1. Introduction “Had Eddington lost his faith in humanity, the (amount of) gravitational deflection would not have been observed”. This statement is about events that did not happen. The antecedent is against the facts – it is counterfactual. The whole statement is a counterfactual conditional that describes how things would have gone, had something gone […]
On Youtube: Philosophy as the Mapping of Conceptual Space. Causal Explanation in History
Scientific Realism, Antirealism, and the Future
Introduction The scientific realism debate is one of the main debates in the philosophy of science. The issue is old, and sometimes it seems difficult even to tell how to distinguish between realism and antirealism. In a relatively new area of debate, there have been attempts to resolve this stalemate by analyzing whether the positions […]
Unpredicatibility of the Future of Science. Against the Received Wisdom
What should we do in science? This is a question about pursuitworthiness of research programs. The question concerns which research programs we should develop further, i.e. which programs are worthy of pursuit. Analyses of pursuitworthiness are motivated by the need for an ability to respond to possible future changes and demands. These changes and demands […]
Time and Possibility
1. Introduction In this post, I discuss how time and temporal scales in the study of the future are intertwined with notions of possibility. I point out that the choice and determination of meaningful temporal scales depend on what is possible and how possibilities can be tracked, and not the other way around. In other […]
Preprint: Frameworks in Historiography. Explanation, Scenarios, and Futures
Here you can find the preprint of the paper, forthcoming in Journal of the Philosophy of History
The Notions of Possibility in Futures Research. One way to think about it
In order to understand futures research, it is necessary to have different notions of possibility at hand. In what follows, I identify different notions of possibility and explain what I mean by them and why I think they deserve to be identified. In other words, I provide one way to understand different notions of possibility. […]
Fixity of the Past. The Past Changes but Events Dont
Later addition: In short, if relation R holds between events E and E* (where E* is later than E), to say that E gains new property at the moment when E* happens is to say that the Earth gains the property of being 384 400 km from the Moon at the location where the Moon is located. […]
Preprint: Pursuitworthiness in the Scheme of Futures
Here you can find my paper that has been accepted for publication in European Journal for Philosophy of Science http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21630/
When Is One Explanation Better than Another in Historiography?
It is often the case that, in historiography, we have two explanations for some outcome, and we wish to know when one is better than the other. We assume here that both explanations are true in the sense that they explain. Consider the following explanations: E1: Eddington observed gravitational deflection in 1919 because Einstein formulated […]