph is the best source to find all the layers, but articles and even short commentaries involve them. Historiography has many functions and layers and different types of work relate to different functions and layers.

C: The philosophy of history in connection to history as a discipline cannot get rid of these two basic assumption. This is not to say that other questions can be put on the agenda of the philosopher of history. It simply means that talking about history-writing requires acknowledging that history-writing is monographic and basically concerned with actions and events in socio-political reality.

• V: I think this depends on which aspect of historiography we are interested in and to whom we are writing.

C: The comment that challenges such as climate change requires us to look beyond disciplinary boundaries is uncontested. I might add that historians have always been very good in appropriating concepts and concerns from other disciplines. But it does not mean that we should give up on the basic assumptions that make up our disciplines. The emphasis on the autonomy of history as a discipline also makes clear that historians look at environment and climate as part of sociopolitical order, and the threat to it. History-writing is always motivated by present concerns. And that is how it should be.

• V: I agree and I think historiography should not give up its (plural, see above) disciplinary identity. However, I do think that philosophy of historiography should show historiography in wider perspective precisely because this makes it possible to see the relevance of historiography among other disciplines.
• I completely agree that historiography is motivated by present concerns. This makes it a fruitful source to understand possible futures. However, I do think there are philosophical ideas present in historiography that prevent is from it making the contribution. Hobsbawm once discussed this in “Looking Forward: History and the Future”.

C: The idea that philosophy of history is not subtle enough is absurd. When the two basic assumptions are taken into account, one no longer can wonder how a narrative about WW2 differs from one on finding the W boson. Narrative as theorized by philosophers of history have always taken the two basic assumptions into account. They are not talking about anecdotes or other small story-like account such as finding the W boson or some mammal that Churchill likes. For an explicit account on the two basic assumptions, consult Hayden White’s “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality”. For singular causal claims and narrative, consult for instance Ricoeur, Time and Narrative. Vol.1 , pp. 182-192. There are many others discussing explanation, including causal explanation. One relevant question is why the question of historical explanation disappeared from the agenda of philosophers of history at the end of the 1970s, after having been extensively discussed for two decades.

• V: I think it has been a mistake that narratives or “small story-like accounts” have not been discussed in philosophy of historiography to the greatest detail. For example, it is a serious question how a paper on W boson produces understanding of history and of science. See: (J. Krige, “Distrust and Discovery. The Case of the Heavy Bosons at CERN,” Isis 92:3 (September 2001), 517-540.) Or how Richard Bellon’s (award-winning), “Inspiration in the Harness of Daily Labor: Darwin, Botany, and the Triumph of Evolution,” Isis 102, no. 3, (September 2011): 393-420 produces understanding of moral and epistemic values in the context of Victorian society.
• To discuss narratives such as these, the best philosophical tools I have found come from (historical) life sciences.
• I hope that the debate on historiographical explanation comes acute again in the coming years. One might conjecture that the question of historical explanation disappeared because the inherent conceptual resources of the debate were exhausted and there was no sufficient fertilization from elsewhere. I hinted at this issue in the beginning. I hope the fertilization is about to happen.