The first workshop of the Improving Ourselves as Moral Agents cluster group was held at the Philosophy unit on February 26th. Kickstarting the workshop, Professor Neil Levy (Oxford/Florey) talked about externalist self-control. He argued that the role of willpower in self-control is exaggerated, and that self-controlled behaviour relies more on structuring one’s environment than it does on sheer force of will.
Oisin Deery (University of Arizona), presenting via Skype, talked about compensating for impaired self-control. He argued that an account of free choices as a natural kind can help explain compensation. Sam Sims (Florida State University) argued that ego depletion can decrease the amount of blame deserved for self-control failures.
Tillmann Vierkant (University of Edinburgh) defended “the crazy view” that judgments and evaluations belong to system 1 thinking, instead of system 2, and that therefore there is no deliberative self-control. Finally, Tom Connor (University of Manchester) described the effects of priming on self-control, arguing that imitation and pretence, both intentional and unintentional, can be used to improve agents’ self-control.
Improving Ourselves as Moral Agents cluster group
In the spring of 2016, the philosophy unit at the University of Turku, Finland, hosts unique opportunities for researchers and postgraduate students in the ethics and science of self-control. Our cluster group, “Improving Ourselves as Moral Agents”, explores both the wider conceptual issues in the research of self-control, and questions concerning self-control implied in the current ethical debate on moral enhancement. In addition to a reading group, a series of three interdisciplinary workshops is organized. For more info, visit turkuselfcontrol.wordpress.com.
